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INTRODUCTION

Commercial banking enterprises are unique among major
American businesses. Unlike their counterparts in industry, which
may transact business throughout the United States, commercial
banking enterprises may not engage in "the business of banking,"
either directly through branch offices or by affiliation with a commonly owned bank, in more than one state. 1 A bank chartered by
and located in state A may not open a branch in state B; likewise, a
bank holding company (BHC) that owns a bank in state A may not
acquire a controlling interest in 2 or receive a charter for a bank in
state B. Of course, a bank or BHC with a bank or banks located in
one state may lawfully deal with residents of another. As a practical
matter, however, without a local branch it will often be at a disadvantage in seeking the business of local residents. Whether the disadvantage is significant depends upon the particular service, since
a bank or BHC can offer some services conveniently by mail or telephone and others through a local office that is not a bank or
branch-that is, one not engaged, as a matter of law, in "the business of banking."
This cursory statement of the regulatory regime for banking
raises a host of questions: What is "the business of banking"? What
is a "bank"? A "branch"? Why does the regulatory regime confine a
1. Commercial banking enterprises include both banks and bank holding
companies. State-chartered mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, and
credit unions are usually similarly restricted, depending upon state laws. Even in the
aggregate, however, these thrift institutions do not approach commercial banking either in size or in importance to the nation's economy: hence, this Article's exclusive
focus on commercial banking. A separate analysis would be required to determine
whether the considerations raised herein with respect to commercial banking apply
with equal force to the thrifts. Within commercial banking, there are some excep-

tional cases of interstate branching and affiliation that were "grandfathered" when
prohibitory legislation was enacted. See text accompanying notes 501-507 infra.
2. "Control" is defined in this context as the ownership, control, or power, direct or indirect, to vote twenty-five percent of any class of shares, elect a majority of
directors, or exercise "a controlling influence over the management or policies of the
bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (1976).
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banking organization's banks and branches to a single state? Most
important, what are the costs and benefits involved? Would an interstate reach for banking organizations-whether nationwide or
regional-be preferable?
This Article considers the appropriate geographical limitations
for enterprises engaged in the business of banking. Each of the
questions raised in the preceding paragraph must be addressed to
some extent in order to conduct the inquiry fully; the last two will
be dealt with extensively. The Article will develop, and then apply, the criteria for determining that one geographical configuration
for the banking industry is "preferable" to another. Accordingly,
after establishing in Part I both the legal and business backgrounds
against which this inquiry proceeds, I shall specify in Part II the
appropriate criteria for analyzing alternative policies respecting
geographical limitations. Part III will examine the extent and
means of interstate banking indicated by the criteria. There I will
take up such issues of means as interstate branching versus
multistate BHCs and acquisitions versus de novo entry, as well as
such issues of extent as full-service branching versus automated
teller machines and the limits to be placed on the geographical
reach of banking organizations. This effort will entail both application of the criteria developed in Part II and analysis of the political
considerations that may constrain the changes possible or desirable
in the geographical structure of the banking industry. Finally, Part
IV will detail the standards and procedures that should be applied
to a bank or BHC application to open an interstate banking facility.
The recommendations developed for interstate market penetration
by banking organizations will be offered subject to familiar
standards respecting bank solvency and community needs and a
preference for the most procompetitive form of entry practically
available in the particular circumstances.
On the basis of the criteria developed here, and inferences
drawn from current experience, I conclude first that out-of-state
BHCs. should be able to acquire existing banks or obtain de novo
charters on the same terms as local banks and BHCs. It will probably be necessary, however, as the political price of geographical
liberallization, to allow states to limit the means of entry by an outof-state BHC. Thus, as a second-best solution, a state would be
able to provide that entry by an out-of-state BHC be accomplished
only by acquiring an existing bank, or only by chartering a de novo
bank, as long as the state applies the same limitation to intrastate
geographical extensions by in-state BHCs.
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Second, a bank located within a metropolitan area including
more than one state should be able to branch throughout that metropolitan area regardless of state boundaries. Third, I will conclude
that banks should be permitted to open "wholesale" branches in
major financial centers to serve commercial customers.
I.

CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

A. The Current Legal Position
1. The Dual Banking System: State and National Banks.-

Express authority, in the form of a charter, is required for entry
into the business of banking. 3 A charter may be granted by a state,
acting through a banking commissioner or a collegial agency, or by
the federal government, acting through the Comptroller of the
Currency. 4 In either case, the resulting state or national bank will
thereafter be supervised primarily by the chartering authority, its
"primary regulator." An existing bank, however, may convert from
one type of charter to the other-from state to national or vice
versa-with the permission of only the regulator to whose regime
it seeks admission. 5 Thereafter, its primary regulator will be the
new, rather than the original, chartering authority.
a. Origins.-Until Congress enacted the National Bank Act in
1863,6 commercial banks had been chartered exclusively by the
states, 7 with the brief exceptions of the congressionally chartered
Bank of North America (1781-1785) and the bitterly controversial
First (1791-1811) and Second (1816-1836) Bank of the United
States. 8 The federal government entered the commercial-bank3. See AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, STATE BANKING LAW SERV. 3
[hereinafter cited as STATE BANKING LAW SERV.].
4. See 12 U.S.C. § 27 (Supp. III 1979).

5.

(rev. ed. 1978)

Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30

STAN. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1977); see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1976); CAL. FIN. CODE 99
2090, 2092 (West 1968); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 137(1) (McKinney 1971).
6. National Bank Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 21- 215(b) (Supp. III 1979).
7. See generally B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1957); Klebaner, State-CharteredAmerican Commercial Banks, 1781-1801, 53 Bus. HIST. REv. 529 (1979).
8. The Bank of North America was chartered by the Continental Congress, but
doubt about this authority led the directors almost immediately to seek additional
charters from the several states in which the bank operated. B. HAMMOND, supra
note 7, at 51. Regarding the banks of the United States, see generally id.; J. HURST,
A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970 passim (1973); P.
STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 60-63,
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chartering field in 1863 in response to problems encountered in
financing the Civil War. Under the National Bank Act, charters

were available only upon purchasing and depositing a substantial
volume of United States bonds, in return for which the bank received national bank notes, a national currency. National banks
were given special privileges, such as serving as depositories of

government funds, while bank notes issued by state banks were
subjected to a two-percent tax. In this way the federal government
intended to drive state banks out of existence, subject all banking
to federal regulation, establish a uniform currency, and support the
market for its debt. 9 When this combination of carrots and sticks

proved inadequate to attract many state banks to national char-

ters, 10 Congress raised the tax on state bank notes to ten per-

cent.'1 The constitutionality of the tax was upheld by the Supreme

Court in 186912 in an opinion by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase

who had promoted the national bank scheme when he was the Secretary of the Treasury, charged with financing the Union government.'13
Although some state banks persisted after the Supreme
103-07 (2d ed. 1963). The controversy over the banks is bracketed by Alexander
Hamilton's TREASURY REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK (1790), reprinted in 5 AMERI-

CAN STATE PAPERS (1832), and President Andrew Jackson's veto message regarding
recharter of the Second Bank of the United States, reprinted in 8 CONG. DEB. app.,
at 73 (1832). The political context leading to the demise of the Second Bank, and
thereby the withdrawal of the national government from bank chartering until the
Civil War, is recounted in R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 56-63 (Vintage ed. 1948).

9. As a contemporary observer noted, "[tihe great argument in favor of the
measure was, that it would support the public credit and create a demand for government bonds." S. NEWCOMB, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF OUR FINANCIAL POLICY
DURING THE SOUTHERN REBELLION 212 (1865). As Bray Hammond has noted, however, the establishment of the national bank system was also part of a more general
plan, devised by several members of Congress in December 1861, for financing the
Civil War through the sale of bonded indebtedness, as well as taxation and the issuance of greenbacks. Hammond, The North's Empty Purse, 1861-1862, 67 AM. HIST.
REV. 1, 8-14 (1961). Earlier that year, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase had
been so frustrated by the reluctance of New York banks to lend the government $150
million in specie that he threatened to "put out paper until it takes $1,000 to buy a
breakfast." A. HART, SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 223 (1899).
10. Only 66 banks, mostly in the Middle West, took out national charters in the
first eight months after passage of the National Bank Act, and their note circulation
was less than $4 million. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, supra note 8, at 154.
11. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 6, 13 Stat. 469, 484. Thus it has been said
that the national bank proposal "was of far less help to the war than the war was of
help to it." Hammond, supra note 9, at 10.
12. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
13. Hammond, supra note 9, at 10-11.
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Court's decision, the great majority converted to national charters.1 4 In 1870, about eighty-five percent of all banks, holding
eighty-eight percent of all bank deposits, were national. 15 The survival and later resurgence of state banks was made possible, however, by the general shift to the use of checking deposits instead of
bank notes as money. 16 Able to circumvent the disability created
by the tax on their notes, many states' bank charters again became
more attractive than national charters since state regulation was
generally less stringent. In fact, the decline in state bank deposits
ceased in 1867; state and national bank deposits were about equal
in 1871; 17 and state banks again outnumbered national banks by
1892.18 There have been no other frontal assaults on state banks
since 1865. Today there are more state than national banks in every state except Pennsylvania,' 9 although national banks hold fiftyfour percent of all commercial bank deposits. 20
b. Regulatory Competition.-Because of the competitive check
on state and federal regulators that the dual system provides-each
is restrained from "excessive" regulation by the ability of banks to
switch charters and therefore regulators-banks have venerated the
dual bank system as their "magna carta." 21 They have fought to
preserve the system's vitality against proposals for federal
preemption of bank regulation2 2 and presumably would be equally
14.

In 1864, there were 467 national and 1,089 state banks. By 1866, the num-

bers were 1,634 and 297 respectively. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, BANKING STUDIES
418, table 2 (1941) [hereinafter cited as BANKING STUDIES].
15. Id.
16. M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWVARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1867-1960, at 19 (1963).

17. Id.
supra note 14, at 418, table 2.
[1978] FDIC ANN. REP. 126-33 table 103, reprinted in CONFERENCE OF
STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE-CHARTERED BANKING 197-98
(1979) [hereinafter cited as CSBS PROFILE].
20. [1979] FDIC ANN. REP. 161-63, table 106.
21. Perceiving that the alternative to dual banking is most probably a single
federal system rather than various state systems, state regulators typically join bankers in their paeans to duality. E.g., Proposed Federal Banking Commission and Federal Deposit and Savings Insurance Board: Hearings on H.R. 729 & H.R. 5874
Before the House Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Insurance, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 329, 330-31 (1963) (statement of Randolph Hughes for Nat'l Ass'n of Supervisors of State Banks).
22. E.g., Federal Bank Commission Act-1976: Hearings on S. 2298 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 186,
188 (1976) (statement of John Chisholm, American Bankers Ass'n); see Consolidation
of Bank Examining and Supervisory Functions: Hearingson H.R. 107 & H.R. 6885
Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House Comm. on
18.

BANKING STUDIES,

19.
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opposed to exclusive state regulation. Indeed, since regulatory
competition is the essence of the dual banking system, I pause

here to examine how and where it operates.
i. Entry.-Banking entry is controlled and limited primarily
for two reasons. 23 The first is consumer, particularly depositor,
bankers are foremost the custodians of
protection, for banks and
"other people's money." 24 The opportunities for fraud and the severe con sequences of mismanagement caution against completely
free entry to a greater extent than obtains in many other entry-

regulated fields. This concern, however, touches only upon the
character, competence, and other qualifications of the individuals

and entities admitted to the industry, and not upon the number or
25
location of banks.
The second reason for controlled entry is limiting competition.2 6 A highly competitive industry is characterized by a rate of
failure and withdrawal unacceptable in banking due to: (1) the dis-

ruption of established consumer and commercial borrowing relationships resulting from a bank's closing; (2) the infectious and self-

fulfilling character of a loss of public confidence in the solvency of
banks; and (3) the financial impact of bank failure on uninsured deBanking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 119, 120-21 (1965) (statement of F.
Shelby Cullom for Nat'l Ass'n of Supervisors of State Banks) [hereinafter cited as
1965 Consolidation Hearings].See generally Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study
in Federalism, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 749, 770 (1966).
23. These are the public policy justifications for entry control. For the view
that such entry regulation is procured by the regulated industry in order to secure
protection from competition, see Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971).
24.

L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT

passim (1914).
25. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1814, 1816 (1976) (Comptroller to certify to FDIC
consideration, inter alia, of the "general character of [the] management" of each
newly chartered national bank); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 24(1) (McKinney 1971) ("character, responsibility and general fitness" of bank organizers must be "such as to command confidence and warrant belief that the business of the proposed corporation
...will be honestly and efficiently conducted in accordance with the intent and purpose of [this section]"); Investigation into Federally Insured Banks: Hearings Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 22 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Investigation into
Federally Insured Banks]. Cf. 47 C.F.R. § 73.24 (1980) (broadcast license applicant
must be "of good character"). On the administration of the character requirement in
the broadcasting context, see Sharp & Lively, Can the Broadcasterin the Black Hat
Ride Again? "Good Character"Requirement for BroadcastLicensees, 32 FED. COM.
L.J. 173 (1980).
26. See, e.g., Smith & Greenspun, Structural Limitations on Bank Competition,
32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 40-44 (1967).
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positors. 27 In order to limit competition, the
number and location
28
of banks in a given area must be controlled.
The unique element in the control of bank entry is competition
among regulators to grant charters. Under the dual banking system,
state and national governments may both charter a bank at a particular location; if one chartering authority will not grant a charter, perhaps the other will.29 While both the state regulator and the national Comptroller must consider whether the community "needs"
will sustain another bank, as well as the related question whether
existing banks can withstand added competition,30 the two char27.

See, e.g., COMISSION ON

MONEY AND

CREDIT, MONEY AND

CREDIT:

THEIR INFLUENCE ON JOBS, PRICES AND GROWTH 157-58 (1961); Greenbaum, Competition and Efficiency in the Banking System-Empirical Research and its Policy
Implications, 75 J. POL. ECON. 461, 476-77 (1967). But see Tussing, The Case for
Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & ECON. 129 (1967).
28. Peltzman, Entry in Commercial Banking, 8 J.L. & ECON. 11, 48 (1965), estimates that in the absence of legal restrictions on entry the number of new banks
formed in the years 1936 through 1962 would have been about twice the number actually authorized (2,272). But see Edwards & Edwards, Measuring the Effectiveness
of Regulation: The Case of Bank Entry Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 445 (1974)
(Peltzman's finding reduced by 25 to 50 percent).
The justifications for limiting entry-depositor protection and the maintenance
of a less-than-fully-competitive market structure in order to control the externalities
associated with unbridled competition-are not uniquely applicable to banking regulation. Indeed, they are the usual justifications for control over entry in the absence
of rate regulation. Thus, for example, state control of admission to a trade or profession may be based on either of the justifications, although it is more often justified
solely as a means of consumer protection from fraud and incompetence. See T.
MORGAN, ECONOICC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 170 (1976) (entry regulation apart
from natural monopolies and the need to allocate inherently limited resources, such
as ratio spectrum, arises where "safety or welfare of individuals depends on conduct
they cannot dictate and information they cannot acquire without excessive expense"). Cf. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1962) (need for occupational licensure generally doubted). Further, entry into broadcasting is regulated
in part on the ground that the rigors of competition will lead to a degredation of
service to the public. See Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir.

1958).
29. See, e.g., Conflict of Federal and State Banking Laws: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 127, 128-30 (1963)
(statement of Joseph H. Bottum III, Assistant Attorney General of South Dakota)
[hereinafter cited as Conflict Hearings]; id. 198-200 (statement of Llewelyn Brown,
Mississippi Comptroller).
30. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has recently revised
its charter policy by "a shift in emphasis from the appraisal of economic and competitive conditions in the community to be served to the appraisal of the organizing
group and its operating plan." OCC Classification and Revision of Charter Policy;
Final Rule and Request for Comments, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,603 (1980). By statute, however, the Comptroller must still, like most state bank commissioners, consider the
"convenience and needs" of the target market. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1976).
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tering authorities may apply these standards differently, with one in-

clined to a more pro-competition, pro-entry view of the market. 31
Indeed, each has an incentive to be the more liberal. If the
state regulator, for example, takes a more restrictive view than the

Comptroller, applicants will seek and may receive national charters. The result will be additional competitors in the market,
notwithstanding the state regulator's preference to the contrary.

Worse from the state's point of view, the new competitors will be
national banks, supervised by the Comptroller. At the same level
of resulting competition, the state regulator might have had additional constituents, justifying a larger staff and budget. 3 2 Thus con-

ditions would exist enabling state regulators to pursue personal or
31. It is clear, for instance, that Comptroller Saxon had a more procompetitive
bias than his predecessors, his successors, and his state counterparts. Thus, the average number of new national banks Comptroller Saxon chartered annually during the
years 1962-1966 increased to 448% of the average for the years 1957-1961. See C.
FIsCHER, AMERICAN BANKING STRUCTURE 212, table 5.3 (1968). It was 427% of the
average chartered by Comptroller Camp during the period 1967-71. See Scott, supra
note 5, at 24, table 1. Meanwhile, the annual average number of banks converting
from state to national charters increased from nine in 1957-1961 to twenty-three in
1962-1966, thereafter decreasing to thirteen in 1967-1971; the annual average number of banks dropping national for state charters increased from four to eight and
then increased again to twenty-two over the three quinquennia. See id. at 26, table 3.
The last set of data suggests that even in states where a state charter was more desirable, some entrants may ultimately have found it easier to obtain one during the
Saxon years by first getting a national bank charter and then converting to state status. In fact, four of the thirteen national banks merged into state banks in 1966 had
been chartered in 1962 or 1963; of those converting in 1965, one of the eight national banks converting to a state charter, and two of the eighteen merged into state
banks, had been chartered in 1963 or 1964. Even one of the mere six national to
state conversions in 1964 had been chartered by Comptroller Saxon, in 1962. Moreover, every one of these eight national banks converting to or merging into state banks
was located in California (4), Texas (2), or Virginia (2), suggesting that these may
have been particularly difficult states in which to obtain state charters at the time.
See generally 55 CAL. SUPERINTENDANT OF BANKS ANN. REP. 12 (1964) (noting decline in number of new state banks chartered and "sharp increase" in number of
new national banks); 56 CAL. SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS ANN. REP. 13 (1965)
(noting continued decline in new state banks chartered and increase in new national
banks chartered).
Comptroller Saxon's procompetitive, free-entry views appear in Miller, An Analysis of Chartering and Conversions, 1960-77, in FDIC TASK FORCE ON STATE AND
FEDERAL REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS, 2 STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 502 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FDIC TASK FORCE];
Saxon, The Promise of Free Enterprise (remarks before symposium on survival of
free enterprise, May 1, 1963), quoted in G. FISCHER, supra, at 218 n.120; and in his
testimony, Investigation into Federally Insured Banks, supra note 25, at 7, 16, 26, 93
(remarks of Comptroller Saxon).
32. See A. DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 16-17 passim (1967); R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 19 (1979).
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state policies respecting such matters as bank reinvestment in

home mortgages, local enterprises, and municipal debt, and in
states that allow branching, the appropriate number and location of
branch offices.
The incentive for both the state regulator and the Comptroller
liberally to charter is offset by their concern with avoiding bank

failures. Generally, a failed bank is no longer merely liquidated,
with the adverse consequences mentioned above. 33 Instead, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which insures the
first $100,000 of most accounts in state and national commercial
banks, 34 induces another local bank or group of banks to purchase
the good assets and branches, and assume the deposit liabilities, of

the failed bank. 35 Nonetheless, the failed bank's primary regulator
is often held accountable by the legislature for the failure, 36 which
still entails some adverse effects: decreased competition; disruption

of banking relationships; loss of some employment; loss to the
failed bank's shareholders; and loss of public confidence in the

banking system. Needless to say, regulators wish to avoid such occasions for legislative inquiry which, in the case of a large failure or
a number of small ones within a short time, can be embarrassing as
37
well as protracted.
33.
34.

See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1976) as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 308, 94

Stat. 147 (1980) (increasing maximum insured deposit to $100,000). As of December
31, 1979, 14,364 of all commercial banks, accounting as of June 30, 1979 for 97% of
all commercial-bank assets, were FDIC insured. [1979] FDIC ANN. REP. 140-41, table 101; 161-63, table 106.
35. In the period 1975-1979, the FDIC arranged purchase and assumption
transactions in 42 of the 52 instances of insured bank failure. [1979] FDIC ANN. REP.
205-06, table 124.
36.

See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.

ADEQUACY OF THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY'S SUPERVISION OF FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK, H.R. REP. No. 1669, at 1, 5-7 (1976) [herein-

after cited as H.R. REP. No. 16691 (failure of Franklin National Bank "brought to a
conclusion half a decade of financial mismanagement and regulatory neglect," id. at
1; OCC disregard of law requiring at least three examinations every two years
"wholly unacceptable," id. at 6); Oversight Hearings into the Effectiveness of Federal Bank Regulation (Franklin National Bank Failure): Hearings Before the Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
37. See, e.g., Failure of the U.S. National Bank of San Diego: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); The Failure of the Citizens State Bank of
Carrizo Springs, Texas, and Related Financial Problems: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Investigation into Federally Insured Banks, supra note 25, pt. 1, at 1 (hearings occa-
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At the point of entry control, then, there are conflicting motivations at work. Entry control was adopted by the legislatures partly

to limit entry, but regulatory competition between the Comptroller
and his or her counterpart at the state level tends to encourage
more permissive administration of entry policy. At the same time,
controlled entry is reinforced by legislative oversight, post hoc,
when there are significant bank failures.

This is not to suggest that many bank failures result from
overly competitive banking markets. In fact, there have been relatively few bank failure in recent decades and most have been
caused by fraud or mismanagement. 38 Studies of entry policy and
concentration ratios in banking markets suggest that both state and

national regulators have limited entry and bank competition,
notwithstanding regulatory competition, to a degree sufficient to
39
avoid failures and ensuing legislative disapprobation.

ii. Examination.-For the same reason-avoiding legislative

sanctions for bank failures-regulators have not made laxity in solvency examination a locus of regulatory competition. Bank exami-

nations are not as detailed as financial audits but are much broader
in scope. 40 Every aspect of a bank's operations relevant to solvency
sioned by failure of ten insured banks in 15 months). See generally Problem Banks:
Hearing before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976).
38. In the period 1960-1974, sixty-seven insured banks failed; only ten failures
(14.9%) were attributed to factors that did not involve turpitude or self-dealing by
the management. G. HILL, WHY 67 INSURED BANKS FAILED-1960 TO 1974 reprinted in MAJORITY STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,

STUDY ON CHARTERING OF NATIONAL BANKS:

1970-1977, at 74-93 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 SENATE STAFF
STUDY].
39. Other regulatory controls, such as minimum capital requirements and asset
examination, also operate to prevent bank failures. Entry control itself therefore cannot be said to account for the failure rate. Rather, the point is that sufficiently
unrestricted entry would almost certainly cause some banks to fail (or at least to
withdraw) due to competition, notwithstanding the existence of these other controls.
The FDIC, however, does not attribute any of the sixty-seven bank failures in the
1960-1974 period to the rigors of competition. See G. HILL, supra note 38, at 74. This
is not surprising, since the average banking market is highly concentrated, having
numbers-equivalents of 4.5 banks in the average Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (SM'SA) and 2.2 in the average rural county. Heggestad & Mingo, The Competitive Condition of U.S. Banking Markets and the Impact of Structural Reform, 32 J.
F NANCE 649, 656 table 2 (1977). The OCC has been criticized for limiting new charters, particularly in concentrated markets, during the 1970s. 1980 SENATE STAFF
STUDY, supra note 38, at 3.
40. Board of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Manual of Examination Procedures
iii (undated looseleaf publication) (examination primarily concerned with appraisal,
audit with verification).
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may be examined, including the quality of management personnel,
security and control systems, liability management procedures, and
asset quality. 4 ' While the adequacy of some examination staff and
procedures has been criticized by legislatures investigating bank
failures,4 2 there is little evidence that a state regulator or a Comptroller has even implicitly held out the prospect of lax examination
43
to make a particular bank charter more attractive.
iii. Powers.--On the other hand, there is evidence of vigorous
competition between the Comptroller and the state regulators
(including even some state legislatures) to make their respective
charters more attractive by interpreting broadly the powers that
such charters generally authorize and administering liberally statutory grants of discretion to regulators to confer special powers upon
banks. 44 Thus, for example, the Comptroller has interpreted the
National Bank Act as permitting national banks to offer travelagency services, 45 establish and operate mutual funds, 4 6 open loan
production offices, 4 7 and so on.4 8 Although each of these interpre41.

See 1980 SENATE STAFF STUDY, supra note 38, at 1; Miller, The Man-

power Cost of Bank Examination, in 2 FDIC TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 417,
420.
42. E.g., Dunne, Shoring Up the Dual System-A Modest Suggestion, 95
BANKING L.J. 403 (1978). On average, federal-agency examiners are more highly regarded by bankers than their state counterparts; both federal and state examiners regard the former as better trained. Elhat, The State and Federal Regulation of Commercial Banks: A Survey of Bankers, Regulators, and Consumer Specialists, in 1
FDIC TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 305, 319-20.
43. The Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the
House Committee on Government Operations claimed to have "evidence that some
of the switching [by state member banks to national charters from 1960 to 1975] was
motivated by a belief that OCC supervision would be less strict than supervision at
the Federal Reserve." H.R. REP. No. 1669, supra note 36, at 7.
44. Indeed, an official of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors once observed that "the real value of [the dual banking] system, with its choice and its
alternative sources of regulatory innovation, lies in bank powers not bank structure."
Guenther, The 1970 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments and State Influence
on Banking Structure, 89 BANKING L.J. 318, 328 (1972).
45. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972) (interpretive ruling invalid).
46. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (authorizing regulation
invalid).
47. Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, No. 78-0811 (D.D.C. Mar.
30, 1979) (interpretive ruling invalid), rev'd on other grounds, 627 F.2d 486 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (laches); Oklahoma ex. rel. State Banking Bd. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., No. 78-0304-E (W.D. Okla. Aug. 28, 1978); 12 C.F.R. § 7.7380 (1981). See
also Wier v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, No. 98-256 (D. Del. 1979) (stipulation of dismissal
in light of Heimann); Letter from Don C. Brown, Deputy Att'y Gen., State of Delaware to author (Sept. 5, 1980) (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review).
48. See First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969) (interpretive ruling
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tations was rejected by the courts, others-most importantly, those
authorizing financially related data processing services 49 and per-

sonal property leasing 5 -have

survived judicial review, though

substantially qualified in breadth by the courts.
Some state regulators have also been expansive in interpreting
the charter-powers provisions of their organic statutes 51 and a majority of state legislatures have assured state banks of competitive
equality with national banks by promulgating statutes authorizing
state banks to exercise all powers possessed by national banks, in
52
addition to their enumerated powers.
Regulatory competition through liberal exercise of discretion is
somewhat harder to assess. Discretionary grants of special powers
involve such matters as applications to open branches, in states
permitting branching, and applications to acquire other banks. Although there is some impressionistic evidence of regulatory competition in these areas, 53 discretionary decisions have not been rigor-

ously studied to determine whether liberalization by one regulator
has led the other to follow suit. 54 This may reflect the methodological problem of establishing a causal relationship between two
authorizing armored car messenger service invalid); Georgia Ass'n of Independent

Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (ruling authorizing insurance business invalid), aff'd, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968); Baker, Watts & Co. v.
Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966) (ruling authorizing underwriting of local government securities invalid), aff'd, 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
49. 12 C.F.R. § 7.3500 (1981); see National Retailers Corp. v. Valley Nat'l Bank,
411 F. Supp. 308 (D. Ariz. 1976) aff'd, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979) (data-processing
services authorized only to extent they are convenient, useful, or otherwise directly
related to the bank's performance of an express power specified in the National Bank
Act; the Comptroller was a defendant in action).
50. 12 C.F.R. § 7.3400 (1981); see M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l
Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977) (leasing authorized only to extent lease transaction constitutes loan secured by leased property).
51. For example, the New York Banking Department allows state banks to offer
financially related data-processing services generally to the same extent as does the
Comptroller for national banks. Interview with Arthur Celdman, Attorney for N.Y.
Banking Dep't (Jan. 5, 1980).
52. At least thirty-four states have such so-called wild card provisions in some
form. STATE BANKING LAW SERV., supra note 3, at 122; see Am. Bankers Ass'n,
Model State Banking Code § 2.103(4) (1950).
53. See Miller, supra note 31, at 2 FDIC TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 511;
Conflict Hearings, supra note 29, at 241, 242-43 (statement of Floyd W. Kramer,
Member, Colorado Banking Bd.).
54. Scott, supra note 5, at 31, cites instances in which state regulators have prevailed upon the Fed to reverse its prior rulings and allow banks to open loan production offices and invest in operations subsidiaries to meet those of the Comptroller in
the wake of major conversions by state member banks to national charters.
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factors in what are inevitably complex situations.5 5 Nonetheless, it
is fairly inferable in principle that a bank regulator with a significantly tighter policy on branch applications or grants of other discretionary powers than his or her counterpart in the other system
would find banks converting their charter status to that of the more
liberal regulator.
The recent attempt of the Marine Midland Bank, chartered by
New York, to be acquired by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HKSB) provides an example. Because HKSB
would become a BHC by reason of the acquisition, Federal Reserve Board (Fed) approval of the acquisition was needed, 56 and
obtained. 57 New York Banking Commissioner Siebert, however, indicated that she would not approve HKSB's acquisition of control
of Marine Midland, 58 whereupon the bank applied to convert to a
national charter. 59 The Comptroller granted the charter;60 the acquisition was consummated; and Marine Midland remains a national bank. Moreover, since the Marine Midland acquisition,
Comptroller Heimann has made a lengthy statement dealing indulgently with foreign acquisitions in general. 61 Thus state banks
throughout the country trying to be acquired by foreign banks may
secure their regulator's approval more readily in the future with
implicit or explicit threats to convert to national status.
There are many ways in which national and state banking statutes and regulatory systems can and do differ, and these differences confer competitive advantages or disadvantages upon constituent banks. An example is the disparate treatment of limits on
loans to any one borrower. 62 This limit is generally expressed as a
55. It would be almost impossible to demonstrate a statistically significant increase that might not also be explained by other factors applicable to all banks
within that state. State-bank branch-application approvals, for instance, lagged after a
similar increase for national banks in the same state.
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (Supp. III 1979).

57. See 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 354 (1979).
58. Wall St. J., June 28, 1979, at 8, col. 2.
59. See 12 U.S.C. § 35 (1976).
60. Opinion of the Comptroller of the Currency on Application of Marine Midland Bank to Convert from a Banking Institution Chartered Under the New York
Banking Law to a National Banking Organization, O.C.C. News Release (Jan. 28,
1980) (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review).
61. Hearings Before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). In
1980, the OCC also issued fourteen staff papers dealing with foreign banks in the
United States. Comptroller of the Currency, Staff Papers 1-14 (1980).
62.

CSBS PROFILE, supra note 19, at 126-29.
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percentage of capital, itself variously defined, and establishes a

maximum loan with respect to any given bank. The maximum may
differ in a particular state depending upon whether the bank holds

a national or state charter. Accordingly, the lending limit and other
statutory differences affecting the choice of charter are de facto

terms of competition between the two banking systems. Taken together, however, they are not as important as a significant disparity

between the national and state regimes in granting general and
special powers to banks.
c. Increasing Regulatory Uniformity.-In recent years, Con-

gress has passed a number of banking laws applicable to both national and state banks.6 3 As a formal matter, the predicate for asserting jurisdiction over state banks has generally 64 been, with few
exceptions, that their deposits are insured by the FDIC. 6 5 In most
states, banks are required by statute (as are national banks), or by

regulatory policy, to insure their deposits with the FDIC. 66 In
three states, however, including such a major banking center as
Texas, deposit insurance is not required;6 7 nevertheless it remains
a business necessity for state-chartered banks to obtain FDIC insurance in order to compete with national banks for deposits.68
63. E.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 303, 94 Stat. 132, 146 [hereinafter cited as 1980 Act] (title III) (authorizing all depository institutions eligible for federal deposit insurance to
offer accounts accessible by negotiable orders of withdrawal). Title IX of the 1980
Act, supra, imposed a moratorium on the federal regulatory approvals required for
foreign acquisitions of all banks "organized under the laws of any State or of the
United States," id. § 901(1), 94 Stat. 192, and title V preempted certain state usury
ceilings applicable to FDIC-insured state banks. Id. § 501, 94 Stat. 161. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 applies to both state and national FDIC-insured
banks, 12 U.S.C. § 2902(2) (Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as CRAJ, as does the
Change in Bank Control Act of 1978. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (Supp. III 1979).
64. For exceptions, wherein federal regulation purports to govern state noninsured banks that are merely eligible for FDIC insurance, see Consumer Checking
Account Equity Act, title III of the 1980 Act, supra note 63, and the Monetary Control Act of 1980, title I of the 1980 Act, supra note 63, which extends reserve requirements to such institutions. The first-cited statute, insofar as it authorizes FDICeligible but noninsured institutions to offer NOW accounts, would not seem to be
effective except where supplemented by state law authorization to such statechartered institutions; there is no basis for inferring an intent to preempt state prohibitory law, that is, with respect to entities lacking federal deposit insurance.
65. See [1979] FDIC ANN. REP., supra note 34, at 140-41, table 101.
66. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 23.710(58)(2) (1970).
67. 12 C.F.R. Part 346, App. A (1980).
68. See CSBS PROFILE, supra note 19, at 151-52 (state requirements for deposit
insurance); [1979] FDIC ANN. REP., supra note 34, at 150, table 103 (all but 5 of
1,427 banks in Texas FDIC insured).
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Since FDIC insurance is a practical necessity, Congress can regulate uniformly by conditioning FDIC insurance upon compliance
with desired norms. While states remain free in theory to impose
even more stringent conditions upon state-chartered banks, they
would do so to their competitive detriment. Thus federal standards
linked to insured status are likely to be a uniform feature of bank
regulation across the two systems.
i. Reserve Requirements.-The most significant extension of
uniform regulation concerns reserve requirements. Since 1914 national banks have had to be, and state banks have been permitted
to become, members of the Federal Reserve System. 69 Member
banks are required to subscribe six percent of capital as a condition
for stock in their regional Federal Reserve Bank. 70 Until 1980 they
alone have been subject to the Fed's requirement that a percentage of deposit liabilities be held in vault cash or in a non-interestbearing account at the Federal Reserve Bank. 7 1 In this way, member banks were an instrument through which the Fed could
exercise monetary policy, for the Fed's adjustment of reserve requirements would affect the amount of member banks' lendable
funds and thus the overall money supply. 72 Nonmember state
banks, in contrast, were required by the states to hold reserves
only for the purpose of meeting liquidity needs. Typically, thereTreafore, they were allowed to meet reserve requirements with
73
interest.
earn
and
marketable
readily
are
which
bills,
sury
The capital subscription and the reserve requirement have
acted as implicit, substantial taxes on Fed member banks. The effect of the taxes was offset, to an extent that varied with the size of
the bank, by the Fed's provision of free services 74 such as check
processing and coin and currency services. Nonetheless, the economic significance of the implicit taxes was so great, in spite of the
69. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 2, 38 Stat. 251.
70. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. §§282, 323 (1976).
71. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 19(b) 38 Stat. 270 (repealed by 1980 Act, supra note 63).
72. When a commercial bank makes a loan, it establishes a demand-deposit account in favor of the borrower, which may draw on its loan by writing checks against
the account. Under a fractional-reserve system, the establishment of such an account
occasions a reserve requirement. Thus the greater the reserves that must be maintained, the more limited a bank's ability to make loans.
73. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.68(1) (West Supp. 1980).
74. See, e.g., Gilbert, Utilization of Federal Reserve Bank Services by Member
Banks: Implicationsfor the Costs and Benefits of Membership, FED. REs. BANK OF ST.
Louis MONTHLY REV., August 1977, at 2.
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offset for Fed services, that many banks withdrew from Fed membership during the 1970s. 75 Since national banks have to be Fed

members, some national banks switched to state charters; some
new and extant state banks were probably deterred from seeking
national charters.
When the Federal Reserve Bank convinced Congress that the
exodus of Fed members was so severe that the Board's ability to
control monetary policy was jeopardized, Congress made the reserve requirements essentially universal by extending them, on a
phased-in schedule, to all FDIC-insured banks 76 (as well as other
depository institutions offering transaction accounts). 77 In addition,
Congress directed the Fed to charge a compensatory price to
members and nonmembers alike for all services.1 8 Consequently,
while member banks are still burdened by the stock-subscription
feature of Fed membership, and the benefits of membership are
now far from clear, most of the previous burden of Fed membership has been extended to nonmembers, removing a disadvantage
long associated with national bank charters.
ii. Branching Authority.-A degree of regulatory uniformity
was achieved regarding the branching powers of state and national
banks when in 1933 federal law incorporated statutory provisions
governing branching. Prior to 1927, national banks were prohibited
from opening branches by the National Bank Act, as interpreted by
the early Comptrollers. 79 Meanwhile, some states had been
authorizing branching with increasing liberality. State-chartered
banks in these states were thus able to follow their customers to
the newly burgeoning suburbs, making themselves convenient to
the public and gaining a competitive advantage over national
banks.80 At the same time, branching policy varied greatly among
75. See, e.g., Gilbert & Peterson, The Impact of Changes in Federal Reserve
Membership on Commercial Bank Performance, 30 J. FINANCE 713 (1975).
76. 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 103, 94 Stat. 133.
77. The extension of NOW account-an interest-bearing savings account against
which check-like negotiable orders of withdrawal may be written-authority to federal savings-and-loan associations and mutual savings banks, see id. § 303, 94 Stat.
146, and the authorization for credit unions to offer "share draft" accounts gave these
institutions the ability to create money by making loans in the form of transaction account balances payable essentially on demand. Id. § 305, 94 Stat. 146. The monetary
control policies that justified a reserve requirement for commercial banks thereafter
applied equally to these other types of depository institutions.
78. 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 107, 94 Stat. 140-41.
79. See R. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION 81-83
(1968); 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1911).
80. See G. CARTINHouR, BRANCH, GROUP AND CHAIN BANKING 281-84, 292-96
(1931); [1924] OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 12.
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the states. At one extreme were the so-called "unit bank" states,
which did not allow branching; at the other extreme were those
permitting statewide branching, subject only to prudential considerations. In between were those authorizing branching subject to
geographical limitations such as home or contiguous county branching, 81 numerical limitations such as opening no more than one or
two new branches per year, 8 2 or anticompetitive limitations such as
protecting a bank from branch competition in its home office com83
munity.
Notwithstanding the National Bank Act, some national banks
managed to take advantage of the branching powers open to their
state competitors. Shortly after its enactment, the Act was
amended to induce more state banks to convert to national charters
by adding a provision allowing state banks with branches to retain
their branches after conversion to national status. 84 Pursuant to the
Consolidation Act of 1918, moreover, a bank with branches retained at its conversion from state to national status could consolidate with another national bank.8 5 Accordingly, in branch-banking
states, national banks could acquire branches by inducing a state
bank with branches to convert to national status and then
consolidating with it. Indeed, the national bank could cause a state
bank to be chartered, to open branches, and then to consolidate
with itself. By 1926 national banks had acquired 121 branches by
this circuitous route.86
In 1927 Congress ameliorated the branching disadvantage
through passage of the McFadden Act,8 7 which authorized national
banks to open a limited number of branches in their home
communities. The inadequacy of this home-community solution

81. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 904(b) (Purdon 1967).
82. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 172, § 11 (West Supp. 1981) (maximum of
one branch office per year outside home county).
83. E.g., N.Y. BANKING LAw § 105(1) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) (bank may
not branch into city of less than 50,000 population where principal office of another

bank is located).
84. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 7, 13 Stat. 484 (proviso).
85. Act of Nov. 7, 1918, ch. 209, 40 Stat. 1043.
86. [1926] OFFICE OF COMTROLLER OF THE CURRENcY ANN. REP. 13-15. The
Comptroller also authorized 298 "additional offices" of national banks between 1922
and 1926. S. SOUTHWORTH,

BRANCH

BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES

154-55

(1928).
87. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228-29. Only one or two
branches could be authorized in towns of 25,000 to 100,000 population, whereas in
larger cities the Comptroller could determine the number of branches to be authorized. Id.
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soon became apparent, however, and in 1932 the Senate passed a
bill authorizing national banks to branch throughout their home
state and interstate within fifty miles of their home office;"8 the
House, however, did not accede. Under the Senate's approach, national banks would have had an advantage in every state that did
not meet the competition by authorizing statewide branching for
state banks. Even in states that did authorize such branching, interstate compacts would be required before state banks could
branch across state lines in parity with national banks.
In 1933 Congress reconsidered the branching issue amidst the
emergency atmosphere created by widespread bank failures and
the President's declaration of a "Bank Holiday."8' 9 The branching
issue was resolved by a compromise enabling national banks to
branch throughout their home state if state banks were authorized
by statute to do so, subject to the same locational restrictions
imposed upon state banks. 90 As the Supreme Court has stated,
whereas "National Banks have been National favorites" 91 with respect to some subjects, in 1933 the Congress adopted a policy of
"competitive equality"9 2 between national and state banks with
respect to branching.
Regulatory competition has resurfaced, however, as the Comptroller has taken a narrow-and thus liberating-view regarding
branch definition. The McFadden Act merely defines a branch as
"'any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office,
or any branch place of business

. . .

at which deposits are received,

or checks paid, or money lent. " 93 The Comptroller has interpreted
this language to exclude from the definition a national bank's "loan
production office" (LPO), at which bank employees solicit loans
and aid customer applications subsequently forwarded to the bank
or a branch for acceptance; 94 automated teller machines (ATMs)
88. S. 4412, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); see S. REP. No. 584, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932).
89: See, e.g., H. BURNS, TnE AMERICAN BANKING COMMUNITY AND NEW DEAL
BANKING REFORMS 1933-35 passim (1974); J. O'CONNOR, THE BANKING CRISIS AND
RECOVERY UNDER THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION

90,

6-27 (1938).

12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1976). The statute provides for branching governed "by

the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on State banks." Id.
91. Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 413 (1873).
92.

First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131-33 (1969).

93.

12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1976).

94.

12 C.F.R. § 7.7380 (1981).
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placed at remote locations, such as supermarkets; 95 and armoredcar services used to move cash between bank and customer.96
The courts have disapproved each of these interpretations in
the interest of competitive equality, 9 7 but uniformity between the

federal definition and state definitions of a branch cannot be
achieved. For example, while ATMs are characterized as branches

of national banks wherever located, they are not considered
branches under some state laws. 98 In these states, a national bank's
ATMs are therefore free of the state's geographical limitations on
branching, but are subject to the other provisions of the National
Bank Act which burden branches: The bank must have a minimum

amount of capital to support each branch and must receive administrative approval prior to its establishment. 9 9 The Comptroller has

taken steps to mitigate these burdens, but they cannot be eliminated. Those steps he has taken, while sensible, are of doubtful
validity. 10 0
2. The Triple Banking System: BHCs.-The ownership of
multiple banks by one or more individuals, known as "chain banking," began in the 1880s. 101 In 1889 New Jersey became the first
state to permit one corporation to purchase the stock of another

without a special legislative act, giving rise to the bank-holdingcompany phenomenon. 10 2 The BHC, which has superseded chain

95. See Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C.
Cir.) (interpretation overruled), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
96. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969) (interpretation overruled).
97. The decision invalidating the LPO interpretation was reversed for laches,
however. Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, No. 78-0811 (D.D.C. Mar.
29, 1979), rev'd, 627 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
98. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-6.5-102 (Supp. 1980); MD. FIN. INST. CODE
ANN. § 5-502(f) (1980).
99. The circuit court in Independent Bankers recognized this inequality and
the impossibility of achieving complete equality between state and national banks in
states that do not characterize as a branch any facility that would be so characterized
under the McFadden Act. 534 F.2d at 949.
100. 41 Fed. Reg. 48,333 -34 (1976) (all of bank's electronic branches in same
city to be supported by single capital requirement; capital requirement may be
shared where electronic branch is to be shared). The Comptroller has also reiterated
the view that a terminal in which a national bank shares use is not a branch of that
bank if it is not owned or rented by that bank. Id. This view is disputed at note 318
infra.
101. G. CARTINHOUR, supra note 80, at 82; M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5 (1977).

102. The phenomenon was originally known as "group banking." C. FISCHER,
supra note 31, at 75 (citing E. DONALDSON, CORPORATE FINANCE 715 (1957)).
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banking, is thus distinguished by corporate rather than individual
ownership of the stock in operating banks.
a. BHCs and Regulation.-The rapid growth of BHCs during
the 1920s has been attributed to a variety of factors. For example,
Fischer explains that, especially in rural areas, "[t]he weakness of
banks made many of them anxious to join a group system, and the
booming stock market made it possible for the holding companies
10 3
to easily obtain the funds necessary to acquire new affiliates."
However plausible this explanation, which posits a booming market
for the shares of BHCs acquiring weak banks, it is more certainly
true, as Fischer has elsewhere acknowledged, that the BHC movement was fueled "largely" by the desire to circumvent branch
banking restrictions. 10 4 Clearly, a BHC with ten unit banks could
substitute, however imperfectly, for a single bank with the nine
branches.
By 1929 there were 287 BHCs and chains in control of 2,103
banks and 1,415 branches in the United States. 10 5 As of that time
the twenty-eight largest BHCs owned 511 banks. 106 By 1980 there
were 329 multibank holding companies, controlling 2,261 banks
and 11,418 branches. 10 7 Of these multibank holding companies,
125 are in unit bank states 08 and many more are in states with
geographically limited branching. 10 9 In both cases the BHC serves
as a substitute for branching.
The BHC could also be used to acquire banks in more than
one state, providing local law did not prohibit the practice. By
1929 there were several multistate BHCs: One owned banks in
eight states; another "comprised two extensive branch systems in
California, one of 287 and one of 160 branch offices, and one
branch system of 34 branches located in New York City." 110
In addition to circumventing restrictions on branch banking,
BHCs could be used to aggregate within one enterprise the powers
of both state and national banks. Indeed, prior to the extension of
the Fed reserve requirements to nonmember banks, some BHCs
103. G. FISCHER, supra note 31, at 95.
104. G. FISCHER, BANK HOLDING CoMPANIEs 25 (1961).
105. Id. at 30-32.

106. Id.
107. Letter from Stephen A. Rhoades, Senior Economist, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System to Professor Anthony Oettinger, Harvard University
(Dec. 3, 1980).
108.

Id.

109. Id.
110.

Branch, Chain, and Group Banking, 16 Fed. Res. Bull. 144, 148-49 (1930).
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adjusted their portfolio of bank charters with aggregation in mind.
For example, a BHC might maintain one national bank, with all of
the other banks in the group holding state charters.' The national
bank would have to be a member of the Fed, subject to its reserve
requirements. At the same time, however, the national bank could
act as the correspondent bank for the other commonly owned state
banks. As such, it would access the Fed's services, principally
check collection, on behalf of all banks in the group. The same access could be gained by a BHC retaining all state charters and
making one of the banks a Fed member; however, making it a national bank had the added advantage, at no added cost, of obtaining for the BHC any powers that a national but not a state bank
in the particular state might be able to exercise.
Prior to 1956 there was little federal regulation of BHCs. The
Banking Act of 1933 affected only those companies controlling a
majority of the shares of a Fed member bank and wishing to vote
their shares to elect the subsidiary bank's directors. Substantively,
the Act did little more than limit intracorporate transactions: Banks
were prohibited from lending more than ten percent of their capital and surplus to any one affiliate and more than twenty percent to
all affiliates combined112

The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 established the first
comprehensive federal regulation of BHCs, but applied only to
multibank holding companies, of which there were fewer than
50.113 The Act made the Fed the principal regulator of BHCs, with
power to examine both BHCs and their banking and nonbanking
subsidiaries.1 i 4 Fed approval was required before an organization
in control of one bank could acquire more than five percent of the
i5
stock or substantially all the assets of another bank."
The Fed was to approve BHC bank acquisitions on the basis of
111. For example, the Citizens & Southern Holding Company maintained two
national banks and five state banks. See United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l
Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 92 (1975).
112. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162.
113. As of December 31, 1954, the Fed reported being aware of 46 multibank
BHCs. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1955, H. Rep. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6, table 1 (1955); Hearings on H.R. 2674 Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1955). GOLEMBE ASSOCIATES, INC., A STUDY
OF INTERSTATE BANKING BY BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 33 (1979) [hereinafter cited

as GOLEMBE (1979)] reports that the Fed listed 47 multibank BHCs in a report dated
December 31, 1956.
114. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1976).
115. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3)-(4) (1976).
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rather vague standards, 1 16 but the background from which the Act
emerged indicates that Congress was principally concerned with
the potentially anticompetitive aspects of the BHC movement: (1)
concentration in the banking industry; and (2) tie-ins "requiring the
bank's customers [presumably borrowers] to make use of [affiliated]
nonbanking enterprises as a condition to doing business with the

bank."' " The Act required multibank BHCs to divest themselves
of their nonbanking businesses, except for:
shares of any company all the activities of which are of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature and which the Board . . .has

determined to be so closely related to the business of banking or
of managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto and as to make it unnecessary for the prohibitions of this
section to apply in order to carry out the purposes of this Act." 19
It does not appear, however, that significant divestitures were required by the 1956 Act, since almost all multibank BHCs had confined their nonbanking activities to other financial businesses and
0
insurance.12
Pursuant to a floor amendment offered by Senator Douglas,
section 3(d) of the 1956 Act also prohibited BHCs from acquiring

interests in additional banks outside the states in which their subsidiary banks had the largest total deposits as of 1956 "unless the
acquisition of such shares or assets of a State bank by an out-ofState bank holding company is specifically authorized by the stat-

ute laws of the state in which such bank is located, by language to
that effect and not merely by implication."' 121 Senator Douglas pre116. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976) as amended by 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 713,
94 Stat. 190, incorporates the substance of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and
section 7 of the Clayton Act, subjects the last-mentioned standard to a "convenience
and needs" defense, and directs the Board in every case to "take into consideration
the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the company or
companies and the banks concerned, and the convenience and needs of the community to be served."
117. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1956).
118. Id. at 5.
119. Bank Holding Co. Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(8), 70 Stat. 135 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976)).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 113, at 10, table 3. The principal exception appears to have been Transamerica Corporation. See id. at 4; [1954] TRANSAMERICA CORP. ANN. REP. TO STOCKROLDERS, reprinted in Control and Regulation
of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 2674 Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 289, 293-94 (1955).
121. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1976) to be recodified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1) pursuant to 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 712(b), 94 Stat. 189. As originally enacted, the 1956
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sented his amendment, which "grandfathered" the nineteen
multistate BHCs then in existence. 122 He believed the protection
to be "a logical continuation of the principles of the McFadden
Act, which tried to prevent the Federal power from being used to
permit national banks to expand across State lines in a way contrary to State policy and, of course, under the McFadden Act,
even to expand within a State.' 123 The Act also reserved to the
states, rather cryptically, "such powers and jurisdiction which (they
now have] or may hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof." 124 Several25states do regulate BHCs or prohibit multibank BHCs altogether.1
The 1956 Act, when it was passed, did not cover the majority
of BHCs, since it did not reach the 117 one-bank holding
companies then in existence. 126 By 1970, however, there were
1,352 one-bank holding companies, including parent companies for
virtually every major bank in the country. 127 The one-bank holding
company cannot, of course, circumvent branch-banking restrictions
as can the multibank holding company; nor does it permit the combination of state and national bank powers. Nonetheless, it is true
that the major attraction of the one-bank BHC was circumvention
of the bank regulatory regime.
First, the BHC could issue securities and commercial paper
free of the regulation establishing maximum interest rates payable
on deposits and of the necessity to hold reserves against such
Act's ban on interstate acquisitions was interpreted to create an exception "when the

assets of a bank are acquired by a bank which is a subsidiary of a holding company."
South Dakota v. National Bank of South Dakota, 219 F. Supp. 842, 853 (D.S.D.

1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965). Accordingly, the Fed recommended that the statute be amended to eliminate the exception.
Report Under the Bank Holding Co. Act, 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 776, 787 (1958), reprinted in Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1958
Comm. Print). The statute was in fact amended to this end in 1966. Act of July 1,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 7(d), 80 Stat. 265, 268.
122. GOLEMBE (1979), supra note 113, at 33.
123. 102 CONG. REC. 6860 (1956).
124. 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1976); see Report Under the Bank Holding Company
Act, supra note 121, at 780 (requesting clarification).
125. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16V2, § 73 (1972) (multibank holding companies
prohibited). N.Y. BANING LAW § 1 (McKinney 1971) (comprehensive regulation).
126. Savage, A History of the Bank Holding Company Movement, 1900-78, reprinted in STAFF OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978, at 21, 56 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BHC COMPENDIUM].
127. One-Bank Holding Companies Before the 1970 Amendments, 58 Fed. Res.
Bull. 999 (1972).
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funds. 128 Second, the one-bank BHC could diversify into businesses that would be permissible neither to banks under the powers provisions of their charters nor to multibank BHCs under the
1956 Act. Third, the BHC could diversify geographically, and open
offices across state lines, as long as it was not thereby engaging in
the unchartered business of banking within the states that it entered (host states).
The 1970 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act
finally brought one-bank holding companies under the supervision
of the FRB, primarily to regulate their diversification into
nonbanking activities. 129 First, diversification had long been
viewed as a potential threat to bank solvency because the
nonbanking activities entered by the bank or BHC would almost
certainly be in a higher risk/return category than banking.1 30 Congress and the bank regulatory agencies were concerned that entry
into riskier, or possibly speculative, activities would impair confidence in the solvency of the bank. It was feared that the failure of
a nonbanking subsidiary would cause a confused public, unaware
that the bank is a separate corporate entity, to precipitate a "run"
on the bank and thus bring about its insolvency.131
Second, diversification by banks into nonbanking activities had
long been viewed as a threat to competition in those areas. The
concern was that the BHC would cause its subsidiary bank(s) to finance its nonbanking affiliates and deny credit to nonbanking firms
with which the BHC competed. 132 Related concerns had led Congress to sever commercial banking from investment banking in
1933.1"3 Indeed, national and Fed member banks were then prohibited, with minor exceptions, from owning "any shares of stock of
128. The reserve requirements of Regulation D have been extended, pursuant
to the 1980 Act, to apply to "any liability of a depository institution's affiliate that is
not a depository institution, on any promisory note [etc.] with a maturity of less than
4 years, to the extent that the proceeds are used to supply or to maintain the availability of funds (other than capital) to the depository institution, except any such obligation that, had it been issued directly by the depository institution, would not constitute a deposit." 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1) (1980).
129. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors, 606 F.2d 1004, 1018 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 101, at 14-18; H.R. REP. No. 387, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1969); S.REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1970) (Conf.
Rep.).
130. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955); H.R. REP. No.
150, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) (investments in securities).
131. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631 (1971).
132. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
133. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1976).
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any corporation" 134 and it was thought at the time that the limitation would prevent them from controlling nonbanking enterprises.
In addition, if the BHC's nonbanking activities were unregulated,
as they usually would be, they might provide new opportunities to
avoid legal constraints-for example, by transfer pricing. 135
b. Diversification Under the 1970 Amendments.-Ironically
perhaps, the 1970 Amendments greatly enhanced a BHC's ability
to engage in nonbanking activities at the same time that the
Amendments extended control over nonbanking activities to onebank holding companies. 13 6 As amended, section 4(c)(8) exempts
from the general prohibition "any company the activities of which
the Board . . . has determined (by order or regulation) to be so
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be
a proper incident thereto." The same section provides that in making such a determination the Board is to consider
whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company can
reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such
as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue
concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, con137
flicts of interest, or unsound banking practices.
The FRB has issued Regulation Y, which lists the activities it
considers closely related to banking. 138 Any BHC may engage in

134. Id. § 24, para. 7 (1976); see id. § 335.
135. Transfer pricing occurs when sales between commonly controlled enterpri~es are priced so that profits are realized at their most advantageous locus (e.g., for
tax reasons).
136. Under the 1956 Act, BHCs could own "any company all of the activities of
which are of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature and which the Board ... has
determined to be so closely related to the business of banking... as to be a proper
incident thereto . . ." Bank Holding Co. Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(8), 70 Stat. 135
(emphasis added) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976)). The tortuous legislative history by which this provision was amended is related in Investment Co.
Inst v. Board of Governors, 606 F.2d 1004, 1018-20 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court there
reasoned convincingly that "deletion of the qualifier 'the business of' significantly
liberalized [the Act but] was designed only to permit bank holding companies and
their non-bank subsidiaries to enter markets not served by their bank subsidiaries.
Nowbere was it suggested that the amendment was intended to broaden the lines of
business permitted to bank holding companies." Id. at 1020 (emphasis in original).
137. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976).
138. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1980). Nonbank activities permitted to BHCs by regulation include: making extensions of credit (such as those by mortgage, finance, credit
card, and factoring companies); operating as an industrial bank, Morris Plan bank, or
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any of the listed activities and in necessary incidental activities.
The Board has also established abbreviated procedures for a BHC
that proposes to engage de novo in any of the listed activities,
since such entry, unlike acquisition of a going concern, is considered presumptively procompetitive. 139 The Board also considers
140
applications to engage in unlisted activities of a financial nature.
As will be more fully detailed, 141 some BHCs have aggressively exploited the nonbanking opportunities open to them and
have become nationwide or worldwide diversified financial-service
organizations, though limited by their inability to have affiliates engaged in the securities business. At the same time, it should be
noted that the businesses opened to BHC entry are not only
"closely related to banking," they are almost all elements of banking, at least as it is defined in practice under the National Bank
Act: "Except for underwriting of credit life insurance and operating
an industrial bank, all of the approved activities [are] essentially
permissible for national banks;"' 42 and of those that the Board has
denied to BHCs, none is permissible for a national bank. 143 Inindustrial-loan company; servicing loans and other extensions of credit; performing
trust-company functions; acting as an investment or financial advisor; performing
full-payment leasing of personal and real property; making equity and debt investments in community-welfare projects; providing bookkeeping or data-processing
services; acting as an insurance agent or broker, primarily in connection with credit
extensions; underwriting credit, life, accident, and health insurance; providing courier services; and providing management consulting services. Id.
139. Id. § 225.4(b).
140. Id. § 225.4(a). Nonbanking activities permitted to BHCs by order include:
issuing and selling traveller's checks; buying and selling gold and silver bullion and
service coin; issuing money orders and general-purpose variable denominationpayment instruments; acting as a futures-commission merchant to cover gold and
silver bullion and coins; and underwriting certain federal, state, and municipal securities. See Glassman & Eisenbeis, Bank Holding Companies and Concentration of
Banking and FinancialResources, reprinted in BHC COMPENDIUM, supra note 126,
at 209, 230.
141. See text accompanying notes 200-398 infra.
142. Glassman & Eisenbeis, supra note 140, at 229. This source mistakenly
suggests, however, that national banks are authorized to engage in real estate brokerage and operate travel agencies. With respect to the latter activity, see note 45 supra
and accompanying text.
143. .Activities denied to BHCs include: insurance-premium funding (combined
sales of mutual funds and insurance); underwriting life insurance not related to
credit extension; real estate brokerage; land development; real estate syndication;
general management consulting; property management; computer-output microfilm
services; underwriting mortgage-guaranty insurance; and operating a savings-andloan association. 12 C.F.R. § 225.126 (1980).
The Board has, however, allowed BHCs to acquire a savings-and-loan association in Rhode Island, and "guaranty savings banks" in New Hampshire, where state
law made the operation of such institutions more like that of a commercial bank. See
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deed, some of the activities opened to BHCs are expressly limited
to financially related services or to servicing banks. 144
To be sure, other BHC activities have been given a somewhat
broader scope or have been defined to allow riskier transactions
under the FRB's regulations than under the Comptroller's so that a
BHC can do more than a national bank in some instances. In providing data processing services, for example, a national bank may
"collect, transcribe, process, analyze, and store . . . banking, financial, or related economic data. In addition [it may] market a byproduct (e.g., program, output, etc.) of an above-described data
processing activity."' 145 A BHC, however, not only may process
data and sell the by-products of programs, but also may furnish
"any data processing service upon request of a customer if such
data processing service is not otherwise reasonably available in the
relevant market area." 146 With minimal interpretation, the scope of
the data processing business open to BHCs can far exceed that
47
permitted to national banks. 1

On the other hand, the full-payout leasing business appears
somewhat more accessible to a national bank than to a BHC. The
Comptroller permits a national bank to enter into leases from
which it can reasonably expect to realize the return of its cost in
acquiring the property for lease plus the cost of financing from (1)
lease payments, (2) estimated tax benefits, and (3) the estimated
(unguaranteed) residual value of the property at the expiration of
the initial lease term. The last factor is subject to a maximum of
twenty-five percent of the original cost of the property. 148 Under
Profile Bankshares, Inc., 40 Fed. Reg. 52,318 (1975); Old Colony Co-op Bank, 58
Fed. Res. Bull. 417 (1972). See also Notice Requesting Comment on the Acquisition
of Thrift Institutions by Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,067
(Mar. 16, 1981).
144. Data-processing, courier, and management-consulting services are so limited. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.4(a)(8), (11), (12) (1980).
145. Id. § 7.3500(a) (1981).
146. Id. § 225.123(e) (1980). But cf. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (nonfinancially related courier services not "incidental" to activities closely related to banking, and thus not permissible even if
unsolicited and otherwise unavailable). The Comptroller has requested comment on
whether the various differences between the regulation governing data-processing
services of national banks and the Fed's regulation of such services offered by BHCs
should be eliminated. 45 Fed. Reg. 40,613 -14 (June 16, 1980), reprinted in [1980]
FED. BANIaNG L. REP. (CCH) 60,858.
147. See text accompanying notes 369-374 infra. See generally Note, National
Banks, Bank Holding Companies and Data Processing Services, 14 GA. L. REV. 576
(1980) (BHC data processing authority appropriately broader).
148. 12 C.F.R. § 7.3400(b)(2) (1981). The bank may rely on the residual value
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parallel regulations of the FRB, however, BHCs are limited in the
(unguaranteed) residual-value risk they can assume to twenty percent of original cost. 149 National banks can thus make some riskier

leases than can BHCs and can offer lower rental payments on
others-by taking more residual-value risk-in order to compete
away some leases otherwise available to BHCs.
The point here is twofold: The BHC cannot invariably, or
even frequently, offer services of a type that a national bank, or
depending upon applicable state law, a state bank, cannot offer.
Yet the BHC can offer its services to an extent that a bank cannot.
The advantage of extent arises in two distinct forms. First, it can
operate through nonbank offices without geographical limitation.
Second, the BHC may be able to commit more of its total
assets-banking and nonbanking-to relatively high-risk investments and products than could a bank with the same total assets.
The reason for the latter advantage is to be found in soundness
regulation: Segregating higher risk assets, such as consumer finance, factoring, and equipment-leasing portfolios, in the nonbank
parent or in nonbank subsidiaries, means these assets can be financed by nondeposit liabilities, such as commercial paper and
longer term debt, of the holding company. Since the bank's solvency is not directly implicated, the bank examiners and regulators
will allow a BHG, in pursuit of a higher return on its assets, to
maintain a higher level of overall risk than they would find prudent
for a bank. Alternatively, the BHC may wish to assume some
higher risks in order to diversify its portfolio of risks, thereby actually lowering its overall risk level. 150 This advantage is often
claimed by BHCs in applications to acquire consumer-finance
companies, the loans of which bear a higher risk and rate of return
than bank loans, 151 but the earnings of which are said to be
of the property to a greater extent if the excess is guaranteed by a manufacturer, lessee, or third party with adequate resources.
149. Id. § 225.4(a)(6)(i)(d) (1980). With respect to a lease of seven years or less,
up to sixty percent of the acquisition cost of the property may be recovered from residual value if the bank receives an unconditional guarantee thereof. Until 1974
BHCs could assume only 10% unguaranteed residual risk. 39 Fed. Reg. 11,254
(1974).
150. See generally W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS
(1970); Chase & Mingo, The Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, 30 J. FINANCE
281, 284 (1975).
151. Rose & Fraser, Bank Holding Company Diversification Into Mortgage
Banking and Finance Companies, 91 BANKING L.J. 976, 986-87 (1974); see United
States v. Household Fin. Corp., 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

32

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking
1981]

INTERSTATE BANKING

countercyclical to bank earnings.1 5 2 Even where overall risk will be
lowered by the inclusion of some higher risk assets in the portfolio,
however, bank examiners would surely prefer to see them carried
in a nonbank subsidiary of the BHC.
Changes in the risk-bearing characteristics of banking enterprises owing to the availability of the BHC device necessarily remain indeterminate; moreover, the effects probably vary from one
BHC to another. 153 Some BHCs have a lower, and others a higher,
level of riskiness than their banks would have if the BHC device
were prohibited. Ultimately, the most significant effect of the BHC
movement has been the ability it gives banks, through nonbank
subsidiaries of the BHC, to circumvent regulation. In this sphere,
circumvention of the state-by-state limits on banking has been the
most important development. Perhaps it was this development that
one observer foresaw when, commenting on the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, he predicted that "the prospect of new bank
holding companies may foreshadow the end of the dual banking
system in the United States and the advent of a new triple banking
54
system."1
3. The State-by-State Banking System.-The legal foundation
of the state-by-state banking system is the ability of each state to
exclude persons-both banks chartered by other states as well as
nonbanks-from the business of banking within its borders. Only
because of the supremacy of federal law are states unable to exclude banks chartered by the national government.' 55 Until the
1920s some states allowed banks chartered by other states to
branch into their territory.' 56 Today, however, no state permits the
152. E.g., Johnson, The Rationale for Acquisition of Finance Companies by

Bank Holding Companies, 42 BANKING L.J. 304, 309 (1975) (dubitante).
153. See Meinster & Johnson, Bank Holding Company Diversification at the
Risk of Capital Impairment, 10 BELL J. ECON. 683 (1979) (both BHCs studied had
effectively diversified). Regarding geographical risk diversification through nonbank
subsidiaries see text accompanying notes 206-217 infra.
154.

M.A. ScHAPIRo & Co., THE TBIPLE BANKING SYSTEM 1 (1956).

155. Van Reed v. People's Nat'l Bank, 198 U.S. 554, 557 (1905):
National banks are quasi-public institutions, and for the purpose for which
they are instituted are national in their character, and, within constitutional
limits, are subject to the control of Congress and are not to be interfered
with by state legislative or judicial action, except so far as the lawmaking
power of the Government may permit.
Accord, Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229 (1903). See also McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
156. See, e.g., 1920 Ore. Laws § 6212. When the McFadden Act was passed in
1927, two national banks with interstate branches were grandfathered, G. FISCHER,
supra note 31, at 64 n.163.
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banks of a sister state to branch in, 157 although some states allow
foreign banks to open branches provided that the foreign country
offers reciprocal treatment. 158
a. The Role of Federal Law.-While the state-by-state banking system originates in state law, it has become embedded in federal law. If state A were to invite banks located in state B to
branch into its territory, the invitees would have to comply not
only with state B's law but also with federal law before they could
accept state A's invitation. A bank chartered by state B would have
to obtain approval for extraterritorial branching from its primary
regulator, state B, and from its federal regulator, the FRB if it is a
member bank159 or the FDIC if it is an insured nonmember
bank. 160 As currently drafted, however, many state branching statutes preclude a state bank from establishing an extraterritorial
branch, 161 at least within the United States. 162 A general prohibition on extraterritorial branching-applicable abroad as well as in
other states-may reflect the perceived difficulty of supervising and
examining a state bank with distant branches. It is possible, however, that state law drafters simply did not consider whether to allow state banks to branch into other states when they imposed geographical branching limitations.
Even if the home-state law did not preclude an out-of-state
branch, however, a Fed member bank, like a national bank, would
be precluded from interstate branching under the terms of the
McFadden Act, which is applicable to member banks through the
Federal Reserve Act. 163 The McFadden Act authorizes the Comptroller, and by incorporation the FRB, to approve a branch of a national or state member bank, respectively, only if the statute law of
the bank's home state specifically authorizes such a branch for state
157. Curiously, however, several states provide specific authorization for their
banks to branch into other states. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 105(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981).
158. E.g., id. § 202-a (McKinney 1971).
159. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976).
160. Id. § 1828(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
161. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-6-101 (1974).
162. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 403-54 (1976) (out-of-state branches permitted "in
other countries or in dependencies in insular possessions of the United States").
163. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976) provides that the Fed may authorize a state member bank to establish "branches in the United States or any dependency or insular
possession thereof or in any foreign country, on the same terms and conditions and
subject to the same limitations and restrictions as are applicable to the establishment
of branches by national banks .... "
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banks, and then only "at any point within the State in which [it] is
situated."164

Thus, only if the bank were an FDIC-insured nonmember
state bank might it be able to obtain federal approval for an interstate branch from the FDIC. That agency may approve a bank's
branch application on the basis of the same factors that it applies in
admitting a bank to insured status. 165 These factors relate to the
soundness and future prospects of the bank and the "convenience
and needs" of the community to be served, but impose no explicit
geographical restrictions. 166 Even so, the FDIC understandably
might be very reluctant to approve an interstate branch where the
result would be to make Fed membership and a national bank
charter relatively unattractive and set off a stampede away from
them. 16 7 Thus, while based originally on state sovereignty over
banking, the state-by-state banking system has not only been incorporated into federal law out of deference to the states; it has taken
on a life of its own at the federal level. It is doubtful whether any
state could successfully opt out of the state-by-state system, even
by opening itself unilaterally to the branches of sister-state banks.
Under the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, states are presumed to want to exclude from the
banking industry within their borders any BHC that controls a
bank-state or national-in another state.168 This presumption can
be overcome by explicit statutory authorization, but the federal decision to put the burden of obtaining enabling legislation upon
those who would admit such BHCs has probably contributed to the
nearly universal exclusion of out-of-state BHCs from control of host
state banks. 169 There might be more multistate BHCs if federal law
164. Id. § 36(c); cf. id. § 601, para. 1 (Fed may authorize national bank
branches in foreign countries or dependencies of the United States).
165. Id. § 1828(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
166. Id. § 1816.
167. Cf. West Helena Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd.,
553 F.2d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1977) (FSLIC may not deny coverage to state-chartered
S & L's based upon own determination of insufficient community need because of

"needless friction" with states such reexamination would cause).
168. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
169. Iowa enacted special legislation in 1972 to enable Northwest Bancorporation to acquire two Iowa banks in addition to the four it already owned. 1972
Iowa Acts ch. 1114, § 11; see Iowa Ind. Bankers v. Board of Governors 511 F.2d 1288
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975). A Maine statute provides for the entry
of out-of-state BHCs based in home states that reciprocally allow the entry of Maine
BHCs "under conditions no more restrictive than those imposed by [Maine]." ME.
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had merely granted the states the right to exclude out-of-state
BHCs by positive law, leaving the burden of enacting exclusionary
legislation to each state. Then local banks might have proposed the
exclusion of out-of-state BHCs, and the issue would have been on
the legislative and public agenda. Under the Douglas Amendment,
however, exclusion did not require a legislative majority in any
state. Since it is much less likely that consumers who might benefit
from the competition provided by out-of-state BHCs would obtain
permissive legislation (or even initiate the debate) than it is that
170
banks, the more organized group with the more intense interest,
could obtain exclusionary legislation, the Douglas Amendment's allocation of the burden of going forward has probably been outcome-determinative in many states.
There is some evidence of the Douglas Amendment's independent role in confining BHCs to a single state more completely
than state legislation would do if the burden of acting were upon
the states. Prior to 1956, when the issue of state exclusionary authority was unclear but when multistate BHCs were a real and
growing factor, eight states had regulated BHCs; three effectively
171
prohibited them from gaining majority control of even one bank.
Yet no state that allowed domestic BHCs specifically prohibited the
entry of out-of-state BHCs. 172 Since 1956, however, only three
states have legislated to permit out-of-state-BHC entry under any
circumstances-and in Iowa the legislation was tailored to permit a
particular acquisition by a BHC that, although "based" elsewhere,
already owned four banks in the state.173
Accordingly, federal law appears to be substantially responsible for the present situation: The banking subsidiaries of all but the
surviving multistate BHCs grandfathered in 1956 are confined to
single states' 74 while their nonbank subsidiaries can and do provide
REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9-B, § 1013.2 (1980). To date, no other state has taken up this
invitation. Finally, South Dakota permits the acquisition by an out-of-state BHC of a
single new national or state bank located in South Dakota "at a location which is not
likely to attract customers from the general public in the state to the substantial detriment of existing banks in the state." S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN. § 51-16-41 (1980).
170. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); M.
OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTrIVE ACTION (1965).

171. Kentucky, South Carolina, and Washington. See G. FISCHER, supra note
104, at 76, table 2.
172. See id. app. E.
173. See sources cited note 169 supra.
174. Of the nineteen multistate BHCs grandfathered in 1956, sixteen were domestic and three were foreign. The four largest companies, their home states and

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

36

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking
1981]

INTERSTATE BANKING

services "closely related to banking" nationwide. Contrary to the
statement of its author, the Douglas Amendment is not "a logical
continuation of the principles of the McFadden Act, which tried to
prevent national banks [from expanding] across State lines in a way
contrary to State policy."' 7 5 Instead of deferring to state policies
existing in 1956, the Douglas Amendment established a new policy
for the states, albeit with an escape clause. In this way, the stateby-state banking system became federal policy.

b. The Case for the State-by-State Banking System.-In considering the merits of the state-by-state banking system, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between state-by-state
banking, which entails each bank operating in its own state, and
dual banking, which entails both state and national bank chartering
and regulation. State-by-state banking is a scheme of territorial
market allocation. Dual banking is a scheme for allocating
regulatory responsibility. In principle, and to some degree in practice, the two schemes are separable. For example, it would be possible to have state-by-state banking without duality. The states
might charter and regulate all banks, as they did from 1836 to
1864, or the national government might preempt the field but confine each chartered bank to a single state much as it confines
broadcasters to serving a particular locality.' 76 Likewise, a dual system might operate without state-by-state banking, as it would if
state and national banks or BHCs were given regional or
nationwide scope. An analogous system of shared authority operates to a limited extent in corporate chartering, although Congress
now charters very few corporations.' 77 Perhaps the only other govnumber of states-of-operation, were Transamerica Corp. (California and ten other
states); Northwest Bancorporation (Minnesota and six other states); First Bank Stock
Corp. (Minnesota and four other states); First Security Corp. (Utah and two other
states). At present there are twelve multistate BHCs, of which seven are domestic
and five are foreign companies. The reduction in the number of multistate
companies was accomplished by various corporate reorganizations motivated, it
seems, primarily by "[a] desire to avoid supervision as multibank holding
companies, rather than any considerations relating to interstate banking.
GOLEMBE (1979), supra note 113, at 33-34 & n.1.
175. 102 CONG. REc. 6860 (1956).

176. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1120(a) (1980).
177. See, e.g., Public Telecommunications Financing Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-567, 92 Stat. 2405, 2411 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 396 (Supp. III 1979)) (corporation for public broadcasting). There are periodic proposals for federal chartering
of large corporations in general and lately of the oil companies in particular. See
sources cited in Ginsburg, Making Automobile Regulation Work: Policy Options and
a Proposal,2 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 73, 86 n.29 (1979).
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ernmental field in which duality and state-by-state "markets" are
17 8
combined is the court system.
As a scheme of territorial allocation, state-by-state banking is
moderately local in orientation; in unit banking states it is extremely localized. Accordingly, the advantages that can be claimed
for state-by-state banking are the virtues of localism.
First, local institutions are often thought to be more responsive to variable local needs, especially credit needs. As Comptroller Dawes said of the "small community" banker, in making the
case for unit banking in 1923,
[h]is loans take into account, as a first consideration, character
and moral responsibility. He is naturally inclined to encourage
young, aggressive, and enterprising individuals who will, in the
course of time, bring business to the institution as he succeeds,
and will develop commercial and industrial enterprises ....
...It is inconceivable that the representative of a nonresident board of directors should be granted the authority and discretion to make a type of loan which is based on character,
knowledge of local conditions, and ultimate benefits to be realized by the community and by the banks. 179
Even where the issue is not unit versus branch, but statewide
versus regional or national, there is some force in Dawes' vision of
the community banker. States are economically more heterogeneous, in ways relevant to making credit judgments, than his focus on
the "small community" implies-for example, agricultural and commercial borrowers have different needs-but they are not as diverse as larger regions or the nation as a whole. The broader a
bank's territory, the more challenging is the task of responding to
varied local conditions within that territory.
178. Thus, for example, the federal courts may apply state law, usually that of
their situs, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (diversity jurisdiction) and state courts may normally apply federal law. See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COuRTS 355-69 (1968). Thus,
plaintiffs may choose their forum for some types of cases, and the courts may compete for their patronage. See Rosenberg, Passive State Policies and State Responsibility Under the Fourteenth Amendment for Private Deprivations of "Life, Liberty
or Property," ABA Nat'l Inst. on Civ. Rights Liability, Kansas City, Mo. (June 9,
1981).
The international context provides other examples where multiple authorities
compete to provide access to markets. Familiar examples include not only those
countries that provide "havens" for banks operating in world markets, such as the
Bahamas and the Grand Cayman Islands, but also the countries that provide a "flag
of convenience" to ships, most notably Liberia and Panama.
179. [1923] OFFICE OF COMNTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 10-11.
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Second, local institutions are considered less likely to cause a
flow of capital from one state to another by borrowing in one (i.e.,
taking deposits) and lending in the other. When a bank intermediates funds from one local economy to another it finances the
growth of the capital-receiving area at the expense of growth in the
capital-contributing area. 180 To be sure, while pursuing private
gain the bank may be allocating capital to its most productive use,
thereby benefiting society at large. That, however, is little consolation to the capital-exporting population. Assuming a competitive
market, depositors of the capital-exporting bank will be rewarded
with higher interest rates on their deposits, but depositors and
nondepositors alike will bear the externalized costs of local economic underdevelopment. For example, where employment opportunities for their children become few at home, forcing the capitalexporting area to become a labor-exporting area, disrupted family
life can be counted as a cost.
Third, state-by-state banking is considered better able to accommodate diverse attitudes among states regarding the desirable
size of banks and level of market concentration. Populist and agrarian sentiment has been very hostile to large size and high concentration in banking.' 8 ' This has led some states to prohibit both
branching and multibank BHCs. 182 Other states have prohibited
branching but allowed multibank BHCs, 183 while still others have
set a maximum share of statewide deposits for a single banking or180. More precisely, while "[tihe effect of exporting capital is to reduce the
creation of fixed capital at home, and therefore to reduce the demand for labor," it is
still possible that "the capital may be used in foreign countries in ways which raise
the standard of living of the capital exporting country and so offset wholly or partly
the first effect, or in ways which lower it (thus aggravating the first effect). The result
depends on the type of competition which there is between the capital exporting and

the capital importing countries." Lewis, Economic Development With Unlimited
Supplies of Labor, 22 MANCHESTER ScH. ECON. & SOC. STUD. 139, 177-78 (1954).
Reduced opportunities for labor in capital-exporting areas may be offset if the capital
is applied to lowering the cost of things imported or may result in increased wage
costs in capital-importing areas that compete in third markets. The diminution of labor opportunities is aggravated if the capital export raises the cost of imports or reduces costs in competing areas. Id. at 190.
181. Baker, Chartering, Branching, and the Concentration Problem, reprinted
in FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, POLICIES FOR A MORE COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 21, 27 (1972). Contra, id. at 41 (discussion by Ross M. Robertson).
182. The list of states with this configuration of laws has been dwindling, and
now includes only Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. See
STATE BANKING LAW SERV., supra note 3, at 117, 337-39.
183. For example, Texas and Colorado. Id. at 85, 337, 339.
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ganization, above which no new branches or acquisitions will be
84
approved. 1
Some states have pursued a policy of becoming major financial
centers by fostering the growth of large banking organizations.
California has done so by allowing statewide branching and liberally

granting the branch applications of even the largest banks. 185 Colo-

rado, a unit banking state,18 6 now seems to be on a similar course. It
has authorized electronic banking,' 8 7 approved loan production offices, 18 and liberally granted the applications of major out-of-state
BHCs to charter "industrial banks" and finance companies. 18 9

Still another approach to bank market structure, namely state
enterprise, was taken for a time in Alabama. The Alabama Constitu-

tion of 1819 provided for state establishment of one wholly-owned

bank.' 9 0 As of 1839, there were seven banks in Alabama, five wholly
owned by the state and two in which the state had a forty-percent
interest. 19 1 Although Alabama is now out of the banking business,
192
the Bank of North Dakota remains a state enterprise.

The national aspect of the dual banking system makes state-bystate control of bank size and market structure less than complete.
The Comptroller can increase competition by chartering additional
184. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 362.915 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (prohibiting BHCs
from gaining control over bank where the BHC will thereby control banks with more
than thirteen percent of total bank deposits in state).
185. Thus United California Bank, the largest state bank in California, had 274
branches at the end of fiscal 1978; 21 branches were added during fiscal 1979. [1978]
CALIFORNIA SUP'T OF BANKS ANN. REP. 60; [1979] id. at 208.
186. In November 1980, however, Colorado voters, in a referendum, defeated a
proposal to allow branch banking. Am. Banker, Nov. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
187. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-6.5-101 (Supp. III 1979).
188. 3 Colo. Code Regs. 701-1, § CB-101.28.
189. Thus, twenty-nine of the 105 industrial banks operating at the end of 1978
had been chartered in the period 1975-1978. The information is tabulated from the
report by the COLORADO DIVISION OF BANKING, STATEMENTS OF CONDITION OF STATE BANKS AND INDUSTRIAL BANKS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1978 (1979).
190. ALA. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (1819). The current constitutional provisions on
banking in Alabama were renumbered in the 1875 and 1901 revisions to art. XII §§
247-255.
191. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 594 (1839). In still another
variation, in 1810 when the State of Georgia reserved to itself one-sixth of the capital
stock in the first two banks it chartered, its objective was purely to make a profitable
investment of surplus state funds. M. HEATH, CONSTRUCTIVE LIBERALISM
165 (1954).
192. N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-09-01 (1975). The voters of Minot, N.D., however,
have just "resoundingly defeated a proposal to make Minot the home of America's
first city-owned bank." Wall St. J., April 23, 1981, at 20, col. 3. For contrary advice
see Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1128, 1150 (1980).
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national banks or he can allow concentration to rise, subject to the
antitrust laws, by approving mergers of state or national banks into a
surviving national bank. 19 3 Despite the Comptroller's potential,
however, the states retain much greater influence over bank size
and market structure and remain free to pursue their different policies.
Finally, the state-by-state banking system may be thought to
contain banks and BHCs on a scale where examination and regulation are manageable. In the context of examination, both the size
of a banking organization and the breadth of its geographical dispersion are relevant. All offices of a banking organization should be
examined simultaneously, lest problem-assets be transferred from
one office to another and escape detection. 1 9 4 As asset size increases, simultaneous examination may strain the capacity of any
examination staff.195 In addition, as the operating area of a bank or
BHC increases, problems of coordinating a simultaneous examination increase more than proportionately. If the area spans multiple
states, each would presumably insist upon examination of either
the whole enterprise or at least the state banks taking deposits
within its borders. The coordination required for simultaneous and
effective examination by multiple jurisdictions would have to be exquisite.
Regulators apparently believe that effective regulation is increasingly difficult as the size of a banking organization increases. 1 9 6 With greater potential earnings or costs at stake, a
larger entity may be more willing to invest in circumventing a particular regulation. 197 Furthermore, a larger enterprise can spread
193. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(A) (1976) (regulations governing insured banks).
194. V. WILLIT, CHAIN, GROUP AND BRANCH BANKING 56, 111 (1930); [1923]
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANNUAL REPORT 9.
195. See Miller, supra note 41, at 443. This is not inconsistent with the finding
"that the examination process exhibits significant scale economies with respect to asset size. Therefore, the examiner manpower requirements per dollar of assets supervised is less for states containing large asset size banks." Id.; accord, Murphy, Determinants of the Demand for Bank Examiner Manpower in the First National Bank
Region, 9 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 500, 502 (1977).

196. See, e.g., Burns Asks Halt on BHC Growth, Am. Banker, Sept. 25, 1978, at
1, Col. 1.
197. Cf. Seelig, Convenience and Advantage Clauses as a Barrier to De Novo
Entry by Bank Holding Companies in the Consumer Finance Industry, 30 J. ECON.
& Bus. 124, 129 (1978) ("results also appear to suggest that large firms, or at least
firms experienced in dealing with regulatory authorities (such as bank holding
companies), can be at a relative advantage in overcoming regulatory barriers to expansion.").
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the fixed costs of circumvention-strategic planning, new product
development, legal fees, etc.-over a larger number of transactions
and at a lower average cost than a smaller banking company. As a
result, some products or services that a smaller company would be
able to offer at only an unattractive price, and therefore does not
develop, will be developed by the larger company because it can
spread fixed circumvention costs and thus attract the priceconscious market.
Each of the virtues claimed for state-by-state banking may be
disputed on either normative or empirical grounds, or both. Responsiveness to local credit needs may be achieved more readily by
a regional or national banking enterprise with a substantial devolution of internal authority and yet greater expertise and resources
than a community bank could offer.' 98 Interstate or interregional
capital flow may be in the long-term national interest even if it has
adverse short-term consequences for capital exporting areas. As for
the diversity of banking market structures that states may wish to
pursue, one would need to know much more about the political
process in each state before reposing confidence in the idea that the
present-and diminishing-diversity of banking structures reflects
current community sentiments and not the reified vestiges of ancient, perhaps corrupt, political struggles. Finally, the extreme paucity of empirical literature concerning the problems of bank examination, and the impressionistic nature of the perception that large
banking organizations are more difficult to regulate because of their
smaller number, 199 make evaluation of these claims difficult.
Thorough investigation and evaluation of these claims is unnecessary, however, if the goal is a comparison of the state-by-state
banking system as it exists today with alternative approaches allowing some form of interstate banking. The reason is simply the
magnitude of interstate banking currently conducted within the
state-by-state regulatory framework and the likelihood that the
needs of commerce and the incentives facing bankers will escalate
198.

E.g., Johnston, The Structure of Banking in Small California Communities

and a Look to the Future 12 (April 6, 1967) (unpublished study by the Research
Dep't, Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco) (finding that in rural areas and smaller
towns in a state-wide branching state, branch banks had higher loan-deposit ratios
than unit banks, and that it is "simply their status as branch offices, unburdened as
they are by considerations of reserves, liquidity, and portfolio balance that enables
them to operate on the basis of loan-deposit ratios in excess of those which can be
supported by independent banks of comparable size." Id).
199. See text accompanying notes 582-583 infra.
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interstate activity. The state-by-state regulatory system is not adequate, however, to deal with the present and increasing interstate
activity-neither to contain it nor to encourage its orderly development. The policy question for bank regulation, therefore, is
whether to persevere with the state-by-state framework and hope
for the best, perhaps even requiring banks and BHCs to recede to
within their home state borders, or whether and how to substitute
a regime that explicitly acknowledges, regulates against the detriments, and exploits the benefits of, interstate banking.
The empirical foundation for the claim that interstate banking
is a substantial reality at present is set out as follows in section B.
With the details of the current business reality in hand, it will be
possible to turn to the criteria by which to address the policy issue.
B. The Current Business Reality
1. Reasons for Interstate Efforts.-During the last fifteen
years most of the largest banks in the nation have made successful
efforts to establish an interstate presence notwithstanding the constraints imposed by the state-by-state banking regime. Typically,
they have made extensive use of BHCs to open nonbank offices in
multiple states, although, as will be seen in section 2 below, some
interstate offices are those of the banks themselves. If the factors
identified in this section 1 accurately account for this development,
then efforts to expand the scope of interstate banking activity can
be expected to continue.
a. Growing and Contracting Markets.-In its pristine form,
the state-by-state banking system connotes that each bank does all
of its business within its home state. Long before the growth of interstate banking, however, there had emerged a national credit
market within which banks competed to supply funds to national
and international corporate borrowers. This market for large loans
has been concentrated in New York, where New York-based banks
have acted as lead banks in arranging nationwide banking syndicates to participate in financings too large to be undertaken alone.
In recent years the growth of regional banks has allowed them to
pursue lead positions, which were previously beyond their reach.
Apart from the market for large loans, however, the business
of banking has traditionally been conducted on a relatively localized basis. Retail banking customers, including households and
small businesses, patronize a bank within convenient distance for a
personal visit. Deposits and withdrawals are typically made at the
bank; even the opportunity to use the mails for making deposits
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and ATMs for deposits and withdrawals has not significantly
changed this fact. Likewise, consumer and small business loans are
typically negotiated and consummated at the bank's premises. The
provision of trust services is highly personalized and thus it, too, is
generally carried on at the bank's offices.
Retail banking is therefore comparable to retail merchandizing of largely standardized items, such as drug or grocery stores
sell. In both types of retailing, location is a prime determinant of
customer relationships and the establishment of branch locations reflects the small radius within which the retail establishment
can expect to draw customers.200 Both retail banks and retail merchandisers may also participate in wholesale markets. In banking
this entails not only making large loans but also servicing commercial accounts with cash management, data processing, and other
services. Wholesale customers infrequently need to pay personal visits to banks, and with larger transactions at stake will shop for a banking service over a larger area. This, combined with the large scale
required to offer many wholesale services efficiently, has tended
to favor large, centrally based banks in the wholesale market.
Office location is thus important to success in retail, and to a
lesser degree, in wholesale banking; it simply matters where a
bank is-downtown or suburbia, small town or large city-in a way
that is not true for many other industries. Moreover, the rate of
economic growth, and thus of growth in demand for banking services in the geographical market in which a bank is located, is
probably also an important determinant of profitability. 20 1 There
are significant differences in the rate of growth among various geographical markets; indeed, some have negative rates.202 Banks located in markets that are declining, either absolutely or relatively,
200. The proliferation of bank branches, where allowed, probably reflects also
the diversion of bank competition from price to service considerations brought about
by Regulation Q, which sets the maximum interest payable on deposits. See A.
KAHN, 2 THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 209 (1971):

If price is prevented from falling to marginal cost in the short run or to average total cost in the long run, then, to the extent that competition prevails, it
will tend to raise cost to the level of price. Only when, in this way, marginal
cost is once again equated with price will the tendency to service inflation

be halted.
201. To the author's knowledge, however, there is no published evidence directly establishing this relationship. Cf. Mellon Bank NA., Interstate Banking Legis-

lation: A Need for Change 12-13 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Mellon Study] (growth
patterns of population, employment, and personal income by state closely associated
with bank-deposit growth).

202. Id.
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have the greatest incentive to look for market opportunities elsewhere.
It is therefore understandable that a disproportionate number
of the banks that have been aggressive in establishing themselves
in host-state markets have declining home markets. In 1975, the
thirteen BHCs whose lead bank was one of the fifty largest in the
nation and whose subsidiaries had the largest number of offices
outside the bank's home state included the parents of three banks
based in Philadelphia, one in Pittsburgh, three in New York City,
and one each from Chicago and Boston. Two of the others were
from California and there was one each from North Carolina and
Georgia.2 0 3 Thus the first nine of these thirteen BHCs are from
four states that experienced low growth in bank deposits over the
period 1967-1977; the other four are from states that had below
20 4
median growth.
While it is true that the largest banks logically would be the
first to search for new markets, and that many of the largest banks
are in the older and relatively declining cities of the Northeast, the
representation of large northeastern banks among the most
interstate-oriented BHCs nonetheless seems disproportionate.
While it is necessary to rely on imperfect measures, it does seem
fair to conclude that the banks most determined to enter new geographical markets are those whose home-state markets have the
least desirable futures. This is not to suggest that the desire to escape declining markets alone accounts for the interstate banking activity of the largest BHCs. For example, it clearly could not explain the interstate motivation of the large California BHCs.
Rather, a declining market merely heightens the inclination, seen
among aggressive banks in growing markets as well, to penetrate
new territories.
b. Geographical Risk Diversification.-The advantages of diversifying economic risk across a variety of product markets have
already been discussed. 20 5 Risk, both political and economic, may
also be diversified across geographical markets, and this benefit
203. See American Banker Reprint Series, Bank Holding Co. Map Series (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Bank Holding Co. Map Series].
204. See Mellon Study, supra note 201, at 13. Moreover, two of the four-North

Carolina and Georgia BHCs-were still regional organizations, having almost all
their nonbank offices in the Southeast. (One had a New York City office and another
had corporate-service offices in Chicago and Los Angeles.) Bank Holding Co. Map
Series, supra note 203.
205. See text accompanying notes 150-153 supra.
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must underlie to some extent the tendency of banks to seek markets offshore, through overseas branches and subsidiary banks, 20and
6
throughout the nation, by means of nonbank BHC subsidiaries.
Internationally, "country" risk includes such potential economic and political hazards as adverse regulation, capital controls,
20 7
exchange-rate fluctuations, and, in the extreme, expropriation.
Economic and political risks are diversified by international operations because national economies expand and contract at different
rates and experience adverse political developments at different
times.
Domestically, political risk is less extreme though not unknown. The profits of a New York City bank, for example, depend
to some extent upon political decisions made in the state capitol,
Albany. Changes in state usury laws, income taxation, and branch
banking and BHC powers are elements in the political environment that can have a profound effect on a bank's prospects. If a
bank's earnings are derived from several states, however, it will be
exposed to less risk from adverse political decisions, since it is less
likely that multiple states would take unfavorable positions, particularly at the same time.
Domestic economic-risk diversification is possible because regions of the country are affected differently by the business cycle.
Each region is also subject to special circumstances apart from the
general business cycle. Thus, argricultural lending in the Plains
states, consumer lending in the Midwest manufacturing states, and
export financing in California may have very different business cydiversify its
cles of their own. A bank serving all three markets can
20
risk better than a bank serving only one of the three.
It is true that individual shareholders could diversify their
portfolios of bank shares to diversify personal risk. The single
shareholder could own shares of banks located in California, the
Midwest, and the Plains states. This is not a complete substitute
for bank diversification of risk, however. First, the shareholders
206. See Abrams, Regional Banks and International Banking, FED. RES. BANK
OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV., Nov. 1980, at 3, 4.
207. See Wolfe, Country Risk, in OFFSHORE LENDING BY U.S. COMMERCIA L
BANKS 35 (F. Mathis ed. 1975); Gutmann, Assessing Country Risk, NAT'L WESTMINSTER

BANK'Q. REV., May 1980, at 58; Wilson, Measuring Country Risk in a Global

Context, 14 Bus. ECON. 23, 24 (Jan. 1979).

208. Cf. Mingo, Managerial Motives, Market Structures and the Performance
of Holding Company Banks, 14 ECON. INQUIRY 411, 421 (1976) (finding that holding
company banks "seem to be less risk-averse," and suggesting that this is "perhaps
explained by their geographical diversification").
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taken collectively would probably incur greater transaction costs in
diversifying their portfolios of shares than would the banks in diversifying their portfolios of risks. It would probably be less expensive, that is, for the Bank of America or its BHC to add the desired
portfolio of Michigan consumer loans than it would for each of its
175,134 shareholders to purchase an appropriate interest in a
Michigan bank.
Bank managers would find it even more difficult than bank
shareholders to diversify their risk if the bank cannot directly or indirectly do so for them. They cannot split their time between
banks in California and Michigan, and so must expose themselves
to heightened risks to their employment and compensation owing
to the bank's inability to diversify for them. Indeed, the result may
be for bank managers to cause banks to pursue a socially undesira20 9
ble level of risk avoidance in their one home market.
c. Economies of Scale.-Early empirical investigations of scale
economies in commercial banking generally indicated that a bank's
average unit costs did not decrease (or increase) significantly with
size above a very modest level-in one study, $5 million of deposits. 210 These studies are of limited value, however, since they examine only selected products or services, 2 11 and not necessarily
those with the most sharply declining average costs. 2 12 They predate the effects of widespread computerization on bank operations
and "do not fully account for possible capital (or financial) econo213
mies. "
Recent studies, although subject to some of the same limitations, show that banks' average costs continue to decline even as
deposits increase to well above $10 million, 2 14 and distinguish be209.

Heggestad, Market Structure, Risk and Profitability in Commercial Bank-

ing, 32 J. FINANCE 1207, 1215 (1977).
210. See Horvitz, Economies of Scale in Banking, in PRIvATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 37 (Comm. on Money & Credit 1963).
211. Edwards & Scott, Regulating the Solvency of Depository Institutions: A
Perspective for Deregulation, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 65, 92 (F.
Edwards ed. 1979); cf. Benston, Economies of Scale of Financial Institutions, 4 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 312, 319-23 (1972) (various output measures analyzed).
212. It has also been observed that banking is characterized by "a chronic lack
of depth in management in the smaller institutions," which can be thought of as a

diseconomy of small scale. Casson & Burrus, Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers,
18 Ari. U.L. REV. 677, 680 (1969).
213. Edwards & Scott, supra note 211, at 92. This literature is critically analyzed in Benston, The Optimal Banking Structure, 4 J. BANK RESEARCH 220, 224
(1973), and Schweitzer, Economies of Scale and Holding Company Affiliation in
Banking, 39 S. ECON. J. 258 (1972).

214. See Longbrake & Haslem, Productive Efficiency in Commercial Banking,
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tween banks with and those without computerized operations. 215
Even these studies, however, do not reflect advances in technology
now in use at larger banks. They neither address the potential
economies of scale available if banks were allowed to operate interstate216 nor examine home-office scale economies. 217
Dealing in Fed funds-purchased reserves and correspondent
balances-is one example of a service with obviously significant
scale economies. In order to meet their reserve requirements and
avoid having either excess reserves or correspondent balances that
do not earn interest, member banks "buy" and "sell" their FRB
and correspondent balances to one another for one-day periods.
Money-center banks act as dealers in this interbank market, known
as the Fed funds market, serving the needs of other banks and taking a dealer's profit. 2 18 Typically, the money-center bank buys
7 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 317, 329-30 (1975) (using 1968 data):
[Tihe number of offices operated by a branch bank has little effect on average operating costs per dollar of demand deposits. However, when average
office size, as measured by the number of demand deposits accounts, increases, average costs decline in all banks except unit banks which are not
affiliated with holding companies;
Murray & White, Economies of Scale and Deposit-Taking Financial Institutions in
Canada, 12 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 58, 69 (1980), finds significant evidence
of sizable and increasing returns to scale in a study of credit unions during 1972-75;
expenses of branching are "more than offset by the cost reductions made possible by
the growth in output." See also Wolken & Navratil, Economies of Scale in Credit
Unions: FurtherEvidence, 35 J. FINANCE 769 (1980).
215. Daniel, Longbrake & Murphy, The Effect of Technology on Bank Economies of Scale for Demand Depogits, 28 J. FINANCE 131 (1973); Murray & White, supra note 214. See also Walker, Economies of Scale in Electronic Funds Transfer Systems, 2 J. BANKING & FINANCE 65 (1978).
216. Banks cannot realize scale economies in advertising, for example, because
they must purchase local rather than network broadcast time and local or regional
rather than national magazine and newspaper space.
217. Economies of reporting, accounting, legal counsel, and other overhead or
home office costs cannot be captured by studies that examine the average cost curve
for specific bank products. They could be isolated by a study of financial returns (on
investment, assets, or revenues), perhaps, but only over the range of output with
which there is present experience. Either great sophistication, or only a little common sense, are required to see that such home office economies as mentioned above
must exist, however. Cf. Gilbert & Longbrake, The Effects of Branching by Financial Institutions on Competition, Productive Efficiency and Stability: An Examination of the Evidence, in SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE SENATE
COMM.ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMPENDIUM OF ISSUES RELATING TO BRANCHING BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 475, 493
(Comm. Print 1976) (production of financial services that can easily be centralized in
main office, such as business loans, real estate loans, and securities, less costly in
branch than unit banks).
218. M. STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 286-94 (1978).
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funds from other banks for itself and for resale to major banks. Indeed, according to Martin Mayer, in the 1960s "[t]he crucial function of the money-center bank in its relations with its correspondents became the purchase of their excess reserves at a price at or
just under each day's national market price for money." 219 By
1973, he reports, the Bank of America was trading $2.5 billion a
day in Fed funds. Clearly, the cost of running this operation would
not rise or fall proportionately with increases in the dollar balances
involved; the addition of three zeroes to the end of every number
would not require greater capacity.
The provision of expert advice is another service for which one
would expect average cost to decline until a very large scale is
achieved. Banks provide expert advice to their branches, their correspondent banks, 220 and their customers. 221 This advice may concern general economic conditions, industry studies, or a particular
financing transaction. In any case, accumulating the expertise necessary to render advice may be expensive. It may entail assembling
an extensive data base, building an economic model, or simply
learning from experience in prior transactions. Once these investments in expertise are made, however, their exploitation occurs initially at a low marginal cost; hence average cost declines with scale
for a considerable time until increasing administrative and coordination costs are incurred. As long as average costs decline, an enterprise will seek opportunities to expand its output. If commercial
banking consists of a variety of products and services only some of
which continue to experience decreasing average costs, banks
would seek to expand those products or services selectively. If selective expansion is not feasible, they will still seek to expand until
the diseconomies of scale associated with some products outweigh
the economies realized on others.
One method that banks have to increase their scale and thus
219. M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 210 (1975).
220. See G. Fischer, supra note 31, at 113. See also SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
A REPORT ON THE CORRESPONDENT BANKING SYSTEM 4 (Subcomm. Print 1964).

221.

In addition to personal trust management, banks provide investment man-

agement, custody and advisory services to employee benefit funds, endowments,
charitable organizations, and other institutional investors. Such portfolio management
is extremely information intensive. See K. SMITH, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 42

(1971); Graham, The Impact and Extent of Computer Applications on the Construction and Evaluation of Commercial Bank Investment Portfolios, in THE IMPACT OF
THE COMPUTER ON COMMERCIAL BANKING (F. Fabozzi ed. 1975) (2 HOFSTRA UNIV.
YEARBOOK OF BUS., series 11).
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to realize economies is branching.2 2 2 Banks have pressed for and in
general received from the states increasingly liberal branching

laws. 223 At the same time they have expanded across state lines

through nonbank subsidiaries of their BHCs in order to increase
the scale at which they provide some services. Indeed many of the

activities permitted to nonbank subsidiaries by Regulation Y are
probably characterized by declining average costs over a very wide
range of output. These are the information-oriented services-i.e.,
those in which there is a high initial investment in data,
programming, or experience, but a low marginal cost for drawing
on the information-such as servicing loans and other extensions of
credit; providing bookkeeping or data processing services; invest-

ment or financial advising;

and management consulting for

unaffiliated banks. In addition, many of the activities that are re-

lated to the extension of credit, such as credit-card operations and
real estate appraisals, are themselves information-intensive activities for which one would expect average costs to decline over a
2 24
wide range of output.
222. The leading studies of the 1960s concluded that the additional costs of
bank branching were offset by the economies of scale. See F. Ball & N. Murphy,
Costs in Commercial Banking (Research Rep. No. 41, Federal Reserve Bank of Bos-

ton, 1968); Benston, Branch Banking and Economies of Scale, 20 J. FINANCE 312
(1965). According to a recent study, the staff of the OCC now believe that the costs
of branching are more than offset by the scale economies of branching. MAJORITY
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG.,
2D SESS., CHARTERING OF NATIONAL BANKS: 1970-1977, at 57-58 (Comm. Print

1980).
223. A survey of the
U
U*
L
S

various states is illustrative:
Branching prohibited
Branching prohibited but limited facilities permitted
Branching permitted within limited geographic areas
No geographic branching restrictions
Number of States

Branching
Classification
U
U*
L
S
Total (States)

1929
27
1
11
9
48

1951
12
5
13
19
49

1961
6
10
15
19

1978
1
11
16
22

50

50

supra note 3, at 89.
224. Underwriting credit life and disability insurance, in addition to the scale
economies associated with being information intensive, requires a substantial scale
of operations (and geographical risk diversification) just to accomplish its purposes of
risk pooling and spreading.
STATE BANKING LAW SERV.,
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d. Technological Opportunities: Computing and Communicating.-As suggested, essential bank operations consist to a large
2 25
degree of gathering, managing, and distributing information.
Decisions to extend credit, for example, begin with the accumulation and analysis of data relevant to the credit-worthiness of the applicant. In the case of a consumer borrower, there may be relatively little information, consisting of a credit application, a report
from a credit bureau, and the results of a computerized creditscoring system. In the case of a commercial borrower, extensive information about the corporation and its industry may be required
and this information may be analyzed through industry- or
economy-wide computerized economic models. Deposit services
the
are also information-intensive, reflecting the fact that money in2 26
item.
tangible
a
than
rather
datum
a
become
has
modem world
Today, a bank deposit or withdrawal is little more than a
series of book-entry adjustments. In the simple case of a check
drawn on one bank and deposited at another in the same city, for
example, the depository bank increases the depositor's balance and
decreases the balance that the drawee bank has on deposit with it;
the drawee bank registers on its own books the decreased balance
with the depository bank and makes an offsetting decrease in the
account balance of the check's drawer. Extensions of credit are also
handled by adjustment of balances. When a bank lends money, it
increases the borrower's account balance by the amount of the
loan; the borrower then draws the loan down by writing checks
against the balance.

225. See Oettinger, The Coming Revolution in Banking, in Proc. of the Am.
Bankers Ass'n Nat'l Automation Conference 39 (1964).

226. Historically, money consisted first of commodities, such as cattle, and then
specie-usually gold, silver, or copper. The drawbacks of using precious metals as
money in a sophisticated economy are obvious; accordingly, specie was supplemented by paper currency-bank notes, or originally, receipts-that represented deposits of, and could be redeemed in, specie. See generally R. EDERER, THE EvOLUTION OF MONEY (1964).
In the United States we now use fiat money. Fiat money is paper money that is

accepted in exchange for goods ultimately because the law requires that it be accepted; its tender in payment of a debt is "legal tender." The issuing government
does not stand ready to redeem such currency in specie or any other thing of value.
Fiat money was introduced in the United States when the Civil War Congress authorized the issuance of "greenbacks" in the hope of paying its wartime debts for the
cost of the paper.
Once fiat money was more or less accepted, which took at least a decade, see J.
GALBRAITH, MONEY 45-57 (1975), it was a small matter to eliminate the paper itself
and deal in bank balances.
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With banking operations essentially information-handling, the
unit costs of a bank operation are now intimately affected by developments in information technologies, i.e., computing and communicating. 227 Developments in these fields have vastly lowered
unit costs. For example, IBM memory technology has fallen in cost
from two dollars per byte in 1964 to about eight cents per byte in
1977;228 the cost of 100,000 calculations has fallen from twelve
cents to one cent over the same time. 229 Regulatory changes in the
telecommunications field have enabled new intermediaries between the monopoly telephone company and the commercial user
to resell and share use of telecommunications lines. 230 This has enabled commerical users that do not require full-time dedicated
lines to have access, when needed, to a more sophisticated
telecommunications network than they otherwise could afford.
When telecommunications networks are further combined
with distributed electronic data processing, in which "smart" terminals do many of the functions previously performed by central
processing units, the efficient scale of operation for the
information-handling aspects of banking may be much further increased.2 31 Moreover, it is likely that this trend will continue, if
not accelerate. The introduction ofnew telecommunications-networking technologies over the next several years is assured and the rate
of technical advance in the computing field is making each generation of ever-increasing-capacity computers less expensive than the
generation of machines displaced.
Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that computing and
telecommunication networks together may have an efficient scale
so large that only a small number of enterprises could be supported in any one market.2

32

To the extent that the value of bank-

ing services is attributable to such information-handling tech227. See Baker, Banking Competition in the Age of the Computer, 90 BANKING L.J. 193, 194-95 (1973).

228. International Data Corp., Worldwide Industry Seminar H-23 (1977).
229.

C. LECHT, THE WAVES OF CHANGE 10 (1977).

230. See Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Services and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976), reconsidered 62 F.C.C.2d 588
(1977), aff'd sub nom. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
231. At the same time, small computers and smart terminals decrease the unit
costs of computation at a lower level of output and could, in principle, some day
lower the optimal scale of computer operations.
232. See generally W. BAXTER, P. COOTNER & K. SCOTT, RETAIL BANKING IN
THE ELECTRONIC AGE (1977).
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nologies, the efficient scale for banking enterprises can be expected
to increase similarly and to tend, in the extreme, toward "natural
oligopoly." 2 33 Regulation that prevents the realization of such scale

economies will therefore impose increasingly high opportunity
2 34
costs on banks and deadweight efficiency losses on the public.

It is reasonable to infer that banks will devote increasing efforts to circumventing such scale-reducing limitations, including
the state-by-state banking system. In fact, as detailed at the end of
the following subsection, banks are already turning their attention
to electronic means of penetrating interstate markets: in 1980, sev2 35
eral banks announced plans for interstate ATM networks.
2. Interstate Banking Today.-Virtually all of the activities in
which BHCs are allowed to engage are also permissible for national
and most state banks. 236 Insofar as the BHC engages in the activity
through an office outside of its home state, however, it will generally be exercising a power that is not open to the bank. Still, as
will be shown, banks themselves have been able to establish some
commercial and retail direct presence in host states. Generally, the
type of banking activities conducted through host-state offices of
the bank could lawfully be routed through the BHC or a nonbank
subsidiary. Other limitations, however, such as the availability of
capital in light of the restrictions on credit transactions between
the bank and its affiliates,2 37 generally make it preferable to organ233. The nature of a communications network would be critical in creating a
tendency toward natural oligopoly or monopoly in the handling of banking data. Just

as two telephone networks serving the same area would be wasteful, so too are dual
interchange systems for standardized credit card sales slips (or on-line data transmissions in lieu thereof), and two separate networks of interconnected teller machines
serving the same area, each with a central computer. See Bernard, New Directionsin
Bankcard Competition, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 65, 82 (1980). But see Letter from
Donald I. Baker, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice to
William B. Brandt, Nebraska Bankers Ass'n (March 7, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
NETS letter] (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review).
234. Of course, the alternative arrangement, in which a monopolist or a few
firms supply banking services, also promises to impose opportunity costs on society,
such as those derived from a lack of technological innovation in the absence of competition. See NETS letter, supra note 233. But cf. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

OF LAW 205 (2d ed. 1977) (reward for successful innovation often greater for monopolist).
235. See text accompanying notes 311-324 infra.
236. See text accompanying notes 52, 138-144, supra.
237. With minor exceptions, member and nonmember insured banks are prohibited from lending to any one affiliate more than 10%, and to all affiliates more
than 20%, of their capital and surplus. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c (1976) (member banks),
1828(j)(1) (Supp. III 1979) (nonmember insured banks).
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ize activities directly through the bank where permissible. With
this understanding, the typology of interstate activities used below,
which is based in part upon the distinction between bank and
nonbank offices, will not be misleading.
a. Commercial Interstate Banking.-In order to serve commercial customers nationwide, major banks have established three
types of presence on an interstate basis. These are directed respectively to cultivating loan business, providing cash-management services, and servicing international transactions.
i. Loan Production Offices (LPOs) and Call Programs.-The
larger a borrower's needs, of course, the more willing it is to invest
in shopping among banks. The largest corporate borrowers and the
banks that serve them operate in international and national markets. Middle-sized corporations typically shop among only the
larger banks in their region of the country. In recent years, however, major money-center banks have attempted to compete for
the business of these middle-sized companies that was previously
the exclusive province of the regional banks.
At first the money-center banks relied on "call programs" to
market their loans. Salesmen would be dispatched to call on potential borrowers and solicit their business. Some states attempted to
limit the call programs of out-of-state banks. There seems to have
been little justification for their efforts other than the desire tc protect home markets for home-state banks. As a formal matter, Ihowever, they took the position that the out-of-state bank was en aged
in the business of banking, without a charter, when its loan ot cers
called upon in-state borrowers. Rhode Island took the striptest
view, maintaining that an out-of-state bank could not lawfully send
a "warm body" into the state. 23 8 Connecticut may have taken a
slightly less extreme view by providing that the representative of
an out-of-state bank could not lawfully stay overnight in the
2 39

state.

After experience with call programs, some banks determined
that it would be more effective to open permanent LPOs from
which to base their marketing operations. In 1974, Martin Mayer
reported that the First National Banks of Chicago and Boston, and
238. Telephone interview with Edward Blue, Chief Examiner, R.I. Dep't of
Business Regulation, Banking Division (Mar. 25, 1981).
239. Apparently, any hotel room in which a representative of an out-of-state

bank might stay would thereby become an unlawful branch of the out-of-state bank.
In telephone interviews with representatives of the Connecticut Division of Banking, this view was embraced in 1978 but disavowed in 1981.
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the First Pennsylvania Bank, all planned to open regional offices
throughout the United States within the next few years. 240 It is not
known how many LPOs exist, however, or what banks have established them, or where. 24 1 Some states prohibit or require approval
of LPOs on the ground that they are branches; some require them
to register with the state regulator; still others, including
California, freely permit them by statute or policy, thus vexing any
2 42
hope of getting an accurate tally.
Whether an LPO is a "branch" within the meaning of the
McFadden Act is unclear. The Comptroller has issued an interpretive ruling that LPOs are not branches "[p]rovided, that the loans
are approved and made at the main office or a branch office of the
bank .
"243
,
In litigation challenging this interpretation, evidence was presented indicating that "the Comptroller has construed the ruling narrowly in letters sent to banks subject to his jurisdiction."' 244 Some of these letters clearly responded to inquiries
from banks interested in establishing LPOs oriented toward the
retail-loan market, for they expressly prohibited LPOs from being
used for such activities as "making forms available for opening
2 45
checking or savings accounts" and "accepting loan payments."
Nonetheless, the district court could still accurately characterize
LPOs as "facilities [that] provide all essential services connected
with obtaining loans except approval (which may be communicated
by telephone to the LPO from the main or branch office), and disbursement of proceeds." 2 46 It concluded that an LPO "gives national banks a distinct competitive advantage over state banks in
those states where state banks are prohibited from operating simi240. M. MAYER, supra note 219, at 259.
241. The Bank of New York, in an advertising supplement to the American
Banker, asserts that New York banks alone "have over a hundred commercial loan
production offices in 24 states." Am. Banker, June 24, 1981 (advertising supplement).
242. The position taken by each state as of May 1, 1978, and its source in law
or administrative practice, are reported in Brief for Amicus Curiae Conference of
State Bank Supervisors at E:11-20, Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann,
627 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980). While California does not require LPOs to obtain licenses, it does require that individual representatives of out-of-state banks be licensed, pursuant to CAL. FIN. CODE § 1780 (West Supp. 1981). The State Banking
Department has proposed to license officers rather than individuals. See CAL. SEN.
BILL 785 (1981).
243. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7380 (1981) (emphasis in original).
244. Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 627 F.2d 486, 488n. (D.C.

Cir. 1980).
245. Id. at 488-89n.
246. Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, No. 78-0811, slip op. at 5
(D.D.C. Mar. 29, 1979).
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lar facilities,"247 and on this ground characterized LPOs as branch
banks. Accordingly, they would be subject to the McFadden Act
and could not be established in states other than the home state of
the bank. The district court's opinion was reversed on other
grounds,2 48 however, and the legal status of a national bank's LPOs
under the McFadden Act remains unsettled.
ii. Cash Management Services.-Banks provide a variety of
services to aid corporate treasurers in the management of their deposits. 2 49 A corporation may arrange, through the bank managing
its cash and that bank's correspondents, to receive payments from
customers in banks throughout the country in order to minimize
the amount of mail time and maximize interest.2 5 0 The corporation
will therefore maintain a "concentration account" at one bank to
which excess balances will be transferred by wire on a daily basis. 2 51 The bank providing the concentration account will undertake
to keep all balances invested in interest-earning assets each day.
Consequently, it will continually be receiving, aggregating, and investing funds on behalf of the corporate depositor. It may also
maintain target balances in each of the depository banks in order to
compensate them for their services to the corporation; indeed, this
entire operation may be conducted on a multinational basis
involving hundreds of banks and dozens of currencies every day.
A bank performing cash-management services may report to
the treasurer of the corporate customer by telephone or wire several times each day. In this way the corporate treasurer can retain
control over the decisionmaking process as situations requiring investment or currency transactions arise. Recently some banks have
offered improved communication and control capacity by linking
their corporate customers directly to the bank's computer and
money-market desks through the installation of an on-line com247. Id.
248. 627 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (laches).

249. Examples are lock boxes, remote disbursements, multilateral netting for affiliate payments, and foreign-exchange dealing. See generally Bonocore, Making
Cash Management More Marketable, BANKERS MAG., Jan.-Dec., 1980, at 49.
250. For example, the Kroger Company was once reported to use more than
800 banks through which to receive collections. Mathur & Luisada, Cash Management Services Offered by Banks, BANKERS MAG., Jan.-Dec., 1980, at 62, 63, citing Z.
MELNYK & C. BARNGROVER, CASES IN BUSINESS FINANCE (1971). Recently, however,

corporations have been reducing the number of their banking relationships.
Wittebort, The Frantic New Pace of Cash Management, 15 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1981, at 179, 181.

251.

See Wittebort, supra note 250, at 191.
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puter terminal that has a cathode-ray tube used for video display
(jointly referred to as a CRT) at the customer's premises. In its
most sophisticated form to date, the customer's CRT continuously
provides current information on the corporation's cash position, is
preprogrammed to instruct the bank's computer regarding
recurring transactions such as dividend payments and payrolls to
be met at particular times and places, and enables the corporate
treasurer to instruct the bank or its computer regarding nonrecurring or irregular transactions such as payments to suppliers and investment of proceeds of loan transactions.2 52 Indeed, one major
bank gives its customers direct access to its account at the Fed; the
corporation can transfer funds in and out of the bank's Fed account
over lines linking the bank's computer to the Fed's.
Under current case law it is unclear whether terminals and
CRTs installed in corporate offices and linked to bank computers
are branch banks under the McFadden Act. In Independent Bankers Association of America v. Smith,2 5 3 the court of appeals held
that customer-bank communication terminals (CBCTs) are branch
banks. CBCTs, which include both ATMs and point-of-sale (POS)
terminals, were described by the court:
CBCT's are manned or unmanned electronic terminals
which, depending on how the machines are programmed, permit
an existing bank customer to accomplish various financial transactions, including the deposit and withdrawal of funds and the
transfer of funds between accounts. These automated tellers may
be installed off bank premises in shopping centers, supermarkets, stores, factories, office buildings, etc., and any approved
bank customer with a plastic "key card" can effect transactions at
these terminals. Some CBCT's are connected directly to their
254
bank's central computer ....
In the court's view CBCTs were branches within the Supreme
Court's reasoning in First National Bank v. Dickinson,2 55 which
characterized an armored-car deposit-pickup service as a branch
because it enabled the bank to gain a competitive advantage with
respect to the convenience of locations at which "deposits are re-

252. See, e.g., Kutler, Chase Cash Management Net Offers Firms Immediate
Access to Money Transfers, Am. Banker, Feb. 24, 1978, at 1, col. 2; Wall St. J., June
10, 1980, at 9 (advertisement for Citibank).
253. 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
254. Id. at 924.
255. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
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ceived, or checks paid, or money lent." 25 6 The CBCT received de-

posits within the meaning of the McFadden Act not only by accepting an "ordinary deposit into a customer's checking or savings
account" but also by allowing customers to make "(1) transfers of
funds between two accounts of the same customer and (2) payments on installment loans or credit card accounts." 25 7 In the case
of CRTs installed in corporate treasurers' offices, the bank is clearly
enabling the customer to make "transfers of funds between two accounts." When the customer moves funds from the Fed or another
bank into its account at the linked bank, therefore, it is as clearly
making a "deposit" as would be the retail customer effecting a
transfer between savings and checking accounts through the
CBCT. Furthermore, if the corporate customer repays a loan or
compensates the bank for its cash-management services by making
payments or keeping compensating balances effected over the
linked system, it may be making the second type of "deposit"
found in the CBCT case.
The court also held that CBCTs are places at which "checks
[are] paid." The court admitted that it would be difficult to fit anything involved in an unmanned-CBCT withdrawal transaction into
the definition of a "check" as it is used in either the Uniform Commercial Code258 or in ordinary language. Reasoning that "the
technological change from paper checks to plastic cards as a new
means by which banks 'pay checks' " was of no significance to the
policy underlying the McFadden Act, however, the court stated:
"If future technological innovations render paper checks totally obsolete, [the McFadden Act] will still include within its broad
standard those facilities that permit bank customers to perform the
traditional banking function of withdrawing funds from their accounts." 259 Of course, the court here was contemplating technological advances that still resulted in a retail customer receiving a
bundle of currency from a banking facility. It did not contemplate
that a corporate customer would be transferring large sums of
money from its account at the linked bank to its accounts elsewhere. Nonetheless, under the court's approach it is difficult to see
how the corporate CRT can be distinguished from the retail CBCT
as a place where deposits are received and checks paid. 260
256.

12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1976).

257.
258.
259.
260.

534 F.2d at 940, 941.
See U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b).
534 F.2d at 944.
An alternative interpretation of the McFadden Act's definition of a
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Of course, the issue will arise only if some banks are put at a
competitive disadvantage because their state determines that CRTs
are branches and thus either prohibited or geographically limited.
There would seem to be no policy reason for a state to so hold, except in the interstate context. Consider the situation faced by the
small and even some regional banks that are not competitors in the
cash-management market. Concerned about losing balances to
money-center banks, such banks might well convince their state
regulator that CRTs are branches of the money-center banks to
which they are linked and thus attempt to prevent their installation
in the host state.
As in the case of LPOs, comprehensive information about the
prevalence, location, and interstate penetration of cash-management CRTs is not available because the banks that provide this
service have assumed that they are not engaged in branching. Accordingly, they have not sought official approval of their activities
and have certainly not filed branch applications for each CRT unit
installed.
iii. Edge Act Corporations.-Since 1919 the FRB has been
empowered to charter so-called Edge Act corporations "for the
purpose of engaging in international or foreign banking"2 6 1 and
other foreign financial operations. Until the International Banking
Act of 1978,262 any United States citizen could establish an Edge
Act corporation, but in fact only domestic banks did so. 26 3 Some
banks, indeed, established Edge Act corporations in several states,
since they could not branch. These parent banks tended to be very
large, since each Edge Act corporation must have at least
$2,000,000 of paid-in capital,2 64 while their banking activities are
limited to the facilitation of international transactions. Thus they
could issue letters of credit, create bankers' acceptances, make
loans to finance imports and exports, accept domestic deposits
"branch," which would exclude the corporate CRT from its ambit, is offered at text
accompanying notes 729-737 infra.
261. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
262. Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 [hereinafter cited as International Banking
Act of 1978].
263. See S. REP. No. 1073, 95th CONG., 2d SEss. 5 (1978); Note, The Edge Act:
Will Recent Changes Give Banks with Interstate Subsidiaries an Edge in Domestic
as Well as InternationalBanking?, 4 N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 285, 289 n.26 (1979).
264. 12 U.S.C. § 618 (Supp. III 1979). Only three banks with assets under $1
billion had opened Edges under the pre-IBA regime. Abrams, supra note 206, at 9;
see Cobb, A Shot in the Arm for Edge Act Corporations, 97 BANKING L.J. 236

(1980).
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linked to payments for international transactions, and accept any
deposits from foreign sources. As of 1979 there were only 131
2 65
Edge Act corporations.

The International Banking Act of 1978 made foreign banks eligible to own Edge Act corporations 266 as part of a compromise under which the foreign banks lost their de facto exemption from the
McFadden Act. 267 Foreign banks, that is, lost the privilege of

adding new, full-service domestic banking facilities outside of a
designated "home" state, but were allowed to open branches in
multiple states, state law permitting, if they limited their deposittaking to those an Edge Act corporation could accept. 268 Lending
authority was not similarly restricted, however; thus, foreign bank
branches retain an advantage over a domestic (or foreign) bank's
Edge Act corporations. At the same time, Edge Act corporations
were given the right to exercise substantially broader powers, 269
making them more attractive to domestic banks and less
unattractive to foreign banks as a substitute for full-service interstate banking.
Edge Act corporations are still limited to transactions with an
international aspect. Within that limitation, however, Congress instructed the FRB to reregulate them in order better to realize
their statutory purposes, especially that of facilitating United States
exports. 270 Accordingly, the FRB has broadened its concept of
what is related to an international transaction. 271 For example, an
Edge Act corporation may now finance not only the sale and shipment of exported goods but also their production and storage
where they are identifiably destined for international commerce. 272
The FRB has also determined that Edge Act corporations may
open branch offices 273 "to foster the participation by regional and
265. Abrams, supra note 206, at 9.
266. International Banking Act of 1978, supra note
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 619 (1976)).
267. See Note, supra note 263, at 292.
268. 12 U.S.C. § 3103 (Supp. III 1979).
269. International Banking Act of 1978, supra note
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 611a (1976) (declaration of policy));
of 1978, supra note 262, § 3(d), -(e) (amending 12 U.S.C. §

262, § 3(f), 92 Stat. 609

262, § 3(b), 92 Stat. 609
International Banking Act
615 (1976)) (deleting lim-

itation on liabilities and 10% reserve requirement in favor of such conditions as the
Fed may prescribe). Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 211A(d) (1980) (member bank reserve requirements applied to Edge Act corporations).
270. 12 U.S.C. § 611a (Supp. III 1979).
271. See generally 44 Fed. Reg. 36,007 (1979).
272. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(e)(4)(v) (1980).
273. Id. § 211.4(c).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

60

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking
19811

INTERSTATE BANKING

smaller banks throughout the United States in the provision of international banking and financing services."2 74 Prior to being given
branching authority, each location required separate incorporation
and capital of $2,000,000. With branching, it is now possible for a
single Edge Act corporation with $2,000,000 of capital to have as
many offices as the FRB agrees the parent bank can prudently
and
manage, in any community whose international banking
2 75
financing needs warrant the addition of a new competitor.
In the first eighteen months under the new regime for Edge
Acts, eleven banks received approval to establish twenty-eight new
Edge-Act-corporation branch offices. 276 In addition, several banks

have proposed to consolidate their existing Edge Act corporations
into one company with branch offices, thereby increasing the loan
limit, which is ten percent of the corporation's capital and surplus,
available at each location. For example, the Bank of America has
merged its Edge Act corporations in Chicago, Houston, Miami,
and New York, and intends to open new branches of the consolidated company in Atlanta, Boston, Cleveland, Dallas, Minneapolis,
and St. Louis. 277 Citibank plans to convert its Chicago, Houston,
Los Angeles, and San Francisco Edge Act corporations into
branches of its Florida Edge Act corporation (Citibank
Interamerica) and to open new branches of the Florida unit in At278
lanta, Boston, Cleveland, Minneapolis, St. Louis, and Seattle.
Other major banks are considering or pursuing similar plans to
279
consolidate and extend their existing Edge Act networks.
The Edge Act corporation is now an important element in interstate commercial banking. It enables major banks to establish a
commercial bank presence in many cities while giving regional
274.

12 U.S.C. § 611a.

275. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.4(c), (a)(1) (1980).
276.

J. Houpt, Performance and Characteristics of Edge Corporations 41-42

(Fed Staff Study No. 110 Jan. 1981) (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review).
277. Id.; Wall St. J., July 31, 1980, at 8, col. 1. The Bank of America's Nassau,

Bahamas branch was also to be merged into the new Edge Act corporation, to be
called BankAmerica International. Id.
278. Am. Banker, Nov. 14, 1979, at 1, col. 3, at 26, col. 3.
279. See id. at 1, col. 3. (Security Pacific Nat'l Bank applied to Fed; six other
major banks considering doing so). The Fed has approved Chase Manhattan Bank's
application to merge Edge corporations, open new branches, and provide combined
capital of $100 million. BNA Wash. Financial Rep., Jan. 12, 1981, at A-17. Continental Illinois National Bank will consolidate its Edge corporation subsidiaries in New
York, Miami, Houston, and Los Angeles, and open six new branches in 1981. Letter
from Robert Walker, Vice President & Associate General Counsel, Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank (Jan. 7, 1981) (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review).
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banks access to locations they consider important for servicing existing customers' international transactions or acquiring new international business. Thus a regional bank in Atlanta may open an
Edge Act office in Miami because many of its present and potential
customers import and export through that city; at the same time, it
may establish a presence in the New York market which is a source
of prestige to a regional bank and can "lead to more loan opportu28 0
nities, both in a managing as well as a participating position."
Each Edge Act office may also serve to cross-sell, implicitly or explicitly, the services of its parent bank and act as a loan production
office for it. The FRB would disapprove of the Edge's acting as an
LPO with respect to domestic transactions that the Edge could not
itself book, but business-development activity of this kind does not
necessarily come to the attention of the Fed's examiners.
b. Retail Banking Interstate.-Banks' inability to open
branches across state lines has more effectively impeded their penetration of distant retail markets than of out-of-state commercial
markets. Nonetheless, some banks have attempted to overcome the
competitive disadvantage inherent in being physically absent from
a retail-market area.
i. Credit Cards.-The interstate extension of consumer credit
has been vastly facilitated by the popularity of bank credit cards.
Prior to the widespread use of these cards, banks' consumer loans
were heavily weighted toward secured loans. Security usually
consisted of the chattel purchased with the loan's proceeds, securities, or a savings account passbook. As late as 1974 most banks
were still uncomfortable making unsecured personal loans. They
were typically made only to established depositors as an accommodation. 281 In the latter part of the 1960s, banks entered the
credit card business on a large scale. Today most banks are issuers
of either MasterCard of Visa, or both,2 8 2 and there are thirty-five
million of these bank cards outstanding.2 83 Almost all of the nearly
$6 billion 284 in credit extended by means of these cards is
unsecured.
Once involved in extending unsecured consumer-credit lines
accessed by cards, some banks have realized that there is little reason to limit their sights to the local market. Bank credit card rela280. Note, supra note 263, at 294.
281. M. MAYER, supra note 219, at 334.

282. See Am. Banker, Feb. 3, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
283. Of these, more than 23 million represent active accounts. Id.
284. Id. (dollar volume).
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tionships, unlike personal loans, are typically established through
impersonal applications. If the application is approved, the bank
establishes a line of credit and mails a card to the new account
holder. Making inquiries of the card applicant's employer, local
credit bureau, and credit references is no more expensive when
done by mail. Processing sales drafts and billing customers are
equally insensitive to distance; even collection efforts are probably
no more difficult over distance, since most banks give delinquent
consumer accounts to outside collection agencies even when the
borrower is within the local market.
Some major banks have engaged in mass solicitation of credit
card accounts on a regional or nationwide basis. In August 1977,
Citibank, which then had more than one million MasterCard holders in metropolitan New York, conducted a mass mailing to Visa
holders in twenty-five states. It is reported to have as many as 5.8
million Visa and MasterCard holders now, 28 5 and claims to have at
least 25,000 in each of twenty-five states. 2 6 In Marquette National
Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 28 7 it was
stipulated that the First National Bank of Omaha solicited
Minnesota residents "on a continuous and systematic basis" to accept Visa and that it did so by "direct mail solicitation, telephone
contact and through Minnesota banks."288 The First National Bank
of Chicago, as amicus curiae, informed the court that more than
400,000 of its more than 1.5 million Visa accounts were held by
residents of states other than Illinois. 28 9 Before the advent of
nationwide bank credit card systems, it would have been inconceivable even for a bank as large as the First National Bank of
Chicago to have established that many consumer loans, secured or
unsecured, across state lines.
ii. Retail LPOs.-There is some evidence that banks have established LPOs for the purpose of originating consumer loans. In

285. Citicorp Transfer of Credit Card Center to South Dakota Has July Target

Date, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1980, at 12, col. 2 (5.8 million cardholders); cf. Rose, The
Back Door to Interstate Banking, Am. Banker, Feb. 5, 1980, at 1, col. 2, at 4, col. 1

("about 5 million" cardholders).
286.

OCC Opinion on Application to Charter Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. 3

(Nov. 19, 1980).
287. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 262 N.W. 2d 358, 360
(Minn. 1977), aff'd, 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
288. Id.
289. Brief of Amicus Curiae First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, at 1-2, Marquette
Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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Independent Bankers Association of America v. Heimann,290 the
district court found that "[national banks operating such facilities
advertise them as 'financial centers,' 'Money Marts,' 'consumer
loan offices,' 'personal banker,' etc.,"' 29 1 all of which imply a consumer orientation, as does advertising them. As indicated earlier,
the district court held that these LPOs were "branches," contrary
to the Comptroller's interpretive ruling, and the court of appeals,
in reversing it on other grounds, referred to several letter rulings
of the Comptroller in response to bank inquiries concerning the
provision of various retail services at LPOs. 2 92 The case of
Oklahoma v. American National Bank & Trust Co. 29 3 was a suit
under the McFadden Act to close a particular bank's clearly
consumer-oriented LPO. Finally, Maryland National Bank opened
a loan production office in Wilmington, Delaware in 1977 to solicit
consumer-loan business. The State of Delaware sought to enjoin
operation of the office on the ground that it constituted an unlawful
branch. 29 4 The action was settled in 1979, however, when the bank
agreed to close the LPO for what it says are business reasons. 2 95
While the number of retail LPOs is unknown, it is doubtful
there are many of them in operation either inside or outside the
parent bank's home state. It is significant that there is no litigation,
other than the three cases reported above, implicating retail LPOs.
Given the risk that an LPO would be characterized as an unauthorized branch, a bank would not be likely to establish an LPO where
it could lawfully establish a branch (or perhaps even just an office
of a consumer-finance-company affiliate). In the concrete cases reported above, American National Bank was located in a unit banking state2 96 and Maryland National Bank was attempting to cross a
290.

No. 78-0811, slip op. (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1979) rev'd on other grounds, 627

F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
291.

Id. at 2 n.3.

292. See text accompanying notes 244, 246-247 supra.
293. No. Civ. 78-0304-E (W.D. Okla. filed July 28, 1978) (LPO enjoined).
294. Wier v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, No. 98-256 (D. Del. filed June 7, 1979) (stipulation of dismissal).
295. According to the state, "the matter was settled in light of the pleadings,
the District of D.C.'s order [in IBAA v. Heimann] to the Comptroller to rescind the

[LPO] Interpretive Ruling, and its eventual rescission." Letter from Don C. Brown,
Deputy Attorney General of Delaware to the author (Sept. 5, 1980). The settlement
agreement was not filed with the court however. Id. According to Mr. Raymond
Nichols, a vice president of Maryland Nat'l Bank, the bank was thus able to maintain
its legal position while closing the LPO in light of money market conditions that
made consumer lending unattractive. Telephone interview with Mr. Nichols (Aug.

21, 1980).
296. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 501 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
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state line; thus neither had the option of branching. In such situations, the LPO would certainly be challenged by a competing bank
or other lender in the host community, if not by the host state it7
self.29
Commercially oriented LPOs, on the other hand, are less
likely to provoke legal challenges from competitors. First, they
compete with other large banks that are themselves likely to want
to establish LPOs and thus unlikely to bring suit. Second, their operations need not be as visible as those of a retail-oriented LPO.
Retail LPOs need a retailing location and may well advertise. Consequently, one can reasonably infer that retail LPOs, unlike
commerical LPOs, are probably not much more extensive than
298
published reports reveal.
The legal status of retail LPOs, like that of commercial LPOs,
is unclear. In the American National Bank299 case, an intrastate office of a national bank was held to be a branch at which money was
lent; that result seems indisputable, however, since all steps in
making a loan-except approval by a loan officer, which was done
by telephone-were handled at the branch, including the disbursement of loan proceeds. Whether a consumer LPO that neither approves loans nor disburses loan proceeds-such as the OCC has
required-is a branch, remains unsettled.
There is no basis in the McFadden Act, however, for distinguishing nonapproving and nondisbursing consumer LPOs from
297. Curiously, it seems that both of the banks mentioned in the text could
have opened a finance company subsidiary of their BHC in the targeted markets;
neither Delaware nor Oklahoma appears to impose a "convenience and need" test to
the licensing of finance companies. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2101-2111 (1974 &
Supp. 1980) (small loan law); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-504 (West 1972) (licen-

sure of supervised lenders). Perhaps their preference for a direct branch of the bank
reflected more liberal regimes governing the terms of bank loans than finance com-

pany loans.
298.

The three cases discussed above are reported in Machalaba, Legal Fight is

Starting Over Offices Used by Big Banks to Obtain Consumer Loans, Wall St. J.,
June 2, 1978, at 6, col. 2. Adverse opinions of the Attorney General of Arkansas (June
4, 1969), and the Georgia Supt. of Banks (Dec. 31, 1968), concerning LPOs are noted
3169.757, 3169.294. Consumer
respectively in 1 FED. BANK L. REP. (CCH)
LPOs have also been used in attempts to overcome intrastate geographical restric-

tions on branching. See Ind. LPO is 1st Cross-County Action, Am. Banker, Sept. 4,
1980, at 2, col. 1 (non-approving, non-disbursing LPO in Indiana, which limits
branches to bank's home county); cf. Ill. Op. Att'y Gen'l S-1040 (Jan. 26, 1976); id.
S-512 (Sept. 14, 1972); id. UP-2036 (Nov. 22, 1968); 1 FED. BANK. L. REP. (CCH)

3169.332 (proposed bank loan solicitation offices would be branches and thus unlawful).
299.

Oklahoma ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co.,

No. Civ. 78-0304-E (W.D. Okla. Aug. 28, 1978).
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nonapproving and nondisbursing commerical LPOs. 30 0 Thus their

legal status will necessarily be resolved together.
iii. Solicitation of Deposits.-There are no legal inhibitions on
a bank's soliciting deposits from individuals in other states. 30 1
There are, however, practical constraints. The maximum rates of

interest payable on various types of insured-bank deposits are set
by regulation. 30 2 In recent years, these maxima have often been
below rates available to depositors from competing investments,

notably money-market funds. 30 3 In addition, they have been kept
consistently below the rates payable by insured savings and loan
associations (by one-quarter of one percent). 30 4 Unable to engage
in effective interest-rate competition for deposits, banks have emphasized service competition (for example, opening convenient
branches and maintaining longer banking hours). 30 5 Banks without
a physical presence in a market are therefore at a substantial disadvantage when they solicit depositors by mail or advertising.
Even when there is interest-rate competition among banks,

300. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
301. A national bank, for example, may "transact" its business only at its main
and authorized branch places of business, 12 U.S.C. § 81 (1976), and any place at
which it "receives" deposits is a branch, id. § 36(f), but these limitations do not encumber its ability lawfully to solicit deposits anywhere. The Constitution almost certainly prohibits the states from preventing an out-of-state bank's solicitation of deposits so long as it is not "doing business" in the host state.
302. See 12 C.F.R. § 217.7 (1980) (Reg. Q governing member banks); id. §
329.6 (1980) (insured nonmember banks). The anti-competitive purpose and effect of
regulating the interest rates payable on deposits are obvious; congressional authorization of such regulation in 1933 can be seen as part of the general, then orthodox,
philosophy of political economy that held "excessive competition" responsible for
exacerbating the Depression. See Chandler, Monopolistic Elements in Commercial
Banking, 46 J. POL. ECON. 1, 13 (1938). See also Clark, The Soundness of Financial
Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 26-44 (1976) (anticompetitive regulation as one of
four common strategies of risk regulation).
303. As a result, money market funds now hold balances in excess of $120 billion, notwithstanding their uninsured status. See Wall St. J., June 12, 1981, at 31, col.
4. Most of these balances would almost certainly be held in bank and thrift transaction and savings accounts but for the interest rate controls to which those institutions
are subject; some of the balances are apparently made up of temporarily available investment funds, however.
304. See 12 U.S.C. § 1425b(a) (1976) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board authority
to regulate interest paid by thrifts); Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 102,
89 Stat. 1124, as amended by Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1602, 92
Stat. 3713 (directing that interest rate differential be maintained unless both Houses
of Congress approve of its elimination or reduction).
305. See, e.g., D. Pyle, Changes in the Financial Services Industry in California
4 £Univ. Cal. Inst. Gov't'l Studies, No. 1, 1978).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

66

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking
1981]

INTERSTATE BANKING

there are substantial drawbacks for a consumer doing business with
a distant bank. First, without a local bank, many individuals would
be without a convenient place to obtain cash. Second, although
consumers are more likely to succeed in obtaining a personal loan
at the bank where they maintain a deposit relationship, they may
nonetheless have difficulty if that bank is distant. This factor will
be particularly compelling for relatively high-income depositors
who are most likely to have business and personal banking needs
sufficient to warrant cultivating a personal relationship with an individual bank and bank officer.
Periodically, nonetheless, competition for deposits spurs a
bank to solicit deposits from distant markets. In order to succeed,
of course, the bank must offer some innovation not locally available
in the host state. Thus a New York savings bank recently began offering a "finder's fee" to Floridians who convinced a friend to deposit $3,000 or more. The same offer had been met by competing
banks in New York but was new in Florida and attracted deposits
of $500,000 in the first week. 30 6 For another example, in 1980 the
Chase Manhattan Bank offered by interstate mail a package of
banking services including not only deposit accounts but also bill
not available
paying by telephone, Visa credit, and other features
30 7
together at a single bank in most, if any, markets.
Citibank is considering offering a "credit balance" feature on
Visa accounts as a substitute for a conventional bank account. °
The idea would be to attract funds from cardholders nationwide,
giving them access by card, Visa draft, and telephone bill-paying
service, and paying them at higher rates of interest than are
permitted on insured deposits subject to Regulation Q. 309 The
Bank of America is also considering a credit-balance feature on its
cards. 310
iv. ATM Networks.-Several banks have opened or announced plans to open interstate networks of shared-use ATMs. 31 1
306. Savings Drive Goes Interstate,Am. Banker, July 21, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
307. See Letter from Todd Hoffman, Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. to the author
describing "Chase Full Benefit Banking" (April 17, 1980).
308. See Rose, supra note 285.
309. See note 302 supra. Regarding the closely related credit card product
since offered by Citicorp Financial, Inc., a nonbank subsidiary of the BHC, see text
accompanying notes 363-368 infra.
310. See BankAmerica's Cards Ready, Am. Banker, Mar. 5, 1980, at 3, col. 3.
311. See, e.g., 1st Tenn. Launches ATM Network for Correspondents in 7
States, Am. Banker, July 22, 1980, at 3, col. 1; Girard of Phila. Forming EFT Net in
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These are unmanned CBCTs at which the customers of any
participating bank can make deposits, withdraw cash, transfer sums
between accounts, and make loan payments. Customers will not be
able to make deposits at ATMs in a state other than that of their
bank in all except one of the interstate systems announced thus
far. 312 This limitation is apparently being imposed in the hope of
avoiding characterization of the ATMs as branches for McFadden
3 13
Act purposes.
In the Independent Bankers case, discussed above, 3 14 an
unshared ATM located at a site remote from a bank was held under the McFadden Act to be a branch of the bank that established
it. Unshared remote ATMs are thus permitted equally to state and
national banks in states that do not treat ATMs as branches and in
states that do treat them as branches but in which branching is
lawful. In either type of state, a national bank must make an abbreviated branch application to the Comptroller, whereas a state bank
must apply to its primary regulator only in states that treat ATMs
3 15
as branches.
Independent Bankers did not deal with networks of shared
ATMs programmed to enable card holders to access their accounts
at one bank from a terminal that is established by a second bank,
either on its premises or at a remote site. The case also did not address ATMs that could access a bank account across state lines.
Shared use of an ATM raises the question, "Of which bank(s) is the
ATM a branch"? The shared ATM could be characterized as a
branch only of the bank that owns or leases the machine but this
leaves a major gap in the law, for it is not necessary that any bank
own or lease the ATM. A nonbank subsidiary of a BHC or a "bank
service corporation," a type of joint venture among banks, 316 could
do so, as could a computer communications network company
Three States, Am. Banker, July 1, 1980, at 1, col. 1; W. Coast ATM Net Goes Interstate, id. at 15, col. 1.

312. See FG Electronically Links Area Banks, Washington Star, Sept. 6, 1980,
at B-5, col. 1. Financial General Bankshares, Inc., a gmndfathered multistate BHC

with subsidiary banks in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, has established a nonbank subsidiary, Money Exchange Service, that would operate the 59
ATMs of the three banks in the metropolitan Washington area; depositors of the D.C.

and Maryland banks would be able to effect any transaction, including a deposit, at
ATMs in either jurisdiction. Id.

313. See, e.g., id.
314. See text accompanying note 253 supra.

315. Insured state and state-member banks, however, must apply to the FDIC
and the Fed, respectively. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976) (member banks).
316. See 12 U.S.C. § 1861(b) (1976).
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unaffiliated with any bank or BHC. Alternatively, the ATM could
be characterized as a branch of each bank that shares its use, 31 7 or
of none of them. In the interstate context, the Comptroller has
taken the position that an ATM is a branch only of the bank in the
host state, if any, that owns or leases it, and not of the home-state
national bank that arranges for its customers to use the ATM for a
transaction fee. 318 In the intrastate context, this ruling reintroduces
the potential for competitive inequality that the court of appeals
sought to minimize in Independent Bankers. That is, if home-state
law treats as a branch each ATM in which a state bank shares use
and the Comptroller does not do so with respect to national banks,
then national banks, unlike state banks, will be able to share use of
319
ATMs without geographical limitation.
317.

See, e.g., [1974] ILL. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPs. 150.

318. CBCTs Across State Lines May be Used by National Banks, OCC Letter
No. 153 (July 7, 1980), reprintedin FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,234. This ruling emphasizes the court's statement in Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v.
Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 951 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976), that
any facility that performs the traditional bank functions of receiving or
disbursing funds is a "branch" within the meaning of section 36(f) if (1) the
facility is established (i.e., owned or rented) by the bank, and (2) it offers the
bank's customers a convenience that gives the bank a competitive advantage
over other banks (national or state). (emphasis supplied in OCC Letter).
In Independent Bankers, however, the court was distinguishing a proprietary
ATM from a mailbox and a telephone, to which the Comptroller had analogized the
ATM as just another means of access to a bank account. The court rejoined that in
those cases "no place or facility established (i.e., owned or rented) by a bank is involved." Id. at 941. It supported its distinction with the Supreme Court's phrase in
the armored car case (First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969)) describing
a branch as "a bank facility apart from (the bank's) chartered place of business." 534
F.2d at 941 n.72 (emphasis added by the court).
The OCC is thus elevating form over substance in ruling that an ATM at bank A
is not a branch of bank B whose customers use it to access their accounts at bank B
simply because bank B does not "own or rent" the ATM. The policy objections to
this approach are discussed in the text. It should also be noted that the OCC's position is tenuous even as a matter of form alone. First, in the court's own terms, bank
B has "established" the relationship with bank A that makes such use by its customers possible. Second, to recur to the language of the Supreme Court in Dickinson,
the ATM of bank A is indeed "a bank facility." Unlike a mailbox or telephone, therefore, its installation at bank A could be arranged by bank B, or by bank A in anticipation of bank B's interest, to suit the convenience of bank B's customers and thus to
confer a competitive advantage on bank B over other banks in its home area.
319. OCC Letter No. 153, supra note 318, purports to address the branch issue
raised by ATM sharing only in the interstate context, it thus cautions that an interstate ATM should not be shared by a national bank where it would thereby gain an
advantage over host state banks. It cannot be so limited, however. Consider the case
of intrastate geographical limitations on branching presented by Pennsylvan'ia. If
Girard Bank of Philadelphia can give its customers access to their accounts through
ATMs at banks in New Jersey, that is, see Girard of Phila. Forming EFT Net in
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In Independent Bankers, the court characterized unshared
ATMs as branches because they performed the banking functions
by which a branch is defined in the McFadden Act and, if freely
allowed to national banks, would bestow a competitive advantage
over state banks in states that characterized ATMs as branches and
prohibited branching or limited the geographical area in which a
state bank could branch. The McFadden Act policy of competitive
equality also suggests that an intrastate shared ATM should be
treated as the branch of each national bank using it in states where
it is treated as a branch of each state bank. Since the McFadden
Act must be applied uniformly both in states that do and do not
treat a shared ATM as a branch of each state bank using it, however, the resolution closest to complete competitive equality is for
the Comptroller to treat the shared ATM as a branch of the national banks but, as with unshared ATMs, to minimize the burden
of the branch application procedure imposed thereby on national
banks. Complete competitive equality could be achieved only by
interpreting the McFadden Act to incorporate state law on whether
an ATM is a branch of each bank that shares its use and to let the
results vary from state to state. This possibility, however, was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the McFadden Act
in Dickinson320 as providing a uniform federal definition of a
branch.
The policy of competitive equality also requires that a national
bank be allowed to share use of an out-of-state ATM if a state bank
in its home state would be allowed to do so. If the home-state bank
were allowed to share an out-of-state ATM on the ground that the
ATM is not a branch under home-state law, and the Comptroller
followed this interpretation, no competitive disparity would arise.
If the home state would treat an out-of-state ATM as a branch of a
home-state bank, however, and if it permits out-of-state branching,
an inequality would be created because the Comptroller could not
authorize an out-of-state branch. 321 Here the resolution that miniThree States, supra note 311, on the ground that the distant ATM is not a branch of
Girard, then it should be able likewise to overcome Pennsylvania's contiguous
county branching limitation by arranging for shared use of ATMs established by
other banks in non-contiguous counties of Pennsylvania. If the competitive branching advantage forbidden to national banks by the McFadden Act is only that over
host area banks (whether in New Jersey or distant Pennsylvania counties) and not
that over home area state banks (in Philadelphia), then the results must be the same
intrastate as interstate.
320. See First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
321. See text accompanying note 164 supra.
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mizes the potential for competitive inequality is for the Comptroller to look to the host state to determine whether the ATM is a
branch of the out-of-state bank.
If the host state regards the ATM as a branch of the out-ofstate banks that share its use and prohibits out-of-state banks to
branch in-as all states now do-host-state law will prevent a state
bank from branching in electronically and the McFadden Act
should be held to prevent a national bank from branching in
electronically. If host-state law holds that the ATM is not a branch
of the out-of-state bank, and thus allows its entry, the Comptroller
should have no difficulty under the McFadden Act allowing national banks to follow suit. If a host state were to regard the shared
ATM as a branch of the out-of-state banks that share its use but did
not prohibit this mode of branching in, then neither should the
Comptroller. Again, however, if the Comptroller accepts the host
state's characterization of the ATM as a branch of the home-state
national bank, it could not be authorized. Competitive equality
would then be most nearly achieved if the Comptroller treated an
out-of-state shared ATM as a branch where the host state also considered it a branch and prohibited it, but treated the ATM as not
being a branch where the host state did not treat it as such and
thus allowed it. Then, if the home state regarded the out-of-state
ATM as a branch, only state banks would bear the burden of going
through state branching application procedures, which would presumably be abbreviated by state regulators as the Comptroller has
abbreviated the branching procedures for the intrastate unshared
ATMs of national banks. In fact, however, no state that treats an
ATM as a branch of the out-of-state bank authorizes interstate
branching into its territory. 3 22 At least for the present, therefore,
competitive equality will be achieved if the McFadden Act is interpreted to defer to the host state on the question whether an ATM
is a branch of an out-of-state bank.
Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the shared ATM accepts deposits in one state for a bank located in another. The
deposit-taking function has, however, been determinative for some
state bank regulators in deciding whether the ATM is a branch of
322. South Dakota law allows banks to agree with out-of-state banks to share
access to their ATMs. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-20A-7 (1980). Utah makes provision for ATM use sharing by customers of banks in contiguous states, and expressly
authorizes their interconnection "with a regional or national consumer funds transfer
system." UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-16-9 (Supp. 1979). Again, however, it does not regard

nor regulate an ATM as a branch bank. Id., § 7-16-1(1).
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the out-of-state bank: If it can take deposits for the out-of-state
bank, it is a branch of that bank; if it cannot, it is not a branch. As
a formal matter, regulators are treating deposit-taking as the essential element of engaging in the business of banking and therefore of
323
operating a branch bank.

Functionally, an out-of-state bank taking deposits at a hoststate ATM would still be at a disadvantage in competing for the accounts of host-state residents because it lacks a local office. Of
course, in an interstate metropolitan area, the bank may not be far
away and the disadvantage not great. For an out-of-state bank that
cannot take deposits in the host state, the primary purpose in
sharing an out-of-state ATM is to accommodate home-state residents who find themselves in the vicinity of the out-of-state
ATM. 324 Account holders away from home more frequently want to
withdraw than to deposit funds and the ATM will be able to offer
them this convenience. It will therefore be of competitive significance in the home-state market, not the host-state market, that a
bank can offer access from out-of-state ATMs. Assuring state and
national banks equal treatment in the host state will thus preserve
competitive equality between them where it matters, that is, in
their common home-state market.
c. InterstateNonbank Subsidiaries.-Ithas already been noted
that nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs engage almost entirely in activities that banks themselves engage in, their principal advantage be325
ing that they are not subject to branching limitations as are banks.
Accordingly, nonbank subsidiaries can operate as vehicles for providing specific bank services to distant and interstate markets.
It is not feasible to obtain a complete picture of the degree to
which BHCs have penetrated interstate financial markets. The following discussion focuses on the few lines of business in which
BHCs are thought to have concentrated most of their resources
and which account for most of the interstate offices that they operate. For convenience, these major lines of business have been
grouped into four categories: extending credit; taking deposits; providing trust services; and processing data.

323. See text and authorities at note 312 supra.
324. Access to an out-of-state ATM for cash withdrawal would also make the
bank's credit card more attractive to consumers in the area of the ATM. Furthermore,
a bank marketing lines of credit by mail to consumers interstate would find it advantageous to be able to provide them with local access to cash at the ATM.
325. See text accompanying notes 52, 138-144 supra.
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i. Extending Credit.-BHCs extend several types of credit
through nonbank subsidiaries, including commercial credit, consumer credit, and equipment and automobile leasing, which are
equivalent to extensions of credit.
aa. Consumer-Finance Companies.-Undoubtedly the largest
number of interstate BHC offices extending credit are those of
consumer-finance-company subsidiaries. Consumer-finance companies make direct cash-installment loans and purchase finance paper from dealers; a few of them issue credit cards as well. Domestic BHCs have acquired more than 100 consumer-finance
companies 3 26 with several thousand offices, including thirty-nine of
the 100 largest noncaptive 327 finance companies. 32 8 In addition,
they have established more than 850 de novo consumer-finance329
company offices.
The largest BHC-owned consumer-finance company for which
data are available is FinanceAmerica Corporation, a subsidiary of
BankAmerica Corporation. It has 338 offices in thirty-eight 3 30 states
and assets of $1.2 billion at the end of 1979. 3 31 The ten largest
consumer-finance companies owned by BHCs at that time had a total of 2,039 offices; the nine companies reporting financial data had
just under $3 billion in receivables and the one company that does
not report separately, Citicorp's Nationwide Finance, is believed to
332
have had more than $1 billion in receivables.
326. Golembe Assocs. Inc., Cumulative Volume of BHC 4(c)(8) Activities Jan.
1, 1971-June 30, 1980, 30 BANK EXPANSION Q., 3d Quarter, 1980, at 48, 48 rfiereinafter cited as BEQI reports that BHCs have applied for permission to acquire 139
consumer finance companies, and received 113 approvals and 11 denials.
327. "Captive" finance companies are those whose principal activity is
financing the purchase of their affiliates' goods.
328. Tabulated from 100 Largest Independent or Affiliated Finance
Companies, Am. Banker, June 20, 1980, at 24, col. 3 (data as of end of 1979 or
nearest fiscal year). See also Bank-Related Finance Companies with Corporate
Funds Greaterthan $4 Million, id., at 23.
329. The Fed has received 857 notifications of BHC de novo consumer finance
offices since March 31, 1973. BEQ, supra note 326, at 48. Since 1971 it has also received notification of 370 de novo "general" finance company offices, many of which
may do a consumer finance business, especially since it received 123 general de
novo notifications in the period from Jan. 1, 1971 to March 31, 1973 when it did not
distinguish among types of finance companies (e.g., consumer, commercial). Id.
For perspective, it should be noted that in 1975 there were 26,884 finance company offices, operated by 3,376 companies; the 88 largest such companies, however,
operated 18,899 offices. Nat'l Consumer Finance Ass'n, 1978-79 Office Manual i
(1978).
330. Wall St. J., July 10, 1979, at 46, col. 2.
331. Am. Banker, supra note 328, at 22.
332. Nine companies reporting financial data had just under $3 billion in re-
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bb. Mortgage Banks.-The mortgage banking industry originates, packages for resale, and services residential and commercial
mortgages. 333 As of mid-1980 BHCs had been allowed to acquire
106 mortgage-banking companies and had given notice of de novo
establishment of 730 more. 3 34 In 1979 seventy-six banks and BHCs
accounted for about one-half of the mortgage-banking business
33 5
done by the 196 companies responding to a national survey.
cc. Factors.-Factoring involves the purchase of business accounts receivable. Manufacturers, particularly of soft goods, sell
their accounts receivable at a discount in order to obtain working
capital. According to Glassman and Eisenbeis, "[t]he industry comprises some thirty-five large factoring firms, several smaller factors,
and commercial banks." 3 36 According to Schotland, banks and
BHCs dominate the industry, having obtained a clear majority of
the market by 1975. They controlled nineteen of the thirty largest
factors in 1976. 3 37 As of mid-1980, BHCs had been permitted to
acquire twelve independent factors and had notified the FRB of
3 38
their de novo establishment of sixty-five others.
dd. Commercial Finance and Leasing Companies.-Commercial finance companies make loans to small and middle-sized
businesses and provide inventory financing to distributors and dealers of consumer durables. In some cases they also lease equipment
ceivables, id., and I estimate that Citicorp's Nationwide Finance has more than $1
billion in receivables.
333. These are familiar functions for a commercial bank, and indeed, banks acquired mortgage banking firms in their local markets before the BHC approach to
market diversification became popular. Mortgage companies were also attractive to
banks in part because they "generally control the placement of tax and insurance escrow accounts for the mortgages they service." Martin, Bank Holding Company Acquisitions of Mortgage Banking Firms, 10 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Fall 1975, at 19,
21.
334. BEQ, supra note 326, at 48.
335. The Mortgage Bankers Association of America reports data from which it
can be calculated that reporting banks and BHCs closed 48.8% and serviced 50.9% of
the mortgage loans closed and serviced by all companies. The average reporting
bank or BHC affiliate closed and serviced about 15% more mortgage loans than the
average reporting S&L or other depository, and about twice as many as the average
reporting independent mortgage banking company. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of
America, Financial Statements and Operating Ratios for the Mortgage Banking Industry (1980).
336. Glassman & Eisenbeis, supra note 140, at 238.
337. Schotland, Bank Holding Companies and Public Policy Today, in HOUSE
COMM. ON BANING, CURRENCY, AND HOUSING, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY: COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS PREPARED
FOR THE FINE STUDY 243 (Comm. Print 1976).

338. BEQ, supra note 326, at 48.
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and real property to businesses, but this is more commonly done
by BHCs through a specialized leasing subsidiary. As of mid-1980,
BHCs had received approval for the acquisition of twenty-one leasing firms and notified the Fed of their de novo establishment of
3 39
548 leasing-company offices.
It is impossible to obtain sufficient data about the commercialfinance industry to determine the significance of banks and BHCs
in the field. It is known, however, that the Fed has approved fourteen BHC acquisitions of commercial-finance companies and has
been notified of 187 de novo entries into the field by BHCs as of
June 1980.340 According to a press report, in 1979 alone "Citibank
established a new subsidiary and a network of 29 offices under the
name of Citicorp Industrial Credit Inc. Several months later Chase
Manhattan Bank also said it was setting up a new corporate unit;
Chase Commercial Credit Group with as many as thirty-five offices
in nineteen states." 341 Since then Manufacturers Hanover Corporation "announced the opening of a full-service commercial financial
office" 3 42 in Chicago, to supplement its commercial-finance subsidiary's offices in Atlanta, Dallas, Charlotte, Los Angeles, and New

York.
ii. Deposit-Taking.-BHCs may own nonbank depository institutions in the approximately twenty states that have chartered "industrial banks." 3 43 These institutions, also known as industrial loan
companies, loan-and-thrift companies, and originally as Morris Plan
banks, vary from state to state in the powers they may exercise.
Their most common features, however, are the ability to take savings deposits, make secured and unsecured loans, sell creditrelated insurance, and purchase sales-finance paper. Accordingly,
they are like consumer-finance companies that can also take savings
deposits. In some states they can issue bank credit cards, engage in

339. Id. Current information on the market share of nonbank leasing subsidiaries of BHCs is not available. In 1975, however, Fed Governor Holland attributed to
the Board an estimate of 10% as the share of the leasing business held by BHCs as
of December 1974. Holland, Bank Holding Companies and FinancialStability, 10 J.
FINANCIAL & QuAN. ANAL. 577, 580 (1975).
340. BEQ, supra note 326, at 48.
341. Am. Banker, Dec. 21, 1979, at 1, col. 3, at 12, col. 3. Continental Illinois
Corp. proposed to acquire the Foothill Group, Inc., with assets of $121.5 million,
specifically because the firm was "well positioned in key geographic markets," id. at
1, col. 3, but the acquisition was not consummated.
342. Am. Banker, Mar. 10, 1980, at 15, col. 2.
343. S. Booth, Industrial Banking Companies (Nat'l Consumer Fin. Ass'n Res.
Supp. 373.11, 1977).
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equipment leasing and commercial lending, and exercise some of
the other powers available to banks in general.
Because industrial banks are not banks within the meaning of
the Bank Holding Company Act, BHCs may own them on an interstate basis. The Act defines a bank as a domestic institution (other
than an Edge Act corporation) that both makes commercial loans
and "accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand," 3 4 that is, offers checking ("demand deposit")
accounts. 3 45 Industrial banks are not permitted to offer checking
accounts in any state except Rhode Island and Connecticut 3 46 and
even in those states an industrial bank that did not in fact offer
checking accounts and make commercial loans would not be a bank
within the meaning of the BHC Act. In Colorado and Utah industrial banks are permitted to establish or share use of ATMs and
point-of-sale systems, 3 47 giving depositors a partial substitute for
checking accounts. As long as depositors do not have a legal right
to withdraw upon demand, however, these forms of electronic access may presumably be offered even by an industrial bank that
makes commercial loans without its becoming a "bank."
Industrial banks tend to be small institutions. In some
industrial-banking states there are very few;3 48 in some, such 34as9
Florida, where there are three, no new charters will be issued.
New York has legislatively deleted industrial banks from the typology of institutions it will charter. 350 In other states, however, the
industrial-bank business is booming, largely in response to the entry of BHCs. Colorado is the leading example. In 1971 there were

344. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1976).
345. Nonetheless, the Fed has maintained that a company remained a BHC
when its only commercial bank subsidiary notified depositors that it would henceforth retain but not exercise the right to require fourteen days' notice of withdrawals.
Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors, No. CV81-1560 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1981) (appl.
for TRO); see BNA Wash. Financial Rep., Jan. 19, 1981, at A-9.
346. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-148(e) (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
19-20-25 (1968).
347.

See COLO. REv. STAT.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§

§§

11-48-101 -107 (Supp. 1980) (industrial banks);

7-16-1 -18 (Supp. 1979) (industrial loan corporations).

348. See S. Booth, supra note 343, at 15. In Minnesota, for example, there are
at present three "industrial loan and thrift companies" with five offices that are authorized to take deposits through the sale of"investment certificates." Telephone interview with Mr. Terry Meyer, Office of the Minnesota Commissioner of Banks
(Dec. 29, 1980).

349. Telephone interview with Mr. Ed Stripling, Florida Dep't of Banking and
Finance (Nov. 15, 1979).

350. See 1972 N.Y. Laws, ch. 39.
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industrial banks chartered in that state;351 in 1980 the
had risen to 131.352 The BHCs of Chemical Bank,
First Pennsylvania Bank, and Manufacturers Hanover
acquired or applied to acquire one or more industrial
Colorado. 35 Out-of-state BHCs also own industrial banks

in California, Massachusetts, and Utah. 354 The Fed has approved

twenty-three BHC acquisitions of industrial banks and has been
notified of seventy-nine de novo openings, including an unknown
3 55
number of intrastate affiliations.
Although industrial banks are eligible for FDIC insurance, few
are so insured;3 56 some are or must be members of state guaranty funds that insure deposits to a more limited extent than does
the FDIC.357 Similarly, industrial banks are eligible for Fed membership358 but none has joined. An industrial bank that became a
Fed member would have to be FDIC insured 59 and an insured industrial bank would be subject to Regulation Q governing the maximum interest rates payable on deposits.3 60 At present the states
either leave industrial-bank deposit rates unregulated3 61 or set
them slightly above the Regulation Q rates3 62 to offset the drawback for consumers of being uninsured and perhaps even to give
industrial banks a small advantage in attracting deposits.
351. [1971] COLO. STATE BANK CoaiM'R ANN. REP. 122-23.
352. [1980] COLO. STATE BANK CoMM'R ANN. REP. 197-99.
353. Arenson, A Bank Bridge Over State Lines, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1979, at
D1, col. 3.
354. See id. (Utah; California); 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 1055 (1976) (Massachussetts).

355. BEQ, supra note 326, at 48. In the period 1971-1978, BHCs opened or acquired seventy-five industrial banks, of which thirty-one were outside their home
states. See GOLEMBE (1979), supra note 113, at 96.
356. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a) (Supp. III 1979) (state nonmember banks eligible);
id. § 1813(a)-(b) (definitions of state bank, state nonmember bank); Letter from
William Via, FDIC (Dec. 11, 1980).
357. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-22-201 -203 (1973 & Supp. 1980) (bank
must either be a member of state guaranty corporation or insured by FDIC); cf.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 53.07 (Supp. 1980) ("industrial loan and thrift companies" that
sell "certificates of indebtedness" must obtain insurance thereof acceptable to the
Commissioner of Banks).
358. See 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976) ("Morris Plan banks and other incorporated
banking institutions engaged in similar business" eligible).
359. See 12 U.S.C. § 1814(b) (1976).
360. See 12 C.F.R. § 329.6 (1980).
361. For example, Utah.
362. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 18315 (West Supp. 1981); Memorandum from
H.J. Desz, Special Administrator, Industrial Loan Law, California Department of
Corporations, to All Industrial Loan Cos. Issuing Investment Certificates, concerning
Maximum Interest Rate on Investment Certificates (Feb. 2, 1981); Telephone interview with Mr. Harry Bloom, Colorado State Bank Commissioner (Oct. 3, 1979).
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Thus far BHCs have not aggressively exploited the interstate
deposit-taking potential of their industrial bank subsidiaries. They
have not, for example, used their industrial banks to exploit the
savings-rate differential by marketing industrial-bank savings certificates nationwide. BankAmerica Corporation, however, has obtained twenty-six industrial-bank charters in California in the last
363
few years in order to offer higher savings rates within California.
It has also obtained such charters in Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, and
Utah. This effort might be extended by interstate advertising to attract a substantial volume of interstate deposits by paying higher
rates than are available to consumers elsewhere. 364 Similarly, a
BHC could use an industrial bank in another state as an LPO of
the home-state bank, subject to the policies of the industrial bank's
regulator.
Citicorp recently attempted to take deposit-like account balances through a nondepository subsidiary, Citicorp Financial, Inc.,
which issues the "choice" credit card to residents of the BaltimoreWashington area. Cardholders were offered 8.45% interest on
credit balances left in their accounts. These funds, repayment of
which was guaranteed under a letter of credit issued by Citibank,
could be accessed by use of the card, which would then function as
a debit rather than a credit card. The Fed noted the Regulation Q
and reserve-requirement questions raised by this product but did
not have to resolve them because it determined that the "setting
aside of funds for future use [was] not within the scope of credit
card activities for which Citicorp [had] received approval" 365 under
Regulation Y, and thus would have had to be stopped. If Citicorp
or another BHC seeks such authorization, of course, those issues
will recur, but the basic issue raised by the "choice" plan is that of
defining a "deposit" where the consequence is that deposit-taking
can be done only by chartered depository institutions.
iii. Trust and Fiduciary Services.-Trust services are in-

vestment-management services used by wealthy individuals and by
collective investors, such as employee benefit funds. Fiduciary services include acting as an executor or guardian and serving as an escrow agent. Trust and fiduciary services are typically provided by
363. Telephone interview with Mr. Randy Russell, Sr. Vice-President, FinanceAmerica Corp. (Mar. 26, 1981).
364. See text accompanying note 306 supra.
365. BNA Wash. Financial Rep., Oct. 20, 1980, at A-11, quoting the Fed's letter
of Oct. 10, 1980 to Citicorp; see Am. Banker, Mar. 9, 1981, at 11, col. 1 (text of Fed's
letter to Citicorp denying reconsideration).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

78

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking

1981]

INTERSTATE BANKING

commercial banks through separate trust departments but in some
states nonbank trust companies may also be chartered for these
specialized purposes. 366 Such trust companies do not accept deposits or make loans but rather receive funds in trust for prudent investment.
As of mid-1980, BHCs had received Fed approval for eighteen
trust company acquisitions and had given notification of opening
110 de novo trust companies. 367 California, Chicago, and New York
BHCs have been particularly active in the interstate provision of
trust services, largely by following their bank's personal trust cus368
tomers to Florida and other second home and retirement areas.
Out-of-state BHCs now operate five trust companies in Florida
alone, which has led that state to attempt to prohibit the entry of
additional out-of-state BHCs into the in-state investment-advising,
36 9
and therefore the trust-company, business. When that failed,
the Florida Bankers Association managed to procure a federal moratorium on new interstate entry until October, 1981.370
d. Interstate Data Processing.-The precise degree to which

banks and BHCs are involved in the provision of data-processing
Enough
services on an interstate basis has not been determined.
371
significant.
is
it
that
infer
to
however,
known,
are
facts
It is useful to distinguish two types of BHC data-processing
services-those provided to other financial institutions and those
provided to the public at large. In general BHCs are permitted to
"process .

.

. data for others of the kinds banks have processed" for

themselves and others, sell the by-products of programs developed
therefor, and furnish "any data-processing service upon request of
a customer if such data-processing service is not otherwise reasonably available in the relevant market. "372 As has been pointed out,
the scope of the data-processing business open to BHCs under this
366. See, e.g., 1980 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 80-260, § 2 (amending FLA. STAT.
§ 663.104(28) (1966)); id. at § 6 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 663.203 (1966)).
367. BEQ, supra note 326, at 48.
368. Four are subsidiaries of Northern Trust Corp., a BHC that owns a major
Chicago bank; one is owned by NCNB Corp., parent of North Carolina National
Bank. Telephone interview with Mr. Ed Stripling, Administrator, Banks and Trust
Companies, Florida State Controllers Office (Mar. 26, 1981).
369. See Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
370. See 1980 Act, supra note 63, §§ 712(b)-(c), 94 Stat. 189-90 (amending 12
U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1976) to subject trust companies to the Douglas Amendment); Fla.
Bankers CounterOut-of-State 'Siege', Am. Banker, Mar. 11, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
371. See, e.g., Infocomp Corp. v. Somerset Tr. Co., 165 N.J. Super. 382, 398
A.2d 557 (1979).
372. 12 C.F.R. § 225.123(e) (1980).
ANN.
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standard is quite broad. 373 Giving the standard the broadest interpretation possible, Citicorp has announced its plans to establish a
time-shared computer network called Citishare, serving users in
244 cities throughout the United States and five foreign countries. 374 Customers of the Citishare system need not be financial
institutions, even if the service is nominally limited to the processing of financial and related data. The payrolls and bookkeeping
entries of industrial companies, for example, are financial or related
data.
In contrast some banks and BHCs specialize in the provision
of data-processing services to other financial institutions. In local
markets, downtown banks typically provide many outlying banks
and thrift institutions with data-processing services to maintain
their accounts. At the close of each banking day the customer bank
sends information on the day's transactions to the processing bank,
which returns a computer print-out by morning showing the updated status of each account. Monthly statements and loanpayment posting may be processed by the downtown bank as well.
In this way both the customer and the processing bank can benefit
from the realization of scale economies in computing.
The necessity to transmit data back and forth on a daily basis
made the bank-data-processing-service industry one of local markets. With the advent of computer networking and distributed
processing, however, the emergence of regional and national data
processing services for financial institutions can be expected. Perhaps in anticipation of this, Citicorp is reported to have acquired
several local-bank data-processing services around the country. 375
In addition Citicorp is marketing an ATM system called
"INCA" to banks nationwide. Citicorp will be opening local and regional data centers to service the ATMs in each area. Although the
centers now in operation are not in communication, they could be
linked "in order to permit customers from one state to activate
ATMs with INCA cards in another state."3 76
373. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
374. The initial application contemplated serving customers in 175 cities in.34
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and four foreign countries. 44 Fed. Reg.
12,504 (1979). Subsequent amendments add other locations. For a cumulation, see
Ass'n of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc., Petition to Deny Application of Citicorp,
before the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. System (Sept. 21, 1979). Citicorp's application has been set for a hearing. 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 585 (1980).

375. See Citibank: A Rising Giant in Computer Services, Bus. WEEK, Aug, 4,
1980, at 54.

376. See Citicorp Selling New ATMIDebit Card To CorrespondentsAcross the
Nation, Am. Banker, May 21, 1980 at 1, col. 3, at 22, col. 1.
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Thus BHCs such as Citicorp may soon provide both the internal accounting and the ATM system needed by small banks. They
will do so through a data-processing and communications network
with processing centers and offices around the country as the needs
of customers and the advance of technology dictate. The large
BHC that provides these services will ultimately be responsible for
much of the value of local banking services. Although the name of
the bank may still be local, the service it provides will be a national one for which it is a local retail outlet-much as the comer
drug store provides access to film-processing services.
e. Perspectives on Interstate Banking.-There is no accepted
or reliable method of measuring interstate banking activity and the
data are fragmentary. Although some attempts at measurement
have been made, the methods used are more likely to understate
than overstate the degree of activity.
One method is to count BHC offices. In June 1979, for example, when Connecticut enacted a one-year moratorium on the expansion of nonbank BHC activities within the state, the legislature
3 77
initiated a study of the desirability of limiting BHC activities.
Five out-of-state BHCs were known to have twenty-three
subsidiary-company offices in Connecticut. 378 These consisted of
one data-processing service company, seven commercial-finance
companies, and fifteen consumer-finance-company offices. 379 The
BHCs extending credit through Connecticut offices were the holding companies of Bank of America and Security Pacific National
Bank (California), Citibank (New York), and Merchants Industrial
Bank and Trust (Indiana).38 0
It is impossible to know whether this seemingly substantial
penetration of the Connecticut consumer- and commercial-credit
markets by out-of-state BHCs is typical. On the one hand,
Connecticut's suburban relationship with New York City has probably made it unnecessary for New York banks to locate offices of
their BHCs there in order to reach Connecticut customers. Among
the New York BHCs only Citicorp has a commercial-credit office in
Connecticut, while the Bank of America and Merchants Industrial
Bank of Indianapolis have six such offices between them. 38 1 The
New York banks are similarly underrepresented in the consumer377. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-5c(a) (Supp. 1981).
378. Conn. Bankers Ass'n, Release: Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies in
Connecticut (June 14, 1979).
379. Id.
380. Id.

381. Id.
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finance field, probably for the same reason. Citicorp has one
Connecticut office and had planned to open a second, while the
Bank of America and Security Pacific, both of California, have four3
teen offices between them. 82
Thus, while the New York banks are underrepresented, because Connecticut is an affluent state it has attracted twenty
consumer- and commercial-credit extending offices of distant
BHCs. Unfortunately, comparable data for other states are not
available. Even if they were, they would probably understate the
presence of out-of-state BHCs, since there is no way to confirm the
existence of bank LPOs or nonbank subsidiaries in many states.
The American Banker reported in 1975 that thirteen large
BHCs had 1,642 nonbank subsidiary offices, of which 1,483 were
located outside of the BHCs' home states.38 3 The number of such
interstate BHC offices has increased substantially since 1975. Four
of the largest BHCs for which approximate figures are available increased their nonbank out-of-state offices as shown in the table be3 84
low:

1975

BankAmerica Corp.
339
Citicorp
284
Manufacturers Hanover Corp. 151
Security Pacific Corp.
45
Total

819

1979

350
400±
190
400±
1340±

There are no data available on the number of such offices for
all BHCs. Clearly, however, the total, even in 1975, was much
larger than the number attributable to the 13 BHCs studied. Since
1975 the total number has grown by considerably more than the
500 new offices reflected in the table above. Since that time, large
382. Id. The Westport office of Person-to-Person Financial Center of Connecticut, Inc., was approved by the state banking commissioner and the Fed, but the

latter's decision was remanded by the court of appeals to determine whether the finance company office in a suburb of New York City would result in voluntary tie-in
sales and unfair competition generally. Connecticut Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 627 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1980). After remand the Fed again approved the finance company office. BNA Wash. Financial Rep., Apr. 27, 1981, at A-4.
383. Bank Holding Company Map Series, supra note 203.
384. Id. (1975 data); Janssen, Expanding U.S. Banks Hope Law Will Allow Nacional Competition, Wall St. J., June 21, 1979, at 1, col. 6, at 39, col. 1 (1979 data);
Telephone interview with Arch D. Hardeman, Sr. Vice-President, Security Pacific
Corp. (Security Pacific data).
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BHCs have added a number of commercial-credit offices, chartered
several industrial banks in Colorado alone, incorporated twenty385
seven Edge Act corporations with a larger number of offices,
and established an unknown number of LPOs.
There are other ways of attempting to assess the degree to
which banking has become an interstate industry but they are as
imperfect as counting BHC offices. For instance, it has been estimated that the Bank of America has 14,436 employees outside of
California and 1,361 employees in New York City alone. 386 At the
same time, Citicorp is thought to have 3,000 employees in
California. 387 Again, these are crude data.
The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) has made
conservative estimates for four types of interstate banking operations. 388 CSBS estimates (1) the assets of banks located outside the
state in which the lead bank of their holding company is located at
$23 billion (i.e., the secondary banks of those multistate BHCs
grandfathered by the 1956 BHC Act); (2) the banking assets of foreign banks located in states other than their home state at $18.3
billion (i.e., those grandfathered by the International Banking Act
of 1978); (3) the assets of nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs at $38 billion; and (4) the volume of commercial and personal loans made by
banks with assets exceeding $1 billion to borrowers in other states
at $26 billion. 389 The total estimated volume of assets devoted to
interstate banking on this basis is $105 billion; if the figure for the
assets of nonbank subsidiaries were adjusted from $38 billion to the
staff of the Federal Reserve Board's estimate of $55 billion, 390 the
total would be $122 billion. This is approximately 7.17 percent of
banking-industry assets. 391 Further, beyond the conservative nature of these estimates, no attempt is made to factor in the inter385. J. Houpt, supra note 276, at 41-42.
386. Janssen, supra note 384, at 39, col. 2; Telephone interview with Bernice
Riordan, Sr. Public Information Officer, News Relations Dep't, Bank of America.

387. Telephone interview with Charles Klensch, Press Information Officer,
Public Affairs Dep't, Citicorp.
388. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Release: Interstate Banking (April
18, 1980).
389. Id.
390. Glassman & Eisenbeis, supra note 140, at 238.
391. See 67 Fed. Res. Bull. A17 (March 1981) (calculation based on all commercial banking institutions' total assets of $1,702.7 billion as of end of 1980). The same
$122 billion of assets devoted to interstate banking would constitute 9.17% of the
$1,493 billion of assets held by domestically chartered commercial banks as of Febmary, 1981. Id.
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state flows of Fed funds and correspondent balances that knit the
banking industry together.
f. Notes on the Significance of Deposit-Taking.-However
measured, banks and BHCs are in practice conducting a substantial
interstate business in bank and bank-related activities. As a practical matter the greatest limitation on their activities is the limitation
on their ability to take deposits interstate. The principal exceptions
are the international banking deposits taken at Edge Act corporations and the consumer savings deposits taken at industrial banks
in approximately twenty states .392 Notwithstanding these exceptions, however, deposit-taking is still highly localized, even if no
other aspect of banking is. As long as banks are unable to offer fullservice banking in a host state they will continue to be at a serious
disadvantage in competing with host-state banks for local consumer- and commercial-deposit business. The inability to take local
deposits also inhibits an out-of-state BHC's ability to compete for
consumer- and commercial-credit business, albeit to a lesser extent.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980393 allows insured banks, savings-and-loan associa-

tions, and savings banks nationwide to offer NOW accounts
-interest bearing accounts accessed by draft-for the first time;
credit unions will have the functionally identical product in "share
draft" accounts. 394 These thrift institutions will now be able to
compete with banks for transaction balances of the sort that would
previously have been maintained in bank demand accounts. The
same law provides for the phasing out over six years of Regulation
Q maximum interest rates payable on all deposits-including NOW
accounts, savings accounts, and even demand deposits, on which
the payment of interest had been prohibited. 395 This will enable
392. The Fed has recently ruled that a national bank acquired by Gulf & Western, an industrial company, was not a "bank" within the definition in the BHC Act
because it did not, as a matter of policy, make commercial loans, with the result that
the acquiring company had not become a BHC. See letter from FRB to Mr. Robert C.
Zimmer (Mar. 11, 1981). It would thus also appear to be possible for a BHC with
banks in one state to acquire such a "consumer bank" in other states consistent with
the BHC Act's definition of "bank," 12 U.S.C. § 184 1(c) (1976), and thereby to take
deposits in any number of states.
393. 1980 Act, supra note 63.
394. Id. § 303, 94 Stat. 146 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1976)) (NOW accounts); id. § 305, 94 Stat. 146-47 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1752(5) (Supp. III 1979))
(share draft accounts).
395. Id. § 204, 94 Stat. 143; cf. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976) (payment of interest on
demand deposits prohibited).
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banks to compete for some of the balances that previously would
have been kept in passbook savings accounts at thrift institutions.
Thus each local market for transaction and savings accounts will see
the entry of a substantial number of new local competitors and the
gradual introduction of competition among them on interest rates
as well as service.
Ironically, this enhanced competition for deposits may lessen
the disadvantage that BHCs now face by reason of their inability to
take more deposits interstate. First, core deposits-stable consumer time and demand balances-will cost depository institutions
higher, market rates of interest. 396 Banks in economic-growth areas
will still have easier access to core deposits than banks in economically stagnant older cities; but the cost differential between core
deposits (cost equaling interest plus processing costs) and money
purchased in the money market (Fed funds and correspondent deposits, certificates of deposit, Euro-dollars, etc.) will have lessened
397
and, in a perfect market, equilibrated.
Second, the rising cost of core deposits will also put nonbank
lenders on a more equal footing with banks regarding their cost
of funds. The bank in a growth area will have lost its advantage in
the cost of funds not only in comparison to banks in stagnant areas,
but also in comparison to nonbank lenders-including BHC
subsidiaries-in their own geographical markets. This will occur
because the increased interest paid for core deposits will make
them closer in cost to money raised through the sale of commercial
paper by a BHC or its nonbank subsidiary. Consider the following
example: At present the Valley National Bank of Arizona enjoys access to a large volume of core deposits at low, regulated interest
rates. Citibank, in New York, also has access to core deposits at
regulated rates, but in a stagnant market. Accordingly, in order to
fund growth of its loan assets, the New York bank must turn to a
greater extent to purchased funds at unregulated rates. Finally,
Citibank's sister corporation in the consumer credit field,
Nationwide Finance, obtains its funds from the sale of commercial
paper at unregulated rates closer to those paid by Citibank for purchased funds than by either bank for core deposits. In the future,
however, both Citibank and Valley National will be paying a price
for core deposits that, together with the costs of servicing deposit
396. The total cost of core deposits consists of the interest paid to depositors,
plus the processing costs incurred, less any transaction fees received.
397. See MELLON BANK, N.A., INTERSTATE BANKING LEGISLATION 10 (1979).
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accounts, will equal the cost of their alternative sources of funds,
purchased funds. If funds from one source cost more, banks would
turn to the other until their prices were again equal at the margin.
True, Nationwide may still pay a higher price for funds than either
bank, but that will reflect the market's evaluation of the somewhat
greater riskiness of its loan portfolio versus the banks' and not a
regulation-induced bargain price for bank deposits.
Finally, the deregulation of interest rates paid on deposits will
mitigate to some degree the disadvantage that BHCs now face in
competing for consumer- and commercial-loan business. At present
a borrower that could turn either to a local bank or the nonbank affiliate of a distant bank may prefer the local bank for two reasons.
First, even if the nonbank lender offers the same interest rate as
the bank, the bank offers the convenience of a demand account as
the medium for accessing loan proceeds or a line of credit. The
nonbank lender can at best arrange for a bank to perform this service for its borrowers.
Nationwide's "Ready Credit" product is an example of how
this can be done. Ready Credit borrowers are given a line of credit
and a book of drafts drawn on Nationwide's account at Citibank but
"payable through" the First National Bank of Denver. 39 8 These
drafts may be used and accepted as checks. When they are presented for payment, however, the Denver bank seeks authorizations
from Nationwide, which instructs it to honor the draft or return it
depending upon whether the drawer has unused credit available. If
the drawer has credit and the draft is honored, Nationwide covers
it by a transfer of funds from Citibank to the Denver bank. As far
as the customer is concerned, however, he has the convenience of
accessing his credit line by drafts as though it were a balance in his
checking account. For a distant consumer there may be some disadvantage in the draft being drawn on a Denver bank, which may
impair its acceptance in some areas; on the other hand, the drawer
in such an arrangement, whether consumer or commercial, gets
the benefit of any "float" because he does not incur interest costs
on that portion of his credit line unused until the draft is presented
for payment.
In addition to convenient access, the second reason for a borrower to prefer bank credit to nonbank credit is price. At present
banks may be willing to offer somewhat lower interest rates on
398. See brochures distributed by Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Services,
Inc., One Market Tower, 3033 So. Parker Rd., Denver, Colo.
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loans to depositors in partial compensation for the depositor's business and thus take some business that would otherwise go to nonbank lenders. Core deposits at regulated rates are a bargain and in
any well-functioning marketplace bargains tend to be competed
away. One way that banks have to compete for bargains is to
charge depositors less for loans than they charge to nondepositors.
Nonbanks do not have this ability to cross-subsidize loans because
they are not in the deposit-taking business. When core deposits are
no longer a bargain, however, banks will no longer be as willing to
offer depositors the lower loan rate. Nonbanks will then be on
more equal footing in competing for the depositor's loan business.
C.

The CurrentLegal Position Reconsidered

1. Implications of the Current System.-At the outset of this
Part I, the current legal regime affecting the structure of the banking industry was described in terms of three systems: the dual
banking system, under which state and national bank regulators
compete to construe banking powers liberally; 399 the state-by-state
banking system, under which the banking operations of any one
company (bank or BHC) are confined to one state; 40 0 and the triple
banking system, under which the importance of BHCs in extending
nonbank operations interstate is recognized. 40 1 It was then shown
that the motivations driving banks to reach interstate markets
though their BHCs are significant and likely to endure, and that
some mostly large banks have already made significant inroads in
interstate and, indeed, nationwide markets for most bank services
except deposit-taking. 40 2 Yet, even though the state-by-state banking system is thus being redefined in practice to apply only to
deposit-taking, the formal structure remains.
Notwithstanding the unchanging legal regime, the wisdom and
the possibility of maintaining the state-by-state banking system, or
some pretense thereof, even for deposit-taking, must be reconsidered in light of the changes that have taken place in the banking
industry. Admittedly, there is no visible crisis to occasion this
399. See text accompanying notes 16-100 supra.
400. See text accompanying notes 155-199 supra.
401. See text accompanying notes 101-154 supra.
402. See text accompanying notes 200-235 supra. Some smaller BHCs do participate in interstate markets, including taking deposits interstate-for example, Financial Services Corp. of the Midwest, which owns the ninety-first largest commercial
bank in Illinois and Federal Discount Corp., which has a deposit-taking industrial
bank in Minnesota. See 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 948 n.2 (1977).
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reexamination. Banks are not failing in inordinate numbers, nor are
the nonbank markets in which BHCs compete, for the most part,
unduly concentrated in the hands of banking enterprises. There
are, however, three important reasons to reconsider the state-bystate banking system, and therefore to consider the question of interstate banking. Resolution of that question may help to resolve
the problem of branch definition and alleviate the problem of banking industry concentration. Furthermore, the erosion of the fundamental premises of the state-by-state banking system itself indicates that reexamination of that system is in order.
a. The Branch-Definition Problem.-Under the current regime, a bank that wants to establish a physical presence other than
a bricks-and-mortar branch, whether intrastate or interstate, must
often avoid endowing its new office or other facility with the characteristics of a "branch." As a result, banks have striven to design
their presence to fit within the law and still serve the perceived
public demand for banking convenience. In the hands of the
courts, however, the definition of a branch has become at the same
time highly plastic and very rigid; it has been stretched to reach
armored cars 40 3 and CBCTs, 40 4 yet is incapable of selective application where state law and the policy of competitive equality warrant it.
Judicial craftsmanship will not provide a serviceable meaning
for the term "branch" as it is used in the McFadden Act, because
there is no essential characteristic of "branchness." It is not helpful
to observe, as the Supreme Court has told us, that we are dealing
with a branch if we are dealing with a physical location at which
one of the functions mentioned in the statutory definition is performed 40 5 and a competitive advantage is gained by the bank performing it there. 40 6 Competitive advantage will always be found;
that is what will have motivated both the bank to undertake whatever activity is being challenged as a branch, and the challenger to
bring its suit. As for the prerequisite that one of the named functions be performed there, that is almost no limitation at all. The
court that holds that a CBCT is a place where checks are paid because it dispenses cash, and that it is a place where money is lent

403. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
404. Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
405. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 134-35 (1969).
406. Id. at 136-37.
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because cash may be drawn against a pre-established and preapproved line of credit rather than an account balance, and that a
deposit is received by the bank at a remote terminal but not at a
mailbox, is clearly responding to its perception of competitive advantage without giving meaningful content to the limitation that
one of the statutory functions be performed.4 0 7

The problem of defining the term "branch" inheres in the
present regime and derives from the limitations now placed on
branching. If branching were completely unlimited, there would
be no reason for "branch" to be a term of art; nothing would turn
on whether a particular type of facility is a branch. In light of the
problems that the courts have had with the present statutory definition of branching, and the accumulated technological change
since it was written in 1927, the issue should again be addressed
legislatively. Only Congress can resolve the present uncertainty
that infects a variety of banking facilities, including LPOs, cash
management CRTs, ATM networks, and even a BHC's nonbank
subsidiary offices whose operations are arguably too integrated with
those of the affiliated bank. 408 Uncertainty about the status of these
facilities deters banks from investing in them, although they may
eventually be characterized as permissible non-branches. This uncertainty may have the further effect of deterring innovation in the
provision of banking services. 40 9 Both consequences disserve the
consuming public and foster concentration in the banking industry.
b. Concentration and Competition.-As a system of territorial
market allocation, state-by-state banking is far from fully successful.
Its greatest success has been in allocating markets for deposittaking services. Its success in dividing this product market geographically has also, however, affected markets for other products
(banking services) by making it more difficult to offer them
competitively without being able to offer depository services at the
same place. The market for banking services generally is therefore
407. It is for this same reason that cash management CRTs are arguably in danger of being characterized as branches. See text accompanying notes 252-260 supra.
408. Cf. Connecticut Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. 627 F.2d 245, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in absence of evidence beyond fact of common ownership, Board could rely on BHC's assurances and long history of lawful operation that nonbank subsidiary would not be used as de facto branch of bank subsidiary).
409. Cf. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., F.T.C. No. 9108 (Oct. 20, 1980), reprinted in [19801 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (No. 987) F-1 (lack of guidance chills desirable competitive behavior). See also D. Ginsburg, Antitrust Uncertainty and Technological Innovation (Nat'l Acad. of Sciences 1980).
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less competitive than it would be if territorial markets were not allocated by law. Of course, to the extent that it would increase the
number or likelihood of bank failures, uninhibited competition in
the banking industry cannot be considered an unalloyed benefit.
Nonetheless, there is good reason to question whether banking
markets need to be as concentrated as they are at present410 and
whether some relaxation of the state boundaries presently placed
around banks could result in more competition among them without engendering an unacceptable rate of failure.
State-by-state banking has led to concentration not only within
intrastate markets, but also in the interstate provision of banking
services. Large banks and their BHCs are at a competitive advantage, as compared to small and regional banks, in surmounting the
legal as well as the scale barriers to interstate banking, just as they
were historically advantaged by the capitalization and antibranching aspects of Edge Act corporations before 1978.411 The
costs of legal planning in the design of banking products and the
strategy for their delivery interstate, and the cost of defending
one's interstate services in litigation-usually against the charge of
unlawful branching-are not related to a bank's size. Consequently, a larger bank will be readier to devote the resources necessary to this effort from which, if it is successful, it expects to
have lower average costs per interstate transaction than would a
410. The average local banking market is highly concentrated. Using the
Herfindahl Index to measure concentration, Heggestad and Mingo found that the average SMSA has a numbers equivalent of 4.3 equal size banks, the average rural
county banking market being even more concentrated with a numbers equivalent of
2.2. Only 10% of SMSAs had a numbers equivalent greater than 9.3. Heggestad &

Mingo, The Competitive Condition of U.S. Banking Markets and the Impact of
StructuralReform, 32 J. FINANCE 649, 656 (1977).

In 1979, the weighted average concentration ratios, measured by insured commercial bank deposits in SMSAs, were:

Unit banking
states
Limited branching
states
Statewide
branching states

Largest
Bank

Three
Largest
Banks

Five
Largest
Banks

22.5%

49.4%

60.2%

29.9%

62.5%

76.3%

34.0%

67.5%

80.3%

U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANK-

ING IN THE UNITED STATES app., at 48 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MCFADDEN ACT
REPORT].

411. See text accompanying note 264 supra.
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smaller bank. 412 It is thus the very largest banks in the country
that have made the greatest inroads toward interstate banking. If
this pattern of successful interstate penetration by a limited number of banks is allowed to continue, the markets for some interstate
banking services, such as cash management, bank data processing,
and consumer credit cards, may also become concentrated.
Furthermore, policy options will gradually be eliminated as
this concentration grows. For example, it would no longer be desirable, or even equitable, to remove all constraints on geographical expansion and allow BHCs to convert their nonbank offices to
branch banks, since that would give some of the largest BHCs an
immediately commanding position in the newly-created national
market for banking; they would have many hundreds of branch locations before some regional banks in what were unit banking
states could open a first branch. The Bank of America, that is,
would have almost 400 branch locations outside California
-including
twenty in Illinois at what were previously
FinanceAmerica offices, 413 before a Chicago bank that had not acquired a finance company could open one branch in Illinois. Thus,
as a matter of concentration policy, removing all restrictions on interstate banking locations is no longer a plausible policy
alternative, although it probably was ten or fifteen years ago.
Alternatively, prohibiting BHCs from opening additional nonbank
offices interstate, while grandfathering existing operations, would
confer a permanent competitive advantage on just a few firms; this
option also has been made unattractive by developments taking
place within the ostensibly state-by-state banking system.
c. The Premises of State-by-State Banking.-The claimed advantages of the state-by-state banking system have been considerably eroded as interstate banking has grown up within the state-bystate framework. Many money center and regional banks, which
hold the great majority of bank assets 4 14 and which lend on re412. Cf. Seelig, Convenience and Advantage Clauses as a Barrierto De Novo
Entry by Bank Holding Companies in the Consumer, Finance Industry, 30 J. ECON.
& Bus. 124, 129 (1978) (results "suggest that large firms, or at least firms experienced in dealing with regulatory authorities (such as bank holding companies), can
be at a relative advantage in over-coming regulatory barriers to expansion.").
413. In 1975 FinanceAmerica had 20 offices in Illinois. Bank Holding Company Map Series, supra note 203.
414. At the end of 1980, the 100 largest BHCs controlled commercial bank assets of $1,137 billion, which was 74% of the total assets of all 14,693 domestically
chartered commercial banks. Even the 100th largest BHC, First National
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gional, national, and international scales, 4 15 cannot realistically be
considered "local" institutions. Commercial and consumer lending,
carried on through the BHC, is also, indeed principally, conducted
on a regional or national plane. Furthermore, to the extent that
banks serve commercial customers with broader than statewide operations, they are inevitably non-local in their orientation. Smaller
banks that do not participate in these markets directly do so indirectly, through the sale of funds to regional and money center
banks which, in turn, lend to large corporate borrowers.
Even retail banking is no longer focused on local service, except with respect to deposit-taking. Banks with hundreds of thousands of credit card holders outside their home state are not likely
to be sentimental about directing credit to local consumers if local
consumers are prohibited by law from paying rates as high as consumers in other states or are otherwise less attractive.
With regard to this, it is very significant that the state-by-state
banking system has been supplemented with the Community Reinvestment Act, which makes the various applications of banks (and
other depository institutions) for new deposit-taking facilities depend upon their "meeting the credit needs of [their] entire community." 416 This Act gives the force of federal law to the expectation embedded in the state-by-state banking system that bank
credit will be extended in the geographical markets from which deposits are taken. The need for this legal norm arose only when
small banks became part of the integrated money market managed
by the larger banks, i.e., when it periodically became more profitable to sell funds to distant money center banks than to lend them
417
to local customers.
Interregional capital flows are now substantially uninhibited by
the state-by-state banking system. Indeed, a deposit made in
Massachusetts may be only marginally more likely to result in a
Bancorporation, Inc., of Denver, Colo., had $2.5 billion in assets. See 67 Fed. Res.

Bull. A17 (March, 1981); 1981 Ann. Banking Survey, FORBES, April 13, 1981, at
136-39.
415. For example, United Jersey Bank (Hackensack), a subsidiary of the 97th
largest BHC, see 1981 Annual Banking Survey, supra note 414, at 136, 138, has a
branch in the British West Indies. 1 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual 1502 (1980).
416. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (Supp. III 1979).
417. The overnight market in Fed funds began to grow in the mid-1960s with
the entry of an increasing number of regional banks. "In the Fed funds market now,
regional banks buy up funds from even tiny banks, use what they need, and resell
the remainder in bulk amounts in the New York market." M. STIGUM, supra note
218, at 285.
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bank loan to a Massachusetts borrower than to a developer in the
Southwest. If that is where the best market opportunities are for
bank creditors, it is hardly credible that a banking system in which
billions of dollars are lent by wire overnight and all major transactions are accomplished by electronic entry would not be able to
route a dollar from Massachusetts to its highest return, even if that
is in Arizona.
Finally, the problem of supervising the soundness of a bank
with far-flung interstate operations has already been encountered
without serious mishap. Banks with domestic Edge Act corporations strewn around the country and with branches throughout the
world should be at least as difficult to supervise as banks with of418
fices in multiple states.
National banks operate 646 branches overseas, under the supervision of the Comptroller. 419 Citibank alone has 216 branches
and representative offices abroad. 42 0 Seventeen banks and trust
companies chartered by the State of New York operate branches
abroad, under the supervision of the New York State Banking
Commissioner. 421 In each case, the regulator has been able to devise special examination procedures for the foreign branches that it
considers adequate to the task of soundness supervision. New York
422
is also host to fifty-six branches of forty-seven foreign banks,
which it has regulated without encountering insurmountable problems of supervision or coordination; indeed its requirement that
New York branches of foreign banks hold, in lieu of a separate capital structure, certain qualifying assets-loans booked to New York,
CDs, Fed funds sold, etc.-equal to 108% of branch liabilities "has
been viewed abroad as a model for foreign bank branch regulation
42 3
and has been widely copied."

418. See generally Dahl, InternationalOperations of U.S. Banks: Growth and
Public Policy Implications, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 100, 124-26 (1967).

419.

[1978]

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP.

39

[hereinafter cited as [1978] OCC ANN. REP.].
420. [1980] Citicorp Ann. Rep. 3; [1980] Citicorp Form 10-k.
421. New York Banking Department, Statement of the Condition of the Banks,

Trust Companies, and Private Bankers of the State of New York at the Close of Business on Dec. 31, 1978, accompanying [1979] N.Y. SUP'T OF BANKS ANN. REP.
422. See [1978] N.Y. SUP'T OF BANKS ANN. REP. 150-53.
423. M. STIGUM, supra note 218, at 144. Indeed, perhaps because New York's
reputation is so good, when American Express Company's subsidiary American Express International Banking Corporation required an annual global examination of its
80 offices in 34 countries, in order to satisfy British regulators, it contracted with the

New York State Banking Department for the work. Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1980, at 12,
col. 4.
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The Fed, moreover, reports no special practical difficulties in
examining the operations of BHCs with interstate, nationwide, or
even overseas offices. While it is of course possible that there are
serious undetected problems or that the ability of regulators to examine far-flung banking enterprises may be stretched beyond practical or effective limits, these possibilities seem increasingly unlikely with the passage of time. On the contrary, examination procedures and inter-jurisdictional coordination have demonstrably
improved With time, to the point that the occasional closing of a
failed bank with branches in multiple countries can be accomplished in an acceptably orderly, if perhaps not tidy, fashion by the
4 24
diverse regulators acting in concert.
In short, such supervisory problems as would be likely to arise
with overt interstate banking have to a large extent already been
encountered successfully in the context of international banking
and BHC supervision. The claim that state-by-state banking performs the necessary service of keeping banks at a scale of operations that is manageably supervisable must therefore be relaxed in
the light of experience.
2. The State of the Debate.-At the request of some banks
and BHCs, several state legislatures have considered bills intended
to allow out-of-state banks to enter their state directly by branching
or indirectly by the BHC acquiring a bank there. In contrast, other
states have taken or are considering steps to prohibit out-of-state
BHCs from opening nonbank offices within the state, at the behest
of home-state banks and other competitors of the nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs.
a. State Legislation.-Among the exclusionary efforts, reference has already been made to Connecticut's enactment and extension of a moratorium on the expansion of activities by nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs, 42 5 and to Florida's 1972 statute making
out-of-state BHCs ineligible to own an investment advisory service,
42 6
and therefore a trust company, in that state.
The Supreme Court held the Florida statute unconstitutional
for discriminating unduly against interstate commerce, although it
424. See [1978] OCC ANN. REP., supra note 419, at 40; Bennett, Curb on Foreign Banks Studied, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1980, at D1, col. 3 (reporting that when
New York authorities took possession of New York branch of failed Argentine bank

"the branch itself appear[ed] to be highly liquid and that if the Argentine Government were to guarantee payment of any unforeseen obligations, the New York depositors and creditors could be paid with the branch's existing assets.").
425.
426.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-5c(a) (West Supp. 1981).
See text accompanying note 369 supra.
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acknowledged the legitimacy of the State's interests in "[d]iscouraging economic concentration and protecting the citizenry against
fraud." 42 7 Regulation, the Court suggested, might have been a
more appropriate means of protecting those interests than an "out428
right prohibition of entry."
When repeal of the Florida banking code was about to become
effective on July 1, 1980, pursuant to a "sunset" law enacted in
1976, the legislature passed a new banking code with a provision
expressly prohibiting out-of-state banks and BHCs from having
LPOs in Florida. 429 This provision was passed in response to the
complaints of the Florida Bankers Association that out-of-state
banks could compete for loan business in Florida on unfair terms
since they were not subject to certain Florida taxes. 430 The Governor vetoed the entire new code, arguing that the prohibition on
an out-of-state BHC having LPOs for the purpose of soliciting loans
for its bank subsidiaries was unconstitutional in light of the BT Investments case. 43' The legislature then deleted the offending provision, and the new banking code was enacted, prohibiting only
the LPOs of out-of-state banks and restoring by its silence regarding BHCs what some interested parties have managed to see as an
432
ambiguity.
On the other hand, Maine, South Dakota and Delaware have
enacted legislation to allow out-of-state BHCs to own banks within
those states. The Maine statute is conditioned upon reciprocal
treatment for Maine-based BHCs that wish to expand into the
home state of any BHC acquiring a bank in Maine. 433 The South
Dakota and Delaware laws do not require reciprocity from the outof-state BHC's home state, but they are narrowly drawn to allow
the out-of-state BHC to establish a single new bank that is not allowed to branch and is located where it is "not likely to attract customers from the general public in the state to the substantial detri434
ment of existing banks in the state."
427.

Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 43 (1980).

428. Id.
429. The provision relating to BHC offices soliciting loans for affiliated banks
was section 97, amending section 659.52 and purporting to renumber it as section
663.821. The renumbered section appears, however, at FLA. STAT. ANN. §
658.74(b)(2) (West Supp. 1981). See id. § 658.74 note.
430. See Fla. LPO Ban Cut from Bill, Am. Banker, July 1, 1980, at 14, col. 1.
431. Wall St. J., June 26, 1980, at 39, col. 1.
432. See Fla. LPO Ban Cut from Bill, supra note 430, at 14, col. 1.
433. ME. REv. STAT. ANN.tit. 9-B, § 1013(2) (1980).
434. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 51-16-40, -41 (1980); accord, 63 Del. Laws,
ch. 2, § 803 (Feb. 18, 1981).
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The South Dakota law, although of general application, was
procured specially by Citicorp in order to enable it to establish a
South Dakota national bank to which it could transfer its credit
card operations. 43 3 The Delaware lav was similarly negotiated by
the Chase Manhattan and Morgan banks. 43 6 Under the National

Bank Act, a national bank may charge interest at the rate
permitted by the state in which it is located. 43 7 Whereas New York
limited the interest that banks may charge on credit card purchases
to 12 percent, 438 South Dakota and Delaware, as part of the legislative packages by which they invited the New York and other
banks partially to relocate there, removed all limitations on the interest rates that banks could charge borrowers. 439 In other words,
Delaware and South Dakota are offering themselves as base states
from which lenders, through the establishment of a national bank,
may escape their home state usury laws, at least when they are
making loans to residents of other states. South Dakota's and Delaware's purpose in providing such a base is conventional economic
development: the relocation of credit card processing centers to
those states will yield tax revenues and employment opportunities
there. Citicorp alone has "committed itself to maintaining a staff of
more than 300 people in South Dakota," even if it fails to move its
440
credit card operations there.
Both California and New York legislative committees have
considered bills to establish reciprocity between those two states.
This was done at the behest of the New York banks, which were
more eager to enter the California retail banking market than were
the California banks to enter the New York market. 441 The New
435.

BNA Wash. Financial Rep., Mar. 31, 1980, at C-2.

436. See New York Banks Urged Delaware to Lure Bankers, N.Y. Times, Mar.
17, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
437.

12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. III 1979).

438. N.Y. BANKING LAw § 108(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981), as amended
by 1980 N.Y. Laws Ch. 883, § 6.
439. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 54-3-13 (1980); 63 Del. Laws, ch. 2, § 943
(Feb. 18, 1981).
440.

Wall St. J., March 19, 1980, at 22, col. 2.

441. See Hearings on A.B. 1926 Before the Comm. on Finance, Insurance, &
Commerce of the Calif. Assembly 2 (1977) (statement of Assemblyman Berman that
he sponsored reciprocal banking bill at initiative of Citicorp) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on A.B. 1926]. In 1980 each state considered a virtually identical bill that

would have enabled the BHCs of reciprocating states to establish or acquire two unit
banks or one bank with one branch in cities where there is a Federal Reserve Bank
or branch. BHCs from states reciprocating to the extent of only one banking office
could open one bank in these host states. See, e.g., N.Y. Assem. Bill 1452, 204th
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York bill, which was proposed by the State Banking Commissioner,
failed to pass, apparently in large part because of the embittered
relationship between the large New York banks and the state legislature arising out of their struggle over the usury law-the issue
over which, when New York failed to change its law, Citibank
turned to other states for relief and found it in South Dakota.
California, too, tabled the legislation after hearings at which the
California Bankers Association registered its strong opposition and
at which representatives of the New York banks appeared in favor
44
of the bill. 2

b. Problems of Reciprocity.-The divergent views taken by
the New York and California banks of what was nominally equal
and reciprocal treatment demonstrates the inevitable failure of reciprocity as an approach to interstate banking, and the inaptness of
the view that the states could today, through the Douglas Amendment, provide for interstate banking if they were inclined to do so.
In fact, reciprocal treatment is an elusive concept. The nonreciprocal appeal of different markets, as illustrated by the New
York and California banking markets, is a matter of business rather
than law. There are, however, a multitude of legal problems in implementing reciprocity.
Consider, for example, the problem created by the different
powers that various states confer on banks. Even the New York
and California bills would have applied only to states that allowed a
"substantially similar acquisition" by their BHCs. Admission of a
California BHC to the New York banking market might, however,
enable it to exercise quite different, either narrower or broader,
powers than could the New York entrant in the California market
under California law. If entry is by means of a state bank charter,
soundness supervision will be administered differently, with differAssem. (1981) (proposed amendment to N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 141-142); N.Y. Legis-

lative Proposal No. 11 (1979) (proposed Banking Code art. III-C). Thus, in essence, if
the bills had passed, California BHCs could have opened two banking offices in
New York City and a New York BHC could have opened one banking office in San
Francisco and one in Los Angeles (or two in either city).
442. See Brouillette, Sponsor Drops Calif. Interstate Bill; Battle for Assembly
Speakership Cited, Am. Banker, Jan. 21, 1980, at 2, col. 3. Compare Hearingson A.B.
1926, supra note 441, at 30 (statement of Richard LeBlond II, President, N.Y. Bankers Association) with id. at 78 (statement of A.A. Milligan, on behalf of California
Bankers Association). New bills have been proposed for consideration in both the
New York and California legislatures in 1981. See Interstate Bill Advances in NYS,
Am. Banker, Jan. 22, 1981, at 3, col. 1. See generally Citicorp Chmn. Lobbies in Cal.
for Reciprocal Interstate Banking, Am. Banker, Feb. 24, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
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ent rigor, and reserve requirements may impose different costs on
4 43
banks in different states.
Whether these differences would be obstacles to reciprocal entry is not clear. A state might, perhaps at the behest of its own
banks, hold that these differences precluded another state from
treating its banks reciprocally. Or a state might ignore them, or incorporate them in its treatment of the other state's banks. If they
are incorporated, then, as Governor Wallich of the Federal Reserve Board observed in the international banking context, reciprocity "would lead to a crazy quilt of divergent rules," 44 4 under
which banks from jurisdictions A and B are treated differently in C
because the banks of C are treated differently in A and in B.
Reciprocity as a means to interstate banking would also require a substantial number of bilateral agreements among the 50
states-1,225 determinations that treatment is reciprocal would
have to be reached before each state's banks could obtain access to
each of the other states. Moreover, such agreements would be very
difficult, almost certainly impossible, to reach in light of the disparate attractiveness of various markets and the administrative problems already mentioned. In sum, reciprocity is not a promising
means to interstate banking, as shown by the fact that, in the
twenty-five years since the Douglas Amendment was enacted, only
Maine has invited other states to enter reciprocal banking arrangements, and none has taken up the invitation.
c. The Presidential Report.-With change at the state level
thus stymied by business, legal, and political realities, Congress in
1978 directed the President to study and report on whether there
should be changes in the federal law respecting branch banking. 4 45
Thus defined, the subject encompasses a variety of alternatives to
the McFadden Act-not only proposals for interstate banking, but
also those that are consistent with the state-by-state banking sys443. Under the proposed legislation, it is unclear whether a South Dakota BHC
would be able to enter New York and California now that its state offers access to
out-of-state BHCs through banks with no retail orientation.
444. H. Wallich, "Developments in International Banking," an address to the
Ass'n of Foreign Banks in Switzerland, Bern, Switzerland 2 (June 15, 1979), quoted
in U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, REP. TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN GOV'T TREATMENT
OF U.S. COMM'L BANK ORGANIZATIONS 10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL

TREATMENT STUDY]; see Hearings on the Int'l Banking Act of 1977 Before the
Subcomm. on FinancialInsts. of the House Comm. on Banking, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
262 (1977) (statement of Anthony M. Solomon, Undersecretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs).
445. International Banking Act of 1978, § 14, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (Supp. III 1979).
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tern, such as statewide branching for all national (and one would
then expect, state) banks.
The Report of the President, which was submitted by the Department of Treasury in January 1981, made three recommendations.4 4 6 First, the Administration concluded in general that "the
existing de facto system of interstate banking should be ratified and
further liberalized through a phased relaxation of current geographic restraints." 4 47 Though unable to determine from the evidence examined whether modification of the McFadden Act or relaxation of the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company
Act would be superior, the Report suggested modification of the
Douglas Amendment as a transitional step because it "would have
a less intrusive impact upon many institutions and the existing
regulatory structure." 44 8 Specifically, the Report recommended
that over the short term "Congress enact a phased liberalization of
the Douglas Amendment," perhaps initially to allow interstate acquisitions on a regional basis of banks holding not "more than a
specified percentage of local market share." 44 9 "However, over the
longer term, the Administration recommend[ed] that the Congress
consider what changes in the McFadden Act as it applies to brickand-mortar facilities might be appropriate," such as permitting federally chartered institutions to branch statewide and
450
within " 'natural market areas' such as SMSAs."
Second, the Administration further recommended that "the
deployment of EFT terminals ought to be subject to less onerous
geographic restrictions than those imposed on brick-and-mortar
branches, and that this modification of the McFadden Act should
be undertaken along with liberalization of the Douglas Amendment
in the first phase of geographic deregulation.- 4 51 Specifically, the
Report suggests that EFT terminals be permitted statewide and
throughout interstate SMSAs for all purposes at once; thereafter,
452
authorization would be extended nationwide.

Finally, the Report endorses "[i]nterstate BHC acquisitions to
accommodate the 'failing bank' problem. '45 3 Here the Administra446. See McFADDEN AcT REPORT, supra note 410, at 17-21.

447. Id. at 17.
448.

Id.

449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
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tion was essentially endorsing the Fed's bill, 45 4 supported by each
of the federal regulatory agencies, to increase the number of potential merger partners for a troubled depository institution. 455 At
present, under the state-by-state banking system, a failing bank
may only be merged with an institution located in the same state
or acquired by a foreign bank. The specific bill endorsed would
amend the BHC Act and the Savings and Loan Holding Company

Act 4 56 to authorize the Fed and the Federal Home Loan Bank

Board to permit interstate holding company acquisitions in distress
situations, as determined by the Federal Financial Institutions Ex457
amination Council.

The Report does not specifically address the criteria by which
its recommendations were formulated, but it does clearly attempt
to link its recommendations to identified public policy concerns.
These are labeled "Competition and Concentration," 45 8 "Service to
Local Communities," 459 "Viability of Small Banks," 460 "Safety and
Stability of the 'Banking System," 46 ' and "The Dual Banking System." 462 The relationship between each of these issues and the recommendations is suggested but not fully articulated. Instead, there
is appended to the President's brief (21-page) Report a "Compendium of Research on Branch Banking" more than ten times as long
as the Report itself and devoted to eight different topics. Although
these are useful summaries of source material, they are not linked
explicitly to the recommendations in the Report. Instead, they represent the views of various individuals in the several different
agencies that prepared the chapters.
The disjointed character of the President's Report and the fact
that it deals with geographic restrictions in general-both intrastate
and interstate-makes extended analysis of it unfruitful. The ultimate significance of the Report may lie not in its content but
454.

S. 2575, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).

455. MCFADDEN ACr REPORT, supra note 410, at 20-21.
456. 12 U.S.C. § 1730a (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
457. The Council, which was established by the Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, § 1004, 12 U.S.C. § 3303 (Supp. III
1979), to prescribe uniform principles and standards for the federal examination of
depository institutions, consists of the Comptroller, a Governor of the FRB, and the
Chairmen of the FDIC, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and National Credit Union
Administration. Id.
458. MCFADDEN ACT REPORT, supra note 410, at 12-14.
459. Id. at 14-15.
460. Id. at 15-16.
461. Id. at 16.
462. Id. at 16-17.
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rather in the momentum it lends, through presidential attention, to
the debate over interstate banking. Issuance of the Report accordingly enhances the urgency of identifying the criteria by which the
subject should be addressed before attitudes are formed or decisions are made on the basis of inadequately articulated standards.
Accordingly, in Part II of this Article, I suggest and apply a set of
criteria for the evaluation of problems associated with the implementation of de jure interstate banking.
II.

THE

CRITERIA FOR DECISION

The general question is whether banking organizations should
in principle be prohibited from operating full-service facilities 463 in
more than one state. 464 If the case for interstate banking can be
made in principle, then it will be necessary to address the specific
issues of implementation. These issues include whether there are
any special circumstances under which interstate banking should
not be allowed; whether a bank should be able to branch interstate
or instead be required, through its BHC, to form a separate banking affiliate in each state; whether entry into a new state should be
by acquisition or de novo; if entry by acquisition of an existing
bank is allowed, whether it should be more limited than it would
be under the antitrust laws of general application; and by what
standards and under what procedures interstate entry should be
authorized. 465 Each of these questions should be answered by reference to a consistent set of criteria for the evaluation of alternative
answers.
463. As was seen in Part I, interstate banking activity is already extensive, with
the exception that deposit-taking interstate is quite limited. In the discussion that
follows, references to and proposals for interstate banking are meant to encompass
full-service banking, including deposit-taking and the exercise of such incidental
powers as banks are now permitted under state and national chartering laws.
464. A complete inquiry into the question of the appropriate geographical limitations, if any, to be placed on banking enterprises would consider the full range of
options running from unit banking to nationwide branching. This Article, however,
does not address geographical limitations within state boundaries, such as unit banking, limited intrastate branching, and statewide branching. If, as I assume, there is to
be a dual banking system, states must be able to determine bank structure questions
for state banks and, in light of the competition between them, for national banks
within the state as well. It is quite sensible to leave the structure of banking within
each state to state policy and yet to inquire whether interstate banking should be
permitted as a matter of federal policy. Even if federal law were changed to give
banks or BHCs a federal right to enter and do business in every state, that is, they
could still be expected to comply with local law concerning intrastate branching,
multibank BHCs, and the like.
465. See parts III and IV infra.
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In this Part II, six criteria are introduced and applied to the
general question of whether banking organizations should in principle be prohibited from operating full-service facilities interstate.
Some of these are the conventional criteria of welfare economics;
others are peculiar to the banking industry, as regulated by state
and federal governments. Throughout, the discussion assumes the
continued existence of all major institutions-states, the dual banking system, deposit insurance, private ownership of banks,
etc.-other than the state-by-state banking system that is here under reconsideration.
A. Consumer Welfare
In economic theory, consumer welfare is increased as competition to meet a consumer demand increases. Banking may depart
from the model that tells us that more competition is better for
consumers and society if, in a perfectly competitive banking market, some consumers of bank services and other persons would experience uninsured losses due to bank failures. 466 Perhaps for this
reason, and an excess of caution, much of the debate over interstate banking has been conducted as though interstate banking and
increased-indeed often fatal--competition in local markets were
synonymous. 467 At the same time, concern that interstate banking
will lead in the long run to a banking industry concentrated at both
the national and local market levels 4 68 suggests that there is a need

for some clarification of the relationship between interstate banking
and competition.
466.

It is possible that in a perfectly competitive banking market depositors

could purchase actuarially fair insurance that, in the absence of moral hazard, would
provide full coverage of any losses otherwise arising from bank failures. In addition,
however, insurance against the externalized costs of bank failures would have to be
available even to nondepositors for unrestrained competition in banking to be clearly
efficient.
467. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas F. Bolger, President, Independent Bankers
Association of America, to Hon. Bob S. Bergland, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture (July
22, 1980) (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review) (associating "the disappearance of small unit banks [with] liberalization in bank branching limitations under
state laws;" and cautioning against interstate branching in the interest of maintaining
"an adequate supply of credit to farmers.") For a more balanced view of the likely
effects of interstate banking, see J. Guttentag, Branch Banking, Interstate Branching,
and Loan Production Offices: Analysis of the Issues (Univ. of Miami Law & Econ.
Center, 1979); Edwards, Interstate Banking: The Debate Begins, BANKERS MAGAZINE, Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 64; and C. Felsenfeld, Banking, Business, and Barbicans
(undated monograph by vice-president of Citibank).
468. See, e.g., Rhoades, The Competitive Effects of InterstateBanking, 66 Fed.
Res. Bull. 1 (1980).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

102

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking

1981]

INTERSTATE BANKING

First, interstate banking does not necessarily imply increased
actual competition in any local markets. 46 9 Entry into local markets
will presumably be regulated much as it is today, even if interstate
banking is permissible. Regulators, that is, will limit the entry of
new banks and branches into local markets at least to the degree
necessary to prevent significant numbers of failures among either
incumbent or newly entering banks.
Second, interstate banking does necessarily imply increased
potential competition in at least some markets. At present, there
are few potential entrants into some highly concentrated local markets. Assume, for example, that five or six banking organizations
control virtually all of the deposits in a local market. Potential competitors would, in principle, include other banking organizations
within the state, which might seek to branch into the concentrated
market, and new bank incorporators that might obtain a charter for
a new bank in the area. There may well be no other banking organizations in the state, however, or none that is capable of mounting a significant de novo entry into the concentrated market. 4 70 It
is possible that the highly concentrated market will not attract new
bank incorporators either, since potential incorporators would perhaps correctly fear that the existing banking organizations would be
able to underprice them due to scale economies, greater experience, or even price predation. Furthermore, even if new banks do
enter the market, they will not be able to do so with such great
and rapid success as substantially to deconcentrate the market.
With interstate banking, however, potential entrants would include banks and BHCs in other states whose scale and experience
would make them efficient competitors in the concentrated market.
Once the costs of entry had been incurred, scale and experience
would allow the newcomer to operate within a cost structure similar to that of the incumbent banks. Indeed scale alone would serve
to deter price predation as an effective response by the incumbents
to new competition; it simply would not pay for them to price below marginal cost in the hope that their staying power would be
469. As Professor Bernard Shull has wisely observed: "It is sometimes argued
that geographic market extension by large banking organizations is inevitably procompetitive; sometimes that geographic expansion is inevitably anticompetitive ...
[Tihe competitive impact of geographic expansion is simply not inevitable. The impact will depend on a variety of factors, including the regulatory constraints
imposed." Shull, Bank Expansion: The New Competition and the Old Predatory
Practices,91 BANIaNG L.J. 726, 727-28 (1974).
470. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 629 (1974).
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greater than that of an equally large or larger out-of-state banking
organization that has entered the local market.
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that interstate banking:
(1) does not necessarily imply increased actual competition; (2) does
necessarily imply increased potential competition; and (3) may in
fact lead to increased actual competition in at least some markets.
At the same time, we will continue to assume that regulators will
permit new entry only in "underbanked" markets, at least in the
sense of not permitting entry where it would lead to increased
bank failures.
In order to analyze the consumer welfare implications of increased competition in banking, it is necessary to distinguish
among different groups of consumers. In 1963, in United States V.
PhiladelphiaNational Bank, 47 1 the Supreme Court held that commercial banking is a distinct line of commerce, in that commercial
banks offer a unique "cluster of products" that differentiates them
from other institutions competing with banks in only some product
lines. 472 Since the decision in Philadelphia National Bank, of
course, the cluster of products offered by commercial banks has
come to seem less unique. Today savings and loan institutions may
offer transaction accounts, make consumer loans, and invest in
commercial paper;4 73 and finance companies may issue the same
credit cards that banks issue and compete on similar terms for
much, although not all, consumer loan business. 4 74 Regardless of
whether the cluster of products offered by banks may still be regarded as unique to the banking industry, 475 however, a close examination of the expected impact of increased competition requires
that that cluster be unbundled and that a separate analysis be
made of how the consumers of the various bank products would be
affected.
1. Depositors.-Consumers of deposit services have two conflicting interests. On the one hand, they are interested in the
471.

374 U.S. 321 (1963).

472. Id. at 356.
473. 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 401, 94 Stat. 151 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)
(Supp. III 1979)).
474. See, e.g., United States v. Household Fin. Corp., 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980) (incomplete overlap between customers of
banks and finance companies).
475. Even before these developments, there was good reason to doubt the
Court's holding that commercial banking constituted a distinct line of commerce. See
Weston & Hoskins, "Line of Commerce" and Commercial Banking, 42 So. CAL. L.
REV. 225 (1969).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

104

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking
1981]

INTERSTATE BANKING

safety and soundness of the depository institution to which they are
essentially lending money. On the other hand, they want to receive the most desirable price (i.e., interest) and service combination possible. If banks freely competed to offer more desirable
combinations, however, they could ultimately jeopardize the safety
of the deposits that they attracted.
In a completely unregulated market, consumers would choose
among combinations of the risks to and the prices paid for their deposits. Even in the world of partial regulation that existed in 1933,
when entry into banking had long been regulated and banks examined for safety and soundness, regulators and consumers alike
proved to be rather poor judges of risk. Since then, deposit insurance provided by the FDIC has relieved depositors of the need to
be much concerned with bank safety. As long as they maintain deposits that do not exceed the amount insured by the FDIC, which
is currently $100,000 per account per person 4 7 6 they need not
worry at all.
Because it would bear the impact of most depositor losses in
the event of bank failure, the FDIC has joined the Fed and the
primary regulators-the Comptroller and the state banking
commissioners-in concerning itself with bank safety. Depositors
with balances in excess of $100,000, primarily commercial depositors and wealthy individuals, are also exposed to the risks of bank
failure, but they are presumably better evaluators of bank risk than
are small depositors. 4 77 They can also diversify their risk by maintaining accounts in more than one bank.
As part of the effort to control risk, the Fed and FDIC have
4 78
regulated the interest rates that banks may pay to depositors.
Interest-rate regulation, however, is now being phased out by congressional directive, 47 9 so that interest paid on deposits in the future
will more closely reflect market rates for money. As a result, the
FDIC will have to rely on other techniques to assure bank soundness. Unable to control the cost of deposit liabilities, the FDIC, in

476.
477.

1980 Act, supra note 63, § 308(a)(1), 94 Stat. 147.
See J. SPERO, THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK 88 (1980).

478. Fed. Res. Bd. Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1980); id. § 329 (parallel
FDIC regulation of interest rates paid by insured nonmember banks). Through the
differential that enables thrift institutions to pay Y4% more than commercial banks for
most types of deposits, interest-rate regulation has been used in an effort to channel
funds to the residential mortgage market, in which thrift institutions are major providers.
479. See 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 201, 94 Stat. 142.
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supervising banking activity, will presumably pay more attention to
asset quality and the match of asset and liability maturities.
In markets where interest rates on deposits are lower than the
competitive level, either because of tacit or explicit price fixing,
the entry of an interstate competitor will tend to raise interest
rates to competitive levels, so that depositors in all local markets
receive the benefits of interest-rate deregulation. While such entry
may not affect the interest paid on deposits in markets that are already competitive, it may still affect bank assets and safety by its

operation; with the addition of new competitors, banks may find it
necessary to make loans of poorer quality, or at lower rates.
If bank failures increase, the FDIC will have to raise its insurance premium, 48 0 and insured banks will have to recover the
added cost from their depositors. But increased failure seems un-

likely. The federal banking agencies would restrict entry to prevent
overbanking, and while the burden on bank examiners may be in-

creased, there is no reason to think that they will be unable to pre481
vent bank failures as well as they do now.
In conclusion, depositors may benefit from the potential and
such actual competition as is introduced by the relaxation of inter480. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(d) (1976) as amended by 1980 Act, supra note 63, §
308(d), 94 Stat. 148 (assessments set by statute).
481. There is some empirical support for the foregoing analysis. Many states
have moved from unit or limited area branching regimes to allow statewide branching. Since the large New York City banks are among those most likely to seek interstate expansion opportunities, if allowed, New York's experience in moving from
limited to statewide branching is of particular interest. The change occurred in 1960,
and since that time the New York City banks have opened numerous branches upstate, as well as acquiring several existing banks, and chartering some de novo bank
subsidiaries of their BHCs. During the years 1960-79, however, there were only two
insured bank failures in New York State and one of those (Franklin National) was
caused by losses from foreign exchange dealing. See [1960]-[1979] FDIC ANN. RhP.
This suggests that neither the Comptroller nor the New York State Banking Commissioner has allowed local banking markets to become overbanked to the point of
causing some banks to fail simply because they have the authority to allow statewide
banking. See generally E. Kohn & C. Carlo, The Competitive Impact of New
Branches (N.Y. Bank. Dept. 1969). In this regard, the transition in New York appears
to have been typical, moreover. See, e.g., Shull, Multiple-Office Banking and the
Structure of Banking Markets: The New York and Virginia Experience, in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition 30 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago 1972).
Of course, the experience in New York, and indeed in all other states, occurred
during a time when interest rates on deposits were regulated. As suggested above,
however, banks will have to pay a market price for deposits in the future regardless
of whether there is interstate banking. See text accompanying notes 393-397 supra. The only effect that the relaxation of territorial market boundaries should have is
to insure that a fully competitive interest is paid in all markets.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

106

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking

19811

INTERSTATE BANKING

state banking barriers. They may not benefit very much in fact if
market entry is too tightly controlled, but there is surely no reason
to expect that their welfare would be decreased by reason of inter4 82
state banking.
2. Retail Borrowers.-Borrowers are benefited by increased
competition among lenders. Having more lenders in a credit market implies not only more vigorous competition in price and terms,
but also more independent judgments being made about the
creditworthiness of a particular loan applicant; the more such independent judgments, the more likely that, for any given set of rates
and terms, someone will be willing to lend to a particular borrower.
Viewed in isolation, the market for consumer bank loans is relatively concentrated in most areas of the country. Empirical studies
of the relationship between loan terms and concentration yield
mixed results, but tend to show a small and statistically significant
price effect in the expected direction. 48 3 Heggestad and Mingo
found that new car loan interest rates increased with concentration
up to a Herfindahl index of .14 which means that there would be
monopoly pricing of consumer loans in markets with seven (the reciprocal of .14) or fewer banks. 48 4 They found that the average
SMSA has the equivalent of 4.5 equal size banks; rural counties the
equivalent of only 2.2 equal size banks. 48 5 Thus, the inconsistent
results of the various studies of bank prices and their relation to
482. Rhoades, supra note 468, at 7, suggests that under interstate banking competition in a local market could be adversely affected if the leading firms meet in
other markets. This "linked-oligopoly" or "mutual-forebearance" theory claims some
support from an empirical study showing that changes in rank of leading banks in a
market were fewer in markets "when the leading firms met in a relatively large number of other markets." Id.; see Heggestad & Rhoades, Multi-Market Interdependence
and Local Market Competition in Banking, 60 REv. ECON. & STAT. 523 (1978). But
see Whitehead, An Empirical Test of the Linked Oligopoly Theory: An Analysis of
Florida Holding Companies 13 (At. Fed. Res. Bank, working paper, June 1978)
(linkage "positively associated with market competition"). To the extent that linked
oligopoly is important-and more empirical work is needed to determine that
extent-it should affect regulators' bank entry decisions, intrastate and interstate. Under interstate banking, however, more bank expansion could be allowed with fewer
meeting points betveen any two firms than otherwise. Indeed, interstate banking
would make it possible for regulators to frustrate linked oligopolies by preferring
market entrants that have fewer (or no) meeting points with incumbent firms in any
given market.
483. Heggestad, Market Structure, Competition, and Performance in Financial
Industries: A Survey of Banking Studies, in IssuEs IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 449,
474-75 (F. Edwards ed. 1979).
484. Heggestad & Mingo, supra note 410, at 654.
485. Id.
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concentration ratios can be explained on the ground that no significant changes in price would be expected with changes in concentration above the "effective monopoly" level.
Unfortunately, the same data could be explained on the
ground that the markets under study are highly competitive when
one considers consumer loan sources other than banks; again,
changes in concentration among banks alone would not then affect
expected price levels. The studies that have taken account of competition from other institutions, particularly thrifts and savings
banks, suggest that inter-institutional competition does not have a
significant influence on the price of bank services, however. 486
Thus, they tend to support the inference that in most banking markets the price of consumer loans is effectively monopolized rather
its relative
than highly competitive, and that is what explains
487
insensitivity to further moves towards concentration.
Thus, consumer borrowers stand to benefit to the extent that
interstate banking increases competition in local banking markets.
They certainly cannot be harmed by such a development, and if
prices are indeed effectively monopolized at present, they may
benefit significantly.
3. Commercial Borrowers.-Because large commercial bor-

rowers now enjoy nationwide competition for their loan business,
interstate banking would not affect the interest rates they pay unless interstate banks realize economies of scale in gathering deposits, in which case one would expect that competition among them
would result in lower prices to all borrowers, including large commercial borrowers.
Small and intermediate size corporate borrowers face a more
limited number of lenders competing for their business. Intermediate sized borrowers that shop for bank loans on a regional basis are
being courted by the money center banks that have LPOs in each
region of the country. 488 Banks now represented only by LPOs
486. See Rhoades, Nonbank Thrift Institutions as Determinants of Performance in Banking Markets, 32 J. ECON. & Bus. 66 (1979). But cf. Heggestad &

Mingo, supra note 410, at 658-59 (demand deposit account charges lower where
thrifts could offer such accounts).
487. Of course, with increasingly liberal asset powers, thrift institutions are becoming ever more direct competitors of banks and may someday provide effective
competition in markets that are now effectively monopolized.
488. See PAYMENT SYSTEMS, INC., FOREIGN BANKS 31 (1979). It has been esti-

mated that the intermediate-sized group of corporations traditionally served by regional banks numbers "perhaps 10,000 firms." Id.

On the relationship between

banking-market concentration and interest rates on commercial loans to small and

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

108

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking

1981]

INTERSTATE BANKING

would be more effective competitors if they could provide depository services to their intermediate sized borrowers, because they
could then offer a service package comparable to that available
from the indigenous regional banks. Small businesses are not generally reached by and thus do not benefit from the money center
banks' presence in the form of LPOs. If the ability to take deposits
induced money center banks or regional banks from other regions
of the country to open full-service facilities in their locale, small
businesses would face a more competitive market among the lenders serving them.
Again, it is possible that regulatory control would so limit entry that these potential benefits from interstate banking would not
be realized by borrowers, as they might not be realized by depositors, but it is quite impossible to imagine any adverse consequences for borrowers (or depositors). Instead it seems quite likely
that at least some regulators would exploit the possibilities for interstate entry to make local and regional markets for intermediate
and small business loans more competitive.
B.

ProducerWelfare

The impact of interstate banking on producer welfare is likely
to be mixed. Producer interests include those of bank sharehold4 89
ers, employees, and indirectly, creditors (other than depositors).
In general, the interests of these three groups are coincident in
that they all want the banks on which they are claimants to prosper. Non-depository creditors are least affected by changes in bank
profits, however; short of balance sheet insolvency, their claims
will be satisfied in full regardless of whether the debtor bank is
profitable. Therefore, since increased bank failure is not a necessary result of interstate banking, 490 we need not be concerned here
with the welfare of bank creditors.
1. Shareholders.-In contrast, the welfare of shareholders is
most intimately correlated with profitability. If interstate banking
makes the industry as a whole more profitable, then shareholders
as a group will be better off. If the disaggregated effects of interstate banking are to make some banks more profitable and others
less profitable while the industry as a whole is more profitable,
midsized borrowers, see D. Jacobs, Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure:
An Empirical Estimate of their Relations (NBER Occasional Paper No. 115, 1971).
489. Nondepository creditors include both trade creditors and financial creditors such as sellers of Fed funds.
490. See text accompanying notes 480-482 supra.
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then adequately diversified shareholders will be better off; inadequately diversified shareholders in banks that are adversely affected
will, of course, be worse off, but it is within their ability to diversify their holdings, and they will do so if they are isk-averse.
On the other hand, interstate banking may make the industry
less profitable if it is administered to increase the level of competition. Regulation Q and controls over entry may have kept bank
profits above the competitive rate of return on investments of
equivalent risk;491 if not, it would be because bank rents have been
dissipated through price competition for loans and service competition for deposits. 492 In either event, though, increased competition
should lead to lower average returns on investments in banking
-permanently if profits are now at super-competitive levels, and
to the point at
at least in the short run if they are already down
493
which only a competitive return is being earned.
It thus seems at first anomalous that a leading bank-stock analyst believes interstate banking will increase bank profits. 494 The
reason given, however, is that banks now compete for deposits
with other institutions, such as securities and non-financial
companies, that are not limited by state boundaries but can branch
nationwide. 495 In other words, when viewed as part of the wider
market to provide financial services, banks may be at a relative disadvantage. If so, then they may now be earning less than competitive returns on investment. 496 A move to interstate banking may
increase their profits, therefore, even though it also increases intraindustry competition in banking, since the truly relevant market is
broader. If this possibility is added to the possibility that interstate
banking may result in greater scale economies, some of which
491. See Rhoades, A Comparative Investigation of Risk and Rates of Return in
Commercial Banking and Manufacturing Industries, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 589
(1980).
492. See, e.g., Williamson, Economies As An Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125
U. PA. L. REv. 699, 714 (1977).
493. -A subcompetitive return would be tolerated only while specialized physical capital that has been dedicated to the banking business is allowed to wear out.
494. See Unequal Opportunity, BANK STOCK Q., May 1978, at 1, 19.
495. Id. at 19. Of course, these nonbanks are not regulated with respect to the
rates they can pay public investors for funds either; this fact may be as important as
their ability to operate nationwide-and thus perhaps to realize scale economies unavailable to banks-in giving them a competitive advantage over banks. Id.
496. See note 493 supra. In addition, banks might remain in the industry at
subcompetitive returns if they expect the law to undergo a favorable change and if
exiting now would not enable them to re-enter in such a way as to profit from the
change in law.
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could be retained by producers under a condition of less than perfect competition, then it seems plausible that interstate banking
will benefit bank shareholders as a group.
2. Employees.-Employees are more like creditors than shareholders in that their fortunes do not rise and fall with every quarterly report of profits. But unlike either of those groups, employees
must depend upon a single firm and cannot diversify in such a way
as to minimize their risk of unemployment. Thus, their economic
prospects are affected by the growth or contraction of the enterprise for which they work, as well as the growth or contraction of
the industry to which their skills are specialized. If interstate banking creates additional competition in a local market with the result
that an incumbent bank contracts, then some of that banks' employees will lose their jobs and some of those that are discharged,
particularly among the managers, will not be re-employed by the
new market entrants.
While some bank employees would undoubtedly be harmed
by enhanced competition in banking, it should also be borne in
mind that, other things being equal, increased competition will increase the demand for all banking inputs, including labor. If the
banking industry is now less than fully competitive, then it is
producing less than the competitive level of output and thus probably using less inputs than it would under competition. Increased
competition should occasion a general expansion of the industry,
therefore, and a net increase in the number of persons it employs.
Of course, all other things are not equal, and an increase in banking competition may accelerate the discovery of technological and
managerial innovations that reduce costs by substituting capital for
labor. In that event, the overall demand for banking labor could
decrease.
The effects of increased competition on banking employment
are necessarily very speculative. The possibility of adverse effects
on employment in a particular industry should not and do not generally weigh heavily in the formulation of legislative policy unless
they have a high probability of occurring at a fairly severe level in a
particular locale. That was the case, for example, when the airline
industry was substantially deregulated; it was reasonably expected
that ground employment would be very adversely affected at some
locations. 497 Provision was therefore made to protect the interests
497. See Reform of the Economic Regulation of Air Carriers,Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works & Transportation,
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of those who would be laid off by giving them priority claims on
the new job opportunities that could be expected to arise at other
locations as the industry expanded to a competitive level of output. 498 If interstate banking is similarly likely to result in increased
competition that in turn would work to the detriment of some employees in some local markets, consideration should perhaps be
given to a labor-protective approach that would mitigate the harm
to them; such ameliorative steps must at least be considered before
any expected adverse effect on employees is counted as a cost in
moving from state-by-state to interstate banking.
In summary, the implications of interstate banking for producer welfare are necessarily indeterminate and probably mixed;
some producer interests will almost certainly benefit, while others
will almost certainly be harmed, at least if protective measures are
not provided for them. Specifically, bank creditors will probably be
unaffected; some shareholders may be harmed if interstate banking
increases competition and lowers the return on investment for the
industry as a whole. Meanwhile, some employees will gain security
and opportunities for advancement in expanding banking enterprises, while others will lose their jobs. Holding constant the rate
of bank technological innovation, however, overall employment in
the industry will probably increase.
C.

Equity of Regulation

There is a public interest in regulation being equitable and in
its being perceived as equitable by those who are regulated. The
first is an economic and the second a political interest.
Equitable regulation treats like parties alike. It imposes like
burdens on competitors so that the victors in economic competition
are those who produce goods and services most efficiently, rather
than those who are most benefited by regulations for reasons
unrelated to their efficiency as competitors. It is nearly impossible
to devise regulations that do not affect competitors differently,
however. Nominally neutral regulations impose different compliance costs on competing firms that have different endowments;
thus, some firms gain relative price advantages and market share as
a result of even the most stringent regulations applied alike to

94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1224 (1976) (statement of Roderick Gilstrap, First Vice-President, Airline Pilots Association).
498. 49 U.S.C. § 1552(d) (Supp. III 1979).
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them and their competitors. 499 At the same time, however, it is
generally difficult or impossible to implement regulations in such a
way as to equalize their impact on the regulated firms.
The impossibility of achieving anything like precise equality of
impact makes it more, rather than less, important that direct competitors be subjected to like regulation. Subjecting some competitors to more burdensome regulations or excusing others altogether
exacerbates the unavoidable degree to which regulation rather than
efficiency affects competitive outcomes.
In addition to its implications for allocative efficiency, inequitable regulation cannot be accepted as fair by those whom it disadvantages. It is the essence of an arbitrary regime to treat like cases
differently and different cases alike. Insofar as a regulatory system
is perceived as arbitrary, it cannot command the acquiesence, let
alone allegiance, of those who believe they are its victims.
Regulatees-as-victims engage in minimal compliance strategies that
induce officials to redouble their efforts at enforcement. This cycle
in which regulatees circumvent regulations and regulators extend
them consumes real resources and produces only disrespect for
regulatory law. 50 0 The key to making regulation equitable, of
course, is deciding which cases are alike and which are different.
1. Banks in Different Markets.-The state-by-state banking
system penalizes banks in declining markets by preventing them
from reaching out to growing markets. Reciprocally, state-by-state
banking protects the banks in growing markets from the competition of those who would enter from declining markets. This distribution of benefits and burdens cannot be realistically justified as
necessary to provide incentives to foresight by investors or managers. Since 1956, even a bank with superior foresight could not, if
it was located in a declining market, establish an affiliate in a
499. See Leone, The Real Costs of Regulation, 55 HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec.,
1977, at 57, 61-62.
500.

The cycle of regulation, creative response, and loophole-closing has been

the hallmark of Regulation Q. See, e.g., Latest 'Advantage' From Chase Draws Regulators' Interest, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1981, at 40, col. 3 (bank interpreted lawful $10
maximum value of premium per account per deposit up to $5,000 to enable it to solicit customers to open multiple accounts and receive up to $800 for 30-month deposit); 46 Fed. Reg. 15,131 -32 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 1204.109(a))
(prohibiting such solicitation). Compare Bank oJ California Complies with Fed Request to Hold Off on London Accounts, BNA Wash. Financial Rep., May 18, 1981, at
A-8, with 46 Fed. Reg. 27,090 -92 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 204, 217)
(Regulation Q extended to cover deposits of less than $100,000 payable outside the

United States).
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growing out-of-state market. Prior to that time, and to the communications and transportation advances since then, it would have
simply been impractical for banks in the now-declining northeastern quadrant of the country to have established affiliates in the
growing states of the South and the West. The banks in declining
markets, that is, are not unlike the banks in growing markets in
any relevant respect.
Yet these banks, and the natural persons who are their shareholders, managers, and employees now find their economic opportunities limited by their location-a circumstance that they might
gladly change if only the law allowed. Their regulatory confinement
in relatively declining markets certainly seems to be an inequity of
regulation that can only be cured by some form of interstate banking.
2. Grandfathered Multistate Foreign Banks and Domestic
BHCs.-Until the International Banking Act of 1978, foreign banks
were not subject to the state-by-state regime. They could establish
branches or subsidiary banks in any state that let them in, and several states did so. As a result, when this advantage was eliminated
in 1978, some foreign banking organizations had built extensive interstate operations. Thirty-six foreign institutions had deposittaking banks or branches in more than one state; one had deposittaking banks or branches in as many as five states, and many had
agency offices in additional states. 50 1
The 1978 legislation required each foreign bank to designate
one of the states in which it had operations as its "home" state.
Thereafter, additional offices-banks or branches-could be opened
only in the home state, and only if the home state permitted
multibank holding companies or branching, respectively. 50 2 Operations established in other states prior to 1978, however, were
grandfathered. 50 3 The sixty-five foreign banks with multistate operations prior to the Act 504 were therefore given a permanent advantage over their domestic competitors operating under the state-bystate system.
When the 1956 BHC Act was passed, the domestic multistate
BHCs then in existence were also grandfathered. These BHCs
501. GOLEMBE (1979), supra note 113, at 101, 110-14 (Table 5-2).
502. 12 U.S.C. § 3103(a) (Supp. III 1979). A compilation of state laws excluding
and allowing entry by foreign banks appears in the MCFADDEN ACT REPORT, supra
note 410, app., at 234 app. A. See also id. app., at 211 (table 8.2).
503. 12 U.S.C. § 3103(b) (Supp. III 1979).
504. See GOLEMBE (1979), supra note 113, at 110-14 (Table 5-2).
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compete in twenty-four states 50 5 with banks and BHCs that are
limited to banking in only one state. Whatever the advantages of
multistate BHC operation may be, therefore, they are realized by
some firms and not by others in direct competition with them.
Consider the advantages enjoyed by Western Bancorporation,
which owns twenty-one banks in the eleven western-most states of
the lower 48. These banks have a total of 859 offices, 369 ATMs,
and 2.1 million cards outstanding. All of the offices and ATMs are
linked by 41,000 miles of leased telephone lines, giving the customers of each bank access to cash withdrawal, credit line, and
check guarantee services at all of the banks and ATMs in the system. 50 6 With this interstate access feature, it is difficult to see why
any person living in the vicinity of a subsidiary bank and expecting
to travel in the West would fail to open an account with a Western
Bancorporation bank. The BHC's multistate advantage will only be
enhanced, moreover, if it implements a plan now under consideration to establish an on-line regional POS system; holders of debit
cards issued by any of the BHC's subsidiary banks could use this
50 7
payment system throughout the eleven-state region.
The inequity of regulation inherent in requiring some banks to
compete with others that have grandfathered multistate operations
could be resolved either by extending the reach of all banks, or by
requiring the division of the multistate banking organizations into
separate entities, separately controlled, in each state. Multistate
BHCs may well have argued in 1978 that another kind of inequity
would have been involved if they had been required to dismember
along state lines; after all, in becoming multistate they had not
failed to comply with the law as it then was. Yet it is far from clear
whether any hardship, or even loss, would have been entailed if
they had been required to comply with the new regime. If so, it
suggests that there are significant economies from interstate operation; the "grandfathering" of these economies conferred a permanent competitive advantage on some banks and a correspondingand permanent-disadvantage on others. The inequity of regulation
is obvious.
505. Id. at 66 (Table 4-1).
506. Address by Lisa E. Smith, Ass't Vice Pres., Western Bancorporation, Before the Electronic Funds Transfer Ass'n: Debit Card I (Sept. 8, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Address]; see Hollie, Coast Bank Going Interstate, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1981,
at D1,col. 3 (profile of Western Bancorp., which has since changed its name to First
Interstate Bank).
507. Address, supra note 506.
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In any event, both instances of grandfathering rewarded those
organizations that had sought their advantage by circumventing the
general prohibition on interstate branching. They did not violate
the law in establishing an interstate presence. Rather, they demonstrated a superior ability and willingness to exploit the lacunae in
it. It is true that any bank could have formed a multistate BHC
prior to 1956. This may have been influential in the decision to
grandfather those who did take advantage of the opportunity, and
it may still be thought to temper the resulting inequality somewhat. It was not open to any domestic bank, however, to make itself a foreign bank and thereby to gain an interstate branch presence. The advantage of foreign banks can in no way, therefore, be
attributed to foresight, insight, or even just greater aggressiveness.
They had a unique opportunity, and they took it; when it was
closed, their advantage was made permanent. Since it turned upon
an immutable status, this was the essence of inequitable regulation.
3. Banks and their Nonbank Competitors.-An increasing variety of nonbank institutions compete with banks for deposits. In
most local markets, savings and loan institutions and credit unions
are the principal nonbank competitors. Although savings and loans
had historically been limited to taking savings passbook and time
deposits, they have offered accounts accessed by "remote service
units," which are off-premise ATMs, since 1974,508 and were authorized in 1980 to offer NOW accounts starting in 1981.509 Credit
unions, which have offered transaction accounts called "share draft"
accounts since 1977,510 have also been able to offer NOW accounts
5 11
as of 1981.
Some savings and loans institutions and credit unions do in
508. 39 Fed. Reg. 23,991, as amended by 39 Fed. Reg. 26,286 (1974); see 12
C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1980). The application of this regulation was questioned in American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, 447 F. Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd, 595 F.2d 887
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (No. 78-1337, Apr. 20, 1979) (order vacating regulation stayed pending congressional determination). But see 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 304, 94 Stat. 146
(remote service units authorized) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979)).
509. 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 303, 94 Stat. 146 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)
(Supp. III 1979)).
510. 42 Fed. Reg. 61,977 (1977); see 12 C.F.R. § 701.34 (1978). The regulation's
application was questioned in American Banker's Ass'n v. Connell, 447 F. Supp. 296
(D.D.C. 1978), rev'd, 595 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (No. 78-1337, Apr. 20, 1979) (order vacating regulation stayed pending congressional determination). But see 1980
Act, supra note 63, § 305, 94 Stat. 146 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1752(5) (Supp. III
1979)) (share drafts authorized).
511. 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 303, 94 Stat. 146 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)
(Supp. III 1979)).
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fact operate interstate at present, but not to an appreciable extent. 512 This is not a limitation of statute law, however. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board could authorize a federally chartered
savings and loan association to open branches interstate. In fact, it
is currently considering the question whether to authorize interstate branching in metropolitan Washington, D.C., which encompasses portions of Maryland and Virginia.5 13 If it does authorize interstate branching in this area, then most local banks will be in
direct competition with institutions that have a distinct advantage
in being able to offer convenient access points throughout the relevant geographical market, while each bank is limited to operations
in one of the three jurisdictions that the market spans. 5 14 Equity of
regulation requires that savings and loans associations and banks be
treated alike in this respect, however, absent a strong countervailing reason for the distinction. Thus far, no such reason has
been offered. Any resulting disparity in regulation can be viewed
more as the product of "regulatory competition" and of different
statutes than of a considered judgment.
Nationally chartered credit unions are also operating interstate. Historically, credit unions existed to serve a limited class of
potential customers, often an employee affinity group. Such a
group consists of the employees of a particular employer, which
may have operations and employees in many states. Perhaps the
most extensive interstate operation is that of the Navy Credit Union, which offers share draft accounts in sixty-five branch offices located in ten states and several additional places overseas. 515
512. Perpetual Savings and Loan Association is perhaps the most extensive
such interstate institution, having eleven offices in the District of Columbia and five

in Maryland.
513. See 46 Fed. Reg. 3,909 (1981); 44 Fed. Reg. 36,057 (1979). On March 23,
1981, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board also approved a "policy clarification" reaffirming its authority to approve an interstate merger or acquisition involving a financially troubled savings and loan institution. See BNA Wash. Financial Rep., Mar. 30,
1981, at A-1.

514. The sole exception is Financial General Corporation, a grandfathered
BHC with a bank in each of the three metropolitan Washington jurisdictions and a
network of 77 offices and 59 ATMs. Even it would be at some disadvantage relative
to a coextensive savings and loan association, however, since its Washington and
Maryland banks cannot accept deposits for, nor receive deposits through, the
Virginia bank. See FG Electronically Links Area Banks, Wash. Star, Sept. 6, 1980, at

B5, col. 1.
515. Letter from J.M. Henderson, Director, Education and Information, Navy
Federal Credit Union, to Samuel W. Goodhope (May 4, 1981) (copy on file in office
of Hofstra Law Review); see Navy Credit Union, Pertinent Facts About Navy Credit
Union 17 (Mar. 1981).
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The brokerage house of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc. (hereinafter Merrill Lynch) has demonstrated the ability of stockbrokers to compete for deposit business through a network of nationwide offices. Merrill Lynch, which has 390 retail offices nationwide, offers its Cash Management Account (CMA)
through 250 offices in 40 states now, and these numbers are
increasing. 516 CMA consists of a money market fund with a transaction account feature linked to a securities trading account at
Merrill Lynch. CMA customers are given a Visa card and "Visa
drafts" issued by Bank One of Columbus, Ohio. When sales drafts
and the check-like Visa drafts are presented for payment at Bank
One, the bank seeks authorization and cover from Merrill Lynch.
Merrill Lynch will authorize the payment and cover it by wire
transfer, drawing first on any cash balances in the customer's trading account, then on shares in the money market fund, and then
on margin credit. The principle is to draw on the cheapest money
first. All cash balances are automatically invested in the firm's
money market fund on a weekly basis, so the customer gets the advantage of money market rates on funds that would otherwise earn,
at best, the rate paid on NOW accounts; and the funds are immediately available for either investment or for transactional pur517
poses.
At least two states have maintained that CMA is unchartered
banking. Oregon prohibits it on this ground. 518 The state of Colorado settled its suit upon Merrill Lynch's undertaking not to allow
customers to access their balances with drafts of less than $200,
thereby limiting the competitive impact of CMA on local banks. 519
Merrill Lynch itself imposes a $20,000 minimum of cash and securities that one must deposit in order to open a CMA account. This,
too, somewhat limits direct competition with banks for transaction
balances, but it leaves the brokerage firm in competition for the
most desirable customers' balances, and it is in any event a selfimposed limitation that could lawfully be removed at any time.
516.

Mayer, Merrill Lynch Quacks Like a Bank, FORTUNE, Oct. 20, 1980, at

135.

517. CMA Money Trust Prospectus (Aug. 25, 1978).
518. Letter from Jos. A. Redden, Attorney General of Oregon, to John B. Olin,
Oregon Superintendent of Banks (May 30, 1978) (concerning Opinion Request
OP-4340) (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Redden
Letter].
519. Agreement between Colorado State Bank Commissioner and Merrill
Lynch, in settlement of People v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., No.
C-79745 (Denver Dist. Ct.).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

118

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking

19811

INTERSTATE BANKING

CMA is already of some competitive significance-there is $4
billion in the component money-market fund 52° -and it represents
a potential competitive force of unknown dimensions. Moreover,
there is no barrier to other brokerage houses entering the competition for what are essentially transaction balances and exploiting
their advantages over banks in being able to operate nationwide
and to operate a money-market fund. 52 1 Any brokerage house
could accept deposits into a CMA-like account and allow withdrawals from it at any of their offices around the country, and presumably could do so also through ATMs, giving their customers deposit
and withdrawal access nationwide, twenty-four hours a day. Perhaps access could even be gained from off-premise locations if a
broker is allowed to share in ATM networks or customers are allowed to make deposits to and withdrawals from the broker's account at a bank that does share in a network.
Brokerage houses, such as Merrill Lynch, have clearly resolved to compete with banks and other financial institutions over
as broad an array of products as they can offer, and to exploit their
interstate advantage in doing so. For example, Merrill Lynch also
sells $100,000 insured certificates of deposit (CDs) issued by about
twenty banks and savings and loans .522 It thus reaches interstate
markets on behalf of banks that cannot do so directly, and charges
them a fee for acting as a conduit between bank and investor. This
may be the most efficient means in any event for banks to reach
substantial investors around the country, but one cannot know because the arrangement is not the product of competition between
Merrill Lynch, on the one hand, and vertical integration by banks
themselves, on the other hand, but rather arises in a legal environment that leaves most banks no adequate alternative to using an
agent to reach depositors in other states.
Finally, ever since Sears, Roebuck announced that it was
523
contemplating selling small-denomination notes to the public,
banks have been facing the possibility that major retailers would
520. Grant, It Looks Like Bank, Acts Like Bank but Its Name Is Merrill Lynch,
L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, Business Section, at 1, col. 1.
521. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., and Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., have each
announced their intention to offer products similar to Merrill Lynch's CMA account.
The Consumer Should Be the Biggest Winner As Competition Transforms Financial
Services, Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1981, at 56, col. 1.
522. Quint, Merrill Uses Branches as CD Outlets, Am. Banker, July 11, 1980, at
1, col. 2, at 20, col. 1.
523. See Commercial Banks Gird for New Challenges as Sears Readies Note
Sale Direct to Public, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1980, at 33, col. 4.
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enter the competition for deposits and, again, exploit their
nationwide branching advantage. The Sears proposal is simplicity
itself. It would accept deposits into what are now credit accounts,
pay interest to customers who have a positive balance during a
month, and charge interest to those who had a negative balance,
i.e. charge users and pay extenders of credit. Sears, too, could provide deposit and withdrawal access to its millions of cardholders
through on-premise or off-premise ATMs. The same possibilities
might attract Wards, Penneys, K-Mart, and others, each with hundreds of locations across the nation.
If plans such as these are not characterized as banking and
prohibited without a charter, they could offer very substantial competition to banks by reason of the retailers' convenient locations,
interstate operations, and freedom from other bank regulations.
Retailers would be free, that is, not only of branching restrictions
but perhaps also of reserve requirements, interest rate maxima, examination fees, and FDIC insurance premiums, all of which would
give them the ability to pay more for deposits than could banks.
Whether these inequities of regulation would be allowed to arise
cannot be determined as yet, since no retailer has in fact implemented what Sears has been considering. Moreover, even if
soundness-oriented regulations or their equivalents are extended to
retailers taking deposits, they will still enjoy the advantages of interstate operation.
D. Soundness Supervision
Any change in the state-by-state banking system must be evaluated also in terms of its implications for soundness supervision.
Supervision of banks for safety and soundness is ultimately linked
to consumer and producer welfare, since bank failures impose
losses on both the consumers and producers of bank services.
Soundness supervision has a distinct role, however, apart from consumer and producer welfare, because bank failures impose an
economy-wide externality in the form of impaired confidence in the
banking system. When confidence in banks is generally impaired,
the economy as a whole suffers because banks experiencing net
withdrawals must contract their credit extensions, and when the
net withdrawals are significant enough, credit must contract even if
the Fed lowers its reserve requirements and increases its extensions of credit to banks at the discount window.
It is certainly arguable, and indeed probable, that the now virtually universal deposit insurance provided by the FDIC would
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prevent a run on banks today even if several large banks failed.
There is, however, understandably little sentiment for testing that
hypothesis by relaxing soundness supervision to the point of
inducing bank failures. Therefore, any change in the state-by-state
banking system must be considered unacceptable if and to the extent that it would make extensive bank failures likely.
Whether interstate banking would have any effect on supervisability is far from clear, but there is no reason to think that it
would make the task easier. In essence, interstate banking introduces the possibility of banking enterprises with far-flung operations within the United States and perhaps increases the probability that some banking enterprises will attain a scale much larger
than anything known to date. At the same time, the ability of state
and national supervisors to oversee a bank with far-flung operations
should no longer be in doubt; as previously observed,5 24 the
Comptroller and the banking commissioners of several of the states
currently examine banks with worldwide operations, and the addition of interstate offices within the United States would not make
the task any more difficult in nature. Interstate and perhaps
nationwide banking would, of course, increase the number of supervised banks with far-flung operations, and thus could increase
by degrees some of the difficulties now encountered in international bank supervision by extending them to additional, but this
time domestic, banks. There might be a much increased demand
for trained examiners, for example. Since all national and some
state banks bear the cost of their own examination, 525 however,
increasing examination resources should not be considered a problem for public policy, except perhaps for the short time required to
train more examiners. Furthermore, the availability of examiners
or examination procedures could be considered a constraint on the
rate at which interstate banking is allowed.
Experience with grandfathered foreign banks and multistate
BHCs suggests that interstate banking by additional'domestic banking enterprises will raise no problems of a type not already encountered and dealt with successfully by both state and national supervisors.526 That experience also suggests the feasibility of co524. See text accompanying notes 419-423 supra.
525.

E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 338 (1976) (state member banks); id. § 196 (national

banks).
526. See, e.g., GOLEMBE (1979), supra note 113, at 80, 138 (both multistate
BHCs and bank regulators report no special or insurmountable problems of supervision).
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ordination among several banking jurisdictions in arranging
simultaneous examinations when necessary. Coordination is, of
course, more difficult if uniform standards must also be agreed
upon by each examining authority. There is no particular difficulty
in applying diverse standards to the various banks of a single BHC
where each operates in only one state, however. Direct branching
interstate may pose a more difficult problem, although New York
has found it possible to regulate foreign branches as though they
527
were separate entities.
Direct interstate branching is at least somewhat more likely
than multistate BHCs to alter the present distribution of supervisory authority. 528 Where a bank chartered in state A opens a
branch in state B, both states A and B have a clear interest in the
examination process. State A cannot risk allowing the branch in
state B to serve as a warehouse for overvalued assets, such as delinquent loans, nor as a haven for imprudent or impermissible
transactions. State B, on the other hand, where the bank has only
a branch, is reasonably concerned with the solvency of the entire
bank, since the branch in state B is taking deposits from residents
of state B on behalf of the entire bank. Those deposits lose their
separate identity once taken and failure of the bank may involve
closure and liquidation of the branch. Unless the liabilities and assets of each branch outside a bank's home state are segregated, and
the branch effectively treated as though it were a separate bank,
the host state will understandably assert an interest in the bank's
operations in the home state, and indeed in any other host states.
The interests of home-state A, host-state B, and any other host
states can be served by simultaneous examination, perhaps even
without uniform standards, but that does not mean that
coordination among the perhaps many states involved will always
be possible.
If cooperation fails to achieve coordination, the interstate bank
will presumably be examined in full by each of the interested jurisdictions. The cost and disruption that this would occasion would
tend to make the interstate bank favorably disposed either to tak527. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 202-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (foreign branch
must hold qualifying assets equal to 108% of liabilities); M. STIGUM supra note 218,
at 144.
528. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Implementing a Policy of Interstate Banking 5 (Aug. 22, 1979) (paper submitted to white House Domestic Policy
Staff in preparation of McFADDEN AcT REPORT, supra note 410); text accompanying

notes 706-708 infra.
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ing out a national bank charter or to federal preemption of the examination process. Of course, federal preemption of banking regulation in the wake of interstate banking would end competitive or
dual regulation. While many banks would therefore oppose federal
preemption, as they presently do, 5 29 it must be acknowledged that
interstate banking at least raises the possibility that some major
banks would favor and perhaps achieve federal preemption of the
examination process, and that that might lead to more general federal preemption as well.
At present, all insured banks are subject to examination by a
federal agency; most state banks are in fact examined by both their
state and federal regulators every year, although some states have
reached an accord whereby they alternate years with the FDIC in
examining their banks. 530 If federal examination is, as often asserted, equal to the best state examination process and superior to
many states' processes, 531 then federal preemption would not adversely -affect the quality of soundness supervision. State bank supervisors may nevertheless oppose anything that threatens to make
federal preemption more likely, in order to preserve their domains. 5 32 If interstate banking is allowed, this threat may provide a
substantial incentive for cooperation and coordination among the
state bank supervisors in examining state-chartered banks interstate.
E. Policy Guidance
Banks are everywhere subject to a significant degree of actual
or potential political control. For example, in many countries, this
control is exercised in order to assure that banks are major purchasers of public-debt issues, and that their expansion and contraction of the money supply through changes in the volume of loans
outstanding furthers governmental monetary policies. Political control may be exerted through any of a variety of means, ranging
from outright state ownership of the major banks, as in France, 533
529. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
530. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE

UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS OF FiNANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 10-11 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT]; CSBS PROFILE, supra

note 19, at 49-52.
531.

Cf. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 530, at 12.

532. See, e.g., 1965 ConsolidationHearings,supra note 22, at 121.
533. The three largest nationalized banks in France hold 55% of all commercial
bank assets in that country. Weiss, National Policies on Foreign Acquisitions of
Banks, BANKERS MAGAZINE, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 25, 29 (table 4).
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to the "administrative guidance" exercised by the Ministry of Finance in Japan. 5 34 In the United States, political influence is ex-

erted through a combination of statutory limitations and incentives,
more and less formal Fed policies, and an implicit "chit" system.
Under the chit system, banks need permission to make a variety of
decisions that are ordinarily left to entrepreneurs; if they do not accept the policy guidance of their regulators, they cannot expect
that their applications-to branch, to establish an ATM, to acquire
a business closely related to banking, etc.-will be as readily ap35
proved. 5
In the United States, policy guidance is used both for fiscal
and monetary purposes and for the purposes of allocating credit to
the housing market in general and to local credit markets in particular. Before examining the implications of interstate banking for
the effective exercise of policy guidance, it is necessary to explicate
the ways in which guidance is now used to further these four ends.
1. Funding Public Debt.-The evidence of policy guidance for
fiscal purposes is clear. The national banking system originated
precisely because the federal government could not induce the
state-chartered banks to purchase its debt instruments at the nadir
of its fortunes during the Civil War. 536 Furthermore, when the National Bank Act was amended by the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 to
take commercial banks out of the investment banking business, national banks were forbidden to purchase corporate stock for their
own account, and were subjected to the regulations of the Comptroller respecting "investment securities," meaning corporate
bonds, notes, and other evidences of indebtedness. 537 At the same
time, however, these limitations and conditions were made inapplicable to bank investments in obligations of the United States and
the general obligations of states and political subdivisions, i.e. municipal bonds. 538
534. See J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON BANKING LAv 1033 (1976).
535. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1669, supra note 36, at 6: "The OCC has on
several occasions attached such conditions [as an increase in capital or ceasing an
unsafe or unsound practice] to the approval of branches, mergers, acquisitions, and
other actions by banks." Judicial review of adverse decisions on such applications is
not adequate to assure that decisions are based on, or even supported by, their ostensible grounds, and mere agency delay, or selectively strict application of statutory
standards, escapes review altogether. Thus, use of the implicit chit system may be
seen as an exercise of unreviewable agency discretion to implement policy.
536. See note 9 supra.
537. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979) (para. seventh), as amended by
1980 Act, supra note 63, § 711, 94 Stat. 189.
538. Id.
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Since 1933, a long list of exceptions of Glass-Steagall have
been made in order to enable banks to invest liberally in the obligations of federal agencies, public housing authorities receiving
federal assistance, agricultural credit corporations, and other
public-sector entities. Many of these obligations are backed by the
full faith and credit of the United States, so that unlimited bank investment in them raises no soundness issue-they are virtually
risk-free-and the exception may be justified on this ground. The
blanket exemption for investment in municipal bonds, which do
carry a risk factor, is clearly, however, a gentle form of credit allocation in favor of the public sector. And banks do tend to be major
purchasers of both municipal bonds and United States agency securities.
Banks have large municipal bond holdings for several reasons,
including tax considerations and the requirement, imposed by
many states, that deposits of public monies be backed by municipal
bonds in the bank's portfolio. 5 39 It seems probable, however, that
banks buy even more municipal bonds than these factors would explain. In some cases, local banks buy local municipal and agency
obligations for which there would otherwise be no market. The
reason for this is that local officials expect them to do so, and
would be more than mildly upset if the banks refused to do so.
They would certainly carry their complaints to their state's banking
commissioner and their state legislators.
State chartered banks are, of course, more dependent on harmonious relations with state, and therefore local, governments than
are national banks. National banks can hardly be indifferent to
their standing with state authorities, however, since they may wish
540
to switch to a state charter at any time in the future.
539. See Hearings on Rev. Proc. 80-55 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1981)
(statement of John E. Chapoton, Ass't Sec'y (Tax Policy), Dep't of Treasury, and
Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Comm'r of Internal Revenue).
540. Consider, for example, the ten largest banks in Texas, each of which had
domestic deposits in excess of $750 million in 1978, and 9 of which were national
banks. These 10 banks together held securities worth $4.6 billion, or an average of
18.15% of their total assets. Almost 62% of their securities holdings were in municipal bonds, and almost all those would certainly have been issued by the State of
Texas, its authorities, and political subdivisions. While 11.17% of the assets of the 10
largest banks in Texas were invested in municipals (61.57% of 18.15% = -11.17%),
the 10 largest state chartered banks in Texas had almost 14% of their total assets in
municipal securities. See generally Sheshunoff & Co., The Banks of Your State 1980,
at 10-11.
Conventional scholarship examining bank portfolios of municipal bonds does not
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2. Implementing Monetary Policy.-Monetary policy is implemented by the Fed in three different ways. The first, and by far
the most significant, is through open market operations, in which
5 41
the Fed buys and sells United States Treasury obligations.
When the Fed sells Treasury bills and notes, the money used to
pay for them is removed from the commercial banking system.
When the Fed buys T-bills, its payments end up in the commercial
banking system. In this way, the Fed can raise or lower the money
supply by controlled amounts. In open market operations, banks
may act as buyers and sellers of Treasury obligations; but their
principal connection to monetary policy is that they make loans
54 2
that become bank balances, which are part of the money supply.
Due to the fractional reserve requirement, the Fed's open market
activities affect the volume of bank credit in the money supply by
5 43
the reciprocal of the reserve requirement.
Second, the Fed occasionally resorts to adjustment of its reserve requirements, which makes banks even more directly, but
still passively, the instruments of its monetary policy. In essence,
their role is again primarily one of creating money by making loans
in the form of bank balances. When the reserve requirement is
raised, of course, they can make fewer loans, and when it is lowered, they can make more.
The Fed's third tool for implementing monetary policy is the
"discount window" at which it makes loans to banks at rates below
the Fed-funds rate. Discount-window loans were at one time the
Fed's principal technique for creating bank reserves, since the full
amount lent became part of the borrower bank's reserve account
balance at the Fed. At present, discount-window loans are intended only to aid the bank that occasionally and unexpectedly
finds itself unable to meet its reserve requirements. 5 44 In fact,
attempt to measure the importance of non-economic and non-tax factors such as the
chit system discussed here. See, e.g., Hendershott & Koch, The Demand for TaxExempt Securities by FinancialInstitutions,35 J. FINANCE 717 (1980).
541. See, e.g., J. COCHRAN, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE ECONOMY 440 (3d ed.
1975); M. MAYER, supra note 219, at 401; M. STIGUM, supra note 218, at 180.
542. M-1A, the FRB's narrowest definition of the money supply, consists of
"currency plus private demand deposits at commercial banks net of deposits due to
foreign commercial banks and official institutions." FRB, Monetary Policy Report to
Congress, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 195, 198 n.1 (1981).
543. On the operation of fractional reserves and their relationship to openmarket operations, see A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICs 613-14 (3d
ed. 1972).
544. See 12 C.F.R. § 2 01.3(a) (1980). But cf. id., at § 201.3(b)(1), -(2) (extended
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however, some banks are particularly aggressive in exploiting the
discount window, borrowing every dollar that they can at belowmarket rates. 545 The Fed has traditionally jawboned excessive users
of its discount window facility,5 46 but it realized during the credit
restraint program of 1980 that it could more effectively discipline
these aggressive banks by price discrimination against them; banks
that borrowed during successive weeks or too many weeks in a
54 7
quarter were charged a higher rate than were others.
Jawboning is a familiar, and perhaps an effective, Fed technique for pursuing monetary and related policies. It has been used
in attempts to reduce float by chiding banks against remote disbursement practices; 548 during periods of tight credit, it has been
used to coax banks into lending to feedlot operators and perhaps
others whose costs of funds affect consumer price levels, and
against lending for corporate takeovers, speculation, and other
54 9
"non-productive" purposes.
Jawboning, of course, depends upon there being an implicit
chit system as well. The Fed's jawbone has teeth because the Fed
can foreclose a bank from access to the discount window and can
withhold or delay approvals for various BHC applications; chits
may be even more important to Fed member banks, since they are
also examined by the Fed and it can be more or less demanding
based in part upon whether a bank has shown its willingness to
cooperate with the Fed in the past.
3. Housing Finance.-After fiscal and monetary policy, the
third purpose for which political control of banking is used in the
United States is that of assuring funds to the housing market.
Housing construction in the United States is heavily dependent
upon debt financing. Thus, in addition to providing subsidies to inseasonal and other extended credit); FRB Press Release, Operation of the Federal
Reserve Discount Window Under the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (Sept. 9, 1980).
545. See M. STIGUM, supra note 218, at 201.
546. Id.
547. See FRB's Announcement of Monetary and Credit Actions, and Implementing Regulations (Mar. 14, 1980), reprinted in BNA Wash. Financial Rep., Mar.
24, 1980, at T-1, -3. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 201.3(b) (1980) (rate above basic discount rate charged for "other extended credit").
548. See Report on Remote Disbursement, 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 140 (1979); Fed.
Res. Bank of Minneapolis, Circ. No. 8501, Remote Disbursement Practices (Jan. 22,
1979).
549. See Hearings on H.R. 212 Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary
Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency, & Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
65-68 (Comm. Print 1975) (statement of FRB Governor Brimmer) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on H.R. 212).
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dividual renters and homeowners, nonprofit housing developers,
and public housing authorities, and to creating government mortgage insurance programs, the federal government has encouraged
banks and other depository institutions to provide credit to housing
markets. 550
Thrift institutions, of course, have long-term housing finance
as their primary mission. In contrast, commercial banks participate
in housing primarily by providing construction mortgages, which
are then "taken out" by long-term mortgagees, such as insurance
companies. 551 In their capacity as investors in government obligations, however, the banks play a major role in funding government-insured and agency debts incurred in order to finance housing, including the obligations of the Federal Home Loan Banks,
the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Government National Mortgage Association, and the various public housing
agencies and other issuers of obligations insured by the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development. It is thus for understandable
reasons of policy, not accident, that each house of Congress has
vested in a single committee responsibility for both banking and
housing affairs.
When Congress directed that the Regulation Q maxima on interest rates paid to account-holders be phased out, it also directed
the President, through an interagency task force, to study and
make recommendations concerning the options available to provide
balance between the interest rates on the assets and liabilities of
thrift institutions and to enable them to pay market interest rates
for deposits during periods of high interest rates. 552 Congress was
here concerned that in the absence of interest rate controls, the institutions providing long-term fixed-rate financing to housing buyers would experience both depressed or negative earnings and a
shortage of funds as savers transferred money from thrift institutions to money-market funds and other higher-rate alternatives.
Interstate banking would thus run contrary to established national policy if it either diverted bank investments from housing or
housing-backed obligations, or if it exacerbated the problems ex550. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICs 326 n.6 (10th ed. 1976).
551. See Gallaudet, Construction Mortgage and Real Estate Warehousing
Loans, in THE BANKERS' HANDBOOK 703, 711-12 (W. Baughn & C. Walker eds.

1978). While the average commercial bank invests a small percentage of its assets in
long-term residential mortgage loans, there are major exceptions. In general, commercial banks in California have emphasized such loans.
552. 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 406, 94 Stat. 159.
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perienced particularly by thrift institutions during periods of substantial dis-intermediation. On the other hand it would further national housing policy if it facilitated housing finance. Furthermore,
since high interest rates and the associated dis-intermediation are
themselves products of inflation, the relevance, if any, of interstate
banking to the control of inflation should also be considered in relation to established national housing policy.
4. Extending Local Credit.-Finally,political control of banking is exercised to encourage the investment of locally originated
deposits in local credit needs. It has already been mentioned that
banks are encouraged to serve local public sector credit needs
through the municipal bond exemption from the Glass-Steagall Act,
the tax system, and the chit system implicit in bank regulation. 553
Local private sector lending is encouraged also, generally by informal policy guidance.
The principal exceptions to the norm of informality in the allocation of bank credit to local communities are the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), passed by Congress in 1977, 554 and the
various linked-deposit schemes found in some of the states. 55 5 The
CRA policy is expressed in congressional findings that:
(1) regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and
needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do
business;
(2) the convenience and needs of communities include the need
for credit services as well as deposit services; and
(3) regulated financial institutions have continuing and affirmative obligations to help meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered. 556
The purpose of the Act is to enlist each of the federal financial
supervisory agencies in encouraging their regulatees to discharge
these obligations. Thus, the supervisory agencies are to assess in
their examination process each institution's "record of meeting the
credit needs of its entire community, including low- and moderateincome neighborhoods" 55 7 and to "take such record into account in
its evaluation of an application for a deposit facility" by that institu-

553.
554.
555.
556.
557.

See text accompanying notes 535, 538-539 supra.
12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. III 1979).
See text accompanying note 561 infra.
12 U.S.C. § 2901 (Supp. III 1979).
Id. § 2903(1).
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tion.5 58 CRA compliance records are therefore made a part of the
process by which a national bank is chartered and a state bank obtains deposit insurance; and by which any insured bank establishes
a dorestic branch or other deposit-taking facility, relocates an office, or merges with or acquires another bank. Federal regulators
have denied branch applications of several banks on CRA
grounds, 55 9 as has the Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks who
has chosen to apply CRA, as a matter of discretion, to statechartered savings banks, which are not FDIC-insured and thus are
5 60
not subject to CRA at the federal level.
Under the linked-state-deposit schemes of some states, a
state's demand-deposit-account business is placed with banks with
superior performance in meeting selected local credit needs, typically those involving housing finance. In the program established
by Colorado State Treasurer Sam Brown, for instance, banks first
bid purely on price for the State's business. The bids are then adjusted (solely for the purpose of awarding that business and not for
the purpose of actual pricing) on the basis of the banks' in-state
loans to finance the purchase of residences in general and older
and lower-priced residential units in particular. 5 61
The economic wisdom of credit allocation schemes such as
CRA and linked-state-deposit programs is arguable, 56 2 but there is
no doubt that these efforts represent national and state policy decisions properly and openly taken and within the lawful authority of
those governments. Accordingly, the impact of interstate banking
on the pursuit of these policies must be taken into account. To the
degree that an interstate banking proposal would frustrate their
achievement, that must be considered a drawback of the proposal.
5. Note on the Significance of Foreign Ownership.-In light of
the recent controversy concerning the acquisition of major United
States banks by foreign banks and foreign individuals, there may
be some doubt about the continuing importance of local, state, and
national political control over banking in United States policy.
558. Id. § 2903(2).
559. See, e.g., N.Y. Banks Facing CRA Protests Worried About Recent FDIC
Denial, BNA Wash. Financial Rep., May 7, 1979, at A-15.
560. See Warsh, Bank Commissioner Denies Provident a Newton Branch, Boston Globe, Jan. 3, 1980, at 23, col. 1.
561. See Comment, "Linked Deposit" Systems for the Deposit of Public Funds
in Private FinancialInstitutions, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 1100, 1111 n.71 (1977).
562. Compare Hearings on H.R. 212, supra note 549, at 88-95 (statement of
Prof. Lester Thurow), with id. at 187-88 (statement of Prof. Yale Brozen).
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Indeed, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve
Board have cautioned against efforts suggested by others, such as
the New York State Banking Commissioner, certain members of
Congress, and the Government Accounting Office, to prevent further acquisitions of major domestic banks. 56 3 Other than a brief
moratorium on such acquisitions, 56 the United States has taken no
steps to hinder their occurrence; it thus remains unique among the
countries of the world in allowing foreign control over major do5 65
mestic banks.
New York Banking Commissioner Siebert has been a leading
opponent of allowing further foreign acquisitions of major banks.
Her report on the proposal of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation to acquire the Marine Midland Banks, Inc. appealed clearly, if indirectly, to the perceived need for local political
control over banks. Thus, she stated that "[w]hile credit generally
tends to be allocated through the operations of the free market, local, domestic-owned banks share certain pre-dispositions that might
not be applicable if they were foreign-owned." 5 66 Most important,
she said, is that pre-disposition towards meeting domestic credit
needs:
[F]oreign ties . . .make it far more likely that the bank would
be responsive to requests from the government of the foreign
controlling stockholder that cause it to act in ways that meet the
needs of the foreign country regardless of whether such actions
are in the best interest of the U.S. economically or politically. 567
Diversion of funds from retail banking or from local communities
563.

Compare The Operations of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting

on, and Analyzing Foreign Investments in the United States, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, & Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (Aug. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Gov't
Operations Hearings] (statement of Comptroller Heimann), and Letter from Griffith
L. Garwood, Deputy Secretary of the FRB, to William J. Anderson, Director General
Gov't Division General Accounting Office (July 9, 1980), reprinted in Report by the
Comptroller General, Despite Positive Effects, Further Foreign Acquisitions of U.S.
Banks Should be Limited Until Policy Conflicts are Fully Addressed, app. XII
(1980), with N.Y. Sup't of Banks, Report on Proposed Acquisition of Marine Midland
Banks, Inc. (June 28, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Marine Midland Report] and Report
by the Comptroller General, supra.
564. 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 902, 94 Stat. 193 (moratorium from Mar. 31 to
July 1, 1980).
565. See Report by the Comptroller General, supra note 563, at 2-4 to 2-5.
566. Marine Midland Report, supra note 563, at 23.
567. Id. at 25.
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in favor of other ties is an exercise of asset management policies
which is neither unlawful or dangerous to the safety or soundness of an institution, though it may well be inconsistent with
the public interest in having the credit needs of the local
communities adequately served. 568

Commissioner Siebert went on to note that Marine Midland
had a "substantial investment position in securities of New York

State and its agencies as well as local municipalities throughout the
State." Indeed, the bank held the obligations of more than 250 municipalities and school districts, and its portfolio of New York State
municipal obligations amounted to $275 million. According to the
Commissioner:
There [was] a serious risk that under HSBC ownership, Marine
would reduce its local support and commitment to New York

and its municipalities, which could have an adverse effect on the
market for such securities and could lead to higher interest rates
on the securities. 569

It should be clear that a bank making investment decisions in
order to maximize its return on assets would make pretty much the
same decisions regardless of whether the majority of its stock was
held by United States citizens or by a foreign BHC. Yet there is no
reason to doubt the foundation for Commissioner Siebert's apprehensions. As a regulated bank, Marine Midland was presumably
not in a position to make investments solely on the basis of their
nominal economic return; it needed to make certain sub-optimal
investments in order to store up chits with the Commissioner.
HSBC, on the other hand, might feel freer to pursue economic
maximization because its banking interests are diversified among
many jurisdictions and it is not as dependent upon the approval of
the New York Banking Commissioner if it is to prosper and grow.
Denied an application for additional authority in New York, such as
a new branch, HSBC might be better able than Marine Midland to
find equally attractive opportunities abroad.
As recounted before, when Commissioner Siebert indicated
that she would not approve the acquisition, Marine Midland applied for a national charter and the Comptroller granted it so that
the acquisition could be consummated. 5 70 The Comptroller, too,
568. Id. at 27.
569. Id. at 28.

570. See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
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has spoken out on the issue of foreign control over major American
banks. In congressional testimony pre-dating the Marine Midland
affair, the Comptroller emphasized the pro-competitive benefit of
enabling foreign banks to acquire a position in United States banking markets. 571 He acknowledged that most foreign banks seeking
to operate in the United States have emphasized wholesale or corporate business, where their influence has clearly been procompetitive. He added, however, that "[t]he beneficial impact of
competition among banks applies no less forcefully to the services
'
available for small businesses and individual consumers. "572
The Comptroller did not deny the relevance of the concerns
later to be expressed by Commissioner Siebert, however. He simply doubted their foundation, saying "neither logic nor experience
convinces us that foreign owners of U.S. retail banks are any more
likely than domestic owners to shift away from the provision of retail services.- 573 Indeed, in approving the conversion of Marine
Midland to national bank status, he "conclude[d] that the improved
flexibility which [HSBC's] acquisition will bring to the [Marine
Midland] organization [through an infusion of capital] carries the
potential for more effective satisfaction of CRA obligations by the
5 74
holding company and its principal banking subsidiary."
It is doubtful that the Comptroller considered the Community
Reinvestment Act completely adequate to allay the New York
Commissioner's concerns, particularly regarding the market for
New York municipal bonds. His decision can best be understood as
resting at least in part upon the adverse implications for United
States banks abroad should United States policy turn hostile to foreign acquisitions. True, United States banks can not acquire banks
abroad, as a matter of host-country law, but they branch quite
freely and hold a very large percentage of the international banking
business. 5 75 Retaliatory pressures exerted abroad could harm
571. See Gov't Operations Hearings, supra note 563, at 55-56 (statement of
Comptroller Heimann).
572. Id. at 71. Thus, while the few foreign banks that have acquired domestic
banks with a retail orientation have done so in "lucrative and growing local markets," a study by the California Superintendent of Banks found that additional foreign banks increased competition and improved services in all markets, including
growing retail markets. Id.
573. Id.
574. Opinion of the Comptroller of the Currency on Application of Marine
Midland Bank, Buffalo, N.Y., to Convert From a Banking Institution Chartered Under the N.Y. Banking Law to a National Banking Ass'n 11-12 (Jan. 28, 1980).
575.

See NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY, supra note 444, at 13-35.
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United States banks, and to some extent the national interest, far

more than could even several additional foreign acquisitions of domestic banks.
In short, the United States' unique openness to foreign-bank
acquisitions is not inconsistent with the view, held at both the national and state levels, that banks in the United States must be
kept amenable to official policy guidance. With the increasing internationalization of bank ownership, however, policy guidance
may have to be exerted more frequently through explicit measures,
such as CRA, rather than continuing to rely on the implicit chit
system. Diversification of banking organizations across administrative jurisdictions may lower the value of the chits held by any one
jurisdiction.
6. Implications of Interstate Banking.-From the foregoing
discussion, it appears that interstate banking has conflicting implications for political guidance of bank policies.
a. Funding Public Debt.-With respect to the funding of public debt at the federal level, interstate banking is unlikely to have
any effect. While it is true that the largest banks tend to hold a
smaller percentage of their assets in United States government obligations, 576 and that interstate banking might imply an increase in
the number of large banks, 577 any effect on the demand for government debt would certainly be inconsequential. Likewise, there is
no reason to associate interstate banking with any concern that the
market for federal debt instruments could become oligopsonistic. That would require consolidation in a few banks of most of
the assets now held by all 14,000 banks in the United States,
which would be unlikely to result even if the antitrust laws did not
almost certainly prevent it. In conclusion, interstate banking in any
plausible form represents no threat to the ability of the United
States to market its debt at fully competitive rates.
Notwithstanding the previous discussion of foreign BHC acquisitions of United States banks, the implications of interstate banking for the municipal bond markets are unclear. 578 A bank or BHC
576. See. [1978] FDIC ANN. REP. 160 (table 112: Percentages of Assets, Liabilities, and Equity Capital of Insured Commercial Banks Operating Throughout 1978 in
the U.S., Dec. 31, 1978).
577.

See generally MCFADDEN ACT REPORT, supra note 410, app., at 49-66.

578. But cf. Roley, The Role of Commercial Banks' Portfolio Behavior in the
Determination of the Treasury Security Yields, 12 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING

353, at 354 (1980) (setting out criteria for determining commericial-bank demand for
Treasury securities).
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with operations in multiple states, that is, may be more independ-

ent of any one state's influence (the "independence hypothesis"), since expansion opportunities would not depend upon
the good will or chits of a single regulator. Alternatively, the multistate bank or BHC may simply be subject to multiple sources of official influence, having to serve many masters and buy the debt of
each (the "many-masters hypothesis").
The empirical evidence bearing on these competing hypotheses is ambiguous. First, it is reasonably well established that
subsidiary banks of BHCs keep a significantly smaller percentage of
their assets in United States government securities and significantly
more in municipal securities than do independent banks.5 7 9 They
have significantly higher loan-to-asset ratios as well, 580 suggesting
that BHC subsidiary banks hold either less cash and/or less public
debt overall than independent banks. There is no reason to think
that ownership by a BHC lessens a bank's cash needs or holdings,
however, so it is reasonable to infer from their higher loan-to-asset
ratios that BHC banks do hold less public debt. A separate study of
the subsidiaries of multistate BHCs, moreover, showed that they
were not significantly different from one-state BHC banks of similar size in their loan-to-deposit ratios. 5 1 From this it may reasonably be inferred that multistate BHC banks, too, hold less public
debt than independent banks, but probably no more or less than
one-state BHC banks. It cannot be determined from available
sources, however, whether the multistate BHC banks, like BHC
banks generally, hold more state and municipal (as opposed to total
governmental) securities than independent banks. The independence hypothesis suggests that they need not do so. On the other
hand, since the banks within any one state would probably be run
as one or more profit centers under a multistate BHC, they may
each find it just as advisable to invest in state and municipal securities as they would have if the BHC were limited to one state. Indeed, the BHC as a whole may find municipal bonds even more
attractive, measured by the percentage of assets invested in them,
with the more diversified municipal portfolio that interstate bank579. See generally Curry, The Performance of Bank Holding Companies, in

BHG COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, at 95, 99 n.5.
580. Id. at 99 n.7.
581. GOLEMBE (1979), supra note 113, at 84. The data show some tendency for
the multistate BHC banks to have higher loan-to-deposit ratios than peer group independent banks, but that is true regardless of whether the BHC is multistate or onestate. See generally Curry, supra note 579, at 99 n.7.
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ing would give a BHC, i.e., even if it still bought primarily from
issuers where it had operations. These questions simply cannot be
answered without additional empirical investigation.
It can be said, however, that even if multistate BHCs and
banks are more independent of the individual states in which they
operate, the market for each state's debt could only become
stronger, not weaker, with the entry of additional out-of-state banking enterprises into its territory. If out-of-state banks or BHCs enter de novo that is, they can only increase or leave unaffected, but
not diminish, the market for the host-state's debt. On the other
hand, the diversification of home-state banks into other states could
lessen their appetite for home-state debt.
b. Implementing Monetary Policy.-The implications of interstate banking for monetary policy are also conflicting, but more
certain to be of minimal significance. Insofar as interstate banking
implies fewer and larger banks, the Fed may find it more necessary to discipline their use of the discount window, since it has
been the largest banks in the past that have been most aggressive
in borrowing from the Fed at below-market rates for investment at
higher rates. 582 Nonetheless, the Fed has shown that it can use
price discrimination to deter overuse of the discount window, as it
5 83
did during the 1980 credit restraint program.
If interstate banking brings about an appreciable consolidation
of the banking industry, the Fed may find jawboning easier with
fewer banks to oversee. The smaller number of banks overseen by
the Bank of England-about one hundred domestic and two hundred foreign banks-is said to make its task more easily managed
on a more informal basis, with perhaps equal or greater success
than United States regulators have had in dealing with their thousands of banks. 5 84 It is hardly necessary to imagine that interstate
banking would bring about the consolidation of the industry into a
couple of hundred institutions, however, in order to realize some
of the benefits of a more personal and informed relationship between banks and their regulators, and to make it easier for the regulators to review the banks' compliance with official policies. If
each of the fifty-one bank regulatory jurisdictions in the United
582. Use of the discount window seems to be correlated with bank size. See M.
STIGUM, supra note 218, at 200-01.

583.

See FRB's Announcement of Monetary and Credit Actions, and Imple-

menting Regulations (Mar. 14, 1980), reprinted in BNA Wash. Financial Rep., March
24, 1980, at T-1.

584. See M. STIGUM, supra note 218, at 138.
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States had primary responsibility, on average, for only one hundred banking enterprises, and additionally concerned itself secondarily with two hundred more that were based in another jurisdiction but had a presence in their own, there would still be 5,000
separate banking organizations in the United States, instead of
15,000; yet there would still be on average only three hundred
banks competing in each state's retail markets. While an even distribution of competitors to markets is of course unrealistic, the basic point remains that policy guidance would probably be facilitated
by some consolidation in the banking industry, and that an equivalent degree of consolidation without interstate banking would result
in there being far fewer competitors in each market.
c. Housing Finance.-With respect to housing finance policy,
interstate banking would probably further the flow of funds to
housing markets. It may reasonably be assumed that many banks
expanding interstate will seek to enter economically growing markets, which will have the greatest demand for housing construction
and financing. That demand may presently be met by the limited
number of local banks originating, packaging, selling, and servicing
mortgages in the market. Those local banks may already be
experiencing competition from mortgage banks owned by out-ofstate BHCs, 58 5 but the introduction of out-of-state bank competitors into such local mortgage markets could only make them more
competitive and probably reduce the cost of housing credit.
If mortgage markets then become more fully competitive,
mortgages may become less attractive investments than others
open to banks. As between keeping mortgage markets oligopolistic
to attract banks, however, and making them more competitive at
the risk of then having expressly to allocate bank credit to mortgages, as does CRA to some extent, credit allocation is the more
appealing policy. Maintaining concentrated banking markets affects
many bank products, not just mortgages, whereas opening banking
markets to increased competition and then assuring the desired
flow of funds to housing, at any given level of housing finance, requires less of a departure from allocatively efficient results.
d. Extending Local Credit.-Finally, it is doubtful that fullservice interstate banking will much affect the degree to which locally generated deposits are now devoted to local credit purposes.
The nationwide interbank money market described earlier has already succeeded in intermediating between depositors in one loca585.

See text accompanying note 334 supra.
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tion and borrowers in another, although more than one bank may
have to be involved in order to accomplish this result. Interstate
banking enterprises might be able to accomplish the same results
somewhat more efficiently through their internal organization, but
it is doubtful that the volume of interstate intermediation could
much increase for that reason simply because the interbank system
is already.,so well integrated. Nonetheless, if states that now export
capital foui-nd that they were doing so to an even greater extent because their local banks were branches or affiliates of banks in other
states, the CRA principle could be extended to require a portion of
locally booked deposits to be invested in local loans. In practical effect this would be akin to but less onerous than New York's requirement that branches of foreign banks maintain qualifying assets
in New York equal to at least 108% of liabilities. The New York
rule means that each foreign branch must be a net importer of capital to the host state, not just refrain from large-scale capital export.

58 6

e. Conclusions.-In summary, interstate banking may make
policy guidance in general more effective if it decreases the number of banking organizations; in any event, it is unlikely to have adverse implications for political control over banks with respect to
monetary policy, housing finance, or local credit availability. The
implications of interstate banking for bank demand for public debt,
particularly at the state and local levels, are unclear, although more
probably favorable than not. Empirical data concerning the present
operation of the multistate BHCs grandfathered in 1956 would be
helpful in this connection. For present purposes, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it should be assumed that interstate
banking will have no effect on the demand for municipal bonds.
F. Undue Concentration of Resources

There are two senses in which concentration in banking seems
to offend established national banking policy. The first is market
concentration in the sense conventional to the antitrust laws: banking markets should not be more concentrated and less competitive
than necessary to serve other regulatory ends. The second, which
is less clearly articulated, deals with mere asset aggregation in a
way not applicable to non-financial industries: banks should not be
allowed to attain a size so great that they can exert an "undue"
force in the community, notwithstanding that they may operate in
586. See M.

STIGUM, supra note 218, at 144.
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competitive economic markets. These two concerns are taken up
seriatim in this section.
1. Market Concentration.-The business of banking is subject
to the antitrust laws of general application, with certain minor variations. In general, the substance of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
is applied to bank mergers and BHC acquisitions of banks, first by
the appropriate bank regulatory agency. 5 7 The regulatory agency
may, however, approve a consolidation that would not otherwise meet the standards of Section 1 of the Sherman Act or of the
Clayton Act if it determines that "the anticompetitive effects of the
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest
by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served."5 8 8 The Department of Justice may thereafter bring an original antitrust action in
the district court to challenge de novo a consolidation that has received regulatory approval. 58 9
Nothing in the applicable statutes, or the banking agencies'
administration of them, suggests that interstate banking would exacerbate concentration in the banking industry in any relevant market. Most banking markets are relatively concentrated now, 590 in
part because they are legally subdivided by state lines, so that
removing legal barriers to interstate banking should only make
them more competitive and less concentrated. It is true that if
some of the largest banks in the country become larger still by
virtue of interstate expansion, they could conceivably gain a significant share of the total loans and deposits held by banks in their region or nationwide, but the antitrust laws are not powerless to prevent a trend toward concentration from developing in a regional or
nationwide product market. 59 1 For example, the Bank of America,
which is the largest commercial bank in the United States, holds
about 8.6% of all commercial bank deposits. 592 Through a few well587. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2), (5) (1976) (bank mergers); id. § 1842(c) (BHC
acquisitions), as amended by 1980 Act, supra note 63, § 713, 94 Stat. 190.
588. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(5)(B), 1842(c)(2) (1976). While the banking agencies
may approve a consolidation that would not meet normal antitrust standards, where
community needs so require, they may not disapprove on competition grounds a consolidation that would not be condemned by the antitrust laws. See Mercantile Texas
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981).
589. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6), -(8) (1976); id. § 1849(b)-(f) (1976 and Supp. III
1979).
590. See note 410 supra.
591. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63
(1963).
592. The Bank of America had deposits of $88.4 billion as of December 31,
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chosen acquisitions interstate, that bank's national market could
perhaps be doubled and its regional market share raised further
still. But it is difficult to believe that, in view of the Department of
Justice's merger guidelines 593 and the potential competition doctrine, 594 a single banking company's national or regional market
share would be allowed to reach troublesome levels, or even to approach the Bank of America's present share of the California de595
posit market, which is 24%.
Furthermore, even if a single bank or BHC had a relatively
substantial share, say 10%, of the national or a regional market,
that would not represent as significant an anticompetitive development as it might at first seem, since the relevant geographical markets for most banking services are local. The principal exceptions
are the markets for loans to intermediate and large corporations,
which are regional and international respectively; the market for
cash management services, which is national and increasingly international; and the market for bank-issued consumer credit cards,
which is becoming more of a national market.
In the international market for large loans and cash management services, concentration is not a realistic possibility. The number of major banks in the international loan market is large, and
their ties to many different home countries preclude any possibility
of their future amalgamation into a few institutions, each with market power.
Insofar as there are truly banking product markets that are national, i.e., in which international competition is not practical, national concentration ratios would be relevant. As suggested, these
might include cash management services to large corporations and
consumer credit cards for individuals. At present, however, neither
market seems to be at all concentrated. More important, neither
would be much affected by interstate banking. Cash management
services and consumer credit cards have become national competi1980. Am. Banker, Apr. 21, 1981, at 22. All domestically-chartered commercial banks
had deposits of $1,029 billion as of that date. See 67 Fed. Res. Bull. A17 (1981). The
second largest enterprise is Citicorp; its Citibank N.A. and Citibank (New York
State) together had deposits of $71.7 billion as of December 31, 1980. Am. Banker,
supra, at 22. This was 6.96% of all commercial bank deposits on that date.
593. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines (1968), reprinted
in 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 4510.
594. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
595. Based on yearend 1979 data from [1979] FDIC ANN. REP. ($177,783 million total California deposits); [1979] BankAmerica Corp. Ann. Rep. ($43,020 million
deposits).
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tion arenas precisely because banks need not be near their customers in order to provide them. This would remain true under interstate banking, so that at least as many competitors should remain
in the market, other things remaining equal, even with interstate
banking. 59 6 In any event, antitrust law enforcement policy would
appropriately be concerned with nationwide market shares in these
product markets insofar as they are achieved by interstate acquisitions.
Regional market concentration is a more plausible concern
than national market concentration, of course. Concentration ratios
in large statewide markets, such as California, Texas, and New
York, indicate that a few banks can obtain significant market shares
even in areas that are very populous and geographically large, at
least when they are protected from interstate competition. 59 7 With
interstate banking, again, the antitrust laws should be sufficient to
prevent regional or national market concentration from arising
through acquisitions, and if it arises from internal growth in the absence of legal territorial market protection, then the superior efficiencies that must make it possible should be welcomed.
2. Asset Aggregation.-While the implications of interstate
banking for antitrust law and concentration in interstate markets
are thus quite limited, might some banking organizations expanding interstate grow so large as to have an undue influence in the
economy or the affairs of government? While "mere size is no offense" to the antitrust laws, limitations upon size may conceivably
be appropriate public policy in the case of banks and other financial intermediaries. There is some, albeit ambiguous, implication to
that effect in existing law. Congress has expressly directed the Fed
to avoid the "undue concentration of resources" under the control
596. Indeed, if interstate banking enables additional banks to attain the size
and distribution of facilities that would enable them to enter the market for cash
management services, the result would be to increase the number of competitive
providers. Likewise, interstate banking may produce more banks of a size sufficient
to realize scale economies in the processing and marketing that go into nationwide
consumer credit card distribution.
597. The following table, which shows the 1979 concentation ratios for commercial banks in three states, serves to illustrate this point:
Top 3 Banks Top 5 Banks
California
57.6%
73.8%
New York
37.2%
55.1%
Texas
24.7%
35.9%
McFADDEN ACT REPORT, supra note 410, app., at 46-47 (table 2.5). States, of course,
are not relevant geographical markets for any banking products, but multistate regions would be relevant markets for some wholesale banking products.
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of a single BHC in passing upon holding company applications to
enter nonbank activities. 5 98 Specifically, having determined that an
activity is closely related to banking, the Fed is required in addition to determine whether it is "a proper incident to banking" in
light of the various public benefits and "possible adverse affects,
such as undue concentration of resources [or] decreased or unfair
competition," that it may have. 59 9 The implication of this passage
seems to be that "undue concentration of resources" is something
other than the market concentration associated with decreased
60 0
competition in antitrust theory.
The Fed has occasionally adverted to the undue concentration
criterion in disapproving particular nonbank acquisitions, but it has
not been very clear about its understanding of the criterion in
doing so. For example, in denying the application of the Chase
Manhattan Corporation to acquire Dial Financial Corporation, the
Board stated that the proposed acquisition "by one of the nation's
largest bank holding companies, of a major consumer finance company with a large national network of offices and a commanding position in the market for provision of data processing services to the
industry, involves the issue of concentration in credit-granting resources that was within the intent of Congress in enacting the 1970
Amendments" to the BHC Act. 60 1 The Board's concern with "concentration in credit-granting resources" suggests that it may be
reading the undue concentration criterion as a type of market concentration standard. As such, however, it is considerably more
stringent than the standards of the antitrust laws themselves, since
"credit-granting" is probably too broad to be a line of commerce
for antitrust purposes, and the Board's finding of undue concentration did not rest on any reference to market shares either of the
proposed consolidated company or of the leading four or eight
firms in the "credit-granting" industry.
The Board was even more obscure in its opinion denying the
application of BankAmerica Corporation to acquire a 50% interest
in an overseas affiliate of the Allstate Insurance Company subsidiary of Sears, Roebuck & Company.60 2 Noting that the firms involved were respectively the "largest U.S. Banking organization
598. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
599. Id.
600. But see Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d 1255,
1260-63 (5th Cir. 1981).

601.
602.

Chase Manhattan Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 142, 144 (1974).
BankAmerica Corporation, 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 517 (1974).
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and one of the nation's largest insurance companies, which . . . is
wholly-owned by the largest retailer of general merchandise in the
U.S.," the Board stated:
Close working relationships abroad between large U.S. banking
organizations and large U.S. insurance companies could in time
weave a matrix of relationships between the joint venturers in
the U.S. and abroad that could lead to an undue concentration
of economic resources in the domestic and foreign commerce of
60 3
the United States.
Without further elaboration, it remains unclear whether the Board
considered the firms to be in actual or potential competition in the
domestic market, or whether it simply feared that their conglomeration abroad would lead to their effective conglomeration in the
United States; if the Board held the latter concern, then the undue
concentration criterion would more clearly be a matter of absolute
size and not of competition. In other words, for a BHC, mere size
may be an offense after all, at least if it is achieved through acquisi60 4
tion rather than internal growth.
The relevance of "mere size" remains obscure, but it is possible to speculate about why Congress might have been concerned
with something other than "decreased competition" in characterizing the "undue concentration of resources" in the BHC Act
as an adverse effect of some acquisitions made under the Act. 60 5
The undue concentration criterion was added to the BHC Act at
the same time that the limitations on the nonbanking activities of
BHCs were liberalized. It is plausible that Congress was prepared
to allow BHCs to diversify into activities closely related to banking,
and yet to prohibit their doing so by the acquisition of large firms
in those related lines of business.
First, since the BHC would, by hypothesis, be entering into
activities closely related to banking, Congress may have sensed
that banks would be acquiring firms with which they were at least
in some degree of competition. But this concern merely duplicates
the desire to avoid decreased competition.
Second, Congress may have hoped to use the opportunity of
BHC diversification to make the fields being entered more compet603. Id. at 519.
604. The FRB may also have been concerned that the bank would acquire an
undue influence over the co-venturer's nonbanking domestic operations, which were
not "closely related to banking," but it did not say so.
605. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
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itive by effectively channeling BHC acquisitions toward smaller
"toeholds," even if those fields were not already concentrated.
This
interpretation is consistent with the suggestion implicit in the sentence that follows the references to undue concentration and decreased competition; that sentence authorizes-and by implication
directs-the Board to "differentiate between activities commenced
de novo and activities commenced by the acquisition, in whole or
in part, of a going concern."606 Congress may, in other words,
have preferred that a BHC diversify by de novo entry or by
toehold acquisition, and moved to assure this result by discouraging the acquisition of very large firms even in unconcentrated industries. This approach would maximize the pro-competitive effects
of liberalizing BHC powers (at least if de novo entry into fields
closely related to banking was not too expensive or risky). Still, it
is not really possible to determine, with confidence, whether Congress was merely expressing a pro-competitive policy or whether it
was also condemning mere size in its reference to the undue concentration of resources within a BHC.
Mere size becomes a more clearly appropriate limitation when
considering liberalization of the geographical limitation placed on
banking itself through the relaxation of the state-by-state system.
Specifically, there are three potentially adverse affects to be expected from the emergence of "megabanks," i.e., very large banks
60 7
or BHCs with very large aggregate bank assets.
a. Political Influence.-It is reasonable to believe that megabanks would acquire substantial political influence at the national
level, 60 8 as have the trade associations representing smaller banks
today. At the state level, it may already be true that individual
large banks and BHCs in highly concentrated states have substantial political influence in state governmental affairs, as do bank
trade associations in unconcentrated states. As employers of many
606.

12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).

607. There is no need here to quantify the terms "megabank" and "very large";
for present purposes they may be defined loosely as being of a size sufficient to
make plausible the concerns raised in the text, since they are what make the
megabank's size an "undue" concentration.
608. See P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGA CORPORATION IN AMERICAN SocIETY 38-40
(1975); Salamon & Siegfried, Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact
of Industry Structure on Public Policy, 71 AM. PoL. Sci. R v. 1026 (1977) (large firm
size related to success in avoiding federal income and state excise taxation). But cf.
Rose, Aggregate Concentration in Banking and Political Leverage: A Note, 6 INDUS.
ORG. REv. 193 (1978) (no significant correlation between statewide banking concentration and U.S. senatorial voting on banking bill).
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thousands of state residents and important lenders to the state and
its political subdivisions, the voices of large banks are undoubtedly,
and not inappropriately, heard clearly-along with the voices of
large non-bank employers in the state. Banks of such size and influence are the creatures of state policy, however. States that
wished to prevent them have adhered to unit banking. Others may
have deemed the risk of individual banks obtaining political influence to be worth the benefits of having large banks or BHCs, particularly if the alternative was that a large number of small banks
would collectively achieve the same political influence anyway.
Under the state-by-state banking system, however, no bank
can attain a size sufficient to give it, individually, significant influence at the national level. 60 9 Thus, while Citicorp may obtain special legislation from South Dakota and its chairman may venture an
implicit threat to the New York legislature, it is far from able to
command a sympathetic hearing in Congress. If it were an important institution in perhaps a half dozen states rather than one, however, it would predictably have greater access to more congressional delegations. 6 10 The representatives from states in which it
was an important employer, and buyer and perhaps underwriter of
municipal bonds, would understandably be concerned with its welfare and its views on proposed legislation, just as would be their
state government. It is not difficult to imagine that at some point, a
megabank's appropriate access to legislators could conceivably become an undue influence over the national legislature.
b. Credit Judgments.-Insofar as interstate banking would encourage or allow the emergence of a few megabanks, there would
necessarily be fewer smaller banks. The market for banking services is relatively fixed at any given moment; whether large banks
expand by acquisition or by internal growth, therefore, the existence of such megabanks inevitably implies the existence of fewer
banks overall.
If the resulting market structure under interstate banking
were to include a number of megabanks, it is inferable that there
would be substantially fewer independent credit judgments being
made in the market place. Assume, for example, that there are 100
regional banks large enough to be potential participants in a syndi609. But cf. Baker, Chartering,Branching, and the Concentration Problem, in
Policies for a More Competitive Financial System 21, 28 n.15 (Fed. Res. Bank of
Boston, 1972).
610.

See M. GREEN, B. MoORE & B. WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE

SYSTEM 19 (1972) (quoting Sen. Phillip Hart).
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cated loan to a major corporation. If the same 100 banks were consolidated into, say, twenty nationwide banking enterprises, there
would be only twenty and not 100 independent credit judgments
making the market. In other markets for the sale of fungible commodities, such as steel, twenty suppliers would certainly be
enough to assure that vigorous competition prevailed. While commercial credit is also a fungible commodity, the decision to provide
it and the price to be charged for it may require a complex judgment about the borrower, its prospects, management, etc. The
fewer suppliers there are making such judgments in the market,
the less likely it is that any particular borrower will find a willing
lender at an acceptable price. Riskier and new borrowers in particular may find it more difficult to borrow in a market made by
twenty lenders rather than 100.
c. Failure Intolerable.-While it may be assumed that a
megabank is no more likely to fail than any other well-supervised
large bank, it remains possible that a failure will occur. In that
event, it is unlikely that another bank or consortium would be able
to assume the failed megabank's liabilities and take over its management. At the same time, confidence in the banking system
would surely be impaired, perhaps gravely, if such a major institution were declared insolvent and liquidated in whole or in large
1
part. 61
The alternative certain to be tried in these circumstances
would be some form of government rescue.6 12 There is already a
statutory provision for the FDIC to organize a new national bank
to assume the deposits of a closed bank and operate in its place for
up to two years with any losses it sustained to be replaced by additional funds from the FDIC. 613 Whether the FDIC could reorganize or wind up the affairs of a troubled megabank in two years is
far from clear, however. More likely, the FDIC would be authorized to continue as the (semi-permanent) receiver of the bank, thus
introducing into banking an unprecedented element of state enterprise, with the probable inefficiency and potential for corruption
that experience has shown to be associated with such state activity.
In addition, if a megabank ever did encounter severe difficulties, for which FDIC management would not be a desirable solu611. Cf. Glassman & Eisenbeis, supra note 140, at 215 (government may be reluctant to permit failure to occur).
612.

See W. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SocIETY 21 (1980).

613. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(h), 0), (1)(1976).
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tion, it would certainly acquire substantial leverage in dealing with
the national and several state governments. Consider the example
provided by the Chrysler Corporation's recent difficulties. Of
course, Chrysler did not willingly, or at least intentionally, put its
own survival in doubt. Once the corporation's finances became precarious, however, it was no longer a mere supplicant in seeking
state and federal governmental aid. The affected governments
wished very much to avoid Chrysler's failure. Although that would
probably have resulted only in its reorganization rather than its being liquidated, they were concerned about local and state
unemployment effects if many plants were closed, and about the
market concentration that would have obtained among the surviving firms in the automobile industry. Consequently, Chrysler,
prostrate though it was, had a good deal of bargaining leverage and
was able to obtain federal loan guarantees to the extent of $1,430

billion. 614
Certainly the impending failure of a megabank would occasion
at least as much solicitude from bank regulators, and others answerable for the orderly workings of the economy, as did that of
Chrysler. The widespread disruption of depositor and, more important, of credit relationships would be viewed as an intolerable public hardship. This would be true particularly for the local
communities of deposit that would feel the concentrated effects of
the failure-including unemployment and perhaps substantial con6 15
centration of the local market in a few remaining banks.
d. Implications of Interstate Banking.-An undue concentration of banking resources may be an outcome much to be abhorred, but it is by no means clear that even the removal of all geographical limitations on banking enterprises would result in any
undue concentrations of resources being created. Banking regulators and the antitrust laws would presumably continue to restrain
the growth of banking enterprises by acquisition and thus prevent
undue concentation of the market, measured, as in antitrust analysis, by market shares. Still, it is at least conceivable that one or
614. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875
(Supp. III 1979). See also Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1852
(1976 & Supp. III 1979); H. Rep. No. 92-379, reprintedin [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1270 (regarding Lockheed Corporation's distress).

615. Such concerns may have been implied when the regulators who arranged
$500 million in credit for the ailing First Pennsylvania Bank said their plan to aid
the bank was "designed to enable the bank 'to maintain its service to the community.'" First Pennsylvania Bank Gets Assistance of $500 Million From FDIC, 22
Banks, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1980, at 3, col. 2.
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more megabanks would evolve through internal growth, and it is
only prudent to assume that even in a competitive banking market
there could be an "undue concentration of resources" defined in
terms of an undesirable level of political power, credit markets that
are, although competitive, excessively conservative from a social
point of view, and the potential need for government either to take
over or otherwise assume financial responsibility in the event of a
failure. This possibility does not, however, require prohibiting
otherwise desirable interstate banking, especially if the danger can
be made improbable or avoidable. Two principle safeguards should
be considered.
First, the growth of any banking organization operating interstate (or for that matter, intrastate) could be limited by supplemental antitrust-type prohibitions upon the acquisition of going concerns. For example, a banking enterprise could be precluded from
acquiring a bank outside its home state; entry into other states
would then have to be de novo, whether by branching or by obtaining a new bank charter. This approach, which could entail significant efficiency losses by preventing those who could best manage a particular bank's assets from acquiring them, 6 16 would also
probably be unnecessarily stringent as a prophylactic to undue concentration; but intermediate variations can readily be devised. An
example would be to limit or prohibit acquisitions above a certain
size. As discussed below, 61 7 however, it may be necessary for political reasons to allow the states to require that expansion into their
territory be by acquisition.
A second and more modest proposal would deny interstate expansion opportunities, at least by acquisition, to banks over a
specified size. Federal Reserve Board Governor Caldwell, for example, has suggested that, in conjunction with interstate banking,
"acquisitions in state and interstate markets" respectively
be
denied to banks or BHCs with 25% of state deposits or 5% of the
total national deposits. 618 This proposal was apparently directed in
whole or in part to the undue concentrations of resources issue under discussion here, since a state would rarely, if ever, be the relevant geographical market for an antitrust analysis of banking. 619
616. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAuv. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (1981).
617. See text accompanying notes 738-763 infra.
618. Remarks of FRB Gov. Philip E. Coldwell, Exchequer Club (Jan. 16, 1980)
(copy of speaker's notes on file with author); see Coldwell Wants BHC Size Limits,
Am. Banker, Jan. 17, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
619. Moreover, this proposal would prevent a bank with more than 25% of one
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Five states already deny both acquisitions and new branch applications to banking organizations that hold more than a set percentage of statewide deposits. 6 20 Growth by acquisition is thus precluded, and internal growth is limited by the inability to establish
new facilities. To the extent that a bank at the ceiling size seeks
growth, it must do so through price and service competition.
This approach has one possible drawback as a safeguard against
undue concentration of resources, however; when market growth
exceeds the internal growth of a bank at the ceiling size, it again
becomes eligible to acquire or open new facilities. This could be
prevented if the ceiling size were expressed in absolute terms. Expression in terms of statewide market share is not entirely inapposite, however; at least in a large state, the likelihood of encountering the problems that make a concentration of resources
"undue" is probably correlated with market share as well as mere
size.
If this approach were adapted for use at the federal level in
conjunction with interstate banking, it would be best to leave
statewide ceilings, if any, to state policy, and to adopt a nationwide
ceiling indexed to the size of the national economy as measured,
for example, by gross national product. The antitrust laws would
continue to impose a market share ceiling on acquistions for each
geographically relevant market. Since deposit-service is an inherently local banking product, it makes no sense to limit acquisitions
based on the acquiring and acquired banks' shares of national deposits. Limits based on market shares of national product markets
would be sensible for antitrust purposes, and will presumably be
used by the Department of Justice, 621 while limits based on absolute size, measured by deposits or assets, would be sensible for the
purpose of precluding an undue concentration of resources.
Third, one might attempt to respond narrowly and directly to
the problem of undue concentration by devising a special remedial
approach to the emergence of banking enterprises above a ceiling
size. The added objective here would be to avoid creating inefficient incentives for bank managers. Limiting the further growth of

market from entering another by toehold acquisition-again apparently reflecting a
concern with size and perhaps political influence, but certainly having little to do
with competitive markets.
620. See STATE BANKING LAW SERV., supra note 3, at 318. The states are Iowa
(8%), Missouri (13%), Tennessee (16.5%), New Hampshire (15%), and New Jersey
(20%). The bases for computation vary among them. Id.
621. See Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, supra note 593.
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a bank through acquisitions and new facilities may induce lethargy
among the managers of a bank at the ceiling size. Shareholders, of
course, could not be expected to tolerate this to an unlimited degree, but their ability to monitor its occurrence and extent is problematic. One possible alternative, a rule that automatically divided
a bank at the ceiling size into multiple enterprises, could provide
an incentive for the management to prevent its growth to the point
at which division would be required. This would present a problem
to the extent that managerial compensation, status, or perquisites
depended upon the size of the enterprise.6 22 The concern here is
that in establishing a maximum enterprise size, management of a
firm approaching the maximum would engage in inefficient behavior in order to avoid dismemberment. They might, for instance
raise prices in order to lose loan and fee business. It would be very
difficult for either shareholders or antitrust authorities to detect
such a purpose in pricing policies. The managers might also
consume resources and perquisites or side payments in order to
keep the company from exceeding the maximum size.6 23 It is per-

haps most likely, however, that the managers would simply slacken
their efforts in order to restrain the enterprise's growth.
In principle, therefore, one wants to fashion a rule requiring
the division of banking enterprises above a certain size that is objective, so that there is little or no room for arguments from managers (or shareholders) that it does not apply to a particular case,
and yet does not create perverse incentives for managers of banks
below but approaching the ceiling size.
There may be no way to accomplish the latter task completely,
but it should be possible considerably to mitigate the undesirable
incentive effects that would arise if a ceiling were merely placed on
the growth of a banking organization. For example, advance provision could be made for the mitosis of any bank or BHC that attained a certain size, the bifurcation to be carried out along predetermined geographical lines. For example, when a bank or BHC
had assets in excess of some figure, say $200 billion in 1980 dollars,
622.

See, e.g., W. BAUMOL,

BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GRoWNTH 9

(1959).
623. Cf. Edwards, Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: ExpensePreference Behavior in Banking, 85 J. POL. ECON. 147, 148-49 (1977) (managers are
utility maximizers and not profit maximizers). See generally Hannan & Mavinga, Expense Preference and Managerial Control: The Case of the Banking Firm, 11 BELL
J. ECON. 671 (1980).
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it would be required to devise a plan for its reorganization into two
organizations of approximately equal size, each operating in a nonoverlapping set of contiguous states, the plan to become effective
when the organization attained a size of $300 billion. The period
between regulatory approval of the plan of reorganization and the
time for its implementation could be several years. Meanwhile, the
firm could be required to organize along divisional lines that would
reflect its later bifurcation. Indeed, if interstate bank growth were
accomplished through a BHC with a separate bank subsidiary for
each state or set of contiguous states, their later separation would
be much easier than if a single bank with interstate branches were
624
to be separated into two enterprises.
None of these approaches to the prevention of an undue concentration of resources is entirely satisfying, of course. If the probability of an undue concentration arising seems sufficiently high,
further efforts should be made to refine these approaches or to devise a better one. It should be emphasized, however, that the principal drawbacks of the various safeguards discussed herein relate to
the incentives they create, and not to their ultimate ability to prevent an undue concentration of resources from arising and persisting. The problem of potential undue concentrations of resources,
therefore, should be considered solvable. The solutions offered
thus far all entail some inefficiency, but the efficiency losses encountered to safeguard against an undue concentration of resources
would surely be less than those inherent in the state-by-state banking system.
It is therefore possible to conclude with some confidence that
the necessary implications of interstate banking for the undue concentration of resources are negligible. Completely unrestrained interstate banking, in which a single bank could branch throughout
the country, would naturally be the approach to interstate banking
most likely to cause a problem of undue concentration. That problem could be solved by placing a ceiling, in one form or another,
on the size of bank organizations; this solution would be less costly
if the banking organization had been required from the outset to
expand interstate in such a way to facilitate its later mitosis should
that be required.
624. See G. FISCHER, supra note 31, at 279 (1968) (in formulating strategy to
break up BHC, FRB "realized that something would have to be done quickly to prevent the conversion of numerous Transamerica banks to branches.").
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Summary and Conclusions

In this Part II, the general question, whether banking organizations should in principle be allowed to operate full-service facilities interstate, has been examined with reference to six criteria:
consumer welfare; producer welfare; the equity of regulation; amenability to safety and soundness supervision; amenability to policy
guidance; and avoidance of undue concentrations of resources.
1. Summary of Part 1.-First, because interstate banking
would increase potential and could increase actual competition in
banking without threatening bank safety, it was shown that the
welfare of consumers, including depositors, retail borrowers, and
commercial borrowers, would probably be enhanced and could in
no event be lessened. 6 25 Second, with respect to producer welfare,
a possible division of interests emerged. As a group, shareholders
in banks would probably be better off with interstate banking.
Bank employees, on the other hand, would experience mixed effects, with some gaining and some losing as a result of interstate
banking. Overall, employment in the banking industry would probably be increased, and new opportunities open to most present
employees. Moreover, the losses experienced by some employees
could be averted or mitigated through a labor-protective ap62 6
proach.
Third, interstate banking would unequivocally increase the equity of regulation. It would lower the legal barriers by which some
banks are fenced into declining markets, while others benefit from
regional prosperity and growth.6 2 7 It would also eliminate the inequitable terms of competition under which most banks and BHCs
must compete with a favored few grandfathered BHCs that have
banks in as many as eleven contiguous states and grandfathered
foreign banks with branches in several money center states. (These

inequities could also be eliminated by the dismemberment of the
grandfathered firms, however.) Additionally, interstate banking
would put banks on more equitable terms of competition with nonbanking enterprises that have begun to offer close substitutes for
demand deposit-taking in conjunction with the other financial services that they have traditionally provided. These enterprises include interstate credit unions, brokerage houses, and money market funds. They may soon be joined by interstate savings and loan
institutions, at least in some markets.
625. See text accompanying notes 466-488 supra.
626. See text accompanying notes 489-498 supra.
627. See text accompanying notes 499-523 supra.
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Fourth, interstate banking will not impair the quality of safety
and soundness supervision. 6 28 It could complicate the task, however, particularly insofar as interstate activity is accomplished by
direct branching rather than by separate bank subsidiaries of multistate BHCs. If the multiple jurisdictions involved in soundness supervision of interstate operations cannot coordinate their efforts adequately, federal preemption of the examination function would be
an appropriate response, and would ensure against any deterioration in the quality of soundness supervision.
Fifth, the implications of interstate banking for political control
of banks' policies are generally favorable.6 29 If interstate banking
results in substantial consolidation within the industry, the smaller
number of resulting organizations will probably be more tractable
to policy guidance and their compliance will be more readily monitored. Interstate banking may also have a favorable effect on housing finance and the funding of public debt, but the latter proposition must be regarded as very speculative. While there is no
reason to think that interstate banking would further the policy of
using local deposits to extend local credit, it is not likely to contribute to its frustration. Even if interstate banking does increase the
interregional flow of funds beyond the levels desired by capitalexporting jurisdictions, those areas would be more able to staunch
the flow of funds through explicit efforts at credit allocation than
through the territorial market allocation scheme of state-by-state
banking.
Sixth, interstate banking would increase somewhat the possibility that a problem of undue concentration of resources would
arise, but that problem could easily be met, especially if it has
been properly anticipated when interstate banking is first authorized. 63 0 Specifically, it should be sufficient to require that interstate growth occur at least to some extent through separate bank
affiliates of a BHC so that their later separation, should it become
necessary, will be made easier.
2. Conclusion: The General Case Favors Interstate Banking.-The criteria by which the general case for interstate banking
has been evaluated do not have a common denominator; nor is it
practical to make realistic quantitative estimates of the various benefits and costs to be expected from interstate banking, so that a net
gain or loss could be determined from their summation. While the
628.

See text accompanying notes 524-532 supra.

629. See text accompanying notes 533-586 supra.
630.

See text accompanying notes 587-624 supra.
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exercise of some judgment is therefore required in order to resolve
the matter, it does seem apparent by the criteria used here that interstate banking would be a net improvement over state-by-state
banking. Indeed, it may and probably will have substantial benefits
for all consumers, most producers, and the equity of regulation; it
could improve the effectiveness of soundness supervision and policy guidance. Meanwhile, it has only the most speculative
drawbacks-some bank employees may be harmed and the problems of undue resource concentration may arise. Moreover, each of
these possibilities could be averted or substantially ameliorated by
rather minor departures from the general proposition that banking
organizations should in principle be allowed to operate full-service
facilities interstate.
If interstate banking is desirable in general, it follows that the
present regime, under which the states are merely authorized to
allow the entry of out-of-state BHCs, will not produce a desirable
level or pattern of interstate banking. First, the opposition of local
banks to the introduction of new competition will generally be sufficient to prevent state legislatures from inviting interstate entry
under the Douglas Amendment. Experience bears this out, in that
only two relatively underdeveloped states, viz. Maine and South
Dakota, have opened themselves to out-of-state banking organizations, and then only on a conditional or limited basis.
Second, even if banks in particular states were prepared to encounter competition from out-of-state entrants in return for reciprocal entry rights into other states, experience and logic indicate
that few such reciprocal entry arrangements will be consummated.
There will almost always be reasons for the bankers in one of any
two states to object that their market is more desirable than the
one to which they will be gaining access; and their legislators will
understandably be loathe to disadvantage local banks relative to
those of other states.
Third, even if the banks in each of two states were generally
inclined to favor reciprocal entry rights, it would be very difficult
for them to agree on what constitutes reciprocal treatment both in
principle and in practice. It would be difficult if not impossible, for
example, to determine whether a reasonably subtle host-state
banking commissioner is discriminating against out-of-state bank
applications for new bank and branch charters in the host state, or
in the examination process. Experience with intrastate banking
shows that practices of this sort defy judicial review. Consequently,
there would be many opportunities for real and imagined discrimi-
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nation against outlanders under what is nominally reciprocity be-

6 31
tween two states.

New York's experience with reciprocity as a requirement for
the entry of a foreign bank branch offers no real evidence that reciprocity can be made to work. The banks of sixteen countries operated branches in New York as of the end of 1979.632 In the great
majority of cases, however, there was no question about reciprocal
treatment for New York banks, since New York banks had established branches in those countries before the foreign banks
branched into New York. Meanwhile, banks likely to benefit both
themselves and New York residents by branching in New York
have been precluded from doing so by that state's reciprocity re6 33
quirement.
In any event, any pattern of interstate banking likely to result
from reciprocal bilateral agreements between the states would not
meaningfully be related, except by chance, to the criteria employed above, with the probable exception of producer welfare. A
given pair of states would be most likely to reach a reciprocal banking agreement, that is, if their home-state bankers found it mutually advantageous and if the respective state-bank supervisors did
not object on supervision grounds to the introduction of out-ofstate banks. The circumstances in which these conditions would
obtain and reciprocal agreements would be reached would certainly
be more limited than the circumstances favorable to interstate
banking under the criteria developed here. For example, cases in
which consumers and some producers would be benefited, and in
which supervision would be unaffected, might not result in bilateral agreement due to the opposition of the most risk averse or inefficient bank managements in one of the states, if they can persuade their state commissioner or legislators that they would be
unable to compete.
This analysis suggests that the present legal structure, under
which interstate banking is permitted only to the extent that a state
enacts a -statute authorizing the entry of an out-of-state BHC,
should be changed to permit interstate banking to the geographical
631. Discrimination could be minimized to the extent that entry was by means
of a national bank branch or charter. It is unlikely, however, that two states would
readily enter a reciprocal banking arrangement where the likely result was to encourage use of, and conversions to, national charters.
632. [1979] N.Y. SUP'T OF BANKs ANN. REP. 148.
633. Id.; see N.Y. BANKING LAw § 202-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). The reciprocity requirement prohibits Canadian banks from branching into New York.
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extent most consistent with the criteria used above. In addition,
the particular means by which interstate banking is conductedwhether by subsidiary bank, branch banking, or ATMs-should
also be evaluated according to those criteria. Part III of this essay
accordingly turns to issues of the appropriate extent and means of
interstate banking.
III. ISSUES OF EXTENT AND MEANS
Having answered affirmatively the general question whether
banking organizations should be allowed to operate full-service facilities in more than one state, two questions of implementation
then arise. First, should there be any limitations on the geographical reach of a banking organization? Second, within its appropriate
reach, should the enterprise be restricted with respect to the
means by which it crosses state lines? Specifically, should the bank
be required to form a sister subsidiary of its BHC in each of the
states in which it operates, or be left free to branch directly across
state lines? Insofar as direct branching is to be allowed, there is
the further question of whether bricks-and-mortar branches are to
be treated differently from ATMs.
It is difficult to separate questions of geographical extent from
questions of the means by which interstate expansion is achieved.
It would be possible, for example, to determine that a BHC should
be able to reach nationwide through the organization of several regional banks, each of which could operate bricks-and-mortar
branches in several states and be accessed by ATMs in a lesser
area (such as one state only) or a greater area (such as nationwide).
The combinations are legion, but there is little reason to explore
many of them. Take the example just given; there would be no
reason seriously to consider limiting the ATMs of a regional interstate bank to a single state. But even the number of plausible
regulatory patterns is too large to be subjected to a simultaneous
comparison under the six criteria used in this analysis. As a practical matter, therefore, it is useful to separate, at least initially, the
question of geographical reach from questions of form.
A.

GeographicalLimitations on Interstate Banking
There are three types of geographical areas within which interstate banking could plausibly be permitted. These are the country
as a whole; a multistate region of the country, such as a Federal
Reserve District or other group of contiguous states, such as those
bordering each bank's original home state; and a "natural trade
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area," such as an interstate metropolitan area (SMSA). Accordingly,
each of these possibilities will be considered in connection with
each of the standard criteria.
1. Consumer Welfare.-In Part II, we saw that consumer welfare would be served by a move to interstate banking primarily because it would entail increased potential and could entail increased
actual competition in local markets. This would tend to increase the
interest rate paid on deposits and decrease the rates charged on
loans, except in the case of large commercial borrowers who already
receive the benefit of a highly competitive nationwide market.
It follows that the larger the geographical area from within
which banks may enter a particular local market, the more consumer
welfare will be served. Accordingly, consumer welfare would be
best served by nationwide banking, and least enhanced if banks
were allowed to operate interstate only where a metropolitan area
within their home-state territory spills over into another state. Under nationwide banking, every bank would immediately have scores
of potential competitors in the wings of its market. With regional interstate banking, every bank would face at least some new potential
competition. Under the metropolitan area approach, however,
banks in entirely intrastate SMSAs would face no new potential
competition 63 4 and those in interstate SMSAs would face only little
added potential competition from the banks located in the out-of635
state counties of their own SMSA.
A regional approach to interstate banking encompassing several
contiguous states would necessarily imply more potential competition, and more potential benefit to consumers, than a metropolitan
area limitation on interstate banking. It is impossible to determine
the precise degree to which nationwide banking would be superior
to the most promising regional approach, but potential competition
analysis leads irresistibly to the conclusion that it would be superior.
2. ProducerWelfare.-To the extent that interstate banking increases the potential competition facing incumbent banks, shareholders in banks will presumably be adversely affected. In this respect, the producer welfare effects of interstate banking appear to be
634. Intrastate SMSAs with high three-bank concentration ratios, using
mid-1974 data, included Elmira, N.Y. (100%); Honolulu, Hawaii (75.5%); Pittsburgh,
Pa. (82.6%); and San Francisco-Oakland, Cal. (79.6%). Carter H. Golembe Assocs.,
Inc., Some Thoughts on Interstate Banking 38-39 (Dec. 1, 1975).
635. Interstate SMSAs with high three-bank concentration ratios, using
mid-1974 data, include Augusta, Ga.-S.C. (77.8%); Fall River, Mass.-R.I. (85.9%);
and Memphis, Tenn.-Ark.-Miss. (79.6%). Id.
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the reciprocal of the consumer welfare effects, and the more limited
the geographical range from within which potential competitors may
be drawn, the better off the owners of banks will be.
There are countervailing and complicating considerations, however. First, many banks may be able to realize scale economies from
interstate banking that are not entirely competed away. It is very
difficult to estimate, however, the extent to which the economies
may continue with scale, and thus one cannot know whether interstate banking regions would be sufficiently large to exhaust the available economies of scale, or whether, on the contrary, only
nationwide banking could do so. The latter possibility seems doubtful under present technological circumstances, although it may fast
be coming true. The geographical area of the eleven western-most
states in which Western Bancorporation finds it economical
electronically to link all of its 859 offices 636 suggests that the efficient
area over which a single banking enterprise may operate-i.e. at
least before diseconomies set in-may be very large indeed, if it is
not already nationwide.
Second, most banks are at a disadvantage insofar as they are
competing with grandfathered multistate banks and BHCs, interstate brokerage houses, and money-market funds. If the ability to
operate interstate would improve the banks' ability to attract core
deposits, and to diversify their deposit base regionally, they would
be more effectively able to meet this competition.
These points do not apply with equal force to all banks, of
course. Some banks will be able to realize scale economies, for instance, while others-perhaps because they are less wellmanaged-will lose a market share to them; in a more competitive
environment, they will clearly be worse off for their poor management. Moreover, if the banks that gain from interstate banking gain
more as the scope of interstate operations is expanded, those that
lose from interstate banking will presumably lose more. Finally,
some banks will benefit from remaining small, emphasizing personalized service, and attracting customers from other banks that grow
too large and impersonal for some customers' taste.
Under .these conflicting circumstances, it would be entirely too
speculative to suggest whether bank shareholders, as a group, would
be better off with nationwide or regional or metropolitan interstate
banking. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify three categories of
bank owners that would clearly be better off the broader the scope
636.

See text accompanying note 506 supra.
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of interstate banking. These are the owners of problem and failing
banks, the owners of banks that would be purchased at a premium if
interstate acquisitions were allowed, and, most obviously, the owners of banks that would profit from expanding into new markets.
If the area within which acquisitions were allowed was larger,
problem and failing banks would have more potential buyers who
could be expected to bid up the price of the shares. Even in local
markets with several banks financially capable of acquiring a failing
bank, antitrust standards may eliminate most of the potential purchasers already in the market; in addition, the state-by-state banking
system precludes acquisition by any bank or BHC not already chartered in the state. As noted in the Bank Stock Quarterly, "when it
became clear in 1974 that Franklin National Bank [of New York]
would have to be acquired by another organization... [liarge West
Coast and Chicago banks that would presumably have been more
than casually interested were automatically excluded" from the bidding. 63 7

Indeed, the Federal Financial Institution Examination

Council has since requested that Congress pass legislation enabling
failing banks and thrifts and credit unions to be sold interstate in order to avoid a market-concentrating consolidation with a local com638
petitor.
Other bank-stock analysts have pointed out that there are many
potential "buyee banks" that "may be purchased at substantial pre639
miums" by other banks if interstate acquisitions are permitted.
These are not problem or failing banks, but banks that are now
healthy. In this analysis, the phasing-out of Regulation Q and the increased competition sure to result from homogenization of the powers of various financial institutions, both brought about by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980,640 will "result in severe [profit] margin pressure on many
smaller banks."641 One result, the analysts believe, will be to:
...precipitate a change in the independent banker's attitude
about branching laws, and his profit problems will result in significant industry merger and consolidation .... It is likely that re637.
638.

Unequal Opportunity, supra note 494, at 18.
See 126 CONG. REC. 83802 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1980) (S. 2575 introduced by

request). The Council is composed of the three federal banking agencies, the Federal Home Loan Board, and the National Credit Union Administration.
639. Robinson-Humphrey Co., Inc., Interstate Banking-The Topic of the
1980's, at 2 (Aug. 6, 1980).
640. 1980 Act, supra note 63.
641. Robinson-Humphrey Co., Inc., supra note 639, at 4.
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moval of geographic restrictions will be in the best interest of the
small bank's stockholders as it will increase the number of potential buyers. 642
If this analysis is correct, then banks that are not themselves
likely to profit by expanding interstate will want to be in a position
to be acquired by others that can. Again, nationwide banking
would maximize the number of potential buyers for any given
"buyee bank." Thus, all bank shareholders, not only those whose
banks will be able to realize scale economies from interstate expansion, or are failing banks, may benefit from the broadest possible
geographical reach for banking enterprises. In this respect, the interests of bank employees will be virtually congruent with those of
bank shareholders.
3. Equity of Regulation.-As between nationwide, regional
and metropolitan interstate branching policies, the approach that
allows the widest possible geographical scope for banking enterprises best serves the public interest in equitable regulation. Only
completely nationwide banking opportunities would fully eliminate
the geographical disparities now embedded in the state-by-state
banking system. Regional interstate banking would do little, in
fact, to alleviate the inequity of confining some banking organizations to declining territorial markets while others enjoy the benefits
of regional growth.
Both regional and metropolitan interstate banking would have
one salutary effect in this regard, however: they would enable
some banks that are at present severely confined, such as those in
the downtown or inner-city sections of a unit or limited branching
state, to enter the other, and especially the suburban, counties of
their own SMSA, at least insofar as those counties were in another
state. In fact, under regional interstate banking, these banks could
often operate more freely throughout nearby states than in their
home state. For example, under either approach the banks in the
Springfield-Chicopee-Holyoke area of Massachusetts, a state which
allows county-wide branching, could branch throughout Connecticut because one county of that state is in their SMSA and
Connecticut allows statewide branching.643 Under a regional approach enabling Illinois banks or BHCs to enter contiguous states,
642. Id. at 2.
643. CONN. GEN. STAT.

ANN. § 36-59 (West Supp. 1981); see STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 942 (1979) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
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however, an Illinois BHC could hold one unit bank in Illinois and
6
several banks throughout Missouri. 44
Under a metropolitan area approach, new differences in opportunity, equally as arbitrary as those under state-by-state banking, would be created. Consider an example drawn from Pennsylvania, which allows branching into contiguous counties. 6 1 Banks
in metropolitan Pittsburgh would not be benefited at all, since the
Pittsburgh SMSA is entirely within one state. At the same time,
banks in Philadelphia would be able to branch into the New Jersey
and Delaware counties within the Philadelphia SMSA.6 4 6 This
might be viewed superficially as even-handed treatment in that
Philadelphia banks would then, like those in Pittsburgh, simply be
able to reach their entire metropolitan area, including some of the
affluent suburban areas to which they are presently denied access,
unlike the banks of Pittsburgh. In reality, however, since Philadelphia is already a much larger and more desirable retail market than Pittsburgh, this would only exacerbate the inequality of
opportunity facing Pittsburgh and Philadelphia banks.
An analogous example under regional interstate banking would
depend upon how the regional boundaries were devised. If they
follow Federal Reserve Districts, for example, New York, northern
New Jersey and Fairfield County, Connecticut banks would be
able to enter only each others' territories,6 47 whereas California
banks would have access to six additional states, including several
with above-median economic growth, such as Arizona and Colorado.6 48 Other regional schemes might be more equitable, but

their determination would not be obvious. The resulting debate
could exceed in acrimony that over the location and number of
Federal Reserve banks, which had "deeply divided Congress on
banking reform for several years" until passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 and then plagued the system's Organization
Committee in 1914.649

The disparity between domestic banks and foreign banks that
established branches or subsidiaries in multiple states prior to the
644. Missouri prohibits branching, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.105 (Vernon 1971)
but permits state-wide multibank holding companies. Id. § 362.920 (Vernon Supp.

1981).
645.
646.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 904 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
See STATISTICAL ABSTRACr, supra note 643, at 942.

647. See 67 Fed. Res. Bull. A80 (March 1981) (Map: Boundaries of the Federal
Reserve Districts and Their Branch Territories); R. Johnson, Historical Beginnings
...

The Federal Reserve 51 (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston 1977).

648. See 67 Fed. Res. Bull. A80 (March 1981).
649. R. Johnson, supra note 647, at 37.
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International Banking Act of 1978 would be eliminated only if interstate banking were allowed nationwide. 650 Short of that, neither
a regional nor a metropolitan interstate approach would cure the
disparity. On the other hand, since the foreign banks with
branches or subsidiaries in multiple states are concentrated in New
York, Illinois, and California, and found to only a limited extent in
a handful of other states, it would theoretically be possible to restore equality of treatment if these states were to treat the banks of
other states as they do foreign banks. Any domestic bank, that is,
would be able to apply for subsidiary or branching authority in
New York, California, Illinois, and perhaps the other states with a
foreign bank presence.
This scheme is obviously of limited and questionable practicality, however. First, those few states could not accommodate most
of the out-of-state banks that would seek to enter them. Second, it
would only increase the inequitable treatment of banks in those
host states, since they would now have to compete with domestic
as well as foreign multistate banks. While host-state banks could
seek to enter other host states-for example New York to California and vice versa-they could not enter other home states; a
Georgia bank could enter New York, that is, but not vice versa.
The inequity presently existing between grandfathered multistate domestic BHCs 651 and other banking organizations could also
be cured by nationwide interstate banking authority. Metropolitan
interstate banking would do little to give other banks the opportunity presently enjoyed by the grandfathered BHCs. On the other
hand, most of the advantage now enjoyed by grandfathered BHCs
could be extended to others under a regional approach to interstate
banking as well, since each of the grandfathered companies tends
to operate in a single region of the country. Indeed, each of the
seven grandfathered holding companies operates in a group of contiguous states, with the exception of Financial General Bankshares,
Inc., which has subsidiaries in New York as well as the District of
Columbia and three contiguous states in the south-central region of
the country. 652 Some of the regions are very large, however; as
mentioned before, Western Bancorporation operates banks in the
11 western-most of the lower 48 states. Each banking organization

650. See text accompanying notes 501-503 supra.
651. See text accompanying notes 505-507 supra.
652. The companies and their states of operation are listed in GOLEMBE (1979),
supra note 113, at 66-67.
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would presumably have to be admitted to a similarly large or populous area to be given a truly equal opportunity.
Finally, the nonbank institutions with which banks must compete now or in the future for retail deposits operate nationwide.
Brokerage houses, money-market funds, and retailers are completely unlimited with respect to location. Credit unions may operate nationwide, subject to the important limitation that they serve
only an employee affinity group. The extent to which savings and
loan institutions will be authorized to operate interstate remains to
be seen and, of course, may depend in turn upon changes in the
policy respecting interstate banking.
It is thus clear that the public interest in equitable regulation
would best be served by nationwide interstate banking. A regional
solution that would largely cure the inequity now favoring grandfathered multistate BHCs could perhaps be devised but only the
nationwide approach could eliminate the disparity now favoring
grandfathered multistate foreign banks and nonbank competitors.
4. Soundness Supervision.-If interstate banking complicates
the process of safety and soundness supervision, then the more dispersed the operations of a banking enterprise may be, and the
more jurisdictions in which it may operate, the more complicated
the task of supervision will be. To illustrate, consider the
coordination now required for the examination of a BHC with
banking subsidiaries in only one state. Assume that the lead bank
is a national bank, and that there are state member and insured
state nonmember banks in the system. In addition, assume that the
national bank has a significant branch operation in London, that
the BHC has substantial nonbank subsidiaries in the United States,
including an Edge Act corporation based in a state other than its
home state, and that the Edge Act corporation itself has branches
in several states around the country. Examination of this system
would require coordination among the Comptroller of the Currency, to examine the national bank at home and abroad; the
FDIC and/or the state banking commissioner, whose cooperation
in examining the insured state nonmember bank could be helpful,
and the Fed. The Fed's role would include examination of the
BHC itself, the state member bank subsidiary, and significant
nonbank subsidiaries, including the Edge Act corporation. In order
to examine the Edge Act corporation's branches efficiently, moreover, the Federal Reserve Bank in the district where the BHC is
based would require the coordinated efforts of all the Federal Reserve Banks in whose districts the Edge Act corporation had
branches.
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Clearly, the present structure of banking can require a good
deal of coordination among the federal examining agencies and is
facilitated by the coordination of the relevant state banking commissioner. If the BHC operated banks in additional states, the task
would become only slightly more complex; their examination could
require coordination among additional Federal Reserve Banks or
regional offices of the Comptroller; in the case of state-chartered
banks, the cooperation of the host-state banking commissioners
would be helpful, but not essential.
In the case of direct interstate branching by a national bank,
coordination would be required only among the regional offices of
the Comptroller and, in the event that the national bank is a BHC
subsidiary, the Federal Reserve Bank for the district in which the
national bank is located. Where the bank engaged in direct interstate branching is a state bank, however, coordination would also
be required among the host- and home-state-banking commissioners and, if the state bank is a Fed member, the Federal Reserve
Bank for the district in which it is headquartered, and possibly the
Federal Reserve Bank for the district in which the branch is located.
Clearly, as the number and dispersal of the states in which a
banking enterprise has operations increases, the number of supervisory entities-separate agencies or separate regional offices of the
federal agencies-whose coordination is required in order to perform an examination increases. Therefore, it appears that metropolitan area interstate banking would add the fewest complicating elements to the bank examination process. In the case of an
independent national bank branching interstate, no additional
regulating entities would be implicated. In the case of a state bank
branching interstate, two state banking commissioners would be
concerned rather than one. Where the interstate presence is in the
form of a new subsidiary bank of a BHC, either one or two primary
regulators (depending on whether both banks are nationally chartered) and the Fed would be implicated in the examination process. In sum, metropolitan area interstate banking would not pose
formidable problems for examination and supervision.
Regional and nationwide banking enterprises could clearly implicate many more regulatory entities, and complicate the examination process significantly more than a metropolitan area approach.
At the same time, few banking enterprises would become
jurisdictionally more complex under regional or perhaps even under nationwide interstate banking than some BHCs with many

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

164

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking
19811

INTERSTATE BANKING

large overseas branches and banking subsidiaries may become under the present regime. This will become even more true as Edge
Act corporations continue to branch throughout the country without regard to Federal Reserve district lines.6 3 Still, there would

be a larger number of complex organizations requiring examination
under interstate banking, thus increasing the overall burden of
soundness supervision.
From the point of view of examination simplicity, interstate
banking has a potentially negative effect, and the more states that
may be comprehended by a single banking organization, the more
potential that effect may have. This should not necessarily be considered a significant drawback, however. Coordinating procedures
among the federal examining agencies are not difficult to establish;6 54 indeed, they will have to be improved anyway, simply in

order to deal with the challenge presented by Edge Act corporations.
The only real potential for a failure of coordination arises
where the several states are involved. This is a concern to the extent that state banks are allowed to branch directly into other
states, or one state in which a BHC has a subsidiary bank insists on
duplicating the Fed's examination of the BHC itself, including the
lead or other subsidiary banks chartered in other states. If the concerned states are not able to coordinate their efforts adequately,
however, their state-chartered banks will have an incentive to convert to national charters. Accordingly, as long as the federal
agencies are adequately able to coordinate their examination processes, one need not fear that banks will be subjected to impossibly
burdensome and duplicative examinations, nor that they will be insufficiently supervised.
5. Policy Guidance.-It was previously suggested that interstate banking may make policy guidance in general, and particularly that for monetary policy, more effective if it decreases the
number of banking organizations.

655

The potential for consolidation

within the industry is, of course, greater if the area over which
banking enterprises can operate is greater. In this regard, then,
nationwide banking may be superior to regional and metropolitan
interstate banking. It is impossible to estimate, however, whether
653. See text accompanying note 273 supra.
654. See 12 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. III 1979) (Financial Institutions Examination
Council to prescribe uniform principles and standards for federal supervisory
agencies). But cf. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 530, passim.
655. See text accompanying note 584 supra.
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the degree of banking consolidation that would be desirable overall
(i.e., when market-concentration effects are taken into account)
could not be accommodated just as well with regional banking organizations. Only metropolitan interstate banking would be clearly
insufficient to make the Fed's task measurably easier.
The implications of interstate banking for the banks' demand
for public debt depends upon whether the "independence" or
"many masters" hypothesis is correct. 656 In the absence of
empirical data, it seems likely that a bank would want to purchase some
of the public debt of each of the states in which it has regulated
operations that periodically require it to apply for additional authorities. If this "many masters" hypothesis is correct, then each
state would have some incentive to admit a certain number of outof-state banks to its jurisdiction. While metropolitan interstate
banking authority might not create a large number of potential entrants, both regional and nationwide interstate banking would do
so: the more potential entrants to a particular state market, the
higher they could be expected to bid up the price, paid in part
through additional municipal bond purchases, that they would be
willing to pay for admission. Each state, as a potential host, would
then be better off with nationwide than with regional interstate
banking.
Conversely, if the "independence" hypothesis holds true after
all, each state's ability to extract municipal bond purchases from its
home-state banks would diminish as the number of states in which
they had alternative expansion opportunities increased. That is, if
interstate banking inherently increases the difficulty of selling public debt to home-state banks, then the more interstate banking opportunities there are, the more difficult it would make this type of
political control over banks.
Earlier it was suggested that housing finance policy may be
furthered by interstate banking insofar as it facilitates the (intraorganizational) flow of funds to growing markets better than the
present state-by-state (interbank) system does. 65 7 While there

might be only little room for improvement in the banking system's
present ability to intermediate housing (and other) funds interregionally, it seems obvious that any further improvement would
best be accomplished through nationwide interstate banking, rather
than through the regional or metropolitan area approaches. With
656.

See text preceding note 579 supra.

657. See text preceding note 585 supra.
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respect to the devotion of local deposits to local credit needs, it
probably does not much matter whether interstate banking takes
the form of metropolitan, regional, or nationwide banking; the
state-by-state system already directs funds effectively to their most
profitable geographical area for investment, except to the extent
that laws like the Community Reinvestment Act 658 succeed in

keeping more deposits invested in local loans.
In sum, political control over banking will probably not be
greatly affected by the decision whether interstate banking should
be implemented on the nationwide, regional, or metropolitan area
scale. It is clearest that the most limited option, that of metropolitan interstate banking, would have virtually no effect on political
control. It is less clear whether nationwide interstate banking
would be materially better or worse for policy guidance than regional interstate banking; unless nationwide banking made banks
less responsive to the fiscal needs of the states in which they operate, however, it would seem that nationwide banking is the superior option.
6. Undue Concentration of Resources.-With respect to market concentration in the sense with which the antitrust laws are
concerned, the broadest possible area for interstate banking will
have the most salutary effect in local and regional markets. Opening them to additional potential and actual competitors could do
much to deconcentrate these markets, which would be desirable. 659 National market concentration would decrease as well if interstate banking enables more banks to attain the size needed to
enter national product markets, such as the market for large commercial loans. On the other hand, national market concentration
could increase with any move to interstate banking, in relation to
the extent of the geographical area over which banking enterprises
are allowed to operate, if the largest banks are best able to exploit
the opportunity with respect to a particular product market.
In projecting market concentration effects, of course, much
depends upon the measure of concentration that one uses, and different measures are appropriate to different size markets. In local
banking markets, the three-firm concentration ratio is a conventionally used and appropriate index of concentration. In a
nationwide market, however, one would be more concerned with
the market share of the top 50 and 100 firms; three-firm and even
658.
659.

12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. III 1979).
See notes 410, 634-635 supra.
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five-firm concentration ratios would not be sensitive enough to reveal an early trend toward concentration or deconcentration.
Using these measures to illustrate the point made above, assume that the largest 100 banks in the country are the most likely
to expand interstate. 660 The local and regional markets that the
largest banks enter de novo or by toehold acquisition would then
become less concentrated even as the national-market share of the
largest banks, measured say by deposits, is growing. For example,
several large banks may seek and obtain entry into a growing but
relatively concentrated market, such as Dallas. If a few of them
gained any significant (5%-10%) shares of the local market, it would
become less concentrated; meanwhile, to the extent that smaller
Dallas banks lost market share to the larger banks entering that
market from out-of-state, national deposit concentration would be
increased.
Increases in national market shares measured by deposits or
assets should not be troublesome, however. It has already been
pointed out that the banking products for which the relevant market is national are few-large commercial loans, cash management
services, and perhaps the issuance of bank credit cards. 6 6 1 Since
only large banks make large commercial loans and offer cash management services, competition in these products markets will not
be affected if these large banks grow larger at the expense of small
banks. In contrast, many small and most intermediate size banks
are now issuers of bank credit cards. This market is undergoing
some transition toward national competition among very large
banks. They may come to dominate the market, particularly if consumers have a preference for a bank card issued by a "local" bank
and interstate banking enables these large banks to obtain a local
presence.
Nationwide interstate banking may therefore represent some
threat to the competitiveness of the bank-credit-card issuing business. It is not at all clear how realistic this possibility is, however.
There are thousands of card-issuing banks, 662 and only a few signs
660. Of course, many smaller banks as well, especially in interstate SMSAs and
near state borders, will probably expand interstate; their interstate activities are
likely to be dwarfed, however, by those of the 100 largest banks or BHCs.
661. See text preceding note 596 supra.
662. MasterCard has 11,666 member institutions, Visa 11,646. Am. Banker, Feb.
3, 1981, at 3, col. 1. Most members are commercial banks and belong to both systems, but not all members are card-issuers; some act only as merchant banks, processing credit slips engendered by merchants. See Bernard, supra note 233, at 67.
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that the money center banks may be able to obtain a significant
share of the nationwide total of cards outstanding. 663 Moreover, it
is not clear whether even significant concentration in this market
should be of much concern, inasmuch as the prices that are
charged for bank-card credit are regulated in almost every state. It
would still be preferable to maintain a competitive market, so that
prices are held below legal maxima by market forces whenever
possible, but even under a rather far-fetched worst case in which
the credit-card-issuing business comes under the domination of a
handful of banks, consumers could presumably be protected from
monopoly pricing by usury laws or some more particularized form
of regulation.
While nationwide banking is clearly superior to regional or
metropolitan interstate banking from the point of view of avoiding
market concentration, it equally clearly represents the greatest potential for the emergence of an undue concentration of resources in
the special sense of an undesirably large asset aggregation. Metropolitan area interstate banking holds no such threat; of the largest
banks in the country, it would potentially enable only those in
New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia to increase their retail deposit base to an appreciable degree-almost certainly too little to
be material to this concern.
Regional interstate banking could be implemented on a scale
designed to provide assurance against the creation of undue concentrations of resources. The regions within which banking enterprises are allowed to operate could be established in such a way as
indirectly to impose a ceiling upon resource concentration. While
the implicit ceiling would in practice be somewhat imprecise and
variable from one region to another, this would have the added
benefit of obviating the need for setting an explicit ceiling on enterprise size and providing for the dismemberment of oversized
banks or BHCs.
In conclusion, market deconcentration could best be served by
nationwide banking. On the other hand, undue concentrations of
resources would be more likely with nationwide than with regional
interstate banking. The weight to be given to this latter factor
should probably depend upon one's fear that the problem will arise
and one's willingness to undertake a remedial approach of the sort
discussed earlier should it do so.
7. Summary and Conclusion.-In this section, three possible
663. See text accompanying note 285 supra.
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geographical ranges within which interstate banking might take
place, viz. nationwide, regional, and metropolitan areas, were evaluated according to the standard criteria. It was first seen that in
principle consumer welfare would best be served by allowing banking enterprises to operate over as wide a geographical area as possible; but it was impossible to say whether nationwide banking
would be materially superior to regional interstate banking.
Initially, producer welfare concerns seemed to be in conflict.
Insofar as interstate banking enhances competition, the welfare of
producers as a group would be served by restraining banks to the
narrowest possible geographical reach; on the other hand, the realization of scale economies and the ability to compete with nonbanks for deposits suggested that producer interests may lie in the
direction of regional or even nationwide operations. Finally, it was
suggested that the owners and employees of problem and failing
banks, and of the probably very large number of banks that will
find it difficult to operate profitably in the absence of Regulation Q
and with increased competition from thrift institutions, will find
their interest served by the broadest possible range for interstate
banking in order to increase the number of potential buyers for
their banks. Thus, producer welfare is probably best served by
nationwide banking.
The public interest in equitable regulation would unequivocally best be served by nationwide interstate banking; lesser geographical ranges would do little or nothing to make regulation
more equitable.
Soundness supervision could become somewhat more complicated as the geographical reach of banking institutions increases
and they span more regulatory jurisdictions. Metropolitan area
banking would have only a trivial effect, whereas regional and
nationwide banking could create complications that would require
adaptation and coordination among regulatory entities. Nonetheless, the same type of cooperation will be required to a similar degree even in the absence of interstate branching or BHC subsidiary
banks simply in order to supervise the interstate activity presently
authorized for Edge Act corporations and nonbank subsidiaries. In
perspective, then, the task of supervision will be only marginally
more complicated with nationwide or regional banking than with
metropolitan area or indeed with state-by-state banking.
Political control over banking is not likely to be much affected
by the geographical decision at hand. Policy guidance in general,
and monetary policy in particular, might be better served if there
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were fewer banks, presumably serving larger areas. Housing finance might be slightly improved as the area of bank operations is
increased from state to nationwide scales as well. While the issue
of geographical limitations could conceivably have the greatest policy implications for the market for state and local municipal bonds,
both the magnitude and direction of any effect are uncertain, and
should be ignored for present purposes.
Finally, concern about market concentration suggests the superiority of nationwide banking, since that could best serve to deconcentrate local and regional markets and would have only
unimportant concentrating effects at the national level. With respect to asset aggregation, however, nationwide banking has the
most potential for creating an undue concentration of resources,
whereas regional interstate banking could be designed to preclude
that adverse affect.
While the implications of the standard criteria are thus not unmixed, their combined force overwhelmingly suggests the superiority of nationwide and regional interstate banking over metropolitan
area interstate banking. As between nationwide and regional interstate banking, moreover, the choice is only somewhat less clear.
Nationwide banking would serve more relevant interests better,
and such problems as it might occasion-increasing the need for
supervisory -coordination and the potential for an undue concentration of resources-are eminently solvable. The supervisory problem is minor at worst, and in any event it will have to be met in
large part simply in order to cope with the expanding overseas activities of banks and the new branching authority of Edge Act corporations. Regional or nationwide banking will add little further
complexity to the problem. Similarly, the drawback of an undue
concentration of resources emerging from nationwide banking
seems both speculative and susceptible to remedy if it should arise.
Accordingly, one may conclude with confidence that banking enter-

prises should be allowed to operate nationwide, as are virtually all
other types of enterprises.
8. Note on Phasing-In.-It does not follow from this conclusion that banking enterprises should be allowed to operate
nationwide at once. While consumer welfare is disserved, pro
tanto, by delay in the transition from state-by-state to nationwide
banking, all of the other criteria counsel an incremental approach.
Supervisory considerations are perhaps the clearest in this regard. Interstate banking offices-whether branches or BHC subsidiary banks-would still have to be approved individually by the ap-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

171

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [1981], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1133

propriate regulators. They would almost certainly administer the
approval process in the conventional manner to assure themselves
at least that each interstate expansion is consistent with the ability
of each applicant to support a new banking office with capital and
management. They will probably continue to apply a "community
needs" test, as well, in order to shield incumbent banks from a degree of new competitive entry that would threaten their viability.
Indeed, they should probably be inclined to allow even less rapid
interstate growth than the conventional criteria for intrastate expansion would allow, in order gradually to gain experience with
such problems of soundness supervision as may arise, and to monitor the impact of interstate operations on the banks' amenability to
6
policy guidance. 6
A precipitous move from state-by-state to nationwide banking
would also raise intertwined concerns about equitable regulation,
producer welfare, and the undue concentration of resources. First,
a new inequity of regulation could arise if banks are suddenly allowed to expand interstate to the degree that the standards generally applicable to intrastate expansion applications-community
needs, and capital and managerial adequacy-would indicate. 665
The banks most capable of supporting extensive nationwide expansion programs are not only the large money center banks of the
Northeast, but also the major banks that have benefited from the
economic groWth of the South and West, especially in California,
Florida, Georgia, and Texas. Regulators would have little or no
reason to deny their many applications solely on the basis of the
criteria applicable to intrastate applications. Nor would the special
supervisory considerations mentioned above as counseling caution
in the interstate context much affect these large banks. Surely, the
soundness implications of interstate expansion would be minimal
where they are concerned; each interstate addition to their operations would be insignificant in relation to their overall operations-particularly if they enter new markets de novo or by toehold
acquisitions. A bank's amenability to policy guidance, moreover,
could not be truly tested until its deposit-taking operations were
reasonably well-diversified among the states; for a small bank, this
point might be reached after one or two offices have been opened
in a second state, whereas for these large banks, it might not be
664. On the problem of discriminatory administration, see text accompanying
notes 769-771 infra.
665. See Gaskins & Voytko, Managing The Transition to Deregulation, 44 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 9, 21 (Winter 1981).
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reached until perhaps hundreds of new offices had been
opened-enough to shift the "center of gravity" of the bank's core
deposit and loan portfolio bases and relieve it of dependence on a
single state.
Accordingly, since there would be no supervisory reason to restrain them, a relatively small number of banks could, if allowed
to, dominate the de novo and toehold opportunities for growth in
the more desirable markets for interstate entry. For example, the
BankAmerica BHC, with assets of $111.6 billion 66 6 and more than
1,100 bank branches in California,6 67 might be ready, willing, and
able to open as many new direct branches or BHC subsidiary
banks in an Arizona market as that market could support. If it is allowed to establish that many offices in the market, however, there
may be few opportunities over the next several years for other outof-state banks to participate in the market. It would be more equitable, better serve producer welfare, and in many cases also be
more pro-competitive, to assure that at least some of these opportunities are made available to the banks that have been most disadvantaged under the state-by-state banking system, regardless of
whether they are able to exploit them immediately.
It would also be inequitable to subject banks in the markets
that first attract interstate entrants to unlimited new competition
too precipitously. It may safely be assumed that regulators will not
allow so many new entrants into these markets as to jeopardize the
safety and soundness of the incumbent banks. As a matter of equity, however, incumbent banks in desirable markets should be
given some opportunity to adapt gradually to the demands of a
more competitive marketplace, so that they have at least a fair
chance to prosper, not just to survive, under the spur of competition. The management of an intensely regulated industry is not immediately suited to deal with the problems of a competitive market. 668 Nor can the management of the Sleepy Hollow Bank fairly
be expected to compete profitably with several branches of money
center banks suddenly opening around it.
Finally, it would be inequitable to deprive the banks in the
most desirable markets of their own opportunities to expand into
markets in other states; if they are preoccupied with an onslaught
of competition in their home markets, however, that becomes a
666. Nonbank Business Pushed Citicorp Past BankAmerica, Am. Banker, Apr.
21, 1981, at 1, col. 3 (data as of Dec. 31, 1980).
667. 70 CAL. SUP'T OF BANKS ANN.REP. A-223 (1979) (1,119 branches).
668. Cf. Gaskins & Voytko, supra note 665, at 27 (discussing means to encourage industries to respond more quickly to deregulation).
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more likely result. To return to the previous example, even the
major banks in Arizona, and certainly the lesser ones, may have
their hands quite full trying to compete profitably with several
money center banks suddenly admitted to the market, whereas
their gradual entry may have been something that the Arizona
banks could have dealt with while at the same time managing their
own entry into desirable markets in, say, California.
The case for a gradual phasing-in of nationwide banking in order to spread the benefits and burdens of a restructured
marketplace thus seems to be a strong one; the nice question is
how to do it. One means would be to establish a schedule by
which banks or BHCs would be allowed to enter increasingly broad
geographical areas. For example, the McFadden Act Report proposed a "phased liberalization of the Douglas Amendment," perhaps allowing regional BHC expansion at first. 669 Similarly, the Association of Bank Holding Companies has proposed that BHCs be
allowed to acquire other BHCs in contiguous states. 670 Seemingly
neutral on its face, this approach is on inspection most inequitable,
and indeed capricious.
One need only consider the vastly disparate and disproportionate new opportunities contiguous state expansion presents to banks
in such states as California and Nevada. California is contiguous to
Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon, each of which has had abovemedian economic growth in recent years, and each of which permits statewide banking, but the combined population of which is
only 5.5 million persons.6 71 Meanwhile, Nevada is contiguous to
California, Arizona, Utah, Oregon, and Idaho-which constitute an
area with rapid economic growth, statewide banking organizations,
and a combined population of 29.3 million. 672 The smaller BHCs in
Nevada would thus seem to be faced with better opportunities for
interstate growth by acquisition than their neighbors in California;

the Nevada BHCs could enter all the same states as the Californians, and.two more.
Under this proposal, the limitations that would be placed on
the "corner" states of Florida, Maine, and Washington, and the
non-contiguous states of Alaska and Hawaii, are even more obvi669.

MCFADDEN ACT REPORT, supra note 410, at 18.

670. See Association of BHCs Outlines Why It Supports Limited Interstate
Banking, Am. Banker, July 16, 1980, at 4, col. 1 (adoption of policy on interstate
banking by Association of Bank Holding Companies on June 7, 1980).
671. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 643, at 14 (1978 preliminary population data).
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ous, and just as arbitrary. Indeed, they seem to be completely
unrelated to any consistent and relevant criteria except a preference for limiting each BHC to its own "region" of the country.
One might as well limit each BHC to the states on either side of
their home state in an alphabetic list of states.
A more reasonable and surely a more equitable way in which
to phase in nationwide banking would be to establish a maximum
number of interstate banking offices that a bank or BHC could
open or acquire each year, without limitations as to place except
the usual standard of "community need." 673 This numerical limitation, or perhaps separate limitations for de novo and acquired offices, would constrain those banking organizations that would be
qualified, so far as soundness is concerned, to open a larger number of new offices. Within the numerical limitation, however, it
would enable them to seek their best opportunities, by their own
lights and not that of a regulatory scheme with an arbitrary passion
for contiguous states.
The only difficulty with this approach is in determining the appropriate number of new offices a bank could open or acquire each
year. If banks have too limited a presence in a particular market,
they may not be able to compete effectively there. For example, a
New York bank limited to opening just a few interstate offices per
year could not hope for many years to be a meaningful competitor
for retail deposits in California, where there are over four thousand
bank branches, 674 of which 1,119 belong to the Bank of America
alone. 675 On the other hand, if the number of permissible inter-

state offices opened or acquired each year is set too high, a small
number of large banks will dominate the most desirable interstate
676
opportunities, as described above.
While there is much room for debate over an appropriate
number, it would seem reasonable to limit each bank or BHC to
opening or acquiring a maximum of somewhere between 50 and
100 banking offices per year.6 77 Regardless of whether this is the
appropriate range, however, the point is to allow meaningful interstate market entry without enabling a few banks to corner the opportunities to do so.
672.
673.
674.
675.
676.
677.
ing bank

Id.
See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
[1979] FDIC ANN. REP. 145 (Table 103).
70 CAL. SUP'T OF BANKS ANN. REP. A-223 (1979).
See text accompanying note 667 supra.
An exception might be made to facilitate the interstate acquisition of a failwith more than the maximum number of branch locations.
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FunctionalLimitations on Interstate Banking: ATMs Only?

The National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfers
(NCEFT) recommended that Congress enact legislation removing
electronic banking facilities from the definition of a "branch" in the
McFadden Act. 678 The Commission believed that banks and other
financial institutions should be allowed to establish or share in the
use of ATM networks nationwide, provided that they accept deposits only through terminals located in their home state or interstatemetropolitan area. 679 The President's recent report to Congress on
the McFadden Act renews the suggestion that "EFT terminals
ought to be subject to less onerous geographic restrictions than
those imposed on brick-and-mortar branches."68 30 It recommends
that terminals be permitted within a bank's "natural market area"
without regard to state policy on electronic branching and presumably without regard to state boundaries; 68 1 in other words, each
bank would be able to deploy electronic terminals throughout its
SMSA or, in the case of banks not in any SMSA, perhaps throughout their home county.
While the President's McFadden study is not entirely clear on
the point, the NCEFT report unequivocally proposed to treat electronic branching more liberally than brick-and-mortar branching in
two distinct respects. First, electronic terminals would be relieved
of the procedural burdens associated with branching. Having been
removed from the McFadden Act definition of a branch, that is,
they could be established (or shared) at will, without prior application and approval or separate capitalization, as would be required
for a brick-and-mortar branch. 68 2 Second, they could be established (or shared) where brick-and-mortar branches could not be
established by the same bank, viz. statewide, even in unit and
limited-branching states, interstate in SMSAs, and nationwide for
all purposes except deposit-taking. 68 3 Thus, the NCEFIT envisioned
a situation in which banks could give their retail customers elec-

678. National Comm'n on Electronic Fund Transfers, EFT and the Public Interest 31-33 (1977).
679. Id. at 45.
680. See McFADDEN ACT REPORT, supra note 410, at 19.
681. Id.

682. National Comm'n on Electronic Funds Transfers, supra note 678, at 47.
The Commission would have retained a "negative" approval process, under which

an application would be automatically granted in a short time if no regulatory action
were taken, with respect to deposit-taking terminals only.
683. Id. at 45.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

176

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking
1981]

INTERSTATE BANKING

tronic access at an unlimited number of convenient locations within
the bank's market area and home state, and enable customers to
perform other transactions-most importantly to debit their accounts, either by withdrawing cash from an ATM or making payment for a purchase at a POS terminal-from anywhere in the
country.
The justification for not applying the procedural burdens associated with brick-and-mortar branching to electronic facilities is
rather strong. First, it would often if not generally be prohibitively
expensive to file a conventional branch application for each
ATM. 68 4 Economic studies and the production of data to demon-

strate community need for a particular terminal at a particular location would probably cost a bank more than having the terminal
would be worth to it. In addition, each application would be subject to a public hearing at which competitors could object to the
terminal's deployment, thereby increasing the cost and delay involved in establishing it. Second, even if the procedures were not
preclusive, they would not be productive. A bank does not risk
substantial capital in establishing an ATM, and may invest little or
nothing to share another's ATM on a transaction-fee basis. Thus, if
it errs in locating or sharing an ATM at a particular place, it can
relocate the machine or withdraw from the sharing arrangement at
a trivial cost. Third, the deployment of the ATM is not as substantial a competitive threat as a brick-and-mortar branch would be to
nearby competitors. The machine can neither open accounts nor
approve loans, although it can offer deposit and withdrawal services
accessing deposits and preapproved lines of credit. An ATM is thus
not a full-scale competitor to the brick-and-mortar locations around
it, and should not be burdened procedurally as though it were.
The justification for treating ATMs more liberally than brickand-mortar branches with respect to geographical locations is not
clear, however. It is relevant that, for the reasons just given,
ATMs do not pose the same competitive threat to host-area banks
as would a brick-and-mortar branch. Thus, removing all geographical limitations on the establishment of ATMs would not have
nearly the same effect on the structure of the banking industry as
would removing all such restrictions on brick-and-mortar branches.
It would have some adverse effects, however, and these may or
may not outweigh the potential advantages; moreover, a complete
684. Id. at 46. Indeed, the OCC allows national banks to use abbreviated procedures for the approval of a deposit-taking ATM. See 41 Fed. Reg. 48,333 (1976).
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analysis must consider also the alternative to which the proposal is
being compared.
The proposal to allow banks to establish or share ATMs where
they cannot branch can be evaluated on two comparative bases.
Compared to the present state-by-state banking system it is probably an opportunity for improvement; compared to nationwide
banking through brick-and-mortar banks or branches, however, it
is clearly a limitation and an inferior option.
First, as to consumer welfare, retail depositors would clearly
be benefited by interstate ATMs, even if banks could not obtain a
brick-and-mortar presence interstate; indeed, the welfare of retail
depositors must be the primary justification for the proposal. Depositors would be given more convenient access to their accounts,
making the process of depositing or withdrawing funds less costly
and time consuming for them. In addition, retail depositors in interstate SMSAs would benefit from enhanced competition among
banks for their depository business. Within an interstate SMSA,
that is, a depositor in one state would be more willing to open an
account at a bank in the other state if that depositor could access
the account from terminals conveniently located in his home state.
Since it would be necessary for the depositor to visit the out-ofstate bank only once, viz. to establish the account relationship, the
present barriers to interstate competition within the SMSA would
be lowered substantially by the ATMs. Accordingly, actual competition for retail deposits would be enhanced, to the benefit of retail
depositors.
Retail borrowers in the host state, on the other band, could be
prejudiced by the use of ATMs beyond a bank's brick-and-mortar
reach. Since ATMs cannot be used to establish a lending relationship, but can be used to gather deposits, they facilitate the flow of
capital from the areas within which they are allowed to take deposits to the areas within which the bank is able to make loans. Retail
borrowers within the bank's brick-and-mortar branching area, and
commercial borrowers in whatever area(s) the bank reaches them,
would thus benefit at the expense of retail borrowers in the areas
from which the bank is taking funds through ATMs.
Of course, as a matter of policy, the bank could decide or be
required to re-lend those deposits in the areas from which they
came, by means that are not dependent upon having a brick-andmortar presence in order to make loans. Deposits gathered through
ATMs in state A by a bank in state B could be re-lent to residents
of state A through the issuance of bank credit cards or, to the ex-
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tent allowed under the affiliate-transaction regulations,68 5 through
consumer finance or other nonbank lending offices of the BHC located in state A. In the absence of a legal norm, however, there is
little reason to expect this congruence between interstate deposit6
taking and lending areas. 68
Allowing ATMs that access banks across state lines while prohibiting interstate brick-and-mortar branching does only little to redress the inequities of the current regulatory regime. As between
banks in growing markets and those in declining markets, there
would be some redress, but only for some banks. In particular,
those banks whose physical presence is limited now to the innercity area of an interstate SMSA would gain some access to more
desirable suburban markets, unrestricted by the limitations of state
law or state boundaries. For example, banks in Philadelphia could
have deposit-taking ATMs in three suburban counties in New Jersey. 68 7 As between banks in declining and those in growing regions
of the country, however, opportunities would not be meaningfully
equalized. The ability of a bank in Pittsburgh to take deposits
statewide, or of a bank in Philadelphia to take deposits both
statewide and interstate within its SMSA, does not put those banks
on an equal competitive footing with the banks of the South and
West, which would also have statewide ATM authority. Even the
ability to take deposits at ATMs nationwide would not give the
Pennsylvania banks in this example an equal chance to compete for
the core deposits of Florida or California residents because of the
severe limitation inherent in having only an electronic terminal
presence within a market.
The same limitation makes the proposal for less restricted interstate ATM authority relatively innocuous in its implications for
soundness supervision, policy guidance, and the undue concentration of resources. An ATM outside the area in which a bank can
have offices is not a significant enough marketplace force to raise
such concerns.
Soundness supervision could be complicated, however, to the
extent that ATMs accept deposits in a host state. The host-state
685. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1976) (member banks); id. § 18280) (Supp. III 1979) (insured banks).
686. At present, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, § 801, 12 U.S.C. §§
2901-2905 (Supp. III 1979), does not appear to impose lending obligations in areas
from which deposits are taken by ATMs, but it could be amended to so provide.
687. Burlington, Camden, and Gloucester Counties of New Jersey are within
the Philadelphia SMSA. STATISTICAL ABSTRACr, supra note 643, at 942.
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banking commissioner might understandably assert his state's interest in examination and soundness-oriented regulation of the
bank-such as lending limits, reserve requirements, and liquidity
ratios-at its home-state location; obviously, examination of the
ATM is not a meaningful alternative, as examination of a branch
might be where an out-of-state bank is taking deposits in the host
state by that means.
If the out-of-state bank is a national bank, it is not subject to
such state examination or regulation even in its home state; and
there is no greater need to subject it to examination or regulation
in the host state than in its home state. If the interstate ATM is
that of a state-chartered bank, however, there would be no constitutional inhibition on the host state asserting visitatorial rights, although the federal law authorizing the interstate ATM could probably, under the Commerce Clause, immunize the state-chartered
bank from host-state examination and regulation. Such immunity
would put the state-chartered bank in a position of competitive
equality, with respect to out-of-state ATMs, with national banks located in its home state. It could also, however, put them at an advantage or disadvantage relative to host-state banks. For example,
if the out-of-state banks are subject to less burdensome regulation
than host-state banks, they will be able to offer superior terms to
depositors; with Regulation Q removed, out-of-state banks with
lower regulatory costs could pay more than host-state banks for deposits. As a result, home-state and host-state banks would be
brought into competition with one another through interpenetration of each other's markets with ATMs; one would then expect that home-state and host-state regulators would also engage in
some of the type of rivalry presently attributable to state and national regulators within a single state. In this way, giving state
banks a federal right to take deposits through out-of-state ATMs
within interstate SMSAs may induce competition in supervisory
laxity between the affected states.
With respect to policy guidance, ATM authority to take deposits interstate could tend to frustrate the policy that local deposits
be used to fund local extensions of credit, as already described in
the discussion of consumer-welfare implications above. 688 With respect to the undue concentration of resources, deposit-taking across
state lines only in interstate SMSAs should have little effect. Its effect on market concentration, indeed, will probably be beneficial,
688.

See text accompanying notes 684-686 supra.
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since it will introduce new competitors for deposit services into
each part of an SMSA now divided into submarkets by one or more
state lines. At the same time, there is no reason to fear that
deposit-taking in a single interstate SMSA could result in an unduly large aggregation of assets.
Thus, application of the standard criteria indicates that the
proposal to extend ATM authority interstate is of little significance
except insofar as it would allow deposits to be taken interstate, particularly within an interstate SMSA. Compared with the present
state-by-state regime, that would clearly be an advantage to depositors, entailing a potential but probably curable drawback for retail
borrowers, and only a very speculative threat to soundness supervision.
Compared with interstate market penetration by whichever
means banks choose-ATM or brick-and-mortar-it is clearly a second best choice, however. Since it has already been established in
this essay that banking organizations should be allowed to operate
full-service facilities nationwide, the question presented here is
whether that authority should be limited to providing electronic access services. Clearly, it should not be; consumer and producer
welfare, and the public interest in equitable regulation that make
nationwide banking desirable, would all be disserved by such a
limitation.
The distinction between the geographical reach of ATMs and
brick-and-mortar offices is not directed to the correction of an externality; therefore, to the extent that the legal regime induces
greater investment in ATMs and lesser investment iri brick-andmortar branches than would have occurred were the two forms of
market entry equally available, both consumers and producers will
be relatively worse off.68 9 In other words, the ability to establish
an ATM interstate serves consumers and producers better than a
prohibition upon such activity, but less well than would the ability
to establish either an ATM or a brick-and-mortar branch at the
same location. If the brick-and-mortar branch would have been
preferred as a matter of business judgment, then it may be presumed that the bank's customers and shareholders are less well off
by being limited to the ATM option. Even more clearly, bank employees are prejudiced by a legal regime that creates noneconomic
689.

Cf. H. ScoTT, NEW PAYMENT

SYSTEMS:

A REPORT TO THE 3-4-8

COMMITTEE OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 38-40 (1978).
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incentives for capital-intensive and labor-saving means of expansion.
Such problems as nationwide banking would create for soundness supervision, policy guidance, and avoiding an undue concentration of resources, would be averted by the limitation only because it would prevent effectively achieving the nationwide
banking system that should exist. Accordingly, limiting interstate
banking-i.e., deposit-taking-to ATMs would entail losses to consumers and producers without offsetting gains, and should be rejected in favor of allowing banks to choose their method for entering interstate markets.
C.

Multistate BHCs vs. Interstate Branching
In prior sections it has been established that banking organizations should be allowed to operate nationwide, and that their presence outside of their home states should not be limited to electronic terminals. If a single banking organization is to have a
brick-and-mortar presence in more than one state, however, it
must be determined whether it should be allowed to choose between direct interstate branching and the incorporation of a separate BHC subsidiary bank in each state that it enters, or be required to enter by one means and not the other. In fact, however,
there has never been any reason to require direct branching in an
intrastate context, 690 and that option will not be considered here
for the interstate context. Accordingly, the present issue is whether
to leave banks their choice of form on entering an additional state
or require that they incorporate a separate bank in each state under some or all circumstances. Before applying the standard criteria to this question, it seems only appropriate to specify what is
logically entailed or implied by the choice of organizational form.
Most clearly, the organization of a separate bank in each new
state of entry requires the observance of certain corporate formalities.6 9 1 The separate bank must have directors and officers, for example. If these individuals can be the same persons who are the
directors and officers of the sister banks in other states (A), then
690. The laws of one state, Washington, nonetheless have the same effect,
since statewide branching is allowed while multibank holding companies are prohibited. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 30.04.405, A0.020 (Supp. 1981). This combination is unique. See M.A. Schapiro & Co., Inc., Confinement of Domestic Banking in
the United States 10 (Oct. 1978) (map showing state policies on branch banking and
BHCs).
691. E.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-78 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

182

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking

1981]

INTERSTATE BANKING

the maintenance of a nominally distinct table of organization in the
new state (B), is of literally no consequence in this regard. If different individuals must be involved, however-and if that requires
some redundant employees-the BHC will incur a cost that could
have been avoided with direct branching. Analytically this cost,
and any other associated with maintaining separate banks, is in the
nature of a barrier to entry into state B. Other formality costs of
using the BHC approach may include separate and greater total legal fees, audits, examination fees, and increased state taxes. 692
A bank separately organized to operate in state B will require
local management, but so too would a branch operating in state B.
While it might be thought likely that a locally organized bank, with
its own officers, directors, and managers, would be more accountable to local interests, and specifically that it might lend more to local borrowers and generally be more amenable to local policy guidance, this is not a logical necessity. 69 3 The authority of local

managers to extend credit or acquiesce in the policy guidance they
receive may be just as limited or capacious whether they are bank
managers or branch managers; that is a matter of organizational
policy respecting the devolution of authority, and not inherent in
the table of organization imposed by the legal structuring of the
entity as a holding company.
There are two respects in which the choice of form could have
meaningful consequences which should be considered in applying
the standard criteria. First, a single bank would have a higher
lending limit-the maximum amount it could lend to any one
borrower-than would any of the separate banks that would be organized in each state under the BHC approach. This follows from
the fact that lending limits are set at a percentage of bank capital,694 as defined by the federal regulatory agencies and the states.
If the same capital is divided to support two or more banks, each
will have less-and a lower lending limit-than would a single
692. For example, Florida imposes a documentary stamp tax, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 201.01 (West Supp. 1981), and an intangible property tax, id. § 199.032, on loans
made and held within its jurisdiction. A separately organized BHC bank subsidiary
operating in Florida would incur these taxes, whereas a branch of an out-of-state
bank may, like an LPO, be able to avoid them by booking the loan to its headquarters office. Cf. Florida Bankers Preparefor Fight to Bar Out-of-State Banks From
Soliciting Loans, Wall St. J., May 13, 1980, at 21, col. 1 (loans originating through
Florida LPOs exempt from state taxation).
693. See text accompanying notes 179, 413-415, supra.
694.

See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976); STATE BANIUNG LAW SERV., supra note 3, at

126-29 (state limits on commercial bank loans to one borrower collected).
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bank. If one bank participates in a large loan to its affiliate banks,
however, their lending limits can effectively be aggregated, al695
though at the expense of some transaction costs.
Second, under the BHC approach, neither the parent holding
company nor any subsidiary bank stand behind the obligations of
the other subsidiary banks in the system. Indeed, that is reflected
in the separate corporate organization, lending limit, and reserve
calculation described above. In contrast, each branch of a bank can
draw upon the assets of, and is exposed to the liabilities of, the
whole bank of which it is a part. Depositors and creditors will
therefore be doing business with very different 'entities under the
multistate BHC and direct interstate branching approaches. BHC
subsidiary banks in each state will be smaller, and geographically
less well diversified, but they will also be entirely within the examination capabilities of each of the states that they enter.696
As shown below, the standard criteria slightly favor direct
branching, but the maintenance of the dual banking system seems
to require that the states generally be allowed to require that an
out-of-state BHC or bank enter their borders through a separately
organized bank subsidiary. A federal right to enter by direct
branch might be appropriate, if all the facts were known, for
wholesale banking purposes and probably within interstate SMSAs.
1. Consumer Welfare.-Retail depositors' interest in bank
soundness will not be affected by the choice betveen allowing interstate branching and requiring multistate BHCs. No significant
risk of failure is implied by either choice of form, under the reasonable assumption that regulators will continue to administer entry policies with due regard to soundness. It is true that BHC
banks tend to be more highly leveraged than unaffiliated banks in
the state-by-state banking system, 697 but that has had no adverse
affect on their soundness, and indeed, the failure rate of multibank
BHC banks is lower. 698 Since, in addition, the BHC form promises
695. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 250.250(c) (1978) (procedure by which limitation on
extension of credit imposed by 12 U.S.C. § 3 7 1c may be avoided).
696. There is a third, but minor, respect in which the choice of form matters. A
single bank would have a marginally higher total reserve requirement than would

separate banks with the same aggregate volume of deposits because reserves are
generally required at an increasing percentage of incremental deposits. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 204.8 (1981); CSBS PROFILE, supra note 19, at 123-25. Distributing the same total
of deposits among separate banks therefore decreases the burden of required reserves imposed upon the banking organization as a whole.

697. See, e.g., Mingo, ManagerialMotives, Market Structures and the Performance of Holding Company Banks, 14 ECON. INQUIRY 411, 413 (1976).
698. "About 0.6 percent of the unit banks and about 0.4 percent of the branch
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no greater local orientation in bank lending policies, neither retail
borrowers nor retail depositors have a stake in the choice-of-form
issue.
Some commercial borrowers would, however, benefit from direct interstate branching because it implies the existence of a
larger bank with a higher lending limit. This would mean that,
with interstate growth, more banks could compete for larger loans,
and that the market in which intermediate and perhaps even large
corporations shop for credit would become more competitive.
Smaller corporate borrowers, with needs that already fit within the
lending limits of a large number of banks, would be unaffected by
the choice of form.
All consumers would benefit to the extent that there are scale
economies that could be realized in the provision of services to
them by a single bank but that would be lost under the BHC approach. For the very large banking organizations that would probably operate in many states, most scale economies could probably
be about equally well realized under either form. Whether one has
1,119 branches, as the Bank of America has in California, or 21
subsidiary banks with a total of more than 800 branches, as Western BanCorporation has in 11 states, many of the internal operations of the enterprise could be configured in whatever is the most
efficient way. For nationwide and large regional interstate banking
organizations, it will usually be of little moment, that is, whether
the managerial and technological units supplying operations
services-such as advertising, account data processing, loan applications analysis, credit scoring, and so on-are placed within the
home office of an interstate bank or in a bank-servicing subsidiary
of the BHC,6 9 9 or whether the units that they supply with services
are labeled branches or banks.
For smaller banking organizations, maintaining separate banks
in each of perhaps two or three states may be prohibitive, depending upon the various costs of maintaining formally separate legal entities, itemized above. This is most clearly likely in the interstate SMSAs in which many relatively small banks would want to
straddle the state line or lines that divide the metropolitan area
among two or three states. 70 0 Indeed, such banks may wish to
open just one or a few small offices in a host state; at this modest
banks failed in the 1970s. An even smaller percentage of multi-bank holding company banks failed (0.1)." MCFADDEN ACT REPORT, supra note 410, app., at 122.
699. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(1)(C) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
700. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 643, at 938-43.
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scale, separate organization of a bank in that state may well preclude entry. If so, then consumers will not realize some of the potential benefits of interstate banking within an SMSA.
In summary, consumer welfare is probably only modestly affected by the choice-of-form issue. Some large and intermediate
corporate borrowers would probably benefit if already large banks
are allowed to enter additional states by direct branching, thus
increasing their lending limits as they grow. Some retail consumers
would almost certainly be better off with interstate branching in
metropolitan areas where the BHC approach would result in fewer
interstate entrants to serve them.
2. Producer Welfare.-Bank profitability, and thus the interests of shareholders, will be served to the extent that banking organizations expanding interstate are allowed the choice of
form-bank or branch-that is most profitable for them. It might at
first seem, by parity of reasoning, that shareholders of host state
banks that do not expect to enter interstate markets would be better served by anything that impairs the competitive ability of the
out-of-state banks that will be entering their markets; accordingly,
they could be made better off if the BHC approach were imposed
upon their would-be competitors, since this will lower the entrants'
lending limits and may prevent them from realizing some economies of scale.
The apparent conflict between the interests of shareholders in
banks expanding interstate and those faced with their competition
in host states is something of an illusion, however, since risk-averse
investors, necessarily uncertain of the competitive outcome, will
diversify their investments across the conflict. And an investor with
a portfolio of shares in interstate and host state banks would be
benefited by total industry profitability. Such an investor will be
indifferent to whether a marginal dollar of profit is realized by an
interstate or a host state bank, and concerned only that both types
of banks are able to realize all possible economies and thus
maximize their joint profitability. In other words, once it has been
determined that there will be interstate banking, and thus increased competition, investors are going to be concerned with productive efficiency. Legal rules that prevent operational efficiency
will harm producer interests, as they would harm consumer interests. Thus, to the extent that banks expanding interstate would find
it more economical to branch directly than to form a separate bank
in each state, diversified bank shareholders are served by having
that option.
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Bank employees should be close to indifferent to the choice-ofform issue. The opportunities for advancement within their banking organization should not be affected by whether the organization
is composed of a single bank with many branches or a BHC with
one subsidiary bank per state and branches of those banks where
state law allows. The BHC approach might require that a larger
number of employees be given officers' titles, and this may be regarded as a dignitary benefit by some.
An increase in the demand for bank employment would provide a more tangible, and probably more highly valued, benefit to
bank employees. Since direct branching authority, being procompetitive, will result in greater interstate (and overall) banking
activity, the interests of employees as a group would be served by
banks having that option. 70 1 The employees of particular host state
banks that will not be expanding interstate may be worse off, however, since their employers' demand for labor may decline; moreover, they cannot practically diversify their interests, as by working
part-time for their present employer and part-time for its new interstate competitors.
In summary, it seems that all bank shareholders (who can diversify) but only some bank employees (who cannot diversify)
would be made better off if banks were not required, in expanding
interstate, to establish separate BHC subsidiary banks in each
state. Their interest is in having the bank(s) on which investment
or employment opportunities depend operate as free as possible of
legal barriers to the most efficient choice of form.
3. Equity of Regulation.
a. Banks in Different Markets.-One of the inequities of the
present state-by-state banking system has been that it confines
some banks in declining markets while others have fortuitously enjoyed the benefits of regional growth. In general, the choice-ofform issue will not much affect the degree to which this inequity is
eliminated by moving to nationwide banking. Of course, if the organization of a separate bank in each state proves to be a substantial barrier to entry, the redress will be less than complete. In any
event, there is one type of market to which direct branching access
may be important for a remote bank to compete effectively. The
reference is to the wholesale banking markets of the major financial
centers such as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco; regional fi701. But cf. text accompanying notes 496-497 supra (discussing technological
displacement).
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nancial centers, such as Atlanta, Boston, and Dallas might also be
included in this group.
At present, out-of-state banks are represented in these wholesale markets by various combinations of commercial LPOs, equipment leasing and data-processing subsidiaries, and Edge Act corporations, which can engage in banking related to international
transactions. In order to provide the full range of deposit services
to their large corporate customers in these wholesale markets, outof-state banks would find it more convenient to open direct
branches than to incorporate a separate bank. In the context of the
wholesale market, moreover, the observance of the formalities, reserve requirements, and lending limits applicable to a separate
bank in each state (e.g., New York, Illinois, and California) would
not seem to be relevant to public policy.
For example, assume that a large Chicago bank establishes a
separate wholesale-oriented bank in New York. Providing cash
management, lock box, and related deposit services to corporate
customers, the New York bank might receive hundreds of millions
of dollars in deposits daily, but retain very little of that money on
its own books at the end of the day. Funds that were not transfered out of the BHC system to other banks would presumably be
transfered to the lead bank in Chicago for aggregation before being
invested on behalf of the depositor. Thus, as a practical matter, the
deposit-taking bank in New York would be little more than a conduit through which the lead bank in Chicago would offer deposit
services to corporations and gather the deposits to itself, whatever
name it is called, it would, in effect, be a branch, and would not
incur a separate reserve requirement of any magnitude, nor book
any loans itself (except to the extent of its required capital).
In the example just given, it may actually be a matter of little
moment to the large Chicago bank whether it must organize a separate bank in New York. Doing so would entail more bother than
opening a branch, perhaps, but whether it would have substantial
drawbacks or would place the out-of-state competitor in wholesale
markets at a disadvantage relative to host state banks is unclear.
If there are non-obvious reasons that would indeed make the
organization of a separate bank for the purpose of carrying on business in a wholesale market burdensome, then consideration should
be given to distinguishing between out-of-state wholesale and retail
banking operations. The choice-of-form issue with respect to retail
banking could be decided on its separate merits, while banks are
given the right to branch directly into specified financial centers for
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the purpose of establishing wholesale-oriented branches. Analogous
to Edge Act corporations, 70 2 these branches could be limited to accepting deposits from and making loans to business entities and individuals in connection with business transactions.
b. Grandfathered BHCs.-The regulatory advantage enjoyed
by the domestic multistate BHCs grandfathered in 1956 will obviously be eliminated regardless of how the choice-of-form issue is
resolved. This is not true of the multistate foreign banks, however.
In the absence of a federal law preventing them from having a
multistate presence, foreign banks until 1978 were subject only to
host-state law respecting the choice-of-form by which they entered
a particular state. Some states allowed foreign banks the option of
branching in directly. 70 3 New York and California, significantly,
made direct branching contingent upon reciprocal treatment of
their banks in the foreign banks' home country, but allowed the
banks of non-reciprocating countries to obtain a state bank
charter 04 -which strongly suggests that a branch is the more desirable form of entry into that wholesale market.
Under the International Banking Act of 1978, a foreign bank
operating branches, agencies, or subsidiary banks in more than one
state was required to choose a "home state" outside of which it
could no longer establish any entity that accepts deposits other
than a branch that, by agreement with the Fed, restricts itself to
the activities permissible to an Edge Act corporation. 70 5 Thus a foreign bank that wants to enter a second state for the first time after
1978 is at no advantage, with respect to interstate operations, over
a domestic bank; each is limited to full-service banking in one
state, may own Edge Act or agreement corporations in other
states, and through its BHC may engage nationwide in permissible
nonbanking activities. Therefore, there will be no difficulty in applying the same choice-of-form rule to domestic and recent and future foreign-bank arrivals when they seek to expand interstate.
Redressing the advantage now enjoyed by some foreign banks
that were able to choose whether to expand interstate by branching
or subsidiary banks, chose to branch, and were grandfathered in
1978, is slightly more problematic. The correction of this inequity
702. See text preceding note 270 supra.
703. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. oh. 167, § 37A (West 1971).
704. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 1756 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. BANKING LAw §
202-a (McKinney 1971); cf. TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 16 (foreign banks prohibited from
operating in Texas in any form).
705. 12 U.S.C. § 3103 (Supp. III 1979).
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would require either giving domestic banks their choice of form in
interstate expansion-at least when they seek to enter states that
previously allowed foreign banks that choice--or if domestic banks
are limited to the BHC approach, requiring foreign banks either to
close or convert to separate banks all of their branches outside of
their "home state". Giving the domestic banks their choice of form
would, of course, have the advantage of not disrupting the existing,
lawful branch relationships of foreign banks. Thus, while either approach to redressing the inequity would be equally effective, it
would perhaps be less costly to give domestic banks their choice of
form rather than to require foreign banks to reorganize themselves.
c. Banks and their Nonbank Competitors.-Credit unions do
not have to organize separately in order to operate offices interstate. If savings and loan institutions and holding companies are authorized to operate interstate, they too will be able to branch directly rather than having to organize affiliates. Brokerage houses
also operate through direct branch offices in multiple states without
limitation. So, too, do the retailers, such as Sears, Roebuck, that
are contemplating selling small denomination consumer thrift
notes at their nationwide chains of stores. In short, all of the nonbanks with which banks are now or may soon be competing for deposits are allowed, to the extent that they operate interstate, to
choose whether to organize separate entities in particular states or
to open direct branches. An inequity of regulation thus exists to
the extent that requiring banks to organize separate affiliates in
each state would be costly or otherwise inconvenient, and the same
burden would not be felt by their competitors. This is undoubtedly
a minor consideration, but one that counts against requiring the
BHC approach to interstate banking.
4. Soundness Supervision.-Regardless of whether banks are
allowed to branch directly interstate or required to form affiliates
in each state that they enter, it is desirable that the entire banking
organization be examined simultaneously. 70 6 As previously observed, the difficulties of arranging a coordinated, and especially a
simultaneous and uniform approach to examination increases with
the number of examining jurisdictions involved.
A BHC with separate bank subsidiaries in each state of operation does not necessarily implicate more jurisdictions, however; if
all of the BHC subsidiary banks have national charters, then only
the Comptroller will examine them, while the Fed will examine
706. See text accompanying note 194 supra.
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the parent BHC. On the other hand, if the subsidiary banks are
chartered by the states in which they operate, they will be examined by their state regulators and by the FDIC or by the Fed.
These two situations are not altered under the direct branching approach to interstate banking. If the bank that branches interstate is
a national bank, it will still be examined by the Comptroller alone.
If it is a state bank, then it may be examined by the FDIC or the
Fed and by each of the states in which it has deposit-taking
branches.
The desirability of simultaneity of examination is greater with
respect to a branch banking system than it is with respect to a
group of affiliated banks. Limits on and records of interaffiliate
transactions make it possible to examine affiliated banks sequentially and yet have substantial confidence in the accuracy and completeness of the picture that emerges. In a branch system, by contrast, overvalued assets may be kept out of the examiner's view if
the branches are not examined simultaneously. Of course, simultaneity in examining branches can be achieved readily if the Comptroller or a single state is the only examining agency. If there are
multiple states involved in the examination process, however, either they will coordinate their efforts and examine the banks simultaneously, or the chartering state will examine all of the branches
and the various host states will separately decide whether to conduct their own examinations of either the branches in their states
or of the entire system.
It seems, therefore, that the potential for duplication, disruption, and expense in supervision is least with a national bank
branching interstate, greatest where a state bank branches interstate, and somewhere in between where a BHC organizes separate
banks in each state. A national bank branching directly implicates
only the Comptroller, while a BHC with banks in each state can be
examined simultaneously by the Comptroller examining the national bank subsidiaries, the FDIC examining the nonmember state
bank subsidiaries, and the Fed examining the parent and the member state bank subsidiaries. If the states want to duplicate these efforts by examining the state bank subsidiaries (and perhaps the parent BHC), 70 7 they would be free to do so. Examination complexity
707. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 7, 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1976) provides that the Act "shall not be construed as preventing any State from exercising
such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may hereafter have with respect to
banks, bank holding companies and subsidiaries thereof." Some states have asserted
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and practicality is not, therefore, as much affected by the choice-ofform, i.e. branch vs. BHC, as it is by the choice of charter(s).
Soundness supervision (and perhaps also policy guidance) may
be made more difficult if banks are allowed freely to choose between state and national charters in the context of interstate banking as they are presently allowed to do intrastate. Under the stateby-state banking system, a multibank BHC may, and typically
does, have both national and state-chartered subsidiary banks. This
enables the BHC to maximize its incidental or nonbanking powers.
When banks are allowed to operate in multiple states, they will
find it advantageous to operate banks with state charters in those
states with liberal policies respecting bank powers. Indeed, since
the acquisition of a state bank charter with broad powers may enable the BHC to engage in a new line of business nationwide, so
long as all such business is directly or indirectly (i.e., through a
subsidiary of the bank) conducted by or booked to the appropriate
state bank, 70° the states will find that they are competing with one
another to attract banks. This competition among many jurisdictions may be much more vigorous than the competition that has
previously obtained between state and national regulators within
each state.
Only a modest amount of imagination is required to envision
how this competition will work, particularly in light of the models
that now exist in the relationships between Citicorp and South Dakota and between the Chase Manhattan and Morgan banks and
Delaware. In the Citicorp and South Dakota case, it will be recalled, the state was induced to pass legislation enabling an out-ofstate BHC to establish a single national or state bank subsidiary
with one office in the state "at a location which is not likely to attract customers from the general public in the state. '' 70 9 The plan
was to enable Citicorp to obtain a national bank charter and then,
under the provisions of the National Bank Act applying the usury
law of a national bank's home state to its loan transactions, to solicit
credit card customers throughout the country. South Dakota also
repealed all limitations on interest rates, making it the ideal "base"
state for this operation.
the right to examine BHCs and their subsidiaries other than national banks. See, e.g.,
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 167A, § 5 (West 1971).
708. See note 710 infra and accompanying text.
709. S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 51-16-41 (1980); see text accompanying notes
435-440 supra.
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Suppose, however, that South Dakota's appetite for economic
development were not satisfied by the establishment of a cardoriented national bank subsidiary of Citicorp. The state might then
amend its banking laws to provide that a state bank in South Dakota may engage in, say, the travel agency business. Citicorp (or
any other out-of-state BHC) could then establish a state bank subsidiary primarily for the purpose of entering the travel agency business. The state bank would establish a travel agency subsidiary,
and that company would presumably be able to operate interstate
without limitation. The Fed would not prevent this activity, pursuant to its view that state-chartered banks are free to exercise their
state-granted powers, regardless of the fact that they happen to be
subsidiaries of BHCs that7 10are otherwise limited to activities
"closely related to banking."
The host states of the travel agency
would not be able constitutionally to prevent its entry, since it
would neither be engaged in the unchartered business of banking
nor otherwise triggering a police-power concern. 7 11 Thus, when
the travel agency opens an office adjacent to (or perhaps within) a
branch of Citibank in New York, or in any state-bank subsidiary of
Citicorp in any state that does not allow banks to operate travel
agencies, the National Bank Act and the banking laws of the relevant host state respectively will have been circumvented.
In this example, Citicorp will have been admitted to the travel
agency business by South Dakota, presumably in return for some
consideration. It would not take long for another state, say North
Dakota, to offer the same powers for a lesser consideration to another out-of-state BHC, or to offer its own package of banking powers at an appropriate price. At the limit, North Dakota might give
710. A state's ability to grant nonbanking powers to state banks is not entirely
unlimited, since one of the factors to be considered by the FDIC in issuing a certificate for a bank to become insured is "whether or not [the bank's] corporate powers
are consistent with the purposes of [the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]
chapter." 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1976). While a state bank might be authorized to engage
in a wide variety of nonbanking activities that did not constitute "unsafe or unsound
practices" such as to warrant the termination of its insurance, see id. § 1818 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), the exercise of such powers by a newly-chartered state bank might
be viewed by the FDIC as inconsistent with the purposes of the statute, making it
ineligible to become insured under the standard of section 1816. The result would
be that newly-chartered state banks given unorthodox powers could not become insured; at the same time, however, existing state banks newly authorized to exercise
the unorthodox powers would command still greater economic rents since the potential for new entry is ended. See id. § 1842(e) (1976) (BHC subsidiary banks must be
FDIC-insured).
711. See Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35-38 (1980).
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banks the same powers that general business corporations have,
viz. to enter any lawful line of business. A BHC that obtains a
North Dakota charter for the purpose of conglomeration would
then be able to enter, through its North Dakota bank, any business
except that of dealing in securities, since federal law prohibits any
firm "engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or
distributing. . . securities" to engage also in the business of taking
712
checking or savings deposits.
Thus, if BHCs are allowed, without more, to expand interstate
through subsidiary banks in each state, they will be able to exploit
a new form of bank regulatory competition, i.e., that between the
states. This possibility could be completely eliminated by either of
two means. First, banking organizations could be required, when
crossing state lines, to do so by direct branching-an option not
under consideration here. 713 Second, multistate BHCs could be required to hold all national charters, or at least to do so outside of
their present home state. Since this approach would surely foretell
the demise of the dual banking system, however, it need not be
considered, under the assumption previously made in this essay
that a move from state-by-state to interstate banking must occur
within the context of the dual banking system.
There are two less drastic, albeit quite imperfect, responses
that could be made to limit regulatory competition among the
states, and they should be considered in any event, whether a
banking organization is required or only allowed to use the BHC
approach in going interstate. First, the Fed could be directed to
apply the BHC Act's limitation on permissible activities to state
bank subsidiaries of out-of-state BHCs. Citicorp, that is, would not
be able to use a South Dakota bank charter to engage in activities
(at least outside of South Dakota) that would not be permitted to
the BHC under Regulation Y.714 Second, host-state-bank affiliates
712. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1976).
713. See text accompanying note 690 supra. If banks were required to expand
across state lines by direct branching, it would be necessary to regulate their choice
of a "home" state and to prevent home office relocations across state lines to keep
the states from competing for their patronage. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1976)
(home state of multistate BHCs designated by law), with id. § 3103(c) (Supp. III
1979) (multistate foreign BHCs choose "home" state from among those where it has
operations) and French Bank's Choice of N.Y. Over Calif.Lets It Expand in 2 States,
Am. Banker, Apr. 3, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
714. If the limitations of Regulation Y did not apply to a state chartered bank
subsidiary insofar as it operated at offices within its home state, competitive states
could still authorize banks to engage in a variety of nonbanking activities that are
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of multistate BHCs could be limited in the powers they can exercise (at least outside the host state) to those that are granted by the
BHC's home state to state banks located there, and are permitted
to host-state banks. This alternative is less intrusive on state authority and, since equally effective and administrable, preferable
on that ground.
Either approach would still create competitive disparities,
however, since state banks that are not the subsidiaries of out-ofstate BHCs would, presumably, still be able to exercise all stategranted powers (both inside and outside their home state). That
disparity may have to be tolerated, however. If it were not, either
the states would be able, or competitively driven, to act as havens
for the conferral of broad powers that could then be exercised in
conjunction with banking subsidiaries in other states that do not allow their own banks to exercise the same power; or federal control
over bank powers would have to be extended to all state banks regardless of their affiliation with a BHC, and the dual banking system will have been substantially altered.
In conclusion, the choice-of-form issue does not affect soundness supervision directly, whereas the choice of charters implicit in
the dual banking system would, in the interstate context, threaten
to induce a competition among states that could ultimately undermine soundness supervision. This would probably happen not
through examination laxity, but through increasing liberality in the
granting of powers to state banks, until they are essentially unlimited in their ability to engage in risky businesses. Regardless of
how the choice-of-form issue is resolved, therefore, and of whether
banks are required or simply allowed to form separate affiliates in
host states, soundness regulation will require that multistate BHCs
be prevented from using a base state bank subsidiary to expand the
powers they exercise in other states.
5. Policy Guidance.-The ability of the state and national governments to influence banks with respect to certain public policies
would probably be only marginally greater if banks could be required to form a new banking affiliate in expanding interstate.
The implementation of monetary policies will not be affected
by whether the Fed is dealing with the management of a BHC or
of a single interstate bank when it is doing such things as
not currently permissible under Regulation Y and do not require a physical presence

outside of the home state in order to reach nationwide markets. Examples would include insurance underwriting, manufacturing, and extractive industries.
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influencing the allocation of credit, jawboning against remote disbursement services, and so on. Nor should the ability of states to
obtain bank assistance in funding their public debt be affected. Under the implicit chit system, the bank will want to have good relations with the state in order to obtain approvals that are needed to
open additional branches, exercise special powers, and so on, without regard to whether the first office that it opens in the state is
separately chartered as a bank subsidiary of its BHC or is admitted
as a branch of the out-of-state bank. Of course, if the host state is
in a position to confer on a BHC subsidiary bank powers that could
then be used by the BHC system nationwide, it will be able to obtain greater funding for its public debt because it will have more to
offer. It has already been shown that this should not be allowed on
supervisory grounds, however, so this method of increasing the demand for a state's public debt should not be available regardless of
whether banks are required or merely allowed to enter by the subsidiary route.
The national and state policies aimed at facilitating housing finance would seem to be unaffected by the choice-of-form question.
So, too, with the policy that local deposits should be directed in
some part to the funding of local credit needs. Indeed, the Community Reinvestment Act now makes that policy applicable to intrastate branches and unit banks alike, and could continue to do so
interstate. If a host state wants to supplement CRA, it could do so
under a branching approach by adapting the New York model for
regulating the safety of foreign branches in that state, i.e.,
requiring that certain "qualifying local assets" equal at least a set
percentage of deposits booked at the branch.
Again, however, the choice of charters may be more important
than the choice of form. Under the state-by-state banking system,
state banking commissioners do not oversee the credit-allocating
policies of national banks. Presumably, they would not be able to
do so under an interstate banking regime, regardless of how the
national bank entered: whether by branching into the state or, in
the case of a BHC subsidiary, by locating in the state. The state
banking commissioner does, however, have some potential influence on a national bank's volume of local lending.
The Community Reinvestment Act directs the Comptroller to
take a national bank's "record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community" into account in passing upon the bank's applications for new deposit-taking facilities.315 The Comptroller's regula715.

12 U.S.C. § 2903 (Supp. III 1979); see id. § 2902(1)(A).
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tions implementing CRA require national banks to make public
certain information about their credit policies, which can then be
used by "any interested person" to oppose, or request a hearing
upon, the national bank's subsequent applications for deposit facilities. 7 16 Thus, the host-state banking commissioner's ability to intervene as an "interested person" under CRA enables him to exercise
some influence over a national bank's lending policies, although
undoubtedly less influence than he can exercise with respect to
state banks, over the applications of which he has the power of decision.
In summary, banks will be equally amenable to policy guidance from public officials in host states regardless of how the
choice-of-form issue is resolved. National banks entering host states
in either form would be more independent of local policy than
state banks in their decisions to fund local credit needs, but will
nevertheless be subject to some state influence under the CRA.
6. Undue Concentration of Resources.-State policy regarding
undue concentrations of resources, in both the market share and
the "mere size" senses, is significantly implicated in the choice-ofform question insofar as that policy is implemented through state
laws governing branching and the permissibility of multibank
BHCs. The states have taken extremely diverse positions on these
issues of banking industry structure. Some have prohibited branching, while others allowed limited branching, and still others
statewide branching; and in each of these three groups of states,
some have allowed multibank BHCs while others have not. 71 7
Thus, at the extremes, some states, have adhered to true unit
banking, disallowing both branching and multibank BHCs, while
others have imposed no structural limitations, allowing both
statewide branching and multibank companies. The federal government has always deferred to these state decisions because of the
importance of concentation policy in both economic development
(market concentration) and the maintenance of democratic political
processes (mere size). This deference lies close to the heart of the
dual banking system; indeed, the proposition that the states would
continue to determine the structure of the banking industry within
their borders718 was implicitly subsumed in the earlier assumption
716. 12 C.F.R. § 5.4 (1980).
717. See M.A. Schapiro & Co., Inc., supra note 690, at 10; text accompanying
notes 182-184 supra.
718. Of course, the states are today subject to federal limitations on their ability
to determine banking structure, as found in the Bank Merger Act, the BHC Act, and
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that the dual banking system would continue to exist when the
state-by-state banking system is replaced by nationwide banking.
States that adhere to unit banking and prohibit multibank
BHCs are declining in number. Those that remain are obviously,
however, still animated by a distaste for large banking organizations, since a concern with competition alone would not justify either limitation. Indeed, allowing statewide banking organizations
could be more conducive to vigorous competition in local banking
markets for the same reason that nationwide banking, properly administered, would be pro-competitive in those same markets.
The varying degrees to which the several states are sensitive
to the risk of an undue concentration of resources and its centrality
to dual banking suggest that the choice-of-form issue in interstate
banking should be resolved in such a way as to minimize the intrusion upon state sovereignty over market structure. This clearly
counsels in favor of the BHC approach, since only a separate banking subsidiary in any given state, whether state or nationally chartered, could be subjected to the limitations of state law respecting
branching and multibank BHCs. To be sure, under the branching
approach to interstate banking, the out-of-state bank entering a
host state that prohibits or limits branching could be limited to one
(or limited) location(s), and thus put into a position of competitive
equality with host-state banks. In the eighteen states that prohibit
or limit branching but permit multibank BHCs, 719 however, deference to state policy, and thus equal treatment for out-of-state and
host-state banks, is impossible under the branching approach.
These states, in effect, permit a single banking organization to have
multiple locations, while requiring them to operate as separate organizations, separately chartered, under separate names, in different parts of the state. 720 It is simply impossible to apply this

scheme to multiple branch locations of a single out-of-state bank. A
single branch might be opened consistent with the plan, but no
the antitrust laws, and these qualifications are assumed in the proposition referred
to in the text. But see G. OLDFIELD, IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATION ON BANK EXPANSION 123-24 (1979) (state branching and BHC law "appears much more powerful
than [federal mergers and acquisitions] regulatory policy in influencing the competitive outcomes in local banking markets.").
719. See M.A. Schapiro & Co., Inc., supra note 690, at 10.
720. One can only speculate about the possible reasons for this state policy.
The states may believe this approach limits the cumulative power-economic or
political-that the banking organization can achieve, increases the local responsiveness of its units, or perhaps facilitates its dismemberment should that become necessary.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss4/1

198

Ginsburg: Interstate Banking
1981]

INTERSTATE BANKING

more. On the other hand, an out-of-state BHC could establish or
acquire state or national banks chartered within the host state in
complete conformity to the state law on banking structure.
Under the branching approach, state policy on market structure would have to be disregarded, then. An out-of-state bank
would be allowed to operate a group of branch banks, in derogation of state policy, and to the competitive detriment of host state
banks subject to a unit or limited branching rule but jointly owned
by multibank BHCs. Experience reveals that multibank BHCs in
unit or limited branching states regard the necessity to maintain
separate banks as a distinct disadvantage; for marketing reasons
alone perhaps, they have frequently attempted to integrate their
operations and present themselves as one entity to the public, thus
giving rise to nice questions of "de facto branching.- 72 1 If such unit
or limited branching subsidiaries of a multibank BHC were now
thrust into competition with an out-of-state bank's statewide group
of branches, the host-state banks could justly claim to have been
unfairly treated. Indeed, one could reasonably expect that states
would simply be disabled, as a practical political matter, from
maintaining their prohibition upon statewide branching if out-ofstate banks could enter and disregard it. They would either have to
allow statewide branching so that local banks could compete with
out-of-state banks, or prohibit multibank BHCs, so that out-of-state
banks could be held to one location in the same limited branching
area as are host-state banks.
In effect, the direct branching approach to interstate expansion
is completely inconsistent with continued state control over banking market structures. Either the states must be divested of their
authority to determine market structure-including the right to determine what constitutes an undue concentration of resources-or
interstate banking must be accomplished through the formation of
a separate subsidiary bank in each state.
The first alternative is not unthinkable, of course. In our political federalism, however, the determination of what constitutes an
undue concentration of resources is appropriate at both the state
and federal levels, because of the relationship of that concept to
democratic political processes, which function at both jurisdictional
levels. To the extent that a concentration of resources is "undue"
because it threatens to have an unwanted influence over the polity,
721. See, e.g., Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Board of Governors, 451 F.2d 86 (8th
Cir. 1971).
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that is, both the state and national polities must be considered.
Although federal preemption is, by definition, inconsistent
with this consideration of state democratic processes, a policy of
continued deference to state determinations of the question is not
inconsistent with any determination made at the national level. Indeed, it was noted previously that banking enterprises operating in
a multistate region of the country, let alone nationwide, might
grow large enough to constitute an undue concentration of resources. For that reason, it was suggested that banks approaching a
certain size could be required to reorganize themselves into two
banks in order to facilitate their division into separate companies
upon reaching the maximum permissible size. The BHC approach
to interstate banking, if adopted in order to enable the states similarly to determine the maximum size and market concentration that
a bank should be allowed within their borders, will only make it
easier to remedy any undue concentration that arises at the national level; interstate banking enterprises will already have been
organized along state lines. Should it become necessary to require
the mitosis of such an enterprise, no physical reorganization of the
company would be necessary. It could be required merely to spinoff certain of its bank subsidiaries, thus dividing itself into two or
more entities each operating in a set of contiguous states.
7. Summary and Conclusion.-Fromthe foregoing application
of the standard criteria to the question whether a bank should be
required to form an affiliate for the purpose of entering each new
state, rather than be left fiee to decide whether to enter through
such a subsidiary bank or to branch directly into the host state, it
appears that the BHC approach is required if the dual banking system is to be preserved. Indeed, little else is at stake.
Considerations of consumer welfare, producer welfare, and the
equity of regulation slightly favor allowing banks their choice of
form in interstate entry. Considerations of soundness supervision
seem slightly to suggest that the BHC approach would be superior.
These conflicting indications are dwarfed, however, by the implications of direct interstate branching for the states' ability to determine for themselves what constitutes an undue concentration of resources.
The direct branching approach was seen to be quite inconsistent with the maintenance of state control over local banking
market structures. Divesting the states of this control, while not
technically an assault on the dual banking system, substantially
weakens its underpinning. Once the states have lost their ability to
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determine whether and to what extent to allow branching and
multibank BHCs, little justification will remain for the dual banking system, as was clearly recognized in enactment of the
McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment to the BHC Act. Indeed, the benefits of federalism will have been lost and the mixed
blessing of regulatory competition, which was wholly unintended in
establishing the national bank side of dual banking, will have been
retained.
Based on this analysis, the following conclusions may be
reached. First, the states should be allowed, if they so choose, to
require that out-of-state BHCs enter their territory by means of a
separate bank subsidiary operating in that state alone. If a state is
indifferent to the matter, then the only reason for federal law to require such separate organization would be to facilitate any later required mitosis of the interstate banking enterprise. If the previously suggested alternative approach to implementing that
remedy-requiring a bank approaching the limit size to prepare for
its mitosis-is acceptable, however, then there is no reason in federal law to require a BHC to incorporate a separate bank in a state
that is indifferent to the choice of form issue. States that allow
statewide branching, with or without multibank BHCs, would be
unlikely to insist that an out-of-state BHC organize a separate bank
within its borders, but there are only twenty-two states (and the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) that allow statewide branching 722 and even they may have their own reasons, perhaps con-

cerning supervision, to prefer the BHC approach over direct
branching in the context of interstate entry. In any event, there is
no reason for federal law to oust them of their preference.
Second, the states should be required to accept a direct
branch of an out-of-state bank only in those situations where it is
the clearly superior alternative, as evaluated by the standard criteria. These include, of course, maintaining the integrity of state policy toward concentrations of resources, as reflected in state laws
determining local market structure.
There are two situations in which direct branching may be the
superior alternative. The first is in interstate SMSAs. It seems
likely that much of the potential consumer welfare gain associated
with interstate banking will be in these markets. If, however, the
requirement of organizing a separate bank operates as a barrier to
entry into the counties of the second or third state within an
722.

STATE BANKING LAW SERV., supra note 3, at 85.
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SMSA, as it might for small banks, then it should be suspended
and direct interstate branching allowed within the SMSA to the extent that the host state allows intrastate branching. If the host state
is a unit banking state, the out-of-state bank would be limited to a
single branch there; if it allows multiple branches to host state
banks, the out-of-state bank should be allowed multiple branches;
and if it prohibits branching but allows multibank BHCs, the outof-state bank should be allowed only one branch location and be
required to operate additional banks if it wants multiple locations.
This would assure that the consumer and producer welfare potential of interstate banking is realized to an extent that would otherwise be lost, without threatening the states' control over market
structure.
The other situation in which states might appropriately be required to accept the direct branches of out-of-state banks arises
where a bank seeks to enter a financial center solely in order to
participate in the wholesale banking market there. A separately organized bank would act merely as a conduit through which the lead
bank would provide deposit services to commercial customers. The
wholesale bank would act as a cash management outpost, transferring its funds on a daily basis back to the lead bank in the BHC,
and maintaining on its own books only the minimum capital required
by its charter, and some offsetting commercial loans.
There does not appear to be any reason in public policy, as reflected in the application of the standard criteria, to require, or to
allow the states to require, banks entering a wholesale market to
organize a separate affiliate for that purpose. 723 Unless some justification for such a requirement can be adduced, banks should be
able to enter wholesale markets through direct branches if they so
prefer. The banks' preference for branching suggests that producer
costs would be lower, and therefore that consumer welfare would
probably be served by allowing it. 724 It seems only reasonable that,
before branching is disallowed as a means of entering wholesale
banking markets, at least some public detriment from branching
should be identified.
723. Puerto Rico, for example, has allowed mainland banks to establish direct
"wholesale branches" in return for acquiring, rehabilitating, and reselling a failing
retail bank. See Cont. Illinois Operating Puerto Rico Branch, Am. Banker, Dec. 19,
1980, at 3, col. 3.
724. Producers will attempt to minimize cost, whether they operate in competi-

tive or noncompetitive markets; the degree to which lower producer costs result in
lower consumer prices is, however, a function of competition.
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Wholesale branches in financial centers need not affect host
state market structure decisions whatsoever. In unit states, the outof-state banks could be confined to one location. No issue of
statewide branching arises under any reasonable interpretation of
what constitutes a financial center. Even under a capacious reading
of that term, there would be more than one such city only in
California, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Since California allows statewide branching, 725 however, it would not offend state policy for an
out-of-state bank to open direct branches in both Los Angeles and
San Francisco. Pennsylvania allows limited branching and prohibits
multibank holding companies 72 6 so that a Pennsylvania bank cannot
operate in both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. According equal treatment to out-of-state banks branching directly into these financial
centers would require that each such bank choose one of the two
cities for its wholesale-oriented branch. Finally, Texas is a unit
banking state that allows multibank BHCs. 72 7 If both Dallas and
Houston were considered financial centers, and if an out-of-state
bank were allowed to branch into both of them, it would arguably
be receiving more favorable treatment than a home-state bank located in either city and required to operate through an affiliate
bank in the other city. In this limited circumstance, deference to
the state's decisions with respect to market structure would again
require limiting the out-of-state bank to a single branch in one of
the two Texas financial centers. Unlike the wholesale branch entrant into Pennsylvania, however, it could organize an affiliate bank
in the other financial center city. 72 8 Of course, in any financial center, if the out-of-state bank wants to take retail as well as wholesale
deposits, it will have to abide by the host state's market-structure
rules and the requirement, if enacted by the host state, that it
establish a separate bank in order to effect its entry to the retail
market.
8. Notes on the Definition of a Branch.-One of the reasons
given in Part I of this Article for examining the question whether
interstate banking should be permitted was the difficulty under the
state-by-state banking system of determining whether a particular
facility is an interstate branch of a bank. If branching were completely unlimited, it was observed, there would be no reason for
725. CAL. FIN. CODE § 500 (West Supp. 1981).
726. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 904, 6003 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1981-1982).
727. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. §§ 342-903, -906 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
728. At the same time, it should not be able to use two subsidiary banks based

in different states to establish a branch in each of the Texas cities.
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"branch" to be a term of art, since nothing would turn on whether
something is characterized as a branch. 729 Application of the
standard criteria to the question whether a banking enterprise
should be permitted to branch interstate has since shown that, outside of narrow and exceptional circumstances, direct branching may
appropriately be prohibited and the BHC form required by the
states to effect interstate entry. Under this approach, therefore, it
will still be necessary to define the term "branch" in order to determine whether a bank's presence in a host state that prohibits direct branching is a branch.
It was also established in Part I that banks-especially the
largest banks--can and do now operate interstate to a significant
extent. They operate physical facilities, such as loan production offices and Edge Act subsidiaries; they provide services that do not
depend upon a physical facility, such as cash management for corporations and credit cards for individuals; and they share the ATM
networks of other banks to give their customers interstate access to
accounts for all purposes except that of making deposits. Through
the nonbank affiliates of their BHCs, banks are operating interstate
facilities to extend consumer and commercial credit, provide trust
services, investment advising, leasing, and data processing; in several states they are also operating industrial banks, a depository
thrift type of institution.
In short, it has been shown that banks are able, directly or indirectly, to provide virtually all services other than deposit accounts interstate and indeed nationwide without running afoul of
the McFadden Act's definition of a branch. 730 Instead of asking
whether interstate banking should expressly be permitted, therefore, the issue may be more narrowly posed as whether interstate
deposit-taking facilities should be permitted. In other words, there
has been implicit in all of the foregoing analysis an equation between commercial bank branching and deposit-taking. 31
729. See text accompanying notes 404-410 supra.
730. To be sure, insofar as their services entail "money lent" or "checks paid,"
they must operate through affiliates, and they do so. Insofar as they want to take deposits, however, they are unable to do so, even through an affiliate.
731. If the issue is re-cast in terms of this equation, then the answer derived
thus far may easily be translated as well. In translation, it provides that a bank
should have federal rights to: (a) take retail deposits throughout its SMSA; (b) take
wholesale deposits in financial centers nationwide; (c) take both types of deposits in
any host state that does not act legislatively to require separate incorporation of each
bank operating therein; and (d) affiliate, through a common BHC, with banks in any
state, subject to regulatory approval.
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The same equation between deposit-taking and branching appears in the approach taken by most of the states that have considered the status of interstate ATM networks. By prohibiting out-ofstate banks that share in the use of host-state ATMs from accepting
deposits at those facilities, while allowing them to perform all other
services there, 732 the states have implicitly distinguished deposittaking as the indicium of branching. The significance of deposittaking has even been made explicit in the responses of some state
regulators to the question whether money market funds are engaged in unauthorized banking. Some have equated deposit-taking
with banking, while others appear to have gone on to consider
whether shares in the funds provide consumers with a close substi733
tute for a bank demand deposit.
The consequence of equating interstate branching with
732.

Delaware, Oregon, and Virginia have expressly permitted reciprocal inter-

state ATM use-sharing arrangements for other functions but do not permit deposittaking across state lines. Telephone interviews with Raymond Gawel, Delaware
Dep't of Banks Commissioner (July 7, 1981), Gordon Prakken, Oregon Assistant Superintendent of Banks (July 7, 1981), Ralph Jaffe, Virginia First Deputy Commissioner of Financial Institutions (July 8, 1981). In Kentucky, a bank may share the use
of an out-of-county ATM only for dispensing of funds. KY. ADIN. REGS. tit. 808, §
1:060(11). This is viewed as applicable to out-of-state ATMs as well. Letter from
Mark Robinson, Review Examiner, Kentucky Department of Banking & Securities
(July 8, 1981) (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review).
The Attorney General of Missouri has ruled that banks may enter reciprocal
ATM use-sharing arrangements intrastate, notwithstanding the law against branching,
so long as the ATMs do not take deposits, and this has been interpreted to allow interstate arrangements that are similarly limited. United Missouri Bank of Kansas
City, N.A. and Overland Park State Bank, which is located in Kansas, participate in
one such system. Telephone interview with Franke Henthorn, Supervisor of ATMs,
United Missouri Bank (July 8, 1981). North Carolina's policy with respect to other
functions is unsettled but would clearly prohibit interstate deposit-taking by ATMs.
Telephone interview with Kern Freeze, Field Examiner, North Carolina Office of
Commissioner of Banks (July 8, 1981).
Alabama and Maryland policies, however, allow interstate ATM reciprocal
deposit-taking arrangements. Telephone interviews with Kenneth R. McCartha,
Alabama Superintendent of Banks (July 8, 1981), Charles Georgins, Deputy Bank
Commissioner of Maryland (July 8, 1981). Nothing in Georgia's banking policy prohibits interstate deposit-taking by ATMs. Telephone interview with Ralph Shire, Examiner, Office of the Georgia Commissioner of Banking & Finance (July 8, 1981).
733. Compare Redden letter, note 518 supra (construing Oregon statute
defining "banking business" to include CMA Money Trust described in text accompanying note 517 supra) with Agreement reached between Colorado State Bank
Commissioner and Merrill-Lynch in Settlement of People v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. C-79745 (Col. Dist. Ct.). The Oregon opinion acknowledges that the "mutual fund shares would have attributes different from the usual
commercial bank deposit," but dismisses this fact with the observation that under
Oregon law the attributes of a deposit can be varied by agreement. Redden letter,
note 518 supra.
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deposit-taking simplifies the problem of defining a branch by
commuting it to that of defining "deposit-taking." Indeed, since
our concern here is not with distinguishing banks from nonbanks
as it would be in determining whether money market funds are
banks, for instance, but rather in distinguishing branches from nonbranches, we need only to determine when a "deposit" is "taken"
without overly complicating the question of what is a deposit.
In ordinary language, a deposit is the delivery to a bank of
currency, checks, and similar negotiable items, resulting in a credit
to an account holder, who is usually but not necessarily the depositor. This definition of a deposit is tested, however, when new
means of effecting a credit are devised. For example, the provision
of a payroll computer tape to a bank may be the means by which
an employer makes a so-called "direct deposit" to its employee's
account at the bank; no currency or checks are involved, but their
electronic replacement nonetheless results in a credit to an account. In essence, the information formerly conveyed by currency
and checks has been separated from the paper on which it used to
travel and converted into electronic form, i.e. magnetic particles on
a computer tape, for greater ease of transmission. Still, it would
seem somehow odd to describe a bank's data processing center, at
which it receives such computer tapes, as a "branch" of the bank
where, in the words of the McFadden Act, "deposits [are] received"; it would seem odder still if the bank's computer received
the information not through physical delivery of a tape but by
transmission from the payor's computer over ordinary telephone
lines. Indeed, the payor's transmission might not be to the account
holder's bank at all, but to a clearing house's computer that will
distribute the information to the relevant bank, either
electronically or by paper print-out, depending on whether it has
its own data processing capability. Whether a "branch" is involved
in such an automated transaction, and which instrumentality constitutes the "branch"-the computer at the bank where the credited
account is held, the clearing house, or the payor's telephonecannot, of course, be dismissed because the questions seem odd;
they can" only be answered, however, by reference to the policy
underpinnings that make it important to know whether, where,
and when one is dealing with a branch.
In the present context, the question of what is a branch, i.e. of
whether something is a deposit-taking facility, will determine not
whether or where it can operate but what bank can receive deposits through it. If any of the elements in the electronic payment net-
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work of automated clearing houses (ACHs), bank computers, terminals, telephones, etc., is a branch of each bank that is advised
through the system of credits to accounts it holds, however, then
virtually every bank in the country is a branch of every other bank.
They are all tied together through the ACHs, BankWire, Fed
Wire, 7 34 and the data networks that link banks without their own
data processing equipment to others with it. As a result, a holder
of accounts in any two banks can cause funds to be "wired" from
one to the other, i.e., can cause one bank to send a message resulting in a credit to the account at the other.
The point to be made here is not that all banks are branches
of each other. Rather, it is that the term "branch," defined in
terms of where "deposits [are] received," was not meant to encompass electronically effected credits. It was meant to include only
the "deposits" denoted in ordinary language-the physical delivery
to a bank of currency, checks, and similar negotiable items. Convenient customer access to facilities that accept such ordinarylanguage deposits confers a competitive advantage on the bank that
receives them, as the courts have understood, but it does so only
in the retail market, where convenience is a factor.
A corporate depositor may have accounts at scores or even
hundreds of banks around the country from which balances are
transferred to a concentration account. Whether the transfer instructions are originated by the corporation's cash management
(lead) bank or by its treasurer over a CRT should be of no moment;
neither the distant banks nor the CRT are branches of the lead
bank. The banks are not branches because their location does not
confer a competitive advantage on the lead bank with respect to
deposit-taking. It, or the corporation, will have selected them because of the city or federal reserve district in which they are located, of course, as well as because of the price and quality of their
cash management and deposit services, but not because they are in
a particular part of town. The precise location of a branch bank is
an advantage only in the retail market, and it is the "deposits received" in that market to which the definition of a branch should
be understood to have been keyed, not only in the McFadden Act,
but in ordinary language and thus in all of the state statutes and
decisions that use the term without explication.
Thus, interstate deposit-taking, and therefore interstate
branching, occurs where a bank takes retail deposits of currency
734.

See generally, H. ScoTT, supra note 689.
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and checks. They are "taken" where and when a bank receives
physical custody of them either directly or through its agent.
Therefore, ATMs that take deposits on behalf of a remote bank are
branches of that bank; banks that accept deposits for transmittal to
another bank, as agent of the other bank rather than agent of the
.depositor, are branches of that other bank. Likewise, armored cars
operated by a bank or group of banks to pick up currency or
checks from merchants are branches of the bank or banks they
serve, while an armored car operated by an independent company
or a group of merchants, not being the agent of a bank, should
therefore not be considered a branch of any bank.
In summary, by defining a branch as a place at which a bank
or its agent receives retail deposits, most if not all of the ambiguity
surrounding the branch definition of the McFadden Act is removed. This would also be true in the intrastate context. Examining the question in the interstate context has served only to make
it clearer that the "money lent" and "checks paid" clauses of the
McFadden Act definition are irrelevant in light of the nonbank possibilities for performing those functions that were opened up by
the 1970 amendments to the BHC Act.
It does not much matter whether an LPO is an unlawful
branch of a bank because it is a place where money is lent, that is,
if it can be transformed into a commercial or consumer credit subsidiary of the BHC. Likewise, if an ATM established by a bank is a
branch because withdrawing cash from one's bank account through
the ATM makes it a place where "electronic checks are paid," then
the ATM can be established by a nonbank subsidiary of the BHC,
or by a joint venture BSC, established for that purpose. 735 It is
only the deposit-taking function that cannot be shifted to a
nonbank affiliate, with its unlimited geographical reach, because
only deposit-taking, indeed retail deposit taking, is unique to banking.
Why is retail deposit-taking the essential core of banking? Because it is taking retail deposits that raises the public policy concern with soundness supervision, and it is soundness supervision
735. It could also be operated by a consumer finance subsidiary of the BHC,
which could offer a line of credit, issue a Visa card with which to access it at the
ATMs, and even arrange for the customer to preauthorize the bank affiliate automatically to pay the Visa bill at the end of the month. Then, little more than a delay in
the time at which the cash withdrawal results in a debit to the depositor's account
will have been accomplished by characterizing the ATMs of banks as branches because they allow cash withdrawal.
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that in turn justifies, however well, both the consumer protective
and the anticompetitive aspects of banking regulation, from man736
dating deposit insurance to entry regulation.
In fact, it would not be too venturesome to suggest that another form of duality exists in banking beside dual chartering. It is
the coexistence of two ideal types: first, retail, localized, less than
fully competitive banking markets and banks; and second, wholesale, nationwide, highly competitive banking markets and banks.
Only the former institutions, I suggest, were meant to be covered
by the restrictions on branching and, as a practical matter, only
they are so covered. This is true even though some of the same
banks participate in both markets as local retailers and national
wholesalers. What is primarily at stake in the interstate branching
issue, therefore, is whether to allow banks to become national, or
7 37
at least multistate, retailers as well.
D.

InterstateAcquisition vs. De Novo Entry

Thus far it has been determined that banks should have a federal right to branch throughout their interstate SMSA, into the
wholesale markets in certain financial centers, and into any state
that does not legislatively prohibit interstate branch entry; furthermore, it has been shown that BHCs should be able to own and
control banks in any state, subject to the limitations of state law
concerning market structure. It remains now to be determined
whether there should be special legal inhibitions upon a bank's or
BHC's decision to effect interstate entry de novo or by means of
acquisition.
Unless displaced, the antitrust laws will preclude many major
interstate acquisitions of banks in concentrated markets. Under the
potential competition doctrine of antitrust law, a bank that lawfully
could and probably would have entered a concentrated market de
736.

The credit allocating aspect of banking regulation is not, however,

underpinned by the concern with soundness and may to some degree be inimical
to soundness. Credit allocating regulation is probably limited to depository lenders,
as opposed to insurance companies and other institutional investors, because they
are more easily controlled, having been subjected already in the interest of soundness to the need for prior approval of every step they take.
737. The analogous question, a generation ago, was whether to allow the
growth of retail chain stores. Then, as now, the proponents of containment
"stress[ed] such matters as their independence, their devotion to the home town,
and the size and presumed greed of the huge corporations" seeking to do a
nationwide retail business. Comment, Anti-Chain Store Legislation, 30 MICH. L.
REv. 274, 274 (1931).
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novo or by a so-called "toehold" acquisition-that is, by acquiring
an incumbent firm with a small market share that could then be
expanded by internal growth-will not be permitted instead to acquire a major participant in the market. 738 It may reasonably be assumed that the potential competition doctrine will apply to interstate banking with the same, somewhat attenuated, force with
which it applies in the intrastate banking context. 739 Specifically, if
out-of-state banks or BHCs are liberally allowed to enter a concentated market de novo and later expand their presence, the antitrust courts will recognize that fact by analyzing skeptically the necessity for a particular firm to effect its entry by means of an interstate acquisition. On the other hand, regulatory limitations on the
ability of a bank to enter or to expand after entry into a concentrated territorial market will be taken to diminish the likelihood that a
would-be entrant by acquisition would realistically have
entered de novo even if that were the only permissible means
74 0
of entry.
The question at hand is therefore whether there are reasons of
bank regulatory policy either to limit the ability of banks to enter
new (interstate) markets by acquisition beyond the limitation now
found in the antitrust laws or, alternatively, to limit their right to
enter de novo--i.e., sometimes requiring that entry be by acquisition-notwithstanding the conflict with antitrust policy that
implies.
Forbidding or limiting acquisitions would presumably be done
in the interest of competition. Many variations on the theme are
possible, including, for example, a per se rule against entry by acquisition, the same rule applied only to acquisitions above a certain
toehold size, or a shifting of burdens to erect a presumption against
entry by acquisition while allowing an acquiror to prove the impracticality of de novo entry or a toehold acquisition. The alternative approach of sometimes requiring that entry be by acquisition, which would presumably be adopted in order to protect existing competitors, might operate like the home-office-protection
rule common in intrastate branching laws: 74 1 A bank might be al738. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623-30
(1974); 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW % 1116-1126 (1980).

739. "[Tlhe application of the doctrine to commercial banking must take into
account the unique federal and state regulatory restraints on entry into that line of
commerce." United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 627 (1974).
740. Id. at 636-37.
741.

See, e.g., N.Y. BANIaNG LAW § 105(1) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
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lowed to enter a new market interstate only by acquisition, or to
enter de novo only if efforts to enter by acquisition are unavail742
ing.
While there are many such possible alternatives to current antitrust policy that could be used to determine whether and when to
limit a bank's ability to enter a new (interstate) market by the
means of its choice, only the two polar cases need be taken up
here. The analysis of these approaches, under which entry would
be allowed either by acquisition only (the "market-protective" approach) or de novo only (the "pro-competitive" approach), is sufficient to identify the relevant interests at stake and to suggest a resolution among them. These polar approaches can better be addressed, however, when the alternative means of bank-market
entry have been further detailed.
1. Methods of Market Entry.-There are five distinct ways in
which a bank or BHC with operations in one territorial market
may, if the relevant regulators approve, obtain a physical presence
in a new territorial market. First, the bank may engage in de novo
branching, either by opening a brick-and-mortar office or by establishing or sharing in an ATM in the new territory. Second, the
bank's parent BHC may obtain a charter to establish a de novo
bank subsidiary in the new territory. Third, the bank may enter
the new market by the acquisition of an existing bank, which
would then be merged into the acquiring bank, its home and
branch offices becoming branches of the acquiring bank. Fourth,
the BHC may enter the market by the acquisition of an existing
bank, which would remain a subsidiary of the BHC. Finally, the
bank may acquire only some of the branches of an existing bank,
which would again become branches of the acquiring bank. 743 In
742.

A doctrine giving preference to entry by acquisition can live only in great

tension with an exception allowing de novo entry when an acquisition is "unavailable." Any acquisition is available at a price, and the evidentiary difficulties of
determining whether a reasonable price was offered (or demanded) before resort was
had to de novo entry are legion. Cf. 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 738,
1124d, at 146 (discussing complications involved in toehold mergers).
743. The purchase and sale of bank branches may constitute little more than
trafficking in officially created market entry rights. The retail deposit liabilities of a
particular branch may be somewhat ephemeral, since a retail depositor's business
could well be lost if he is informed that his account has been transferred to a different, less convenient branch. Commercial deposit accounts, and of course the assets
of a particular branch, are more manipulatable. Branches are nonetheless bought and
sold, and can be spun off in merger situations. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Agrees to Sell
55 Branches, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1979, at 12, col. 2; Sumitomo Wins 19 of 33 Offered BanCal Branches, Am. Banker, July 7, 1977, at 1, col. 4.
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sum, therefore, either the bank or its BHC may enter a new market by acquisition of a bank or de novo, while the bank may also
enter by acquiring only some of an incumbent bank's branches.
a. De Novo Entry.-Forpurposes of the present analysis, it is
not necessary to distinguish between the two types of de novo market entry; whether a bank enters a new market by branching or its
BHC charters a new bank in that market, the fact of competitive
significance is the introduction of a single new competitor into the
market. A requirement that new entry be de novo is, in theory,
and probably in most real markets, pro-competitive for this reason,
but in practice the number of new competitors that will be admitted to a given banking market is everywhere limited by entry regulation justified on the ground that too much competition may endanger the solvency of incumbent banks. Consequently, a policy of
allowing only de novo market entry may significantly limit the potential competitive significance of interstate banking.
To be sure, several new competitors might still be introduced
into each of the presently concentrated metropolitan banking markets, but a per se rule prohibiting entry by acquisition would probably preclude meaningful levels of new entry into many smaller
markets and some portions of the larger SMSAs. Beyond the simple numerical limitations that regulators would undoubtedly
impose on the number of new competitors in a market, there is
sometimes reason to doubt the competitive significance of de novo
or toehold entry into moderately concentrated banking markets,
i.e., where acquisition of a non-toehold but non-leading firm might
have been possible. Simply put, it usually takes longer and may be
more expensive to build than to buy a given market share, and if
there is a critical minimum share necessary to offer effective competition to other firms, a de novo-only approach, if it does not deter an entrant, may certainly defer the time at which its entry has
significant pro-competitive consequences. 74 4
b. Entry by Acquisition.-Market entry by the acquisition of
an existing bank may also be accomplished by either of two means,
but again the distinction need not detain us. Whether the acquiror
is a bank or a BHC, an acquisition does not in itself change market
structure. Rather, it merely changes the identity of the owner of
the acquired bank. Still, it may prove to be highly pro-competitive
if the acquiring bank or BHC is a more aggressive competitor than
the acquired bank, i.e., if the acquiror will exploit the acquired
744.

United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 636-37 (1974).
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bank's physical presence to introduce price reductions or service
improvements in the target market. This is even more likely to occur, moreover, if the acquired bank's market share is not large to
begin with. Acquiring banks tend to have more aggressive, 74 5 and
probably more capable, managements and greater capital with
which to finance the costs of competition. Indeed, it is precisely
because the acquiring bank believes that it can exploit the acquired
bank's assets-its location, existing customer relationships, and perhaps sleepy competitors-that it will want to acquire the bank and
will be willing to pay a price greater than the existing owner's reservation price for the shares.
Market entry by acquisition is thought to be particularly procompetitive if the acquisition gives the acquiring bank only a toehold position in the market. 746 The acquiring bank will then use its
managerial and financial resources to build the acquired bank into
a more substantial competitive force in the market. As it gains market share through internal growth, the market will become less concentrated, whereas the purchase of and the same internal growth
of a bank that already has a large share of the market would tend
to make the market more concentrated.
The number of pro-competitive market entries that can be accomplished by toehold or other acquisitions is limited by three factors, however. First, there must be potential buyers outside the
market that are financially and legally qualified to enter by acquisition. In the intrastate context, such potential buyers may be very
few or nonexistent; there may be no banking organization in a particular state that is not disqualified on antitrust grounds, either because it is already an actual competitor in the local market, or, if
the market is concentrated and de novo entry would have been
lawful, because it is a potential competitor. This constraint will be
substantially, indeed probably completely, relaxed with nationwide
banking because it would create a large number of potential buyers, including many that would not have entered a concentrated
market de novo and thus may lawfully enter by acquiring a non74 7
toehold incumbent.
745.

See Mingo, supra note 697, at 413.

746.

But cf. 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 738,

1124b, at 141

(toehold merger may not improve acquired firm); Rhoades, The Impact of Foothold
Acquisitions on Bank Market Structure, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 119 (1977) (study of all
acquisitions during 1966-72 of banks with deposits of less than $10 million by BHCs
not previously in the acquired bank's SMSA found that there is no significant relationship between foothold acquisitions and changes in market structure).
747. For a glimpse of the types of evidentiary problems raised by the necessity,
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Second, there may be very few potential sellers, especially in
a concentrated market. Indeed, in the most concentrated markets
where the antitrust laws would most strongly suggest the desirability of a new entrant's acquiring a toehold rather than a major firm,
there may be the fewest potential toeholds available for acquisition.
In a market with a three-firm concentration ratio in excess of 80%,
for example, there may be only two or three firms with market
shares small enough for a potential competitor lawfully to acquire
them.
Third, these few possible toeholds may not be for sale at an
agreeable price. More precisely, each toehold may be able to earn
monopoly rents by reason of oligopoly pricing in the local market
for bank services; in addition, it has market power in the local market for control of banks, due to restrictions on entry. Thus, each
toehold will insist upon receiving substantially all of the economic
rents associated with its market position.
A toehold acquisition may still take place if one of two circumstances obtain. First, if the acquiror believes that it can operate the
bank more efficiently, i.e., at lower cost than the old management,
it may hope to realize greater earnings from the same market share
and continued oligopoly pricing. It would then be willing to buy
the bank at a price between the capitalized value of expected monopoly profits under the old and new managements, assuming that
the return on investment to be expected at that price is still higher
than that on any alternative investment. Second, if the acquiror believes it has a superior ability to compete, i.e., to operate at lower
cost than the other banks in the market, it may hope to realize
greater earnings by lowering prices toward competitive levels and
increasing its market share. Only in the latter event will a toehold
acquisition in an oligopoly market actually result in post-acquisition
price reductions to consumers.
c. Hybrid Entry.-Market entry accomplished by the acquisition of some of the existing branches of an incumbent bank can logically be distinguished from the acquisition of the entire incumbent
bank; such a partial acquisition has aspects of both de novo and acquired entry. With respect to the acquired branches, only the
identity of the bank to which they are attached is changed. Looking at the market as a whole, however, an added competitor has
been introduced into the market through those changes in branch
under the potential competition doctrine, to determine that an acquiror was not a potential de novo entrant, see United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526,

533-36 (1973).
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ownership. Thus, while the number of banking offices in the
market, and the public convenience, may be unaffected by the
transaction, the results may nonetheless be pro-competitive if, as
expected, the acquiring bank competes more aggressively at the acquired locations than did the selling bank. Again, however, the
number of opportunities for effecting market entry through such a
partial acquisition is limited by the number of interested sellers
-this time of branches. Even fewer banks would normally be interested in such a partial sale than in a complete sale, however,
since the seller would face the new competition of the buyer as a
result.
Indeed, it would be impractical to prohibit the acquisition of a
bank on the ground that the acquiring firm might have made a partial acquisition of branches from the same or another seller; that
will too rarely be a realistic alternative even to justify an inquiry
into whether it might have been accomplished in a particular market by a particular acquiror at a particular time and at an agreeable
price. Consequently, as a practical matter the distinction between
the acquisition of a toehold bank and a partial acquisition of the
branches of another bank can be disregarded; only the former possibility will be considered here.
2. The CriteriaApplied.-In this section, the standard criteria
are applied to the two polar alternatives to a conventional antitrust
approach to regulating the means by which a banking organization
may enter a new (interstate) market. To reiterate, these alternatives are, on the one hand, to allow entry de novo or by toehold
acquisition only (variously called the de novo-only or "small-start"
approach below), or, on the other, to allow entry by acquisitiononly, subject to the limitations of antitrust law.
a. Consumer Welfare.--Although consumer welfare is generally enhanced by producer competition, it is not clear whether the
small-start or the acquisition-only approach would result in greater
competition. Opportunities for interstate market entry could be
quite limited under the small-start approach.
De novo opportunities would arise only as target markets experience such growth as would warrant the addition of new banks
or branches to the market. This determination would presumably
be made on the basis of the same criteria now employed to determine whether an incumbent bank shall be allowed to open an additional branch or a new bank to be established in the market. Under the small-start approach, toehold acquisitions could be made
without the same constraints, but as suggested above, the number
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of potential toehold acquisitions is severely limited in many markets and may be most limited in precisely the most concentrated
markets where the benefits from enhanced competition are potentially the greatest.
Allowing entry by the acquisition-only approach would not
change the number of competitors in any particular local banking
market. As noted above, however, it could substitute more aggressive competitors for less aggressive competitors or complacent
oligopolists in markets where acquisitions occurred, which might in
some instances ultimately result in increased market concentration.
Assume, for example, an oligopolistic market with only four firms
of any consequence, all enjoying the benefits of a quiet life, in
which one serves as the price leader and the others as price followers. The acquisition of one such bank by an aggressive competitor
could well enable it to acquire a dominant market share when it
turns from cooperating to competing with the other three banks in
the market. Ideally, all of the banks in such a market would be acquired by aggressive out-of-state competitors. In practice, however, only one or two may be acquired by such firms, with the result that the market becomes more rather than less concentrated as
they gain market share at the expense of the others. Eventually
they may be able to resume oligopoly pricing and end the flurry of
competition, leaving consumers no better off than before the acquisitions. It is simply impossible to predict with any confidence,
therefore, whether the small-start or the acquisition-only approach
would in general better serve consumer welfare across the myriad
markets involved.
b. Producer Welfare.-Under the acquisition-only approach,
the shareholders of banks in target markets would be able to sell
their shares to out-of-state banking organizations at prices that reflect their bank's ability, if any, to earn economic rents due to the
limitations on de novo entry into their market. Under the smallstart approach, on the other hand, the shareholders will not only
lose this opportunity, but at the same time may be subjected to
added competition that results in competing away their present
rents.
Still, it is not clear whether shareholders in target markets
would be better or worse off under the small-start approach. Their
advantage from the small-start approach could, ironically, be the
greater protection that it might give them from new market entrants. If aggressive competitors could enter the market through a
non-toehold acquisition (as would be possible under the potential
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competition doctrine once interstate banking has vastly increased
the number of potential competitors perceived to be waiting in the
wings748 ), they could pose a much more substantial competitive
threat to any banks that are not acquired by similarly competitive
firms. Consequently, the effect of this policy choice on shareholder
interests cannot be identified with certainty, although initially it
may seem more likely that the acquisition-only approach would
better serve the interests of shareholders in target markets.
The interests of all bank shareholders as a group may also be
served better by the acquisition-only approach than the small-start
approach. Under the latter approach, such new entry as occurs in
target markets will either be net additions to the number of competitors or a substitution of toehold owners likely to be more aggressive. If competition is enhanced by either means, all banks in
the market may find it difficult to earn more than competitive rates
of return. Under the acquisition-only approach however, entry-by
toehold or on a larger scale-can occur only by the substitution of
one owner for another, presumably as a result of their mutual
agreement to the terms of an acquisition. Of course, it does not follow that because the parties to the agreement both improve their
position that other banks competing in the market with the buyer
will be better off by reason of the transaction. Still, one would expect the shareholders of each incumbent bank in a target market to
be better off when they are given the nearly exclusive right to sell
access to that market by selling their bank-even if it is sold subject to the competition of those who buy other banks in the same
market-than they are when they cannot sell their shares to an
out-of-state bank or BHC and are subjected to the possibility of
those firms becoming net new entrants to the market.
Again, however, one cannot be sure which approach will better serve shareholder interests in practice. The point can be
illustrated by the example of a diversified bank stockholder, who
owns equal shares in an aggressive out-of-state acquiror bank and a
sleepy target bank in an oligopolistic market with cartel pricing. Under the acquisition-only approach, the aggressive acquiror could acquire the target bank at a price equal to or greater than its capitalized monopoly profits, discounted by the probability that some
other aggressor would acquire some other sleeper and subject the
748. See 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 738, 1123b, at 124 (suggesting that potential competition doctrine should not preclude a merger "where the
universe of potential entrants exceeds three to six firms.").
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target to competitive pressure on earnings. The stockholder would
thus receive a price somewhere between the capitalized values of
monopoly and competitive earnings per share. Under the smallstart approach, on the other hand, unless it is a mere toehold the
incumbent bank could not be acquired by the aggressor, but its
share value will be discounted to reflect the possibility that the aggressor will obtain de novo entry rights and, having entered, compete away the monopoly profits of the target bank.
While there is no way, a priori, to determine which of these
two probabilistic discounting procedures will more adversely affect
the value of the target-market bank, experience suggests that the
de novo discount will be the lesser, i.e. that a de novo or procompetitive approach may actually be better for incumbent shareholders. First, the regulators who control entry will be expected to
limit the adverse impact of entry on incumbent banks in the interest of bank solvency; conservatism among bank regulators will
surely induce them to limit de novo entry so that the incumbent
and new banks alike will earn more than merely competitive returns on investment. 74 9 Under the acquisition-only approach, however, regulators would be hard-put to disapprove an acquisition on
the ground that the acquiring bank would be too aggressive a competitor for the other incumbent banks to withstand and no pretext
may be available otherwise to disqualify the acquiror. Yet consumers, legislators, and perhaps the managers and even shareholders of
the other incumbent banks would be angry or embarrassed if the
true ground were given. Thus, allowing de novo entry only may
make it easier for regulators to avoid introducing into a market
what is, from the incumbent shareholders' perspective, "too much"
competition. More banks may be allowed into the market de novo,
that is, but with less cumulative competitive potential than a
smaller number of acquiring banks would have.
Second, there is almost surely less of an immediate competitive threat to incumbent banks when even an aggressive competitor is forced to enter de novo or by toehold acquisition. Building
the number of locations and customer relationships-i.e. market
share-that might otherwise have been acquired at the outset under the acquisition-only approach simply takes time, even with aggressive pricing and marketing strategies. This factor defers some749. See Rhoades, A Comparative Investigation of Risk and Rates of Return in
Commercial Banking and Manufacturing Industries, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 589

(1980); text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
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what the full effect of de novo competition on the value of incumbent banks, and thus reduces the present value of the adverse
impact from new competition.
Consequently, while the acquisition-only approach might seem
initially to be in the interest of incumbent bank owners, the matter
is far from clear. A general conclusion may not be possible, moreover, since regulatory attitudes toward de novo entry may vary
across target markets. Furthermore, there may be some target
markets in which some of the incumbent banks would not be attractive acquisition targets for aggressive banks while others would
be; in that case, the interests of target-market banks in this question may therefore be irreconcilably divergent. The attractive acquisition target's shareholders would actually gain from being
acquired-not just suffer less of a loss than they would under the
acquisition-only approach-while banks that are not acquired
would lose more from the competition of acquiring banks than they
would from that of de novo entrants.
The position of incumbent bank employees in target markets
does not seem to be any different from that of the shareholders in
the banks by which they are employed. Their interests, too, seem
less than fully determinate. Of course, under either the acquisition-only or the small-start approach, employees could be held harmless by the inclusion of a labor protective provision in the regime,
750
if the potential for adverse effects were thought to be significant.
Under the small-start approach, they would then have a preferential claim to employment by new entrants in their market if they
are discharged by the incumbent banks as a result of the increased
competition. Under the acquisition-only approach, they would have
preferential hiring rights at banks with increased market shares, or
perhaps at all banks, as positions arose, after one or more acquisitions were made in a particular market. The theory would be that
the market had become more competitive and market shares, and
thus the demand for labor, somewhat less stable as a result.
the public interest in
c. Equity of Regulation.-Whether
equitable regulation would be better served by the acquisitiononly or the small-start approach is a very difficult question indeed,
and one that arises in principle whenever a change in the law is
considered. Of course, the inequity now favoring banks in desirable markets and BHCs with the advantages of grandfathered
multistate, full-service banks, can be corrected only to the extent
750.

See text accompanying notes 496-498 supra.
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that out-of-state banks or BHCs are allowed to enter host state
markets. More is involved, however.
If the small-start approach is not administered so as drastically
to limit the rate at which de novo entry occurs in target markets,
the advent of significant new competition will destroy the incumbent banks' shareholders' capitalized expectation of receiving economic rents. This could create a new inequity. To the extent that
the present shareholders are not the original incorporators and
owners of the bank but subsequent purchasers, they may be presumed to have paid a price that yields only a competitive return on
their investment. Consequently, any diminution in the value of
that investment due to an unanticipated change in the law will
cause them to suffer a windfall loss.
The key to determining one's own view about the equity of
such gains and losses as are associated with changes in law depends
upon whether one views the change, or the probability of change,
as being beyond the range of risks assumed by investors. Clearly,
legal change is always a possibility, and at least a relatively sophisticated population such as that of shareholders may be viewed as
assuming the risks of legal chaige when they invest in an enterprise that is actually subject to extensive public regulation.
If acquisition is the only means by which an out-of-state bank
may enter a target market, the problem of windfalls will be quite
different. A bank newly subjected to the increased competition of
an out-of-state acquiror will experience a windfall loss of the same
general type as a bank subjected to de novo entry in its market.
The shareholders of the bank that is sold to the entrant-byacquisition, however, may well have realized a windfall gain. Having invested in their bank under the state-by-state banking regime,
they may or may not have paid a price that reflected the possibility
of a future change to interstate banking; the empirical question is
completely unanswerable. It is clear that at some point investments
are made in anticipation that a legal change will occur, i.e., that it
has some priceable probability of occurring. Indeed, this has probably been the case with respect to the change to interstate banking
at least since 1980, when bank stock analysts began to identify the
banks they thought would be premium acquisition targets under
interstate banking. With respect to earlier investors, one can only
decide whether it is reasonable, as suggested above, to assume that
this was the type of legal risk they willingly incurred.
Unfortunately, there is no neater solution to the problem of
regulating equitably and yet reserving the right to alter regulations
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from time to time. 75 1 One could assert that all such changes have
been discounted to probabilities by all affected parties and investments priced accordingly; if a substantial discount rate is used,
moreover, investors need only be blessed with foresight spanning a
dozen years or less. The present value of changes that might occur
any further into the future would be too slim for most analysts to
incur the transaction costs-extensive modelling and calculationsand therefore should certainly not serve to defeat or defer a change
in the law.
Although analytically consistent and defensible, this view of
the world is clearly unrealistic when carried to its logical conclusion, viz. that the probabilities of all possible legal changes worth
anticipating have been actually discounted by investors in the market for shares. Perhaps it is just because this view is not widely
held that significant legal changes are so frequently introduced in a
series of gradual steps. Such an incremental approach to legal
change lessens the windfall gains and losses to affected bystanders
by spreading them over a period of years and thereby lowering
their present value.
In the context of the choice between the acquisition-only and
small-start approaches to interstate entry into bank markets, windfalls could be lessened and the change to interstate banking probably made more equitable by adopting whichever approach is more
susceptible to gradual introduction. Unfortunately, there does not
seem to be any reasonable way to phase in the right of a bank or
BHC to make interstate acquisitions. Gradually expanding the geographical area within which acquisitions can be made is not very
responsive to the windfall problem, although it is not completely
inapposite. If, as discussed above, 752 banks were permitted first to
make acquisitions in contiguous states, for example, and gradually
given a wider scope, shareholders would find themselves gradually
and increasingly affected by the expansion of the geographical
range within which banks compete. Some banks would immediately and suddenly become the objects of merger and tender offers, however, while others would with equal suddenness be put in
a position to make an attractive acquisition; some banks, moreover,
would not be significantly affected either way at first. There does
not seem to be any way to even out these effects other than to ena751. See Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1575, 1650 (1979).
752. See text accompanying notes 669-670 supra.
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ble all banks and BHCs to reach nationwide simultaneously, as
seen before. That, however, would be the surest way to maximize
the windfall effects of the legal change to interstate banking; those
effects could at least be mitigated if the policy decision were made
now but became effective at a later date, so that it had a lesser effect on present share values.
The small-start approach to interstate banking is somewhat
more susceptible to gradual introduction. First, de novo banks and.
branches could be established only as the rate of growth in target
markets warranted their introduction. If the Comptroller and the
state chartering authority maintained a constant ratio in a particular
market between the number of banks and the average volume of
deposits per bank, for example, new banks could be opened or allowed to branch in-de novo or by toehold acquisition-without
any diminution in the deposit business of the average incumbent
bank.
The formula just suggested is hardly exhaustive of the possibilities for mitigating the windfall effects of moving to interstate banking under the small-start approach. That approach has an inherently greater capacity to be introduced gradually because it
involves a smaller marginal unit of change, viz. the opening of a
new bank or branch or the change in ownership of a toehold bank.
The change in ownership and management of a larger bank must
be complete and simultaneous throughout the bank and its
branches, regardless of how large a factor it is in the local market.
Compared to the acquisition of a major bank in a given market, the
introduction of a new banking office or new ownership of a toehold
bank is clearly a more discrete intervention in market structure
and investor equities. The cumulative effect on the value of existing bank stocks, therefore, could be introduced through a larger
number of smaller steps-each constituting the opening of a new
banking office or a small acquisition-than is practical under the
acquisition-only approach. Thus, de novo and even toehold entry is
seen to be more susceptible to an equitable transition, and on this
criterion is to be favored.
d. Undue Concentration of Resources.-The acquisition-only
and small-start approaches could not be more clearly divergent in
their effects on the potential for undue concentrations of resources.
By limiting interstate bank expansion to acquisitions, the former
approach exacerbates the problem of undue concentrations, in both
senses of the term, at the regional and national levels. While the
antitrust laws could be left in place to deal with the problem of
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market concentration, the drawbacks of undue asset aggregation
will necessarily arrive sooner if interstate expansion occurs by acquisition rather than de novo or by toehold acquisition. At the
other extreme, de novo entry has the minimum adverse effect on
asset aggregation that is possible, consistent with allowing existing
firms to enter new markets. At the same time, it has a most beneficent effect on market concentration-at least in the structureperformance theory of the industrial organization. 7, 3 At any rate,
local market deconcentration is its inherent characteristic and its
advantage. Accordingly, the undue concentration criterion favors
754
the small-start approach.
3. A Mixed National Strategy.-From this review of the
standard criteria that seem to be affected by the choice between
interstate acquisitions or de novo and toehold entry, neither of the
polar options really seems very attractive. Neither seems likely to
unleash fully all the competition that could potentially be of benefit
to consumers. Yet each seems to have uncertain and perhaps
mixed effects on producers. The acquisition-only strategy is less
susceptible to an equitable phasing in, however, and is surely less
desirable on the criterion of avoiding undue concentrations of resources. This mix of advantages and disadvantages for the two approaches, although perhaps favoring the small-start approach on
the basis of the last two criteria, also suggest alternative blends of
the two, the first of which is here called the "mixed national strategy.
The mixed national strategy would allow banks and BHCs to
enter new markets by either means, acquisition or de novo; the
states could not require that entry be accomplished exclusively by
either one or the other approach. It would also, however, require
that a bank or BHC use the more pro-competitive alternative if
both are available in a particular market. That is, if the market is
not "overbanked" by some objective ratio, such as that of population or deposits to banks, 755 the de novo approach to entry would
753.

See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER4 (2d ed. 1980). See generally Miller, Measures of Monopoly Power and
Concentration: Their Economic Significance, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND
FORAANCE

PRICE POLICY 119 (1955).

754. Neither soundness supervision nor policy guidance are meaningfully implicated in the choice between the acquisition-only and small-start approaches, and
accordingly those criteria are not separately treated in the text.
755. Both of the ratios mentioned in the text are commonly used by regulators
to determine whether a new bank or branch application should be granted. See, e.g.,
In re United Savings Bank, Conway-Application to Establish a Branch Office at 45
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presumptively be favored; it would still, of course, be open to a
bank or BHC to demonstrate that a toehold or indeed a larger acquisition is in fact innocuous or perhaps even more pro-competitive
in the precise circumstances. This showing might have to encompass more than simple market share and concentration ratio data,
however, to succeed.
The mixed national strategy is nothing more dramatic than a
variation on the potential competition theme of current antitrust
law. The only difference is that whereas the potential competition
doctrine operates only to preclude non-toehold acquisitions in concentrated markets, the mixed national strategy's pursuit of the
more pro-competitive alternative could actually operate to favor a
major acquisition in a concentrated market. In the less concentrated and presumably more competitive banking markets, of
course, there would be little reason to be concerned with the effect
of any particular acquisition. Even in some of those markets, however, if a trend toward concentration is apparent, the strategy's
preference for the more pro-competitive form of entry would have
a prophylactic effect for the future. Alternatively, concern with the
competitive vitality of a bank, although it is not actually failing,
may lead to the conclusion that its acquisition would be procompetitive, where the likely result would be to strengthen the
bank with capital or improved management; in these circumstances, de novo entry may be less pro-competitive than entry by
acquisition.
The mixed national strategy departs only modestly from the
acquisition-only and small-start strategies. Because it allows either
means of entry but always favors the alternative that is more procompetitive in the circumstances, it is likely to serve consumer interests better than either of the other, polar approaches. The impact on producers as a whole remains indeterminate, although it is
probably less favorable than the acquisition-only approach. If the
mixed national strategy tends more to foster competitive markets,
consumers and some producers will probably gain more at the expense of other producers. Since the mixed national strategy allows
Federal Street, Greenfield, Mass., Decision of the Commissioner of Banks (July 6,
1979); CSBS PROFILE, supra note 19, at 203 (people per banking office, by state).
Ratios of population or deposits to banks, rather than banking offices should be used
lest the regulatory structure invite strategic branching whereby incumbent banks

keep a market just enough "over-branched" to shield themselves from new entry.
See Baker, supra note 609, at 30-31; E. Kohn & C. Carlo, The Competitive Impact of
New Branches 2 nA (N.Y. Bank Dep't, 1969).
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some acquisitions (i.e. where they would be neutral or procompetitive) without by any means promoting them, however, it
does not increase the risk of fostering any unduly large aggregations of assets; at the same time, it does assure the maximum degree of local market competition-not merely statistical deconcentration-that interstate banking could bring about.
Absent any rigorous means by which to compare the expected
burdens on some producers with the expected benefits to other
producers and to consumers-a felicific calculus-it is not possible
to determine whether the mixed national strategy is "superior" to
the small-start approach, i.e. whether the burdens to some would
outweigh the benefits to others. It is only this observer's estimate
that the mixed national strategy would be superior in this non75 6
Pareto sense.

4. A Mixed Federal Strategy.-Another approach emerging
from this review of the acquisition vs. de novo or toehold entry issue would be to allow the states alone to determine, as they now
do to a large extent, 757 whether the means of entry into their markets will be limited as to method. Banks would have a federal right
to enter every state by one means or the other, that is, but the
states could specify by statute which one. Yet another variation,
closer to the mixed national strategy and to the present mix of state
and federal law affecting bank market structure, would be to require banks to enter new states by the more pro-competitive
means except where the state passes a statute requiring one means
or the other. Since these two approaches are analytically similar, I
will discuss only the latter, more complex, variation. Because of
the role it assigns to the states, I will call it a "mixed federal strategy.
The probable difference in operation between the mixed national and the mixed federal strategies is that under the latter approach some states would probably act to prohibit interstate entry
de novo, while others would probably prohibit entry by acquisition, in each case in order to limit competition below the level im756.

Pareto superiority describes a move that makes at least one person better

off while making no one worse off. So long as one person is made worse off, it is impossible to determine whether his loss of utility is less than or greater than the gain
to others. See Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487, 488-89 (1980). There are few,
if any, proposals for a change in public policy that would meet the test of Pareto superiority.
757. But see note 718 supra.
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plied by the mixed national approach. It is predictable, that is, that
some states will want to protect their home-state banks from some
of the potential competition inherent in interstate banking and
further increased by the mixed national strategy; yet owing to the
different market conditions among them, they will probably disagree on whether requiring entry de novo or requiring entry by acquisition would do more to limit the impact of new competition
and support the market for shares in home-state banks, and on
which course would expose non-acquired banks to even greater
competition.
Whatever a particular state's view, such states will be trying to
trade off some consumer welfare, by limiting the potential for market deconcentration, in order to favor incumbent producers, although they may disagree about the means. This hardly seems like
an unacceptable trade-off for a state to make, however, from the
point of view of the national interest. Control over local-bank market concentration, as we have seen, has long been vested in the
states, and they take quite diverse views of the matter even now.
This would be just another aspect of state control over the
competitiveness of banking markets. If the consumers within any
particular state object to the trade-off being made, moreover, they
could organize themselves politically to prevent it. Admittedly, this
is not easy to do, but it is a possibility that will prevent legislators
from truly oppressing consumers in the intended service of pro758
ducer welfare.
5. Conclusion to Part III.-Of the two polar and two mixed
approaches to the acquisition vs. de novo entry issue examined
here, the mixed national strategy is only probably, and even then
only slightly, to be preferred on the standard criteria to the mixed
federal strategy; either mixed strategy is superior to either of the
polar approaches, however.
758. It is unlikely, for example, that the public would tolerate a state policy
that required out-of-state BHCs not only to enter the state by acquisition, but to expand thereafter only by acquisition while banks controlled by home-state BHCs
were allowed to branch-a disparity that would probably be unconstitutional, in any
event, under Lewis v. BT Investments Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980). At the
same time, if an out-of-state BHC cannot branch into the state, complete equality of
treatment between out-of-state and in-state BHCs would require that both be required to accomplish any further expansion by acquisition only. To terminate the
ability of incumbent BHC subsidiary banks to branch, however, in order to assure
perfect equality with out-of-state BHCs is almost certainly more than the Constitution, or sound public policy, would require. It should be enough that the out-of-state
BHC must acquire its first location by acquisition, so long as it can branch on equal
terms with in-state BHC banks thereafter.
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The mixed national strategy does preclude the enactment of
state laws that would require that entry be made exclusively by
one means or the other, but that does not seem like a significant
intrusion upon the states' historic primacy in the area of banking
market structures under the state-by-state and dual banking systems. Although the states would be required to allow entry de
novo or by acquisition, once having entered the out-of-state bank
would be fully subject to state law respecting market structure.
There is no reason to think that entry would occur at an excessive rate under the mixed national strategy. "Over-banked" markets could still be protected administratively from undue levels of
new entry, as they are now by both the state and national chartering agencies. Indeed, the mixed national strategy has the virtue
that an out-of-state bank could still enter by acquisition a market
that could not support an additional bank. Under the mixed federal
strategy, on the other hand, if a particular state made either entry
by acquisition or de novo unlawful, consumers would be harmed
thereby to the extent that some pro-competitive entries would be
blocked, or perhaps more often transmuted into less procompetitive acquisitions. Although it is therefore a second-best solution, the mixed federal strategy may be the best solution that is
politically acceptable.
At present, few states now categorically limit the means of intrastate geographical market extensions. 759 It is likely, however,
that many more would want to limit the means of interstate entry
to their markets. The consumers whose interests are harmed by
such limitations are neither organized nor influential on issues such
as this, even where they are organized around other, related issues. Furthermore, banks that do plan to expand interstate would
probably support any limitation on out-of-state entry into their
markets, and banks that hope to be acquired would support a limitation on de novo entry. These would probably be the smaller
banks dispersed throughout each state in suburbs and small towns.
They would therefore be numerous and the constituents of many
congressmen and state legislators.
Reciprocally, banks that want to expand interstate would oppose the states' having any right to erect any limitation on the

759.

For example, some states have "home office protection" laws that would

prevent one bank from branching into the headquarters community of another bank
although it would be permissible for that bank to acquire the other and operate it as
a branch. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 105(1) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
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means of entry used. They would prefer to retain the flexibility to
enter as their business judgment dictates and especially the ability
to use the threat of de novo entry in bargaining over the terms of
an acquisition. These would tend to be the larger banks, which are
few in number, and whose home offices are concentrated in the
downtown sections of major cities. They are thus the constituents
of few legislators; indeed many would be distant outlanders with no
present political connections to the states that they would wish to
enter.
From this analysis, the prognosis is that a mixed national strategy would not be politically acceptable enough to become federal
law. Experience under the Douglas Amendment tends to confirm
this view. For twenty-five years the states have had the opportunity to invite out-of-state banks into their markets, either unilaterally or conditioned upon reciprocity. In fact, only three states, two
relatively underdeveloped and one with a declining economy, have
7 0
acted to do so, and in each case with significant qualifications. .
Reciprocal banking bills have recently begun to be introduced in
state legislatures, 7 61 but none has even come close to passing and
only the New York Banking Department's bill and a bill introduced
in the California legislature at the request of Citicorp have even received committee hearings. 7 62 The California bill was opposed by
the California Bankers Association, which views access to the New
York market as an undesirable trade for access to their own
state.763
If the opponents of interstate-banking entry could be that uniformly successful at the state level, there is little reason to doubt
760. The states and the qualifications are respectively Maine, which requires
reciprocity; and South Dakota and Delaware, which have not opened their retail
banking markets to out-of-state BHCs, but merely afforded them a base state from
which to extend consumer credit and minimize their taxes. See notes 434-440 supra
and accompanying text.
761. See, e.g., Ill. H.B. 1072 (Gen. Assem. 1981); Ill. H.B. 2875 (Gen. Assem.
1979-1980); Proposed Amendment to Fla. S.B. 764 (1979). But see Fla. Now Viewed
As Hostile to Out-State Banks, Am. Banker, Mar. 10, 1980, at 2, col. 1.
762. See N.Y. Banking Dep't Legislative Proposal No. 11, 1979; NYS Assembly
Comm. Defeats Bill to Allow Out-of-State BHCs in NYC, Am. Banker, May 24, 1979,
at 1, col. 2; Cal. Ass. Bill No. 1926 (1979); Am. Banker, Nov. 20, 1979, at 1, col. 2
(hearings); Sponsor Drops Calif. Interstate Bill; Battle for Assembly Speakership
Cited, Am. Banker, Jan. 21, 1980, at 2, col. 3 (Citicorp's role). (The current New York
bill is A.B. No. 1452 (Jan. 13, 1981)).
763. See Hearingson A.B. 1926, supra note 441, passim.; Am. Banker, Jan. 21,
1980, supra note 762. The New York Superintendents of Banks have proposed reciprocal interstate banking bills since 1973. STATE BANKING LAw SERv., supra note 3,

at 96.
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that they could persuade their congressional delegations likewise to
insist that the states be allowed to protect home-state banks from
any extra measure of out-of-state competition entering their markets. In some states, that may dictate requiring that entry be de
novo, in others that it be by acquisition. In all such states, however, it will require that the federal law governing and fostering interstate banking allow the states the means to control entry to their
local banking markets.
IV.

STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR INTERSTATE ENTRY

This part of the Article deals with the standards that should be
applied to a bank's application to branch de novo interstate and for
a BHC's application to acquire a bank interstate, as well as the procedures appropriate to each type of application.
A.

Standardsfor Interstate Branching De Novo

It has been proposed herein that both state and national banks
be authorized, subject to application, to open retail branches (1)
within their interstate metropolitan areas, and (2) in any states that
allow entry by branching, i.e., that do not enact legislation to re-

quire that entry be accomplished through a separate bank subsidiary of the BHC. It has also been proposed (3) that state and national banks be authorized to open wholesale branches in major
financial centers to be designated as such for this purpose.
Intrastate (retail) branching by both state and national banks is
everywhere subject to the prior approval of their primary regulator, either the state banking commissioner or the Comptroller. Approval of an intrastate branch typically depends upon (1). the adequacy of the bank's capital; (2) the earnings prospects for the
branch; (3) the public convenience and needs of the community to
be served by it; and (4) the bank's ability to manage the additional
76 4
branch.
Professor Kenneth Scott has convincingly argued that bank
regulators need not be concerned with the "profitability of a particular location," i.e. its earnings prospects. As he pointed out:
A bank simply closes down a branch that does not become profitable; rather than attempting to second-guess the bank's
profitability estimate, the Comptroller [or presumably a state
764. See STATE BANKING LAW SERV., supra note 3, at 94; Scott, In Quest of
Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U. CHI. L.
REv. 235, 281-84 (1975).
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ascertain whether the bank could afcommissioner] could merely
765
ford the cost of an error.
Be that as it may, however, there is surely no reason to apply
more stringent standards to an application for an interstate branch
than are already applied for an intrastate branch. Indeed, the regulator may be at an even greater relative disadvantage, compared to
bank management, in assessing the suitability of a distant, out-ofstate branch location, due to differences in local economies as well
as the difficulty of studying a distant community. This does not imply, however, that a lesser standard should be applied to interstate
branch applications. Indeed, any more liberal standard for interstate branching than intrastate branching could induce banks to
place a relatively greater emphasis on interstate expansion than the
economics, rather than the law, of the subject would warrant.
Interstate wholesale branching into financial centers should
even more clearly be removed from regulatory oversight, so long
as the branching bank is profitable enough that, in Professor Scott's
phrase, it "could afford the cost of an error." 766 Wholesale
markets-meaning those for banking services provided to businesses, such as cash management, commercial loans, and demand
deposit accounts-are already quite competitive and, insofar as
large corporate customers are concerned, are intensely competitive. The introduction of still more competitors with branches in a
particular financial center is not likely to have measurable, adverse
effects on incumbent competitors. Indeed, the small retail-oriented
banks that might conceivably need protection from additional competition will be virtually unaffected by the introduction of wholesale branches to a financial center. Thus, the "convenience and
needs" standard, and any other criterion that might otherwise be
used to temper competition in banking markets, should not be applied to wholesale-branch applications.
765. Scott, supra note 764, at 285. The Comptroller has recently revised his
policy toward the chartering of new national banks in a manner philosophically close
to that espoused by Professor Scott for the consideration of branching applications.
Specifically, the Comptroller's new policy "represents a shift in emphasis from the
appraisal of economic and competitive conditions in the community to be served to
the appraisal of the organizing group and its operating plan.... The shift in emphasis is consistent with the [Comptroller's] view that the convenience and needs of
communities for banking services are best served by a high degree of competition
and.., that qualified persons should have the maximum opportunity to organize and
operate a national bank." 45 Fed. Reg. 68,603 (1980).
766. Scott, supra note 764, at 285.
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Ideally, banking regulators would be able to develop objective
standards upon which banks could rely in making wholesale-branch
decisions without awaiting prior approval. For example, regulators
might relate all of the capital and operating expenses reasonably
projected for a wholesale branch in its first year of operation to the
bank's capital and surplus in order to enable banks to determine
for themselves whether they have the capacity and therefore the
right to open a wholesale branch; thereafter, they might simply be
required to notify the regulator of their intention, as national banks
now do when they are about to share the use of another entity's
ATMs. 7 67 In this way, virtually free entry into and exit from wholesale banking markets could be assured for all banks capable of undertaking the risks of participation in such markets, and only for
such banks. As a result, it is not necessary further to specify procedures for interstate wholesale branching.
B.

Proceduresfor Interstate Retail Branching D.e Novo

Regardless of their merits, the justifications for requiring
banks to secure the prior approval of their primary regulator before
opening a retail branch apply equally in the interstate and intrastate contexts. Whether the bank holds a state or national charter,
therefore, it should not be allowed to branch interstate without the
approval of its primary regulator so long as that approval is required for intrastate branches.
Whether the approval of the host-state banking commissioner
should be required before an out-of-state bank branches into a host
state is a much harder question. The obvious danger is that hoststate commissioners will discriminate against outlanders by withholding their approvals or granting them only with respect to less
desirable locations or less formidable competitors. Such subtler
forms of discrimination would probably defy detection and would
certainly prove a challenge to effective judicial review in an area
noted for judicial deference to administrative discretion. 76 8
On the other hand, if the approval of the host-state banking
commissioner is not required, the host state will lack control over
two important aspects of its own banking market structure. First,
the host state will lack control over the number of banks operating
767. Comptroller of the Currency, News Release (Nov. 3, 1976), quoted in part
in Comptroller of the Currency, Staff Interpretive Letters, No. 188 (May 12, 1981),
reprinted in FED. BANhING L. REP. (Current Binder) (CCH) 85,269, at 77,408.
768. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Scott, supra note 764, at 264-68.
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in its territory. Second, it will not be able to control or direct the
impact of out-of-state banks' locational decisions on host-state
banks. Consider, by way of example, a market with ten unit banks.
The market may be easily able to accommodate the addition of an
eleventh bank, in the form of an interstate retail branch of a distant
money center bank. Certain of the incumbent banks may not be
able to withstand such competition, however, if the out-of-state
branch is located directly across the street from them.
The states lack these controls on market structure to the same
extent, under the dual banking system, when a national bank charter or branch application is sought for a location within the host
state. The Comptroller, as primary regulator, will pass upon the
application and thereby determine whether a new national bank or
branch will open in a given market and at what location within it.
This provides some competitive incentive for state banking commissioners to approve applications. As observed earlier, if they
deny a charter application, there is some probability that the
Comptroller will approve essentially the same application, the only
difference being that the Comptroller rather than the state commissioner will then have jurisdiction over the bank. 7 69 Even so, no
major problems have arisen from this shared control over entry.
In the interstate context, the incentives for regulatory competition are somewhat different, and would be much stronger. If the
approval of a bank's primary regulator alone were required to establish a branch in a host state, that is, there would be no reason
to expect such approval to be withheld out of solicitude for the
host-state banks with which the branch would be in competition.
Indeed, state banking commissioners might allow virtually unlimited out-of-state branching, subject only to the bank's ability to "afford the cost of an error." So, too, with the Comptroller's attitude
toward interstate branches by national banks. Whatever the merits
of regulatory competition between state and national regulators in
the intrastate context, therefore, nothing can be said to redeem the
expected competition between host and home state regulators in
the interstate context: each state would be tempted to approve its
regulatees' forays into other states, while defending their home
markets against the incursions of banks from other states.
769. See text accompanying note 32 supra. A similar, but undoubtedly more attenuated, competitive force may affect a primary regulator's branching decisions as
well, since a bank that is denied important branch applications may convert its charter (state or national) to join a more obliging regulatory system. Cf. text accompanying note 570 supra (charter conversion to obtain regulatory approval of acquisition).
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From this analysis, it seems that the two elements one would
want to see in the procedures for interstate retail branching would
be (1) assurance to host-state regulators that they will not be inundated by the branches of out-of-state banks in their markets; and
(2) assurance to home-state regulators (and the Comptroller) that
their regulatees will not be discriminatorily denied or hampered in
their efforts to enter host-state markets. These two potentially conflicting goals could both be served if a bank applying for interstate
branching authority were required to secure the approval of a regulator, in addition to that of its primary regulator, whose mandate
and vision extend beyond the welfare of the host state or host-state
banks. This could only be a federal regulator; and it must be someone other than the Comptroller, since he or she will be the primary regulator with respect to national banks branching interstate,
and the point here is to require approval from someone who will
balance the interests of the host state with those of the primary
regulatory jurisdiction, whether it is a state or the Comptroller.
The situation is quite analogous to that in which a BHC proposes to acquire a state bank. The BHC is regulated by the Fed,
although its subsidiary banks have the same primary regulator, be
it the Comptroller or a state, that they would have if they were independent of a holding company. A BHC's application to acquire a
bank subsidiary is submitted to the Fed, which solicits the "views
and recommendations" of the bank's primary regulator. If the primary regulator "disapproves the application," the Fed so notifies
the applicant and holds a hearing on the application. The Fed's final decision on the application is to be made on the basis of the
record of such hearing.

770

In that situation, the state's interest in whether a BHC, or a
particular BHC, will control one of its charters is accommodated,
without giving the state the power to decide the matter by itself.
Nor is the decision vested in a regulatory authority that is any way
in competition with the state banking commissioner (or the Comptroller where he is the primary regulator).
A similar reconciliation of interests could be achieved if the
Fed, or FDIC, (or indeed a new agency) were given authority, in
addition to the bank's primary regulator, to approve or disapprove
interstate retail branches. 771 The host-state banking commissioner
770.

12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (Supp. III 1979).

771. As between the two federal agencies, the FDIC may be the preferable
decisionmaker. While it is an interested party in bank solvency, as the bank's insurer, there is no reason to think it will be more (unduly) conservative in approach-
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could have an advisory role in the federal agency's proceedings to
assure that any adverse impact that the interstate branch might
have on the host state's local banking market is weighed in the
decisional balance.
C.

Standardsfor Interstate Bank Acquisitions

Under this proposal for interstate banking, a banking organization may be prohibited from branching directly into a host state
and required, instead, to operate a separate banking subsidiary in
the state if it is to enter at all. Further, the host state may specify
that the entering BHC must acquire an existing bank or,
alternatively, must obtain a de novo charter (state or national) for a
bank located in that state. In either case, there is nothing in the
interstate context to justify departure from the present standards
by which a BHC's application to acquire an existing or de novo
bank is judged. The BHC Act predicates the Fed's approval of an
acquisition application upon its competitive consequences, the financial and managerial resources of the banks involved, and the
public convenience and needs. These factors are equally relevant
regardless of whether the acquiring BHC has its principle banking
subsidiary in the state of application or another state.
Doubtless, the application of these factors in the interstate
context may be somewhat different in practice. For example, the
financial and managerial resources of the BHC may be stretched
more by a long-distance interstate acquisition than by the same acquisition intrastate. Compliance with an additional set of regulations will be required, for example. Communication and
coordination will make greater demands on the management of the
BHC in the interstate context, at least insofar as significant distances are involved. These would require at most relatively minor
variations in the way that the standards of the BHC Act are now
applied, however. The Fed has substantial experience with the
Act's standards, and it should be no great task to apply them in the
interstate context, with such slight adaptation as experience proves
necessary.
D. Proceduresfor Interstate Bank Acquisitions
Since the Fed is responsible for regulation of BHCs generally,
it must have the same power to disapprove an interstate acquisition
ing interstate branch applications then it is in the intrastate context. The Fed, on the
other hand, would have an incentive to discriminate in favor of member banks' interstate applications.
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as it has over an intrastate acquisition. Otherwise, the BHC that
would not be allowed to make an intrastate acquisition due to inadequacy of its capital or management would be able to consummate
an interstate acquisition notwithstanding the same defects.
The more difficult question is whether the approval of the primary regulator of the bank to be acquired should be necessary before the acquisition is permitted. Where the bank to be acquired
holds a national charter and the primary regulator is the Comptroller, there is no reason to fear that approval would discriminatorily
be witheld, i.e., that interstate acquisitions would be disfavored
relative to intrastate acquisitions.
When the bank to be acquired is state chartered, however,
there is at least some possibility that the host-state banking commissioner will discriminate against BHCs that are based in another
state. The commissioner, after all, will know and often be on good
terms with the management of local BHCs, while the management
of an out-of-state BHC may be entirely unfamiliar to him. He may
understandably, therefore, prefer to see local rather than out-ofstate BHCs acquiring independent banks the supervision of which
is his responsibility.
On the other hand, if the approval of a target bank's primary
regulator is not required, at least in the case of a state-bank acquisition, that regulator could find himself responsible for the supervision of a bank the control of which has passed to an out-of-state
BHC to which the regulator has legitimate, nondiscriminatory objections. 772 Under the BHC Act, the banking commissioner will
have been able to present these objections at the Fed's hearing on
the application. Nonetheless, it is at least conceivable that such objections will be overweighed by other considerations within the
Fed's mandate. Fed approval of the acquisition will then result in
the state commissioner having to supervise-as to both soundness
and state policy guidance-a bank whose control has passed to outof-state managers over his objection. State policy guidance especially may be impeded, since it is more dependent upon informal
relationships (backed up by the chit system, to be sure). Insofar as

772. In practice, the Fed does not even consider applications to acquire a

bank-state or apparently national-over the objection of the state banking commissioner where state law requires it. 37 Fed. Reg. 5084 (1972). For an example of
state law purporting to require state approval for a BHC's acquisition of a national
bank, see N.Y. BANKING LAw §§ 141(1), 142 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See also
Note, Foreign Holding Company Acquisition of American Banks: Legislative Restrictions and Regulatory Policy, 17 HARV. J. LEGIs. 555, 589-93 (1980).
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a hostile regulatory relationship then obtains, neither the bank nor
the public will be well served.
In light of this drawback, the approval of the target bank's primary regulator should probably be required before an interstate acquisition can take place. The possibility of a state banking commissioner discriminating against out-of-state acquirors should not be
intolerably great. It is important, however, that when a state commissioner disallows an acquisition by an out-of-state BHC, that
does not preclude conversion to a national charter and postconversion acquisition. 773 If it appears that a state commissioner is
discriminating, moreover, banks seeking to be acquired will convert to national charters before the acquisition application is filed
by the BHC. In this way, state banking commissioners will be "disciplined" by the dual character of the banking system, even in its
interstate manifestation. Regulatory competition can be relied upon
in this context, that is, to minimize the risk of discrimination
against out-of-state interests.
V.

SUMMARY AND SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
ON FEDERALISM IN BANK REGULATION

Part I of this paper described the state-by-state and dual bank
regulatory structures within which the development of de facto interstate banking has arisen. In Part II of the paper, I suggested
and applied a set of criteria by which to determine whether to give
de jure recognition to interstate banking, while Parts III and IV
considered issues of extent and means, standards and procedures,
under the same criteria, to derive ideas about the alternatives and
an articulated proposal.
Throughout the analysis I have attempted to analyze the problems associated with interstate banking, and the legal recognition
thereof, in isolation from other issues to which they could have
been related. Thus, I have taken as given and legitimate such
other elements in the policy environment as regulatory control
over entry into banking, state autonomy over the structure of local
banking markets, and the continued existence of the dual banking
system, to name but a few. Each of these elements could equally
have been drawn into question and therefore into the analysis, but
it seemed wiser to isolate the interstate banking issue in this initial
foray into the subject. As the policy debate on interstate banking
proceeds, as it is sure to do over the next several years, linkage to
773.

See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
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other issues may be appropriate and inevitable; but simplicity is
the order of the day for now, as we build our understanding of the
is.sue and the stakes. Nonetheless, I shall venture a few remarks on
the irrepressible relationship between interstate banking and the
dual banking system.
This paper has shown that a virtually complete system for interstate banking, including nationwide BHCs and limited interstate
branching by banks, can rationally coexist with the dual banking
system. Of course, the proposal made here does imply a shift of
power to the national government, since it entails a federal right
for a bank or BHC to enter a new state subject only to entry regulations imposed equally upon local institutions and outlanders. This
nondiscriminatory entry right is little more, however, than the application of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to the business of banking; it does nothing to divest the states of their
regulatory authority over those banking organizations that avail
themselves of the right to enter their borders. The dual banking
system could, and I think would, persist and thrive under these
conditions.
The more difficult question is what the future portends for
dual banking if there is no such change in federal law to facilitate interstate banking. Extrapolation from developments thus far
leads me to doubt the viability of dual banking without interstate
banking.
I have already described the imaginative means by which
banks and BHCs have contrived to enter out-of-state markets with
both liability and particularly with credit products, and the reasons
to think that this trend will continue. From another point of view,
the interstate market penetration of banks and BHCs can be seen
as a fragmentation of the business of banking. First, because a
"bank" cannot branch or affiliate through a BHC with another bank
across state lines, an incentive has been created to break the idea
of a bank down into its constituent elements, and to devise means
by which to offer the associated products interstate. In this way
virtually all of a bank's services other than deposit-taking can reach
new markets. Second, interstate bank deposit-taking itself may
soon be a reality, too, as the money-market funds have demonstrated the willingness of consumers to maintain balances at distant
institutions accessed by mail, telephone, or wire, and to do so even
without the benefit of deposit insurance. In the absence of bankinterest-rate regulation, the funds will lose their advantage, and
banks will compete for balances at market rates-presumably in a
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nationwide market. Third, shared interstate ATMs, if they are or
become lawful, will enable a bank to give distant retail customers
access to cash withdrawals.
Under these circumstances, the attachment of a particular
bank to its home state will be substantially more attenuated than at
present. This is not to say that banks will become disembodied
ideas representing electronic networks of computers and ATMs
with their seat arbitrarily "located" wherever economic and
regulatory forces suggest that they should call home. But it is not
so far-fetched to suggest at least some movement in that direction,
abetted by a new regulatory competition among the states.
We have already seen Citicorp relocating some of its retail operations in South Dakota, and the Chase Manhattan and Morgan
banks undertaking a similar move to Delaware, in each case
through a new national-bank subsidiary. 774 In return for jobs and
taxes, these jurisdictions have traded local entry rights and powers,
but in each case their real purpose is to serve as a base state for
nationwide retail banking: the national charter enables the banks to
extend credit to residents of other states at their new "home" state
interest rates, and newly provided state laws make these interest
rates unlimited. This development represents a new regulatory
competition among the states that will only increase in the future,
while the opportunity for banks to exploit competition between the
state and federal governments will decrease; indeed at least 34
states have already passed "some form of wild card statutes" to assure "that state banks have any powers which national banks' have
by statute or which the Comptroller says they have," thus at least
limiting state-federal competition in a majority of the states. 775 As
state and federal powers come more and more into congruence in
any one place, however, disparities among places will increasingly
be the focus of the banks' strategic attentions.
If, instead of leaving the states to compete for the transient allegiance of large banks, interstate banking were authorized in some
manner akin to that proposed here, banking organizations would
avail themselves of the opportunity to establish a retail presence in
target markets, so long as such a presence remains a competitive
advantage. In so doing, they would subject themselves to the regu774.

See text accompanying notes 435-440 supra.

775. Bell, State Regulation of Commercial Banks, 26 Bus. LAw. 109, 114
(1970). For a collection of the statutory citations see STATE BANKING LAW SERV., SUpra note 3, at 131-33.
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lation of the host state in dealing with its residents, and in this
manner, the role of state law-both in chartering banks and
regulating their transactions-would be enhanced. Of course,
should the time come when a retail presence is not worth the
regulatory candle, and banks indeed become invisible, if not abstract, respondents at the other end of a telephone or computer
network, then there will be no room for a meaningful regulatory
regime that is not coextensive with the banking enterprises' scope
of operation. This has been the consistent lesson of modern history
as new technologies have assumed a scale that transcends geographic legal regimes. 776 Either bank regulation will become
unenforceable, as banks choose their jurisdiction the way nonbank
corporations choose their chartering state, or it will be centralized
in the national government.
Accordingly, I submit that a move to interstate banking, accomplished through federal law, will strengthen the dual banking
system, whereas rigid retention of the state-by-state regulatory system will encourage artifice and device in the short run and an artificially accelerated shift of banking to new technologies that in the
long run will transcend and confound state regulation, and thus either trivialize or displace altogether the dual banking system.
776.

See, e.g., Clean Air Act, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. III 1979); Kassel v.

Consolidated Freight-ways Corp., 101 S. Ct. 1309 (1981); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona
ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); R. STEvART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW & POLIcY 333-34 (2d ed. 1978).
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